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ABSTRACT 
 
Financial crimes pose a serious threat to the stability and security of the financial system. 
Financial crimes are tackled via many channels, but a significant role is played by 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), which are essentially dependent on the 
advancement of compliance and integrity-based culture that understands the threats, risks, 
and actions needed to decrease criminal interference with legitimate businesses and 
institutions. This thesis examines IFI’s principles, standards and mandates designed to 
reduce the risk of financial crimes in the international financial system. 
 
The prevention regime used by IFIs ranges from employing soft law to a legal framework 
that requires global cooperative measures and implementation of minimum levels of 
transparency.  IFIs also work to compel disclosure to prevent financial crimes, promote 
stability and more importantly to create a culture of integrity rather than a culture of 
compliance.  In order to do so, this thesis carries out an analysis of current policies and 
frameworks adapted by IFIs based on relevant and practical experience. It also evaluates 
governance structure and decision-making processes with a main focus on compliance 
issues and how far these are implemented in practice. 
 
This thesis also examines whether there is a real threat to the stability of the banking 
system, and failures of compliance and enforcement measures through a comparative 
analysis between the American and the British law dealing with financial market regulation 
and financial crime, through finding lacuna within both systems and evaluating the most 
rational solutions to promote stability and implement practical compliance.  
 
As an example of stability and prosperity in the financial system, this thesis examines the 
Islamic banking system and whether it is more resilient to financial crime. In conclusion, 
this thesis analyses the different legal mechanisms and compliance tools within financial 
institutions through sanctions and cross department regimes, and how far IFIs have the 
chance to concretely protect the global financial stability.  At the end, an assessment and 
recommendations will be provided. 
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CHAPTER 1 
  
Introduction 
 
 
This research aims to suggest improvements to currently applied role of 
International Financial Institution (IFIs), mainly the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). As leading international institute, the IMF promotes stability in the 
face of the financial misconduct.  This analysis will include examining the effectiveness of 
their role and suggesting solutions to improve their role in promoting stability and fighting 
financial misconduct. To do this, a comparative analysis research methodology will be 
followed based on U.S and UK’s laws as leading financial regulators. The research is based 
on a literature review of IFIs role in promoting stability and financial crimes regulations in 
U.S and UK as well as a number of scholarly works written about the role of IFIs in 
promoting stability and its functions through surveillance and technical assistance. 
 
A country’s financial system is composed of various parts and players including 
banks, securities markets, pension and mutual funds, insurers, market infrastructures, 
central bank, as well as regulatory and supervisory authorities. Although it is easy to 
identify the components of a financial system, it is not as easy to determine whether the 
financial system is stable or unstable.1 One manner of identifying a stable financial system 
is the lack of excessive unpredictability, stress, or crises.2  However, this definition fails to 
identify the effect on overall economic performance when a financial system is working 
efficiently. As such, a more encompassing definition would be “a condition in  which  the  
financial  system comprising  financial  intermediaries,  markets  and  market  infrastructure 
is capable of withstanding shocks and the unravelling of financial imbalances, thereby 
mitigating the likelihood of disruptions in the financial intermediation process which are 																																																								
1 Blaise Gadanecz and Kaushik Jayaram, Measures of Financial Stability – A Review, IFC Bulletin No. 31, 
265 (2008), available at http://www.bis.org/ifc/publ/ifcb31ab.pdf (noting it is difficult to define and 
measure financial stability); see also Sanderson Abel, Importance of Financial Stability, The Herald, 
http://www.herald.co.zw/importance-of-financial-stability/ (Oct. 14, 2015) (defining financial stability 
when financial intermediaries, markets and market infrastructure facilitate the smooth flow of funds 
between savers and investors and, by doing so, help promote growth in economic activity). 
2 Ibid. 
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severe enough to significantly impair the allocation of savings to profitable investment 
opportunities.”3 Thus, a financial system is stable when it enhances economic performance 
and wealth accumulation while at the same time averting negative disturbances.   
 
The stability of the financial system is critical to efficiently allocating resources, 
assessing and managing financial risks, maintaining employment levels close to the 
economy’s natural rate, and eliminating relative price movements of real or financial assets 
that affect monetary stability or employment levels. This efficient flow of funds and 
resources helps to promote growth in economic activities.4 The various entities composing 
the financial system thus have a responsibility in mitigating risks of financial disruptions 
that may produce consequences and in responding to any such financial disruptions which 
create the justification for this research. 
 
In recent years, financial stability has become a global priority for a number of 
factors. 5  This increased focus is due to the expansion and globalization of financial 
systems, which can have greater consequences on financial instability and economic 
performance. 6  As it can be noted then, financial stability is a “public good” and 
governments and international organizations continuously aim to maintain financial 
stability, given that financial instability may result in adverse effects on the overall 
economy due to inefficiencies that arise. 7  Systematic financial crisis are potentially 
hazardous and could cause serious damage to the financial markets thereby undermining 
the functioning efficiency of the market creating harmful reactions on the economy.8 
																																																								
3 Progress towards a framework for financial stability assessment, Speech by José-Manuel González- 
Páramo, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, OECD World Forum on 
 “Statistics, Knowledge and Policy,”  
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2007/html/sp070628.en.html (June 28, 2007). 
4 Tatjana Jovanic, Governance Arrangements for Financial Stability – with Particular Focus on CEE, Draft  
Paper (June 2014), available at http://reggov2014.ibei.org/bcn-14-papers/31-148.pdf. 
5See Aerdt Houben et al., Toward a Framework for Safeguarding Financial Stability, Int’ Monetary Fund  
WP/01/101, 1 (2004), available athttp://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04101.pdf 
(commenting that periodic financial stability reports have been conducted by various central banks and  
several international financial institutions). 
6 Ibid. 
7  A. Crockett, why is Financial Stability a Goal of Public Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 
Economic Review, Fourth Quarter, 5, 11 (1997). 
8 Ibid. 
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Much of the agenda for financial regulation is driven by international organizations, 
which produce ‘soft law’ instruments that are converted into legislative form in the various 
jurisdictions.9  One example of this is the Basel documents that the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision has published, which do not have a direct effect. The Basel II 
Framework has been transposed into the laws in many countries. Basel III Framework is 
undergoing the same process.10  Financial regulation is therefore essential in aiding and 
maintaining financial stability and soundness. Moreover, the soundness of the banking and 
financial markets depend heavily on the perception that it functions within a framework of 
high legal, professional and ethical standards in order to create confidence in the economy. 
As can be imagined, financial crimes11 can create adverse effects on the financial system, 
both regionally and globally. For this reason, it is essential that the financial system 
continuously work to fight financial crimes. 
 
The focus of this thesis will be to examine the ways that financial crimes and 
corruption affect financial stability and how IFIs should tackle the problems that can be 
caused by these crimes. In practice, economic crime, organized or otherwise, is 
synonymous with white-collar crime.12 The UK’s National Crime Agency (NCA)13 has 
identified the key threats relating to economic crime as fraud, bribery, corruption and 
sanctions evasion, market abuse and insider dealing, money laundering and criminal 
finance, counterfeit currency and cyber-enabled identity crimes. 14 This thesis will 
emphasize that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are leading 
International Financial Institutions that provide financial support and professional advice 																																																								
9  See Research Hand Book on International Financial Crime Edited by Barry Rider “Responsibility and 
   accountability in the financial sector” by Graeme Baber /For a synopsis see Graeme Baber ‘International  
   Financial Regulation: Order or Chaos? [2012] 33(1) Comp Law17. 
10 Ibid. 
11 See IMF, Financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and Money Laundering –  
  Background Paper, (Int’l Monetary Fund, 12 Feb. 2001, 3) (noting that there is no universal definition for  
  financial crime but defining it as “any non-violent crime that generally results in a financial loss”). 
12 ‘White collar crime’ is a term coined by sociologist Professor Edwin Sutherland as ‘crime committed by  
    a person respectability and high social status in course of his occupation’ to describe non-violent crime  
    committed for monetary gain.    
13  National Crime Agency, Economic Crime Command’ http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-         
us/what-we-do/economic-crime accessed June 12, 2016 
14  National Crime Agency, Strategic Assessment of Serious and organized Crime 2014,1 May 2014, p. 21   
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for economic and social development activities and promote international economic 
cooperation and stability. 	
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund  
 
The term international financial institution typically refers to United Nation’s (UN) 
financial arm which consists of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the five 
multilateral development banks (MDBs): The World Bank Group (WB), the African 
Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank 
and the European Bank for reconstruction and development. All but the IMF and WB focus 
on a single region of the world and hence are called regional development banks. The IMF 
and World Bank, in contrast, are specialized and global in their scope and governed 
independently of the UN.  Therefore, my focus in this thesis will be on the World Bank 
and the IMF.15 
 
The World Bank is devoted to analysis and advocacy in the global arena, especially 
with respect to the policies and actions of developed countries on the trade, aid, and debt 
relieve.  Within this purview, importance is given to addressing these global issues and 
reducing poverty. As the only global institution among the MDBs, the WB has increased 
its support for global programs rapidly in recent years, with more than 70 different 
programs addressing many global issues. A major expansion of the WB’s work on global 
issues began in the late 1990s when the Bank increased its orientation toward global 
partnerships and associated program support activities. This change in policy reflected the 
Bank’s recognition of the rapid pace of globalization and the sharply increased attention to 
global policy issues within the development community. Many of these programs featured 
partnerships focused on the delivery of global and regional public goods, including the 
prevention of seed money.  
 
 
																																																								
15 The Role of the International Financial Institutions in addressing Global Issue by Vinay Bhargava.  
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In 2000, the Development Committee endorsed the Bank’s priorities in supporting 
global public goods.  These priorities focused on five areas: public health, protection of the 
globe commons, financial stability, trade, and knowledge.16  The IMF continues to play a 
central role in addressing global issues relating to promoting stability and open global 
economic and financial polices of those countries that, because of their size or critical role 
in the international trade and finance, are important to the health of the global economic 
system. The consultations with industrial countries that the IMF conducts under Article IV 
of its Articles of Agreement are vehicles for promoting appropriate policies, such as 
curbing domestic imbalances that may pose risks for the global economy. The IMF also 
has become increasingly active in multilateral surveillance, highlighting both 
macroeconomic and financial risk as they emerge at the global level. IMF is planning to 
make its surveillance more effective through more incisive analysis of specific weak nesses 
and distortions in the global financial system that raise the risk of crisis or contagion or 
hinder adjustment to globalization. It will also promote international dialogue within the 
international community on multilateral actions necessary to ensure global financial 
stability.17 
 
Despite the concerted efforts by national and international agencies especially the 
WB and the IMF, it is still impossible to accurately calculate the true extent of financial 
crimes that take place on a daily basis around the world. However, it is of the utmost 
importance to focus attention on regulating these crimes given that “criminal proceeds have 
the power to corrupt and ultimately destabilize communities or whole national 
economies.”18 This thesis will argue for the need for greater financial regulation as opposed 
to deregulation, given that the reliability of financial institutions can erode and the overall 
national security can be affected when financial system instability ensues due to financial 
crimes.19 																																																								
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Financial Action Task Force, Report on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Typologies 2003- 
2004 (Financial Action Task Force 2004). 
19 See Financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and Money Laundering – Background Paper, supra note 
46, at 12 (“Weak financial institutions, inadequate regulation and supervision, and lack of transparency 
were at the heart of the financial crises of the late 1990s as well as the recent global financial crisis. The 
recent crisis also highlighted the importance of effective systemic risk monitoring and management.” 
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Financial crimes impact on economic, social and political stability 	
Organized crime is one of the greatest threats to human, national and international 
security throughout the world.20 It is not only a threat to the world, but also a daily reality 
that causes immense harm to individuals, families, and communities,21and is capable of 
undermining governance, fuelling corruption and hindering economic development. 22 
Financial crimes have particularly significant economic and social consequences for 
developing countries, and are more susceptible to disruption. Therefore, financial stability 
is essential for national and international economic growth.  
 
This thesis will argue that further market reform is needed to enhance the fight 
against financial crimes that continue to be on the rise. In recent years, financial market 
reform has mainly focused on the threats to financial stability that arise from legal activities 
in the financial industry characterized by excessive risk taking, distortive incentives, and 
the lack of controls in the overall regulatory financial work.23 Although these issues do 
indeed need to be addressed, the threat to the economic and financial security caused by 
illegal financial activities cannot be ignored and more focus should be placed on them. 
These crimes often can occur more easily due to the lack of regulation and weak 
supervision of the activities of the financial sector especially in development countries with 
fragile financial systems because they are too susceptible from such influence.24  The 
economy, society, and ultimately the security of countries used as money laundering 
platforms are all imperilled.25  The possible social and political costs of financial crimes, 
if left unchecked or dealt with ineffectively, are serious. Financial crime can infiltrate 																																																								
20 Research Handbook/ International Financial Crimes/ Edited by Professor Barry Rider (Organized 
economic crime by Shima D. Keene P. 65 Published by Edwards Elgar 2015.   
21 National Crime Agency, National Strategic Assessment of Serious and organized Crime 201, May 2014, 
p.1. 
22 World Economic forum, Global Agenda Counsel on Organized Crime 2012-2013’ 
http://www.weforum.org/content/g;obal-agenda-coucil-organized-crim-201-2013>accessed 2 June 2014 
23FINANCIAL CRIMES: A THREAT TO GLOBAL SECURITY xvii (ed. Maximillian Edelbacher et al., 2012) 
24 Reference Guide to Anti –Money Laundering and combating the Financial of Terrorism /World Bank II-
1 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAML/Resources/396511 
1146581427871/Reference_Guide_AMLCFT_2ndSupplement.pdf 
25 For a detailed discussion of negative economic effects of money laundering see Brent L. Bartlett 
“Negative Effects of Money Laundering on Economic Development” (an Economic Research Report 
prepared for the Asian Development Bank, June 2002.)  See also John McDowell and Gary Novis,” 
Economic Prospective” United States, State Department (May 2001)  
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financial institutions, acquire control of large sectors of economy through investment, or 
offer bribes to public officials and, indeed government.26  The economic and political 
influence of criminal organizations can weaken the social fabric, collective ethical 
standards, and, ultimately, the democratic institutions of society.27 
 
This criminal influence can undermine countries, undergoing the transition to 
democratic systems. In addition, a reputation for integrity, soundness, honesty, and 
adherence to standards codes is one of the most valued assets by investors, financial 
institutions, and jurisdictions.28 The important link between financial market integrity and 
financial stability is understood in the Basel Core Principles for Effective Supervision and 
the Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Polices, 
particularly those principles and codes that most directly address the prevention 
uncovering, and reporting of financial system abuse, including financial crime, and money 
laundering.29 
 
Therefore, an effective framework for combating financial crimes has important 
benefits, both domestically and internationally, for a county. These benefits include lower 
levels of crime and corruption, enhanced stability of financial institutions and markets, 
positive impact on economic development and reputation in the world community, 
enhanced risk management techniques for the country’s financial institutions, and 
increased market integrity.30Advanced information technologies and networks now offer a 
surplus of benefits and opportunities, but also have developed many challenges.31 
 																																																								
26 Financial Action Task Force Report (www.fatf-gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering). 
27 Ibid. 
28 IMF “Financial System Abuse” Financial Crime and Money Laundering Background Paper February 12,  
    2001”  
29 These would include the Basel Coe Principles 14,15,18,19 and 21. The guidelines on central bank  
    internal governance and audit on the conduct of public officials, and on accountability and assurances of  
    integrity by financial institutions contained in the Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary  
    and Financial Polices. More generally, see Experience with Basel Core Principles Assessments  
    (SM/00/77, April 12, 2000), for a discussion of the motivation and experience with Basel Core Principles  
    Assessment (BCPA).  
30  Ibid. 
31  Nicholas Ryder et al., The Law of Financial Crimes in the Global Economic Crises. p.75 (Edward  
     Edger 2014)       
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Financial crimes have become one of these challenges. Financial crimes severely 
weaken the integrity and stability of financial institutions and systems, discourage 
investment into productive sectors, and distort international capital flows.32 Transnational 
crimes cross boundaries and borders and take on different forms such as; money 
laundering, financing terrorism, fraud, corruption, and cybercrime. International financial 
institutions have had to shift their roles in order to help the international community step 
up and combat these challenges. 
 
International Financial Institutions, primarily the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, play a critical role in protecting the integrity of the global financial system 
from abuse resulting from financial crimes.33 A particular focus has challenged money 
laundering and terrorist funding because it has been argued that these are at the “heart of 
virtually all criminal activity within and across borders”.34 
 
This thesis will discuss the major financial crimes that have emerged and the way 
the IMF and World Bank have had to tackle new obstacles because of the proliferation of 
global financial crimes. The thesis will argue that the IMF and World Bank are the agencies 
to turn to in order to combat financial crimes due to their resources and capabilities, and 
will also discuss the tools that the IMF and World Bank can utilize in a different way and 
others that can be expanded on or bettered in order to achieve these aims. 
 
Financial crimes are becoming transnational. 35  The globalization of financial 
crimes affects millions of people,36 causes tremendous losses of money,37 and empowers 																																																								
32 Financial Crime Risk & Policy Group. International Chamber of Commerce,  
http://www.iccwbo.org/About- 
ICC/Policy-Commissions/Banking/Task-forces/Financial-Crime-Risk-Policy. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Neil Boister, An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 
36 See Editorial, Libor's Trillion-Dollar Question, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-27/libor-s-trillion-dollar-question.html (detailing the Libor rate 
price fixing fraud and finding that the Libor rate affects virtually all financing agreement from credit cards 
to auto finance to mortgages). 
37 See Ibid. (“If, for example, underreporting caused Libor to be artificially depressed by 0.1 percentage 
 point for only a few months, payments on more than $300 trillion in mortgages, corporate bonds and 
derivatives tied to the benchmark might have fallen short by about $75 billion or so. If the problem lasted a 
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rogue leaders to steal national wealth.38 Recent admissions, settlements and investigations 
have exposed widespread global racketeering and fraud by large global corporations 
resembling organized crime more than banking.39  
 
Moreover, terrorist acts have continued to grow, demonstrating the various 
financial tools being used to fund such operations.40  The stability of the financial system 
is critical in order to efficiently allocate resources, assess and manage financial risks, 
maintain employment levels close to the economy’s natural rate, and eliminate relative 
price movements of real or financial assets that will affect monetary stability or 
employment levels. This efficient flow of funds and resources helps to promote growth in 
economic activities.41 The various entities composing the financial system thus have a 
responsibility to mitigate risks of financial disruptions that may produce consequences and 
in responding to any such financial disruptions.   
 
																																																								
few years, the shortfall could be close to $1 trillion”), The Current State of Cyber Crime 2013: An Insider 
Look at the Changing Threat Landscape; (EMC, White Paper 2013), available 
athttp://www.emc.com/collateral/fraud-report/current-state-cybercrime-2013.pdf (noting that cybercrimes 
have cause upwards of $7.5 billion in losses). 
38 Joe Palazzolo, Tunisia Hires Ace to Track Down Ben Ali's Assets, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Oct. 24, 2011), 
http:// blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/10/24/tunisia-hires-ace-to-track-down-ben-alis-assets (commenting that 
former Tunisian President and his family stole from the nation and retelling the efforts to recover the 
assets); How Did Egypt Become So Corrupt? Al Jazeera (Feb. 8, 2011), http:// 
www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2011/02/201128111236245847.html (remarking on the 
extensive corruption in Egypt); Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Speech 
at the Twenty Sixth National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 8, 2011), available at 
http:// www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-111108.html (discussing the origins of the 
“Arab Spring” to a young Tunisian who was the victim of local corruption). 
39 Ellen Rosen, Municipal Bonds, UPS, JPMorgan, Student Loans: Compliance, BLOOMBERG (July 23, 
2012), http:// www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-23/municipal-bonds-ups-jpmorgan-student-loans-
compliance.html (explaining illicit activity at thirteen major banks, including Bank of America, JPMorgan 
Chase & Co. and UBS AG); Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Regulator Says British Bank Helped Iran Hide 
Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2012,  available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/07/business/standard-
chartered-bank-accused-of-hiding-transactions-with-iranians.html?r=1&hp (“In June, the Justice 
Department and the New York County district attorney's office reached a $619 million settlement with ING 
Bank over accusations that it had illegally moved billions of dollars into the United States for sanctioned 
Cuban and Iranian entities.”). 
40 Shima Baradaran et. al., Funding Terror, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 488 (2014) (conveying the financial 
tools terrorist organizations are known to use to fund their activities). 
41 Tatjana Jovanic, Governance Arrangements for Financial Stability – with Particular Focus on CEE, Draft 
Paper (June 2014), available at http://reggov2014.ibei.org/bcn-14-papers/31-148.pdf. 
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In recent years, financial stability has become a global priority due to a number of 
factors.42 This focus has come about  due to the expansion and globalization of financial 
systems, which can have greater consequences than financial instability on economic 
performance. 43  As it can be noted then, financial stability is a “public good” and 
governments and international organizations continuously aim to maintain financial 
stability, given that financial instability may result in adverse effects on the overall 
economy due to inefficiencies that arise.44  
 
Systematic financial crisis are potentially hazardous and could cause serious 
damage to the financial markets thereby undermining the functioning efficiency of the 
market creating harmful reactions on the economy.45  Financial regulation is therefore 
essential in aiding and maintaining financial stability and soundness. Moreover, the 
soundness of the banking and financial markets depend heavily on the perception that it 
functions within a framework of high legal, professional and ethical standards in order to 
create confidence in the economy. As can be imagined, financial crimes46 can create 
adverse effects on the financial system, both regionally and globally. For this reason, it is 
essential that the financial system continuously work to fight financial crimes 
 
This thesis divides itself into nine (9) chapters. This Chapter consists of an 
introduction, research methodology, review of the literature and accordingly establishes 
the justification for this research.  
 
 
																																																								
42 Aerdt Houben et al., Toward a Framework for Safeguarding Financial Stability, Int’ Monetary Fund 
WP/01/101, 1 (2004), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04101.pdf (commenting 
that periodic financial stability reports have been conducted by various central banks and several 
international financial institutions). 
43 Ibid. 
44 A. Crockett, why is Financial Stability a Goal of Public Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 
 Economic Review, Fourth Quarter, 5, 11 (1997). 
45 Ibid. 
46 See International Monetary Fund, Financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and Money Laundering – 
Background Paper, (Int’l Monetary Fund, 12 Feb. 2001, 3) (noting that there is no universal definition for 
financial crime but defining it as “any non-violent crime that generally results in a financial loss”). 
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Chapter 2 elucidates insider dealing and how the World Bank and IMF have tackled 
them in order to promote stability. Recently, there has been a great deal of coverage on 
financial scandals from all over the world, especially highlighting the crime of insider 
trading, as it is known in the United States or insider dealing as it is known in other 
countries.47  While there is no single definition of insider dealing, it generally refers to the 
buying or selling of a publicly traded company’s stock based on material, non-public 
information about a particular company.48Although some may consider that insider dealing 
has no real harm or victims, the vast majority find that the market is the main victim of the 
offences.49 More so, many find regulation of the market when it comes to insider dealing 
is counterintuitive given that it hinders competition. However, several problems arise when 
insiders are left to their own.  
 
When insider dealing surfaces, as it has in recent years, market confidence 
plummets, raising capital is made more problematic, market efficiency is significantly 
impacted, and market investors at home and internationally find unfairness and the 
reputation of the market can diminish.  Fraud and insider dealing is often the result of poor 
asset quality. When there is a lack of proper incentive to act prudently or supervise 
correctly, then moral hazards can worsen. This can lead to people who may then be guided 
by objectives that are not compatible with sound financial practices and be shielded from 
external discipline. Flaws in the legal framework complicate the problems of lax 
management and weak corporate governance. Once credit quality has been compromised, 
																																																								
47 Jeremy Hodges, Biggest Insider-Trading Case in U.K. Started With 'Stag Party’, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 29, 
2016 (commenting on the U.K.’s largest insider trading trial); Sam Gustin, ‘Guilty’ Verdict in Biggest U.S. 
Insider Trading Case, TIME, Feb. 6, 2014 (describing that Mathew Martoma, the former hedge fund trader 
charged with what federal prosecutors called the most lucrative insider trading scheme in U.S. history); 
Jane Croft & Brooke Masters, Ex- Cazenove Partner Guilty on Five Counts of Insider Dealing, Fin. Times, 
Mar. 11, 2010, at 16 (reporting on an insider trading conviction in London); Tom Mitchell, Du Trial is 
Evidence of How Watchdog is Showing More Bite, Fin. Times, Sept. 11, 2009, at 14 (detailing insider 
dealing prosecution in Hong Kong); Andrew England & Abeer Allam, First Insider Trader is Jailed in 
Saudi, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2009, at 19 (describing the first insider trading criminal prosecution in Saudi 
Arabia). 
48 Robert E. Wagner, Gordon Gekko to the Rescue? Insider Trading as A Tool to Combat Accounting 
Fraud, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 973, 974 (2011). 
49 Tomasic Canberra, Casino Capitalism? Insider Trading in Australia (1991) (quoting those who feel no 
harm is done from insider dealing considering that "there is a willing seller who would have sold anyway. 
It is caveat emptor in the marketplace". Another was that it is "a swings and roundabouts situation. There is 
some damage in blatant cases such as in pre-takeovers”). 
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regulatory shortcomings and supervisory forbearance can aggravate matters  by  failing  to 
identify problems and preventing them from being addressed in a comprehensive and 
timely fashion. All of these matters lead to instability when the responsibility begins to fall 
solely on regulators and supervisors who may not have the capacity to handle the fraud and 
insider dealing happenings. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the financial institutions’ role in fighting money laundering 
and terrorist funding as a major threat to the financial stability.  Money laundering is “the 
process by which one conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of 
income, and then disguises that income to make it appear legitimate.”50 Although it is hard 
to come up with a concrete number, it is estimated that that between $590 billion and $1.5 
trillion is laundered globally every year, making up 2-5% of the world’s GDP.51  In 
“cleaning” the funds, money launders are able to make their proceeds appear to be 
legitimate and have it flow through society without raising suspicion, having it be 
confiscated and continue their crimes without fear of prosecution for the act.52  Given the 
fact that money laundering can be extremely profitable, it has become essential for 
organized crime and terrorist alike 53 Early anti-money laundering efforts were 
predominately focused on averting illegal drug trafficking from benefiting from their 
																																																								
50 President's Commission on Organized Crime, Interim Report to the President and Attorney General, The 
Cash Connection: Organized Crime, Financial Institutions, and Money Laundering 7 (1984) 
[hereinafter Interim Report]. 
51 Financial Action Task Force, Frequently Asked Questions, available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/faq/moneylaundering [hereinafter FATF FAQ]; see also The IMF and the Fight Against 
Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, IMF (Sept. 30, 2013), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/aml.htm. But seeid. (remarking that it is impossible to provide a 
definitive estimate of the amount laundered given the nature of the act itself).  
52 Scott Sultzer, Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and Attempts to Combat It, 63 TENN. L. 
REV. 143, 148 (1995). 
53 Ronald K. Noble & Court E. Golumbic, A New Anti-Crime Framework for the World: Merging the 
Objective and Subjective Models for Fighting Money Laundering, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 79, 84-85 
(1998) (describing the importance of money laundering to organized crime activities ); see also Michael D. 
Hoffer, Note, A Fistful of Dollars: “Operation Casablanca” and the Impact of Extraterritorial Enforcement 
of United States Money Laundering Law, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 293, 294 (2000) (observing that 
criminal enterprises would only be able to operate at a “small fraction of current levels” without the use of 
effective money laundering). 
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proceeds.54 While those initial aims are still important, anti-money laundering efforts now 
have turned their focus to terrorist financing.55   
 
 
Since 9/11, anti-money laundering measures have been the focus for combating 
terrorist financing. 56   Terrorist financing is the means by which terrorists utilize the 
financial system to fund their illegal activities.57  The process of money laundering is 
essential to terrorist avoiding detection.58  However, terrorist financing has often been 
referred to as reverse money laundering given that that it often dirties clean money, but it 
can also clean dirty money when it launders from criminal or illicit activity.59  
 
Both organized crime and terrorist financing use money laundering in similar ways 
and for similar objectives.60  Both groups require substantial amounts of money to go 
undetected.61 However, terrorist also need to conceal the use of the funds in order to carry 
out their activities.62  Consequently, although the aims may be similar, terrorist financing 
may not always be carried out in the same manner as traditional money laundering.63  Dirty 
money has a tendency to flow to countries with less stringent controls. The international 
laundering of money and terrorist financing has the capacity to cause substantial costs on 
																																																								
54 Guy Stessens, Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement Model (2000) (examining the 
U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, entered into force 
on Nov. 11, 1990). 
55 Paul Allan Schott, Reference Guide to Anti-money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism (2004) (commenting on the scope of money laundering expanding to terrorist financing). 
56 Shima Baradaran et. al., Funding Terror, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 490 (2014). 
57 Navin Beekarry, The International Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism   
    Regulatory Strategy: A Critical Analysis of Compliance Determinants in International Law, 31 NW. J.  
     INT'L  
L. & BUS. 137, 153 (2011). 
58 Shima Baradaran et. al., Funding Terror, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 488 (2014). 
59 Paul Fagyal, The Anti-Money Laundering Provisions of the Patriot Act: Should They Be Allowed to 
Sunset? 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1361, 1363 (2006) (explaining that money laundering for terrorist financing 
has been viewed as “reverse money laundering” when the money is obtained from a legitimate sources such 
as charity donations and then laundered for illegal purposes). 
60 See FATF, Terrorist Financing 34 (2008) (observing the similar needs of money laundering and 
financing terrorism to “mask financial resources and activities from the scrutiny of state authorities”). 
61 Michael Martuscello, The Fatf's Nine Special Recommendations: A Too "Soft" Approach to Combating 
Terrorism? 14 TOURO INT'L L. REV. 363, 364 (2011). 
62 Ibid., at 370. 
63 Ibid. 
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the world economy in various ways. The harms that can occur include (a) damaging the 
effective operations of the national economies and by promoting poorer economic policies, 
especially in some countries; (b) slowly corrupting the financial market and reducing the 
public's confidence in the international financial system, thus increasing risks and the 
instability of that system; and, (c) as a consequence of (a) and (b), reducing the rate of 
growth of the world economy. 
Due diligence requirements to “know your customer”, the monitoring of financial 
records as well as the other regulatory actions implemented by countries have shown to 
raise awareness of the possibility of terrorist financing.64  However, it is debatable to what 
extent these measures are benefiting the combat of money laundering and terrorist 
financing.65 It is clear that these crimes have not diminished, and the affects they have on 
financial stability cannot be ignored given the disruption in confidence and efficiency in 
the market. In practice, countries’ counterterrorist initiatives developed from anti-money 
laundering hinders their effectiveness.66 These efforts are more focused on traditional 
money laundering, not addressing the nuances involved in terrorist financing.  What occurs 
is that these countries simply apply their anti-money laundering tools and relabelled them 
to combat terrorist financings. Though there are similarities between money laundering and 
terrorist financing as discussed above, the differences must be addressed in order for a 
system to be effective, for the state to truly be able to combat terrorist acts, and for the 
system to be fair to all those regulated. Additionally, more information is needed to even 
make anti-money laundering efforts more effective because these crimes continue to occur 
and on the same or greater scale. 
 
Chapter 4 dissects cyber financial crimes as a serious threat to the financial stability; 
since most significant financial crime are taking place in the internet and digital sectors 
have become more sophisticated and thus, so have cybercrimes.67 Cyber criminals grow as 
																																																								
64 Richard Barrett, Preventing the Financing of Terrorism, 44 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 719, 721 (2012). 
65 Donohue, supra note 476, at 390 (commenting that neither the United States nor United Kingdom has 
been successful in thwarting terrorist operations). 
66 Ibid. 
67 Michael Cohn, Financial Crimes Increasingly Become Cybercrimes, Accounting Today, (Mar. 4, 2013) 
available at http://www.accountingtoday.com/debits_credits/Financial-Crimes-Increasingly-Become-
Cybercrimes-65942-1.html. 
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the sophistication increases, advancing their skills and methods. As the trend of 
cybercrimes continues to grow, 68  financial crimes are increasingly turning into 
cybercrimes.69 Both organizations and individuals alike are put at risk for fraud as the 
convergence between the two crimes increases.70   
 
The global nature of cyber financial crimes adds to the growing concern.71   
When the internet was first developed, its purpose was to facilitate the sharing of data, 
research and statistics between the United States and Europe.72  Now, the internet controls 
a large portion of peoples’ lives all over the world.73  The growth of internet usage thus has 
contributed significantly to the burgeoning of cybercrime and fraudulent activity.74  In the 
United States, it has been estimated that the cost of cybercrime is as much as $100 billion 
dollars per year,75 while in the United Kingdom, estimates have been found at £27 billion 
per year.76  However, experts have difficulty calculating the exact amount of damages 
caused by cyber financial crimes due to: (1) the lack of a concise definition of cybercrime;77 
(2) the reluctance of companies to report incidents due to fear of losing consumer 
																																																								
68 See 2014 Global Economic Crime Survey 28 (PwC 2014) [hereinafter ECONOMIC CRIME SURVEY] 
available at http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/economic-crime-survey/index.jhtml. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Paul Henninger, Cyber Crime and Financial Crime: The Two Become One, Nov. 15, 2013 Wired 
Innovation Insights Blog available at http://insights.wired.com/profiles/blogs/cyber-crime-and-financial-
crime-the-two-become-one#axzz37vUNNjaI. 
71 Vikram Bhat & Lincy Francis Therattii, Transforming Cybersecurity: New Approaches for an Evolving 
Threat Landscape 1 (Deloitte 2014) available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/FSI/us_fsi_Transformingcybersecurity_021114.pdf(noting that 
cyber risk is now the world’s third corporate risk priority overall in 2013).  
72 Phil Butler, Cyber Crime, Financial Fraud and Money Laundering: Understand the new threat Landscape 
1, (Thomas Reuter Accelus 2013) available at http://acceluscdn.thomsonreuters.com/accelus-
pdf/GRC00331-Cybercrime-Phil-Butler.pdf. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Siobhan Gorman, Annual U.S. Cybercrime Costs Estimated at $100 Billion, Wall S. J., July 22, 2013 
available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324328904578621880966242990 
76 Butler, supra note 575, at 1. 
77 Compare Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 479, 499 
(D. Md. 2005) (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 2701 is directed against unauthorized users gaining access to 
protected computers rather than against authorized users gaining access for larcenous acts), with Int'l 
Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[18 U.S.C. § 1030] is concerned with 
attacks by virus and worm writers ... from the outside, and attacks by disgruntled programmers.”). 
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confidence;78 (3) the dual system of prosecution;79 and (4) the trouble of actual detection. 
Nevertheless, the common unique feature of cybercrimes is that they “are committed across 
cyber space and do not stop at the conventional state-borders. These crimes can  be 
perpetrated from anywhere and against any computer user in the world.”80 Cyber criminals 
often seek personal and financial data for fraudulent objectives.81  Thus, cybercrimes has 
become an integral part of any discussion on fraud.82   
 
The problem arises that many cyber criminals, who are located all over the world, 
are undeterred by the prospect of arrest or prosecution.83 Cyber criminals are difficult to 
detect and pose one of the greatest threats to the financial health of businesses, to the 
consumer confidence, and to nations’ security.84  Studies have also shown that the financial 
sector is the most attractive target to cyber criminals.85 Large scale data breaches enable 
cyber criminals to access a great deal of information, and the proceeds of the act often are 
used to fund fraudulent activity such as terrorism and drug trafficking.86 Businesses and 
entities at various levels have the need to create and maintain an online presence in order 
																																																								
78 Chris J. Hoofnagle, Identity Theft: Making the Known Unknowns Known, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 97, 
107 (2007) (arguing statistics on cybercrime are unconvincing due to victim reluctance on reporting); Bob 
Tedeschi, E-Commerce Report; Crime is Soaring in Cyberspace, but Many Companies Keep it Quiet, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/27/business/e-commerce-report-crime-
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as “fear of attracting other cyberattacks” and ““inviting the ridicule of their competitors” as reasons 
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79 See Joseph M. Olivenbaum, Ctrl-Alt-Delete: Rethinking Federal Computer Crime Legislation, 27 Seton 
Hall L. REV. 574, 575 n.4 (1997) (arguing the dual system creates doubt in the cybercrime statistics). 
80 Communication from the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, creating a 
Safer Information Society by Improving the Security of Information Infrastructures and Combating 
Computer-Related Crime 9 (2000), available at http:// 
europa.eu.int/ISPO/eif/InternetPoliciesSite/Crime/CrimeCommEN.html [hereinafter Creating a Safer 
Information Society].  
81 Mike McGuire & Samantha Dowling, Cyber Crime. A Review of the Evidence Research Report 5 (2013) 
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-crime-a-review-of-the-evidence. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Marc D. Goodman and Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct in 
Cyberspace, 2002 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 3 (2002). 
84 Ibid. 
85 See Economic Crime Survey, supra note 572, at 30 (finding that forty-five percent of financial services 
organization affected by fraud were also victims of cybercrime, which is three times as much as all other 
industries).  
86 See generally Kimberly Kiefer Peretti, Data Breaches: What the Underground World of "Carding" 
Reveals, 25 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 375 (2009) (discussing the connection between cyber 
financial crimes and other criminal activity). 
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to be successful in today’s world. 87  Early on, the financial sector in particular took 
advantage of information and communication technology so that they could prepare the 
ground for borderless, around the clock global trading and offering of services. 88 
Consequently, cyber financial crimes have become the world’s third corporate-risk priority 
overall.89 Financial services are the main targets for cyber criminals, and often fall victim 
to large data breaches which compromises personal financial information, such as credit or 
debit card account information, rather than other types of personally identifiable 
information, such as Social Security numbers.90   
 
Although developing an international standard for addressing cybercrimes is 
difficult, considering the global nature of the threat to financial wellbeing of countries 
along with the national security issues leads to the idea that an attempt is needed.  Measures 
aimed at targeting criminal proceeds and the prevention and control of fraud have not been 
sufficiently addressed in measures combating cybercrimes.91Connections between identity 
theft and terrorism have been established already.92Additionally, drug traffickers have also 
been known to engage in identity theft to finance their activities.93  Criminals have found 
countless ways to exploit vulnerabilities and take advantage of financial institutions, 
businesses, and individuals in order to commit further crimes. 94 Therefore, stronger 
measures addressing these connections are needed to ensure prevention, detection and 
deterrence. 
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91 Ibid  
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Chapter 5 continues the analysis of banking compliance as a tool to promote stability and 
financial crime prevention.  While regulatory agencies continue to issue new rules as a 
means to maintain safe and efficient markets, financial institutions are under fire in order 
to ensure compliance.95  Compliance programs in the financial industry are under pressure 
to revamp compliance programs to meet the demands of federal, state and even 
international regulators. 96 An emphasis on compliance departments to become more 
involved in the businesses they work with has developed as a means to eliminate regulatory 
violations and to avoid fines, or reduce them in the event of an offence.97  Regulators 
understand that financial crime rates are increasing98 and that the role of compliance and 
control must evolve from simply observing the laws to a much more integrated approach 
to address the situation. Financial institutions understand the need to certify adherence with 
the relevant rules and regulations in order to grow, merge, and prosper.99 
 
One important and positive aspect of compliance is that international organizations 
help in establishing the principles of compliance. However, this is not without problems as 
many of these principles fail to rise to the level of binding law and thus are not considered 
legal requirements, rather they are guidelines to a national governments compliance 
program.100  Furthermore, there are no international treaties established to create binding 
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agreements between countries who participate in these international principles. 101  
Compliance principles established by international organizations such as the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (“BCBS”), which is “hosted” by the BIS,102  have no 
real effect. Rather Basel law and other compliance principal exist primarily to guide 
national implementation. The form of national implementation--whether by statue, 
regulation, guidelines or whatever--is left to national discretion.103 
 
This can be clearly problematic in spill over situations. While some countries may 
implement compliance standards in the most effective way possible to suit their needs, 
other countries may not. Thus when financial crimes begin to wreak havoc in the system, 
a spill over may occur, resulting in negative effects throughout the international 
community. Although agencies and institutions continue to produce regulations and 
emphasize compliance, the financial system is suffering from a lack of adherence to these 
rules, jeopardizing the stability of the global market.  Recent scandals over the years 
demonstrate that there is a deficiency in ethical behaviour and lack of compliance in the 
culture of the financial sector. Policy makers around the world need to rethink the goals of 
regulation, including the means and purpose behind the regulations.  Resolution of the 
issues that continue to appear requires the establishment of a common standard of what 
constitutes responsibility and simultaneous clarification of requisite accountability 
structures. Improved global integration allows for financial institutions to better manage 
risks on a global basis.  The world is not functioning on national levels and compliance and 
oversight must address this otherwise instability can overspill into the global market. 
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Chapter 6 of this thesis will examine Islamic financial institutions and their possible 
role in promoting stability. Islamic banking is present today in over 55 countries around 
the world. Despite this consistent growth, many supervisory authorities and finance 
practitioners remain unacquainted with the operations of the Islamic banking especially in 
the U.S.  This thesis will provide an overview of the Islamic finance industry, describe the 
products and services offered, as well as the legal framework behind Islamic banking. 
Furthermore, this chapter will discuss the legal and regulatory challenges to promote the 
development of Islamic banking since “there is no financial system isolated and there are 
few players in the financial world that retain the privilege of an entirely domestic business 
environment and thus not exposed to the risks of legal systems and their courts.”104   
 
This concept demonstrates the importance of using resources efficiently “in order 
to bring about the most superior outcome, and that human beings should achieve God’s 
aim and facilitate the dissemination of good fortune and earth as well as the hereafter.”105 
This model tremendously affects wealth ownership and its generation and it motivates 
every Muslim to get involved in economic activity and to enhance their confidence with 
the goal accomplishment.106 This basis has become the argument for the reasons why 
Islamic banking should replace conventional banking. The aspect of Islamic banking most 
emphasized in this thesis is the prohibition of interest (Riba) and zakat.  Interest, according 
to Islamic economist is a theoretical concept that does not produce real growth of capital.107  
It has been interpreted as a form of exploitation and injustice and thus is contrary to Islamic 
principles of fairness and property rights.108 Zakat is third of the five pillars of Islam, the 
word means “purity” and “cleanliness” and the notion is that one purifies their wealth as 
well as one’s heart by giving away a portion of their wealth to the poor.109 Zakat generally 
means that 2.5% of the wealthy individual’s wealth is distributed to the poor every year.  
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Although Islamic banks are covered by the same laws as conventional banks when 
they are outside of Islamic countries, and not treated distinctly, the Shari’a compliance and 
Islamic banking raises several issues regarding compliance risk and money laundering in 
particular. Terrorist financing quickly became linked to the Islamic financial system given 
that many charitable organizations were found to be utilizing reverse money laundering, 
using clean money to finance criminal activity or terrorism.110 This creates a difficult 
situation given compliance departments and monitoring software is attempting to follow 
the cash flow from its criminal activity, such as drug trafficking, as it is “washed” and 
aimed for legitimate uses in the traditional sense of money laundering.111 This method used 
by terrorist throws a loop in the system since perfectly legitimate money is used and then 
wired or transferred to terrorists.112 Hence, the use of financial crimes in Islamic banking 
can be even more difficult to detect and combat.  Finally,	this	chapter	will	turn	to	means	of	combating	financial	crimes	in	the	Islamic	financial	system	and	promoting	financial	stability.		
 
Chapter 7 examines corruption and stolen asset recovery and the role for the IFIs 
in promoting stability. Professor Barry A.K. Rider writes, “The nature of corruption is more 
insidious than many other forms of economic crime.”113  International law has turned its 
focus to corruption and the recovery of stolen assets.114 Although corruption is found in 
countries all over the world, developing countries and those in transition are the ones that 
are most affected by the harms of corruption.115  Corruption is considered to be the abuse 
of power for personal gain. A more frequently used definition of corruption “is the abuse 
of public office for private gain.”116 In the words of the World Bank’s General Counsel, 																																																								
110 Stefan D. Cassella, Reverse Money Laundering, 7 J. Money Laundering Control 92, 92 (2003). 
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113 Barry A.K. Rider, Corruption: The Enemy Within, p. 3. (Kluwer law International 1997) 
114 Jean-Pierre Brun et, al. Public Wrongs, Private Actions: Civil Lawsuits to recover stolen assets (Stolen 
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115 Larissa Gray et., Few and Far: The Hard Facts on Stolen Asset Recovery 1 (Stolen Asset Recovery 
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affects the quality and accessibility of public services and infrastructure, erodes public confidence in 
government, reduces private sector development and weakens the rule of law). 
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Ibrahim Shihata, “Corruption occurs when a function, whether official or private, requires 
the allocation of benefits or the provision of a good or service. In all cases, a position of 
trust is being exploited to realize private gains beyond what the position holder is entitled 
to. Attempts to influence the position holder, through the payment of bribes or an exchange 
of benefits or favors, in order to receive a special gain or treatment not available to others 
is also a form of corruption, even if the gain involved is not illicit under applicable law. 
The absence of rules facilitates the process as much as the presence of cumbersome or 
excessive rules does. Corruption in this sense is not confined to the public sector and, in 
that sector, to administrative bureaucracies. It is not limited to the payment and receipt of 
bribes. It takes various forms and is practiced under all forms of government, including 
well-established democracies. It can be found in the legislative, judicial, and executive 
branches of government, as well as in all forms of private sector activities. It is not 
exclusively associated with any ethnic, racial, or religious group. However, its level, scope, 
and impact vary greatly from one country to another and may also vary, at least for a while, 
within the same country from one place to another. While corruption of some form or 
another may inhere in every human community, the system of governance has a great 
impact on its level and scope of practice. Systems can corrupt people as much as, if not 
more than, people are capable of corrupting systems”. When perpetrated by public officials, 
these abuses are considered public wrongs.117 Scholars from all over consider corruption 
to be a universal phenomenon.118 As can be imagined, corruption has been found to cause 
a number of negative impacts in the world.119 Although it seems virtually impossible to rid 
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the world of corruption, the international community has formally condemned it and 
continues to make efforts in order to suppress and deter it.120  
 
While the definition stated above is generally accepted, corruption can be an 
eluding word and difficult to define due to the fact its meaning derives primarily from 
cultural norms. 121  The meaning of “corruption” can therefore shift depending on the 
speaker.122 Over the years, anticorruption efforts focus on the fight against administrative 
corruption.123 Administrative corruption involves the payment of small-scale bribes to mid 
and low level government officials.124 The anticorruption focus today has shifted to grand 
corruption. Grand corruption, also known as political corruption, involves large bribes 
given in connection with major interactions, such as large infrastructure projects or arms 
sales, and the abuse of political power to extract and accumulate for private gain.125 The 
key difference between these types of corruption is that “administrative corruption reflects 
specific weaknesses within different systems, while grand corruption involves the 
distortion and exploitation of entire systems for the benefit of private interests.”126 Grand 
corruption is often associated with the massive redirection of public funds for the private 
use of the political elite.127 The most notorious culprits have stolen billions of dollars from 
their countries for their own personal wealth accumulation. 
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Asset recovery has developed into a critical tool in combating transnational 
corruption.128  However, the utilization of asset recovery is filled with both legal and 
practical difficulties.129 Moreover, while there are significant amounts of money involved, 
recovering stolen assets does not always simply focus on money. Deterrence and 
retribution should also become a focus of these efforts. The success of asset recovery can 
often depend on the regulation of the financial sector.130 Financial regulations complement 
and strengthen the anti-corruption instruments, although they have also been seen to 
contradict each other on certain issues. 131  However, asset recovery and combating 
corruption is accomplished with countries and international financial institutions  working 
on having the persons involved in corruption being held criminally or civilly liable (with a 
focus on the individual), but also the proceeds from their corrupt acts can also be seized 
(with a focus on the assets).132 
 
Chapter 8 examines international financial institutions’ sanctions regime as a tool 
to promote financial stability.  In 2006, as a means to harmonize efforts in combating 
financial crimes and to create a joint sanctions system against corruption and fraud, the 
multilateral development banks (“MDBs”),133 along with the International Monetary Fund 
and the European Investment Bank (EIB), formed the International Financial Institutions 
Anti-Corruption Task Force (“the Task Force”). The Task Force became the first real step 
in unifying the international financial institutions in their efforts against corruption and 																																																								
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financial crimes.134 The document, the Uniform Framework for Preventing and Combating 
Fraud (“Uniform Framework”) harmonized definitions for sanctionable practices to be 
used by the participating financial institutions. It also contained a commitment to 
harmonize the investigative procedures and also explore whether debarment decisions from 
one institution should be recognized by the others. The Uniform Framework recognizes 
four sanctionable practices: corrupt practice, fraudulent practice, coercive practice, and 
collusive practice.  
 
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes by supporting the outcome of this research and 
supporting the proven hypothesis, it details what has been accomplished and highlights the 
restraint of this research.  
 
Since the end of World War II and the creation of International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Developments (“World Bank”) 
at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944, the focus of development theory and 
professionals largely has been on design and implementation of appropriate polices 
supported through aid and assistance, culminating in pre-eminence of the so called 
Washington Consensus of stabilization, liberalization and privatization.135 
 
In evaluating the last 20 years of policies and practices set forth by IFIs in 
promoting stability, it is clear that a lot of work needs to be done. While these institutions 
aimed at tackling financial crimes and highlighting different approaches in the various 
jurisdictions, there is insufficient research into the study of the effectiveness of their role 
in promoting stability in the face of the financial misconduct such as fraud and insider 
dealing, corruption and money laundering, etc. This thesis, thus, seeks to fill the gap by 
analysing the International Financial Institutions (IFIs)’s role, while considering the 
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literature and practice generally on evaluating their role which have not received adequate 
attention. 
The principle hypothesis tested is that: International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
can contribute considerably to the financial stability in the face of financial misconduct by 
tackling financial crimes. Unfortunately, the literature on this subject has not progressed 
significantly beyond the date of this writing. Thus, what sort of development and 
improvement to the role of IFIs will be added?  This thesis attempts to answer the question 
in the context of analysing each of financial misconduct in comparative way between 
different jurisdictions mainly in the U.S and the UK. 
  
IMF and Regulation 
 
The globalization of trade and financial markets and the associated liberalization of 
international capital markets may be the most important economic development of the late 
20th Century. The benefits can be measured ultimately in higher standards of living, as 
resources are allocated with increased efficiency and risk sharing is improved. However, 
the increased volume volatility of capital flows has exposed vulnerabilities in recipient 
countries, often in the form of the unsound financial and banking systems and deficiencies 
in financial incentive structures, institution and policies.  While the long term benefits of 
financial liberalization and globalization are not in doubt, the intensified market discipline 
over financial institutions and the frequency of financial sector problems in a range of 
countries have underscored the need for countries to move quickly to implement 
international best practices in financial supervision and regulation.136 
 
In early 1997, a G-10 Working Party presented a report to the G-7 Finance 
Ministers outlining the key aspects of a sound financial sector and a market strategy for 
promoting financial stability. In this same period, the Basle Committee on Banking and 
Supervision developed its Core Principles of Effective Banking Supervision. At the Denver 
Summit, the G-7 Finance Ministers ask the IMF and The World Bank to help encourage 																																																								
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their members to adopt appropriate principles and guidelines in these areas. Moreover, the 
IMF has been encouraged to assist in detecting and preventing financial sector problems 
by strengthening its surveillance of the finance sector.137 
 
Besides financial crimes, a banking crisis is among the most damaging influences 
on economic growth and development prospects and stability. One way that the IMFs have 
helped countries avoid banking crisis is through the Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP), which is jointly managed by the IMF and the World Bank. Started after the 1999 
economic crises in East Asia and Russian Federation, FSAP is a diagnostic exercise which 
looks at the vulnerabilities and financial sector impediments to growth. From 1999-2009 
more than 140 FSAPs were or ministers of finance. (IMF 2012) Long before the current 
crisis raised concerns about the quality of banking supervision, FSAPs were helping 
countries to identify and deal with banking problems, and central bankers privately praised 
the exercise and stressed its importance. 138  The Assessment of the financial sector 
standards is the other significant part of the overall assessment of the financial system. The 
focus of the FSAP in on three areas: Financial sector regulation and supervision, 
Institutional and market infrastructure, Policy transparency.139 
 
The International banking standards devised by Basel Committee are a significant 
part of FSAP process, which adapts Basel Committee methodology to evaluate compliance 
with the Core principles. Through the assessments a number of issues have over time been 
identified which would call in to question the effectiveness of the regulatory regime in a 
country. Examples may include: political interference in the authorization process or lack 
of legal immunity of law suits; a lack of powers to deal with unauthorized activates; a lack 
of criteria to ascertain whether a bank an shareholders or individual director are fit and 
proper; capital adequacy rules which are not adhered to or monitored effectively on either 
an individual bank basis or consolidated basis; large exposures which are not monitored or 
reported; insufficient on site- assessment of banks; limited consolidated supervision of 																																																								
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cross-sector or cross-border activates; ineffective enforcement by the regulators of 
standards of rules the actually exist; and limited cooperation between respective to oversee 
banks that operate across borders.140 
 
The IMF with its near universal membership of the world’s countries has an 
important role to play in these international efforts to promote financial sector stability, not 
just in the emerging markets but across the entire membership. In its individual country 
surveillance with members, the Fund seeks to improve the macroeconomic environment 
and polices through its regular consultation discussion. In addition to assessing the 
macroeconomic implications and on suggesting corrective policy steps, the IMF 
surveillance promotes a financial sector policy framework consistent with internationally 
accepted standards, as developed by the supervisory community and other bodies; it also 
assesses in implications.141 
 
In its multilateral surveillance- primarily through the World Economic Outlook and 
the International Capital Markets exercises- the Fund seeks to identify financial 
vulnerabilities and risks with a potential for generating regional and international spill 
overs. This work involves identifying deficiencies in area such as: systemically important 
banking systems; international aspects of financial supervision and regulation; the design 
and operation of wholesale payments systems; and functioning of the financial 
infrastructures underlying the major international financial markets.142 The Fund supports 
adjustment programs which often include conditionality related to financial sector reforms, 
such as legal and regulatory improvements, systemic bank restructuring privatization of 
banks, and the introduction of appropriate monetary instruments and market based systems 
of monetary management.  The Fund also provides technical assistance, at the request of 
members, focusing on central banking (including central bank and banking legislation), 
and the design and development of monitory, foreign exchange, and public debt markets 
and instruments. Also, payment systems and public sector guarantee arrangement; 
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reporting and disclosure requirements; and linkages between banking system and fiscal 
policies.143 The IMF staff is developing a general framework for identifying the strengths 
and weaknesses of financial system and has produced a distillation of widely accepted 
views of what might constitute a framework for financial stability, focusing on banking 
soundness and pinpointing the deficiencies that have frequently led to macroeconomic 
repercussions.144 In which will be examined in more depth throughout this thesis.  
 
The IMF’s efforts are intended to raise the general awareness of authorities in 
member countries to the potential macroeconomic consequences of unsound financial 
systems, to promote principles of financial sector soundness, and offer appropriate 
solutions to problems in selective cases where financial weakness may become a major 
concern. Of course, the fund is neither a rating agency nor banking supervisor and cannot 
be in the business either of certifying that a country’s financial sector is safe and sound or 
alternatively of making adverse judgments on these issues. Further, the Fund surveillance 
cannot address all of the areas in the financial system that may need improvement, nor can 
it be expected to provide specific assistance to the regulatory and supervisory authorities 
in meeting their day to day challenges.145 The World Bank and the IMF polices, which 
hadn’t changed much in the past decade, seemed more concerned with social policies and 
anti-corruption efforts and tackling financial crimes which will be the focus of this thesis.  
 
Islamic Banking 
 
Another aspect of this thesis deals with Institutions offering Islamic financial 
services which constitute a significant and growing share of financial system in number of 
countries.146 Since the inception of Islamic Banking about three decades ago, the number 
and reach of Islamic financial institutions worldwide has risen from one institution in one 
country in 1975 to over 300 institutions operating in more than 75 countries.147 Reflecting 																																																								
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the increase role of Islamic Finance, the literature of Islamic Banking has grown. This 
thesis attempts to fill the gap in the empirical literature on Islamic banking and analyzing 
the issue of a cross-country context empirical analysis of the role of the Islamic banks in 
promoting financial stability.  
 
The rise of Islamic finance in the global arena can be partly attributed to the global 
financial crises of 2007-2009, where complex financial instruments nearly caused the 
collapse of Western Banking.  Another reason is the need for political inclusion after 9/11. 
In the recent years, the benefits and ethical aspects of Islamic financial instruments have 
increasingly come to light.  In particular relevance to developing countries, Islamic 
financial instruments and services may better serve the interests of many developing 
economies than traditional forms of finance in terms of its shared attributes with ethical or 
socially responsible investment and its suitability for funding for public infrastructure 
projects, but challenges still remain for acquiring expertise to build sound risk management 
framework. The foundation of Islamic finance as distinct from traditional financial services 
will first be briefly illustrated.  
 
Furthermore, Chapter 6 will focus on how and the extent to which multilateral 
institutions and the governments of developing countries are engaging with Islamic 
finance, and particular set of advantages, obstacles, as well as associated with each 
initiative. In the years following the financial crisis, financial institutions have recognized 
that crucial to bank stability and maintenance to the overall health of the financial system 
is the diversity of services offered to different industries and costumers.148  One of these 
services is Islamic Financial Assets, which though currently only accounting for less than 
1% of the total global financial assets,149 comprises of the fastest growing areas in finance 
as to become firmly embedded in global political and economic order.150 A joint report 
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among the Islamic Financial Service Board (IFSB), Islamic Development Bank, and 
Islamic Research and Training Institute in 2010 confirms the “increased initiatives to 
acquire strategic stakes in Islamic financial institutions in different parts of the world, 
“helping to promote productive economic activity and inclusive development.  
 
In 2010, efforts to combat crimes were strengthened when the MDBs decided to 
sign the Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions (“Mutual 
Enforcement Agreement”).151  This significantly enhanced the sanctions regime that the 
MDBs would impose. Any entity found to have engaged in any of the practices recognized 
by the MDBs which results in debarment will be enforced by the other participating MDBs.  
The MDBs took further steps to harmonize their efforts in 2012 as well.  
 
The first document, signed by the five MDBs, along with the EIB, was done in 
order to “harmonize their respective sanctioning guidelines, to ensure consistent treatment 
of individuals and firms.”152 After reviewing certain aspects of the Mutual Enforcement 
Agreement, the document recognizes the sanctions discussed above that may be imposed 
singularly or in combination. In introducing the sanctions of conditional non-debarment 
and debarment with conditional release into the MDB harmonized regime, there was a 
strong incentive for entities and individuals to work on improving compliance measures. 
 
Although the MDBs have made progress in moving forward with major 
harmonization in areas, there is more that can be addressed to further their efforts and unify 
their goals. For instance, the MDBs should consider harmonizing efforts in aiding local 
governments take on corruption challenges themselves. Transparency as well can be 
harmonized in terms of the amount of information that is made publicly available by the 
MDBs. The MDBs have a challenging order – they must provide financial support to 
developing countries, particularly with regard to those with rampant corruption, while at 																																																								
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the same time attempting to safeguard the efficient use of those funds when they are no 
longer in control by the MDBs. The sanctions regime is a great step towards fighting 
corruption and aiding in creating financial stability. The MDBs however, need to examine 
their aims and how they are achieved. Greater due diligence is required to ensure these 
international financial institutions are doing their best in assisting in asset recovery and 
convicting corruption. As other aspects in the financial system, more can be done, 
implemented and harmonized in order to further the fight corruption and financial crimes. 
 
Conclusion  
 
As explained, from the foregoing review of literature about the role of International 
financial institutions in promoting stability on the face of financial misconduct, that there 
is a lack in depth research on issues relating to regulations, governance and polices that 
need to be improved, as well we must ensure that the IFIs have power to perform their 
functions effectively. Therefore, this thesis not only to fill in the research the gap in the 
study, but also to recommend improvements for the current IFIs polices to promote 
stability. While this thesis examines the issues of International Financial Institutions ‘role 
in promoting stability in the face of the financial misconduct such as: insider dealing, 
money laundering, cybercrimes from legal prospective, it is not however, within the 
limitation of this research to empirically establish whether the issues are indeed generally 
problematic in function of IFIs.  
 
As it has been mentioned, financial stability is essential for national and 
international overall economic growth. This thesis will argue that further market reform is 
needed to enhance the fight against financial crimes that continue to be on the rise. In more 
recent years, financial market reform has mainly focused on the threats to financial stability 
that arise from legal activities in the financial industry characterized by excessive risk 
taking, distortive incentives, and the lack of controls in the overall regulatory financial 
work.153 Although these issues do indeed need to be addressed, the threat to the economic 
and financial security caused by illegal financial activities cannot be ignored and more 																																																								
153 Financial Crimes: A threat to Global Security, xvii (ed. Maximillian Edelbacher et al., 2012) 
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focus should be had on them. These crimes often can occur more easily due to the lack of 
regulation and weak supervision of the activities of the financial sector.  
 
The next decade may well be more active roles for the IFIs in the evolution of 
promoting financial stability. Accordingly, it is of relevance to produce views on the 
problem and increase the amount of the literature. Putting things into more specific 
prospective, next chapter, I will start analysing Insider dealing, which is considered one of 
the biggest threats to the financial stability.  
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CHAPTER 2 
INSIDER DEALING 
 
Introduction 
 
Insider dealing is considered to be one of the biggest threats to financial stability. 
One of the cornerstones of a fair, open and transparent market is the prohibition of the use 
of material non-public information. This prohibition goes to the core of the role market 
participants play in maintaining the integrity of markets.154 Over the last several years, 
there has been coverage of financial scandals from all over the world, particularly regarding 
insider trading, as it is known in the United States or insider dealing as it is known in other 
countries.155  Although there is no uniform definition of insider dealing, it generally refers 
to the buying or selling of a publicly traded company’s stock based on material, non-public 
information about a particular company.156 In recent years, most jurisdictions have enacted 
legislation that specifically deals with the problem of directors and officers of companies 
taking advantage of information that they receive by virtue of privileged positions by 
dealing in their company securities.157   
 
The United States is the forerunner in combating insider dealing, and has influenced 
other countries regarding implementing legislation and banning  at least some forms of 
insider dealing.158 In the United Kingdom, insider dealing can be defined as trading in 
organized securities markets by persons in possession of materials non-public information 																																																								
154 See Insider Trading Laws and the Role of Security Analyst, By: Michael S. Caccese / Financial Analyst 
Journal Vol. 53, No. 2 (March-April., 1975) pp 9-12 
155 See, e.g., Jane Croft & Brooke Masters, Ex - Cazenove Partner Guilty on Five Counts of Insider 
Dealing, Fin. Times, Mar. 11, 2010, at 16 (reporting on an insider trading conviction in London); Tom 
Mitchell, Du Trial is Evidence of How Watchdog is Showing More Bite, Fin. Times, Sept. 11, 2009, at 14 
(detailing insider dealing prosecution in Hong Kong); Andrew England & Abeer Allam, First Insider 
Trader is Jailed in Saudi, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2009, at 19 (describing the first insider trading criminal 
prosecution in Saudi Arabia). 
156 Robert E. Wagner, Gordon Gekko to the Rescue? Insider Trading as a Tool to Combat Accounting 
Fraud, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 973, 974 (2011). 
157 Professor Barry Rider. Dr. Keren Alexander, Stuart Bazley and Jeffrey Bryant ‘Market Abuse and 
 Insider Dealing’ –third edition- p 1. (Bloomsbury Professional Ltd, 2016) 
158 Edward Greene & Olivia Schmidt, Duty-Free Insider Trading? 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 369, 371  
(2013) (noting that there is legal and illegal insider dealing).
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and has been recognized as a widespread problem that is extremely difficult to eradicate.159  
It has not been until recently that countries such as the United Kingdom have made more 
robust efforts in enforcing and prohibiting insider-dealing violations. 160 While the 
approaches to handling and combating insider dealing and securities fraud may differ in 
each country, the need and pressure to prosecute violators is increasing, as it is clear that 
insider dealing is still alive and well.161 The perception that the insider abuse is still a major 
issue in most markets and traditional approach of the criminal law has not served as a 
significant deterrent and has led regulators such as the Financial Services Authority and 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission to renew their commitment to ‘stamp out’ 
insider dealing by whatever means are at their lawful disposal.162 
 
This Chapter will compare and analyse the insider dealing regulations in both the 
United States and United Kingdom, by beginning with the development of the laws of 
securities fraud and insider dealing in the United States.163  Then this chapter will discuss 
the laws of insider dealing in the United Kingdom.164 A review of recent case law in both 
countries will follow in order to examine the differences in the U.S. and U.K. laws.165  This 
chapter will also comment on some strengths and weakness of each regime,166 and examine 
whether each provides sufficient protection for the investor and the markets.167  Finally, 
the chapter will give a brief conclusion.168 
 
																																																								
159 Ibid. 
160 Jamie Syminton, Head of Wholesale Enforcement, FSA, Speech at the City and Financial Market Abuse 
Conference: Challenging the Culture of Market Behavior (Dec. 4, 2012), available at http:// 
www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2012/1204-js (“the [Financial Services Authority] has 
become a visible and credible force combating insider dealing. [It is] determined to crack down on market 
abuse and capable of doing so”).   
161 SEC Enforcement Actions: Insider Trading Cases, available at https:// 
www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml (noting that in the past three years, 
the SEC filed more insider trading actions (168 total) than in any three-year period in the Commission's 
history).  
162 Professor Barry Rider. Dr. Keren Alexander, Stuart Bazley and Jeffrey Bryant “Market Abuse and 
Insider Dealing/third edition/ at vii. (2016). 
163 See infra discussion II. 
164 See infra discussion III. 
165 See infra discussion IV. 
166 See infra discussion V. 
167 Ibid. 
168 See infra discussion VI. 
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United States 
 
Securities Fraud 
 
Securities fraud is regulated through the Securities Act of 1933169 (“1933 Act”) and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934170 (“1934 Act”).  Although the 1933 Act targets the 
primary market while the 1934 Act target the secondary market, both Acts have the same 
goal in mind which is to ensure market competition by requiring full and fair disclosure of 
all material information in the marketplace.171 
 
The primary provisions that are used for criminal prosecution of securities fraud 
are Rule 10b-5172 and § 32(a) of the 1934 Act.173  Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act provided 
the basis for Rule 10b-5 and gave rise to a securities fraud claim.174  When there is a wilful 
violator of § 10(b), the Security Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) rules, or other 
provisions of the Acts, then § 32(a) can impose criminal liability. 175 Both private 
individuals as well as the federal government can make a securities fraud claim.176  The 
laws of securities fraud have developed mostly due to judicial construction.177  Securities 
fraud generally encompasses two forms of fraud: the first form is material 
																																																								
169 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006). 
170 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78oo (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
171 Allyson Poulos, Rachel Cox, Claire Burks, Chandra Kurien, Securities Fraud, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1479, 1480-81 (2013) 
172 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). The 1933 Act also contains a general fraud provision under § 17(a), 
which can also be utilized in criminal prosecutions. See15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006). The language of § 17(a) 
of the 1933 Act has been incorporated into Rule 10b-5, creating similar obligations under the two 
provisions. See SEC v. Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Essentially the same 
elements are required under section 17(a)(1) - (3) [as under Rule 10b-5] ... though no showing of scienter is 
required ... under subsections (a)(2) or (a)(3).” (SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1467 (2d Cir. 
1996))). But see Finkel v. Stratton Corp., 962 F.2d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that although Rule 
10b-5 allows for a private right of action does not mean the same can be provided under § 17(a)). 
173 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2006). 
174 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (authorizing the SEC to implement rules “necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors”). 
17515 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). 
176 See id.at 543-545 (explaining that private plaintiffs may bring lawsuits only under Rule 10b-5 and may 
only seek damages, SEC may bring both administrative actions or lawsuits under Rule 10b-5 and § 17 of 
1933 Act, the Department of Justice may bring criminal actions when the conduct was willful). 
177 See Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud? 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 545 (2011) (discussing that 
securities fraud is one of the most judicial created fields of federal law). 
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misrepresentations, omissions or both, and the second is insider trading.178  To succeed in 
a civil case under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must show that the defendant made (i) a 
misstatement or omission179 (ii) of material fact180 (iii) with scienter181 (iv) in connection 
with the purchase or the sale of a security,182 (v) upon which the plaintiff reasonably 
relied,183 and (vi) that the plaintiff's reliance proximately caused his or her injury.184  If the 
elements of Rule 10b-5 are shown to exist, the government may pursue criminal liability 
under the 1934 Act if they are able to demonstrate that the act was wilful.185 
 
Although participation in insider dealing can be found as a securities fraud under 
Rule 10b-5, it is often difficult to fit it under the crime of fraud.186  However, regulation of 
insider dealing under Rule 10b-5 has been found to help protect the marketplace by 
prohibiting material, non-public information from being used to purchase or sell any 
security in breach of a fiduciary duty.187  The following section will discuss insider dealing 
and discuss the development of the law as a securities fraud. 
 																																																								
178 Poulos et al., supra note 171, at 1481. 
179 See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (defining 
misrepresentations or omissions as assertions that are “are false or misleading or are so incomplete as to 
mislead”), Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-55 (1983) (finding that those with a fiduciary duty to investors 
will be held liable under Rule 10b-5 only when they fail to disclose or fail to abstain from using material 
nonpublic information); see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231 (1980) (limiting the duty to 
disclose or abstain to corporate insiders). 
180 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (prohibiting “any untrue statement of a material fact” or any omission of a 
“material fact necessary in order to make the statements made ... not misleading”); see TSC Indus., Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (finding that a fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood 
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in their decision making). 
181See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12, 193-94 (1976) (holding that it must be shown 
“that the defendant acted with scienter, a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud”).  
182 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 656 (1997) (requiring that the 
conduct of disclosing or abstaining be in connection to a securities transaction). 
183 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243(1988) (noting that reliance has 
always been found to be an element of common law fraud). 
184See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005). This last element may be separated into two 
separate requirements: (1) economic loss; and (2) loss causation – “a causal connection between the 
material misrepresentation and the loss.” 
185 See United States v. Cassese, 428 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 2005) (defining willfulness as “a realization on 
the defendant's part that he was doing a wrongful act” under the securities laws”). 
186See Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on Material Nonpublic 
Information, 61 Hastings L.J. 881, 889 (2010) (“[D]ealing with insider trading through an antifraud rule is 
like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole.”). 
187 15 U.S.C. § 78b (declaring one of the purposes of Rule 10b-5 is “to insure the maintenance of fair and 
honest markets”). 
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Insider Dealing 
 
The United States is home to two of the largest stock exchanges in the world.188  
Given the high concentration of securities being traded in the U.S., regulation of insider 
dealing is critical.189  The penalties if convicted of insider dealing are a maximum of twenty 
years in prison and a fine of $5 million.190 There is also the possibility of civil penalties, 
which can equate to fines up to three times the profit gained or loss avoided as a result of 
the insider dealing. 191 Insider dealing has become a “catchphrase used to describe a 
particular type of securities fraud – that which involves trading on material information 
that is unavailable to the marketplace.”192  This type of trading qualifies as a “deceptive 
device” under § 10(b)193 and Rule 10b-5.194  However, no statute has ever attempted to 
create a real definition for the practice of insider dealing.195  Congress and the Securities 
Exchange Commission have not been able to agree on a definition of insider dealing 
because of fear that inside dealers may be able to evade a specific concrete definition.196  
Accordingly, the courts have been left to define the term through the use of common law.197 
 
Although the law of insider dealing is a complex field, the United States has long 
believed in strong enforcement in order to encourage development of the U.S. capital 
markets by facilitating investment in its stock markets.198 The U.S. Supreme Court has also 																																																								
188 James Thompson, A Global Comparison of Insider Trading Regulations, Int’l J. Acct. & Fin. 1, 4 (2013) 
(listing the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ as two of the largest exchanges based on market 
capitalization). 
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello, The Evolving Mystery of Illegal Insider Trading, N.Y. L.J., 
Aug. 3, 2010, available at 
http://www.maglaw.com/publications/articles/00225/_res/id=Attachments/index=0/070081001Morvillo.pdf 
193 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
194 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Richard A. Booth, The Missing Link Between Insider Trading and Securities Fraud, 2 J. Bus. Tech. L. 
185,196 (2007)  
197 Ted Kamman & Rory T. Hood, With the Spotlight on the Financial Crisis, Regulatory Loopholes, and 
Hedge Funds, How Should Hedge Funds Comply with the Insider Trading Laws? 2009 Colum. Bus. L. 
Rev. 357, 363-64 (2009) (describing the development of insider trading common law where legal rules are 
created on a case-by-case manner with respect to specific fact patterns). 
198 Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, A Question of Investor Integrity: Promoting Investor Confidence by 
Fighting Insider Trading, Address Before the “SEC Speaks” Conference (Feb. 27, 1998), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch202.txt (“Our markets are a success precisely because 
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long held that the principal purpose of the federal securities law is to fix the insufficiencies 
of common law protections to ensure the fair and honest functioning of the stock market.199  
Accordingly, the legal development of the law has become essential to understanding the 
prohibition of insider dealing. The law beginning the prohibition of insider dealing began 
in the SEC’s 1961 case, In re Cady, Roberts & Co.200. This case involved a broker who 
received information from a company’s director that the company was deciding to reduce 
the amount of dividends to be issued.201Using the information from the director, the broker 
decided to sell shares in the company to several of his clients prior to the news going 
public.202  The SEC brought suit under Rule 10b-5 to establish the broker’s liability for 
trading on inside information.203 The SEC found the duty that corporate insiders have not 
to use inside information for personal gain could attach to other individuals outside of the 
corporation as well.204 Therefore, the SEC held that the duty to abstain from trading on 
insider information that is not public rests on two factors, first, because there exists a 
relationship that allows access to information which is intended for corporate use and not 
personal benefit, and second, because there is an inherent unfairness when a party takes 
advantage of such information knowing it is not available to everyone.205  Thus, the rule 
for “disclose or abstain” was developed.  The rule created what are known as “temporary” 
or “constructive” insiders, who share the duty to disclose all material non-public 
information known to them prior to trading, or abstain from trading until the information 
becomes public.206 
 
																																																								
they enjoy the world's highest level of confidence. Investors put their capital to work-and put their fortunes 
at risk-because they trust that the marketplace is honest”). 
199 See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 170-71 
(1994) (finding that the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 “embrace a 
fundamental purpose ... to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor”). 
Caveat emptor is a Latin term meaning “let the buyer beware.” 
200 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
201 Ibid.  
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid.  
205 Ibid. 
206 Diana L. Hegarty, Rule 10b-5 and the Evolution of Common-Law Fraud - The Need for an Effective 
Statutory Proscription of Insider Trading by Outsiders, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 813, 820-21 (1988). 
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The “disclose or abstain” rule was expanded on several years later in SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co.207 In Cady, the rule applied only to those who received information from 
a corporate insider, however, in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the rule was extended to any person 
who knew of material, non-public information.208  The Second Circuit held that “anyone 
in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public, 
or must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside 
information remains undisclosed.”209  The court felt that there should be “equal access” to 
information in order to ensure fairness in the markets.210  The court found “[i]t was the 
intent of Congress that all members of the investing public should be subject to identical 
market risks.”211 
 
1. Classical Insider Dealing 
 
Over a decade later, the Supreme Court faced its first insider dealing case, Chiarella 
v. United States,212 in which it rejected the notion that anyone in possession of material, 
non-public information could be held liable for insider dealing. 213  In Chiarella, the 
defendant worked at a financial printing firm.214 While working on certain documents, he 
discovered the identities of two companies that were about to undergo a tender offer and 
used this information to buy shares prior to the information going public, making a profit 
as the share prices went up.215  The Supreme Court found that although § 10(b) is a 
“catchall” provision, any conviction under it must be based on fraud.216  The Court held 
that in order for the defendant to have acted fraudulently, he must have had a duty disclose 
or abstain.217  Given that Chiarella did not receive the information from a corporate insider, 
it could not be found that his possession of the information rose to an existence of a 																																																								
207 SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid.  
212 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
213 Ibid. 
214 Ibid.  
215 Ibid. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Ibid.  
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fiduciary duty that would create such a duty to disclose or abstain.218  Soon after the Court 
handed its decision, the SEC implemented Rule 14e-3, in order to address situations 
involving tender offers and imposed a duty to “disclose or abstain,” regardless of the 
existence of any fiduciary duty.219 
 
Three years after Chiarella, the Supreme Court had another opportunity to develop 
the insider dealing laws with Dirks v. SEC, a “tippee” case.220  Dirks, a securities analyst, 
received inside information regarding a massive company fraud.221  Both the Wall Street 
Journal and the SEC had been informed about the fraud, yet no response or action had been 
taken.222  Dirks then informed his clients who then sold their shares in the company, leading 
to an investigation and public disclosure of the company’s fraudulent activities.223  The 
SEC brought sanctions against Dirks for using the information, but the Supreme Court 
reversed the decision.224 The Court held again that any duty to disclose or abstain must be 
based on the existence of a fiduciary duty.225  A defendant (the tippee) can only be liable 
if the insider (tipper) has breached a fiduciary duty.226  Thus, the Court found that whether 
there has been a breach of a fiduciary duty depends also in part on the intent of the 
disclosure, that is, whether it was to benefit the tipper.227 Dirks tipper was motivated to 
expose the fraud occurring in the company, there was no personal gain by his disclosure 
and therefore the tipper did not breach his fiduciary duty.228  The key factor in the analysis 
became whether the insider (the tipper) benefited, either directly or indirectly.229 In its 
holding, the Court recognized the notion of information as a commodity, which has been 
interpreted as a property right, but that there still must exist a duty in order to be liable for 
trading on non-public, material information.230 																																																								
218 Ibid.  
21917 C.F.R. § 240.14e. 
220 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid. 
223 Ibid.  
224 Ibid. 
225 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. at 655. 
226 Ibid.  
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges and the 
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Misappropriation Theory of Insider Dealing 
 
The most current wave of insider dealing law began with United States v. 
O’Hagan,231 where the Court began to shift from a tort-driven theory (found in Chiarella) 
to an agency law and restitution based theory.232 In O’Hagan, the defendant was a partner 
at a law firm which had been hired by Grand Met to work on its acquisition of Pillsbury 
Company.233  Although O’Hagan did not work on the acquisition himself, he came across 
the details of the plan and decided to purchase Pillsbury shares.234  Once the acquisition 
became public, the Pillsbury stock and purchase options increased in price.235 O’Hagan 
was able to sell his shares and make a $4.3 million profit.236 
 
O’Hagan was found to have violated Rule 10b-5 based on the “misappropriation 
theory.” The Supreme Court held that the theory applies when a defendant 
“misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a 
duty owed to the source of the information.”237  Thus, the Supreme Court found that 
O’Hagan had a duty of trust and confidence to the law firm since he was a partner there.238  
The Court also found that the fiduciary duties owed to the law firm in turn attached to their 
client, Grand Met.239  The Court agreed with the Government’s argument that O’Hagan’s 
conduct constituted a fraudulent device in connection with the securities transactions and 
was therefore liable under § 10(b).240 The O’Hagan court found that both the classical and 
misappropriation theories complement each other since both address the effects of 
capitalizing on non-public information in buying or selling stock.241  The Court found that 
while the classical theory focuses on a corporate insider’s breach of fiduciary duties owed 
																																																								
 Production of Information, Sup. Ct. Rev. 309 (1981). 
231 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
232 See Robert B. Thompson, Insider Trading, Investor Harm, and Executive Compensation, 50 CASE W.  
RES. L. REV. 291, 296 (1999). 
233 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Ibid. 
238 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Ibid 
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to their shareholders, the misappropriation theory addresses the corporate outsiders who 
breach their duties of trust owed to the source of information. 242 As such, the 
misappropriation theory is in place in order to safeguard the integrity of the marketplace as 
a whole from those who attempt to abuse privileged information for their own personal 
gain.243 
The United Kingdom and Insider Dealing 
 
The belief that insider dealing leads to a lack of confidence in the stock markets 
and diminishes the amount of capital invested in the marketplace is no longer only found 
in the United States.244  However, it is a recent development that other countries have been 
taking a more stringent approach to dealing with this issue.245 The United Kingdom was 
the first European country to criminalize insider dealing,246 but it does not have as an 
extensive of a history as the United States in regulating insider dealing.247  As home to the 
fourth largest stock exchange in the world, the U.K. has been pushing for harsher 
penalties.248 Nevertheless, over the years the U.K. has developed the most comprehensive 
legal framework for insider dealing country in the European Union.249In Britain for many 
years it was argued that the best way to deal with insider abuse was through self-regulatory 
rule such as to be found in the then City Code on Take-overs and Mergers and Stock 
																																																								
242 Ibid 
243 Ibid. 
244 Christopher P. Montagano, The Global Crackdown on Insider Trading: A Silver Lining to the "Great 
Recession", 19 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 575, 577 (2012). 
245See id. at 578 (noting that the recent legal development in insider dealing law in the United Kingdom 
demonstrates a renewed focus for the European Union). 
246 Udit Grover & Varun Chandra, Insider Trading: A Modern Day Crime or Not? (Apr. 28, 2014) available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2430039 
247See Margaret Cole, Director of Enforcement, FSA London School of Economics, Insider Dealing in the 
City, (Mar. 17, 2007) (transcript available at  
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2007/0317_mc.shtml) (detailing the historical 
background of insider dealing law in the United Kingdom).   
248 Thompson, supra note 188, at 6 (discussing that the current penalties are a maximum prison sentence of 
seven years or an unlimited fine along with a variety of civil penalties). 
249 Edward Greene & Olivia Schmid, Duty-Free Insider Trading, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 369, 374 
(2013). But see Thompson, supra note 188, at 7 (noting that the United Kingdom has struggled to obtain 
convictions for insider dealing). 
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Exchange’s Model Code.250 Views changed with criminalization of insider abuse in 1980 
and full panoply of the criminal justice system was invoked.251 
 
 The United Kingdom first criminalized insider dealing when Parliament 
implemented the Companies Act 1980,252 after the Stock Exchange began arguing for 
sanctioning the practice.253  The Companies Act was later consolidated in the Company 
Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 (“Insider Dealing Act”).254  The Insider Dealing Act 
prohibited insiders from trading “(1) on the basis of unpublished price-sensitive 
information, (2) in the securities of the company of which he is an insider, and (3) on a 
recognized stock exchange.”255  Furthermore, the Act provided a definition of an “insider” 
which included any person who is or had been an employee, officer, or director, within the 
previous six months, of a corporation or if the person was professionally associated with 
the company.256  The Criminal Justice Act 1993 defined inside information as information 
that (1) relates to particular securities or their issuers; (2) is specific or precise; (3) has not 
been made public; and (4) if the information were made public would likely have a 
significant effect on the price or value of any security.257 Furthermore, the CJA 1993, s 57 
created a distinction between a primary insider - a person who has direct knowledge of 
inside information - and a secondary insider - a person who learns information from an 
																																																								
250 B. Rider “Self-regulation: The British approach to policing conduct in the securities Business, with 
particular reference to the role of the City Panel on Take-over and Mergers in the regulation of insider 
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inside source. 258 This terminology was first adapted in Professor Barry Rider, Insider 
Dealing (1983, Jordans).259 
 
 Additionally, the European Communities (what is now known as the European 
Union) agreed to promulgate a directive in order to coordinate the regulation of insider 
dealing. 260   Thus, in 1989, the Economic Community Directive Coordinating Insider 
Trading (“1989 Directive”) was implemented.261  The 1989 Directive required member 
states to prohibit trading that is done in reliance on inside information that is acquired (1) 
through “membership [in] the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of the 
issuer,” (2) as a stockholder in the corporation, or (3) due to having access to information 
“by virtue of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties.”262  The 1989 Directive 
was later replaced with the 2003 Market Abuse Directive, which retained the definition of 
insider dealing.263 
 
 Prior to the 2003 Directive, the United Kingdom had adopted the Financial Services 
Market Act of 2000 (“FSMA”), which prohibits market abuse.264  The FSMA was enforced 
through the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”).265  The FSA is a private entity that 
serves a public function by regulating the marketplace.266   The FSMA lays out four 
statutory objectives for the regulatory body:  (1) maintain market confidence; (2) contribute 
to financial stability; (3) secure consumer protection; and (4) reduction of financial 
crime.267  Under the FSMA, insider dealing transpires when “an insider deals, or attempts 
to deal, in a qualifying investment or related investment on the basis of inside information 																																																								
258 Barry AK Rider and HL French. The regulation of Insider Trading (1979 Macmillan) and see the 
discussion of the tippee liability 
259 Ibid.  
260 Cole, supra note 247. 
261 Council Directive 89/592/EEC, Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30. 
262 Council Directive 89/592/EEC, art. II. 
263 Council Directive 2003/6/EC, art. 1.  The 2003 Directive also addressed market manipulation. 
264 Slaughter & May, The EU/UK Market Abuse Regime--Overview 1 (2011) [hereinafter U.K. Market 
Abuse Regime], available at http:// www.slaughterandmay.com/media/39260/the-eu-uk-market-abuse-
regime-overview.pdf; see also FSA, Who Are We?[hereinafter Who Are 
We?]http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Who/index.shtml (describing the FSA as the primary regulatory 
body for the financial services). 
265 U.K. Market Abuse Regime, supra note 264, at 1. 
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relating to the investment in question.” 268  FSMA defines insider information as 
information: 
[O]f a precise nature which--(a) is not generally available, (b) relates, directly or 
indirectly, to one or more issuers of the qualifying investments or to one or more 
of the qualifying investments, and (c) would, if generally available, be likely to 
have a significant effect on the price of the qualifying investments or on the price 
of related investments.269 
 
 While the United States requires the information to be “material,” the U.K. requires 
it to be “precise,” when it is found that the information: 
 
(a) indicates circumstances that exist or may reasonably be expected to come into 
existence or an event that has occurred or may reasonably be expected to occur, and 
(b) is specific enough to enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect 
of those circumstances or that event on the price of qualifying investments or 
related investments.270 
 
The definition of “insider” under the FSMA is also defined more broadly than in 
the United States.271 Under FSMA, an “insider” is any person who has inside information 
from (1) being a member of the administration, management, or supervisory bodies of an 
issuer of qualifying investments; (2) holding the capital of an issuer; (3) having access to 
the information through the exercise of his or her employment, profession, or duties; (4) 
engaging in criminal activities; or (5) obtaining the information through other means by 
which he or she knows, or could reasonably be expected to know, that the information is 
inside information. 272In 2012, the U.K. passed the Financial Services Act of 2012, which 
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actually reorganized its regulatory system.273 The FSA was replaced with the Financial 
Conduct Authority, which carries on many of the FSA’s duties.274 
Recent Case law in the U.K. and U.S. 
 
The primary difference between insider dealing laws in the United States and 
United Kingdom is how it is defined and when liability attaches to an individual.275  
Additionally, the regulatory system of the U.S. is enforcement based while the U.K.’s 
regulatory framework focuses on supervision and risk based.276 Recent case law from both 
the United States and United Kingdom demonstrates the differences of how one regulatory 
system can find some actions as punishable, while not another.  
 
The Einhorn Case in the United Kingdom and the definition of insider as a 
critical difference. 
 
The Financial Services Authority brought a controversial case against Greenlight 
Capital, Inc., a hedge fund that is located in the United States, and its owner, president and 
sole portfolio manager, David Einhorn.277  The FSA concluded that Einhorn had engaged 
in serious market abuse in breach of section 118(2) of the FSMA.278  The FSA found that 
Einhorn was in possession of insider information and caused Greenling to trade its shares 
of the UK-listed company, Punch Taverns (“Punch”). 
 
Greenlight was a significant U.S. investor in Punch.279  In June 2009, Punch’s 
corporate broker, Andrew Osborne, approached Greenlight to inquire whether Greenlight 																																																								
273 Richard Powell, UK Regulatory Reform and its Impact on Financial Markets, 19 WORLD SEC. L. REP. 
(BNA) 34 (May 10, 2013) (describing the replacement of the Financial Services Authority with the new 
regulatory system of Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA)). 
274 Ibid. 
275 The Einhorn /Greenlight Insider Dealing Case – EU/US Differences Highlighted, Sidley Austin LLP, 
(Feb. 17, 2012), available at http://m.sidley.com/the-einhorngreenlight-insider-dealing-case--euus-
differences-highlighted-02-17-2012/ (discussing the differences of insider trading laws between the U.S. 
and U.K.). 
276 See Cole, supra note 247. 
277 Einhorn, FSA Decision Notice (Jan. 12, 2012) (U.K.) [hereinafter Einhorn Decision], available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/decisions/dn-einhorn-greenlight.pdf. 
278 Ibid.  
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would agree to be “wall crossed”280 in order to discuss a potential issuance of equity by 
Punch.281  Greenlight declined to be wall crossed because Einhorn did not want to be 
restricted from trading.282 Although Punch’s broker tried to persuade Greenlight to be wall 
crossed, Einhorn continued to disagree and a conference call between Punch management 
and Greenlight was conducted on an “open” basis instead.283 
 
During the conference call, Punch’s management made no statements explicitly 
referencing an actual transaction, nor did they make a definite statement regarding the size 
of the anticipated issuance.284 Punch had made it clear that there had been no definite 
decisions to proceed with an equity offering and that alternative measures were being taken 
into consideration.285 Nevertheless, during the conference call, Einhorn did manage to 
learn from Punch’s broker, who also participated in the call, that Punch was contemplating 
an equity offering of about £350 million in order to repay the convertible bond and create 
headroom in the securitizations.286 Einhorn also managed to learn that a non-disclosure 
agreement (wall crossed) would last less than a week.287   Although Punch stated no 
definitive decisions had been made, they also discussed that other major shareholders, 
which indicated the advanced stages and high probability they would be proceeding with 
the issuance.288 
 
Immediately after ending the call, Einhorn instructed Greenlight traders to sell the 
shareholding in Punch.289 Commencing shortly after the call, Greenlight traders sold Punch 
shares over the course of a few days, lowering Greenlight’s holdings of Punch shares from 
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approximately 13.3% to 9%. 290  When Punch made its official announcement of its 
intention to raise approximately £375 million by means of firm placing and open offer of 
new ordinary shares, the price of its shares dropped significantly.291 The decision made by 
Einhorn to trade Punch shares helped Greenlight avoid a loss of approximately £5.8 
million.292 
 
The Financial Services Authority concluded that insider information was produced 
on the conference call and that Einhorn decision to trade was based on that information, in 
violation of the United Kingdom’s market abuse regime.293  The FSA found that Einhorn 
fell within the FSMA as an insider given he had access to the information through his 
employment at Greenlight and his duties as president and portfolio manager of 
Greenlight.294  The FSA also found that trading Punch shares was dealing a “qualifying 
investment” under the statute. 295  Furthermore, it was found that information Einhorn 
received met the statutory requirements of inside information since it (1) related to Punch 
and Punch shares, (2) the information was precise,296 (3) it was not information that was 
generally available, and (4) the information was likely to have a significant effect on the 
price of Punch shares.297 
 
The FSA explained that due to Einhorn’s position and experience, he should have 
known the information received on the call was confidential and price sensitive that would 
arise to a legal and regulatory risk.298  The call should have raised a flag considering it was 
																																																								
290 Ibid. 
291 Ibid. at 10 (noting the price of Punch’s shares fell by 29.9%). 
292 Ibid.; see also Lindsay Fortado and Ben Moshinsky, Greenlight’s David Einhorn Ordered Insider Trades 
‘Within Minutes’ of Tip, Bloomberg (Jan. 25, 2012) available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
01-26/greenlight-s-david-einhorn-ordered-insider-trades-within-minutes-of-tip.html (reporting that the 
hedge fund avoided a loss of $9.1 million).  
293 Einhorn Decision, supra277, at 14. 
294 Ibid. at 10. 
295 Ibid. 
296 Ibid. (finding that the information was precise because: (a) it indicated an event (i.e., the issue of new 
shares) that may reasonably have been expected to occur and (b) it was specific enough to enable a 
conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect of the share issuance on the price of Punch shares). 
297 Ibid. (holding that the information was significant because a reasonable investor would likely have used 
the information as a basis of his investment decisions). 
298 Ibid. 
	 64	
with management and followed Einhorn’s rejection of being wall crossed.299  The FSA 
found that Einhorn should have been more cautious in assessing the information he 
received.300 Einhorn committed a grave error of judgment in deciding to sell Greenlight’s 
shares in Punch without prior compliance or legal advice, despite the fact that such 
resources are readily available within Greenlight and Einhorn. 301  In the FSA’s eyes, 
“reasonable investors are expected to interpret comments made to them in an appropriate 
manner, which may sometimes mean understanding more than the precise words spoken, 
or interpreting certain comments in light of the context.”302 
 
Although Einhorn believed he was not in violation of insider dealing laws, the 
United Kingdom market abuse regime holds its investors to a high standard and the FSA 
requires diligence from industry members in ensuring they are within legal and regulatory 
framework.303  Thus, after fining Einhorn and Greenlight £7.2 million for insider trading,304 
the FSA even decided to sue Andrew Osborne, Punch’s broker and imposed a fine for 
improper disclosure of inside information.305 Greenlight’s U.K. compliance officer also 
was sued and fined by the FSA, for his failure to make reasonable inquiries that the trade 
instructions were not based on insider information.306 
 
The FSA decision not only to sue Einhorn, but also fine him significantly came as 
a shock to many in the United States.307  In the United States, it is unlikely that Einhorn 
would have come under the same decision in a U.S. court or SEC administrative 
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proceeding.308 Although the Einhorn case can resemble insider trading scenario, it lacks 
important details for it to be brought on charges in the United States.  Despite Einhorn’s 
argument that the information received on the call could not be insider information because 
he refused to sign a non-disclosure agreement.309   
 
In analysing the classical theory310 or misappropriation theory311 of insider dealing 
in the U.S., the Einhorn case lacks the necessary duty to be found in violation of Rule 10b-
5 or Section 10.312  Neither Greenlight nor Einhorn owed a fiduciary duty to Punch or its 
shareholders.313  They also did not fulfil any role or position that would require a fiduciary 
duty to the sources of the information.314In deciding to not sign a confidentiality agreement 
in order to be wall crossed, Einhorn made clear he did not want to be an insider or restrict 
his trading. Thus, there would be no duty owed and no violation of insider dealing laws 
within the United States.315  Additionally, as the SEC v. Cuban case would illustrate, 
establishing a duty is not as simple as signing a confidentiality agreement.316 
 
In contrast, the United Kingdom’s definition of insider trading is much broader, as 
can be evidenced from the Einhorn case. The theory is based on possession of the 																																																								
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information and dealing on a basis of it. The U.S. Supreme Court had rejected the 
possession theory when it overruled the Second Circuits decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co.317in Chiarella. Accordingly, the possession theory in use in the U.K. leads to 
more possibilities of insider dealing cases that could lead to more convictions.  Although 
the U.S. has tried to add to their insider trading laws to create additional scenarios that 
establish a duty of trust or confidentiality, it has not been completely successful.   
 
Martoma in the United States and attachment of liability as a critical 
difference. 	
In February 2014, Mathew Martoma, a former portfolio manager at SAC Capital 
Advisors hedge fund, was found guilty in what U.S. prosecutors have called the most 
lucrative insider trading case in the history of the United States.318  The insider trading 
scheme Martoma was involved in allowed SAC Capital to make profits and avoid losses 
of about $275 million.319 Martoma became the eighth former SAC employee charged for 
insider trading.320 Martoma, who worked in SAC’s CR Intrinsic Investors division and was 
responsible for investment decisions in public companies in the health care sector, 
including Elan Corp. and Wyeth Ltd., which are pharmaceutical companies.321  Both Elan 
and Wyeth were involved in the development of experimental drugs for Alzheimer’s 
disease.322  The results of a clinical trial drug that was being conducted by Elan and Wyeth, 
which offered a novel but untested approach to treating Alzheimer’s, were soon to be 
released, and scientists and investors were eager to hear about the results.323 
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Martoma, who began working for SAC Capital in 2006, began using expert 
networking firms324 in order to try and discuss the drug trials with doctors who were 
involved and who had access to confidential information.325  In his efforts to do this, 
Martoma managed to arrange various paid consultations with one of the drug trial’s 
principal investigators, Dr Joel Ross, along with the Chairman of the drug trial’s Safety 
Monitoring Committee (“SMC”), Dr Sidney Gilman.326  Martoma took advantage of his 
personal and financial relationships with the doctors in order to obtain insider information 
regarding the drug trial.327  Martoma received reports on patients under Dr Ross’s care as 
well as generally positive safety data about the drug trial.328  In fact, after every SMC 
meeting for the trial drug, Martoma would arrange for a paid consultation with Dr Gilman 
in order to be one of the first to hear about any substantive safety issues the drug was 
having, such information could lead to Martoma learning the drug would be cancelled and 
therefore, decrease in Wyeth and Elan stock prices.329  Given that the information he had 
been receiving was generally positive, Martoma purchased and held shares in Elan and 
Wyeth and also recommended the owner of SAC capital, Steve Cohen, to do the same.330  
By spring of 2008, SAC Capital held approximately $700 million worth of Elan and Wyeth 
shares.331 
In July 2008, in preparation for the release of the drug trial’s full results, Dr. Gilman 
received a power point that he was to present at the International Conference on Alzheimer 
Disease (“ICAD Presentation”). The presentation was marked as “Confidential, Do not 
Distribute.” The power point revealed that the trial results were negative and raised serious 
questions about how well the drug would do in the marketplace.332 Martoma found the 
information out after calling Dr Gilman and even flew to meet him to review the power 
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point himself.333  After reviewing the power point, Martoma had a twenty minute phone 
call with Steven Cohen. Cohen soon instructed SAC traders to sell all Elan and Wyeth 
shares prior to the ICAD presentation.  In the course of one week, SAC sold all of its shares 
in Elan and Wyeth, a total of 17.7 million worth $700 million. 334  After the ICAD 
presentation, Elan stock closed 42% lower and Wyeth’s dropped approximately 11%. 
Although Martoma has not been sentenced yet, he is expected to receive record jail time as 
the court’s probation department had recommended a 20 year sentence.335  
 
This case highlights the complexity of insider trading. Expert networks, described 
as “Wall Street matchmakers who connect large investors with outside experts,” have 
grown to capture the SEC’s attention for potential insider trading cases.336  While a quick 
glance at the facts may not show how liability attaches to Martoma and not Einhorn, the 
reason is in the details. Expert networks are not per se illegal or improper.337  However, it 
has often become the case of misusing or actively trying to gain the edge with seeking out 
nonpublic material information in order to trade, as is the case with Martoma. The case can 
fall under the tipper/tippee line of cases that attach liability when an insider provides 
material nonpublic information to an outsider without sufficient justification to do so, and 
the outsider-tippee buys or sells securities based on the information received.338 
 
In order for liability to attach in a tipee case, there are three elements needed for 
Dirks to apply in the Martoma’s case. First, that the outsider-tippee received material non-
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public information from an insider-tipper who knowingly breached their fiduciary duties 
of trust and confidence to the source of the information.339 Second, the tippee must know 
or should have known that the insider was breaching their fiduciary duties by disclosing 
the information.340  Third, the tippee must use the information in a securities transaction.341 
As discussed above, the intent of the tipper does weigh in as a factor. However, the court 
has diminished the requirement of a personal benefit for the tipper.342 In Martoma’s case, 
each element is present to be held liable.  First, Martoma, as the outsider-tippee, received 
a tip from an insider-tipper, Dr. Gilman and Dr. Ross, both who knowingly breached their 
fiduciary duties of trust and confidence to Elan and Wyeth.343  Second, Martoma actively 
sought the information, often exploiting the relationship to gain the information regarding 
the classified drug trial.344  Lastly, Martoma clearly engaged in security transactions based 
on the non-public material information he obtained from the insiders.345 
 
The difference that the tipper-tippee cases present is the analysis needed to attach 
liability.  Dirks established the derivative nature of liability when it comes to tippees in the 
United States.  As discussed above, without a showing of a personal benefit for the tipper, 
the courts would not be able to find the tippee liable.346  Now, the courts are attempting to 
dilute this requirement.  In the Obus case, the court determined that the term “personal 
benefit” has a broad definition and that it is not a high threshold to meet.347  A finding that 
the tipper and tippee were friends in that case was deemed sufficient to question whether 
there was a personal benefit involved in act of disclosing information.348 This is a critical 
movement in the law governing insider trading considering that previously, a tippee would 
only be liable for trading on the material non-public information if the tipper disclosed for 																																																								
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a personal benefit.349 Thus, an inadvertent disclosure or genuine mistake on the part of the 
tipper could have saved the tippee from facing liability.350   
 
Although the courts are now trying to rework the standard in the U.S., the United 
Kingdom has a very different approach to such cases.  In the U.K., the liability is 
irrespective of the tipper’s conduct or liability.351  When there is sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that the tippee knew or should have known they were receiving insider 
information, liability will attach.352  Thus, each party is liable for their own culpable 
behavior, regardless of the liability the other would have.353 In order to determine liability 
and ensure innocent parties are not brought under the statue, there is a scienter 
requirement.354 While neither has a perfect outcome, the United Kingdom again allows for 
greater reach and prosecution of insider dealing cases.  While the United Kingdom requires 
deliberate intent under criminal insider dealing, a civil case can be successful under market 
abuse simply due to inadvertent or unintentional violations.355  This is allowed because 
FSMA does not require an individual to act deliberately or recklessly.356  Thus, under U.K. 
law, a person does not have to be aware that they are committing an unlawful act or 
intentionally commit an illegal trade.  A totality of circumstances will be examined to 
determine whether insider dealing has occurred or not, which bring more defendants under 
the regime.357 
 
 
 																																																								
349 Edward Greene & Olivia Schmid, supra note 158, at 394. 
350 Joan MacLeod Heminway, Willful Blindness, Plausible Deniability and Tippee Liability: Sacs, Steven 
Cohen, and the Court's Opinion in Dirks, 15 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 47, 56 (2013) (conveying the 
fact that U.S. law potentially can allow individuals to structure securities trading in a way that protects 
them from individual, personal liability). 
351 See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 118B (U.K.). 
352 Ibid. 
353 Edward Greene & Olivia Schmid, supra note 158, at 395. 
354 Insiders: Factors to Be Taken into Account, 2000, MAR 1.2.8E (U.K.), available at 
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/MAR/1/2#D46 (discussing the test as whether a reasonable 
person in the individual’s position should have known the information obtained was priviledged). 
355 Masters & McCrum, supra note 315. 
356 Noked, supra note 313. 
357 Kylie Franklin, U.S. v. U.K. Insider Trading Laws: Who Is the Top Dog? (Feb. 21, 2013) available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2308356 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2308356. 
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Strengths and Weaknesses of Insider Dealing Regimes in U.S. and U.K. 
 
In the United States, Rule 10b-5 has been linked to the need for an efficient 
marketplace,358 with the goal of the antifraud regime being to “improve the efficiency of 
the market so that the price reflects value, and therefore, financial, and ultimately real, 
resources will be optimally allocated.”359 Permitting fraud would increase investors’ risks 
and thus cause a lack of confidence.  Although some scholars argue that insider dealing 
should be legalized, 360  many others argue that Rule 10b-5 exist in order to protect 
investors.361  There has even been evidence that suggests the securities laws in the U.S. 
have greatly benefited investors.362 
 
Fraud is an extremely broad concept,363  in which the courts, legislatures, and 
agencies have grappled to fit insider dealing, a narrower concept into it.  The problem with 
the United States fitting insider dealing into a fraud scheme has been that it becomes more 
difficult to determine in what scenarios nondisclosure is deceptive.364  While it is not a 
farfetched idea to contain insider dealing as a type of fraud, it can become problematic also 
in that the determination of whether a type of conduct is deceptive changes overtime to 
meet the expectations of market participants have regarding certain transactions.365  This 
can be noted throughout the judicial interpretations of what it means to breach a fiduciary 
																																																								
358 William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
341, 344–49 (1986) (defining fundamental market efficiency when “prices are based on the rational 
expectations of future payments to which the asset gives title”). 
359 Ibid. 
360 Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog that Did Not Bark, 31 J. Corp. 
L. 167, 174 (2005) (claiming that no corporate actors have advocated for insider trading regulations); See 
Thomas A. Lambert, Overvalued Equity and the Case for an Asymmetric Insider Trading Regime, 41 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 1045, 1083-95 (2006) (proposing an asymmetric change to insider trading laws to 
permit “price-decreasing” insider trading but not “price-enhancing” insider trading). 
361James J. Park, Rule 10b-5 and the Rise of the Unjust Enrichment Principle, 60 DUKE L.J. 345, 351–360 
(2010); Gregg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security 
Issues, 24 J.L. & ECON. 613, 635 (1981).  
362 Park, supra note 361, at 636. 
363 Stonemets v. Head, 154 S.W. 108, 114 (Mo. 1913) (“Fraud is kaleidoscopic, infinite. Fraud being 
infinite and taking on protean form at will, were courts to cramp themselves by defining it with a hard and 
fast definition, their jurisdiction would be cunningly circumvented at once by new schemes beyond the 
definition”). 
364 Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud? 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 562 (2011) (explaining that the 
marketplace also must rely on some acceptable nondisclosures). 
365 Ibid. 
	 72	
duty and what actors are held to a certain duty or obligation.  In early cases, the U.K. 
focused more on the classical theory of insider dealing.366  This meant primarily taking on 
corporate executives and bankers trading based on their own deals.367 As time has gone on, 
the scope of individuals to be included in the securities fraud of insider dealing has 
expanded greatly.368 
 
Additionally, the scope and power behind the insider-dealing regime in the United 
States is much greater than their U.K. counterparts.  The U.S. can manage both criminal 
and civil cases through two enforcers, the SEC and the Justice Department.369 Accordingly, 
even with a narrower definition of the crime of insider dealing than its neighbour across 
the Atlantic, the United States is able to convict and penalize hundreds of people.370 The 
United Kingdom has also sought to protect the integrity of the marketplace as well to ensure 
market efficiency.371  Under the Criminal Justice Act of 1993, the offence of insider dealing 
could only attach liability to individuals, which excluded corporations,372  despite the fact 
that the 1989 European Directive required member states to allow liability for both natural 
and legal persons.373 This later changed with FSMA which expanded the scope of whom 
and what was encompassed under the crime of insider dealing.374  Additionally, prior to 
FSMA, the CJA only provided for criminal liability for insider dealing which had a high 
evidentiary threshold.375 This was problematic for the United Kingdom because the law 
provided a great opportunity to prosecute, but prosecutions were rare due to the heavy 
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime in fact occurred.376  In realizing 																																																								
366 Masters & McCrum, supra note 315. 
367 Ibid. 
368 See id. (examining insider dealing case law which has included reporters, printers, and expert networks). 
369 Ibid. 
370 Michelle Celarier, New Notch for Preet as MArtoma is Convicted of Insider Trading, NEW YORK POST, 
Feb, 6, 2014 (commenting that the U.S. Attorney has convicted 79 people in five years and has lost no 
cases); see also Insider Trading Annual Review 2013, Morrison Foerster, available at 
http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/140108-Insider-Trading-Annual-Review.pdf (discussing that 
the SEC filed 43 insider dealing actions in 2013). 
371 Kern Alexander, Insider Dealing and Market Abuse: The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, 
ESRC CENTRE FOR BUS. RES., U. OF CAMBRIDGE 7–8 (2001), available at 
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP222.pdf. 
372 Criminal Justice Act 1993 (CJA), 36, part V (U.K.) 
373 EC 89/552 (1989). 
374 Alexander, supra note 371, at 8. 
375 Ibid. at 21. 
376 Ibid. 
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not only the importance of market competitiveness and openness, but also the 
representation of a clean and fair marketplace, the U.K. incorporated a civil cause of action 
for market abuse under the FSMA.377 
 
Three key differences lie in the U.K. regime which can bring serious consequences 
to not only corporations, but also investors, who are held to a high standard of due diligence 
in the U.K.  In the U.K. regime, there is no scienter element, breach of duty, or need for 
securities transaction to be convicted or penalized.378  Again, leaving many investors open 
for proceedings or prosecutions in U.K., even if their actions were unintentional.379  Yet, 
despite the wider net for insider dealing, the U.K. is not an effective enforcer. Although 
criminal liability of insider dealing is still difficult and rare to come by, the U.K. is now 
starting to grow into its enforcement role, bringing more cases each year.380  The Financial 
Conduct Authority, although simply replacing the Financial Services Authority, has 
stepped into a role of more aggressive monitoring and investigation.381  While doubts have 
surfaced as to its ability, the FCA and FSA have been coming down on insider dealing 
more and more. 382  A key difference in the amount of enforcement proceedings or 
prosecutions is in part due to the fact that the U.K, while a major world market, it is smaller 
than the U.S.383 Furthermore, the presence of only one enforcement body has a great impact 
on the ability to monitor and investigate insider dealing activity.384  While the U.S. has a 
stream line federal law with dual enforcers, the U.K. has dual laws and a single enforcer. 
This leads to limited resources and different laws to apply for criminal and civil actions.385 
																																																								
377 Ibid. 
378 Michael A. Asaro et a., Perils Across the Pond: Understanding the Differences Between U.S. and U.K. 
Insider Trading Regulation, 5:42 HEDGE FUND L. R. 1, 4 (2012), available at 
http://cdn.akingump.com/images/content/1/9/v4/19299/HFLR-Reprint-11-09-12-Insider-Trading-Perils-
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379 Ibid. 
380 Masters & McCrum, supra note 315. 
381 David Enrich & Harriet Agnew, U.K. Struggles in Fight Against Insider Trading,WALL S. J. an. 4, 2014, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303640604579296520563211360. 
382 Ibid. 
383 Ibid. 
384 Ibid. 
385 Enrich & Agnew, supra note 381; see also Abdulsalam Albelooshi, The Regulation of Insider Dealing: 
An Applied Comparative Legal Study Towards Reform in UAE, at 174(2008), available at 
https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10036/47094/AlbelooshiA.pdf?sequence=2 (“All things 
considered, we would conclude that the UK law of insider dealing is fragmented, opaque and repetitive”). 
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Conclusion 
 
The obligations that the anti–money laundering laws, anti-insider dealing 
regulations and increasingly anti-corruption laws impose on those who handle other 
people’s financial transactions to conduct due diligence and operate effective controls to 
discourage and expose such activity are onerous and well policed.386 Neither the United 
States nor the United Kingdom provides perfect examples of insider dealing regulation. 
The United States is by far the jurisdiction in which insider trading violation are more 
regularly enforced.387 The U.S. has become a model for many other countries in developing 
their laws and enforcement regimes against insider dealing, considering the U.S. has the 
most prosecutions for the crime.388 However, the U.S. regime has also been argued to be 
“inconsistent and erratic . . . regulation that ill serves the investing public.”389  This in turn 
can seem as though the United States’ laws are not sufficient to protect investors and 
market integrity like other markets.390  Nevertheless, the crucial factor is enforcement of 
its laws. While other countries may have wider nets that encompass greater factors for 
insider dealing, the United States is the country that manages to enforce the most, providing 
remedies for the breaches. Statutes and insider dealing regimes will only ever be as 
effective as they can be enforced regularly and bring results.  
 
The United Kingdom, although it has come a long way the past several years, still 
lacks the ability to enforce its broad regime.  As time continues, the U.K. will need to 
ensure monitoring and investigations are fruitful in order to put its regulations to benefit of 
its marketplace.  The U.K.’s insider dealing regime clearly adopts “equal access” approach 
to the prohibition of trading on inside information which profound implications for those 
who trade on U.K. markets. Rather than restrict liability to those who owe a fiduciary duty 
																																																								
386  Barry Rider. Dr. Keren Alexander, Lisa Linklater & Stuart Bazley “Market Abuse and Insider 
Dealing/Second Edition at vii, (2009). 
387 Franklin, supra note 357, at 58. 
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http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/steinb.pdf (observing that while the United States 
has strong enforcement of their insider trading laws, the laws are still not the most effective and concise 
application). 
390 Ibid.  
	 75	
to the issuer or the source of the information, the FSMA and the CJA impose liability on a 
broad range of market participants who come to acquire inside information through means 
that would not restrict them from trading in the United States. 391   
 
Despite strong regulatory and enforcement powers, the US business judgment rule 
presumptions generally afford directors and officers protection from personal liability for 
prudent, informed business decisions made in good faith. As in the UK and other European 
jurisdiction, directors and officers generally obtain protection from personal liability 
through indemnification agreements and directors and officers liability insurance in the 
absent of bad faith or malfeasance, but such protections are limited in certain circumstance 
by law and regulation.392  While the control of insider dealing has much in common with 
the prevention and interdiction of money laundering the next chapter will examine the 
money laundering. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MONEY LAUNDERIGN REGULATION AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF 
TERRORISM 
 
Introduction 
 
The steps taken in recent years against banks by regulators and law enforcement 
bodies in relation to money laundering have garnered a lot of publicity. The year 2015 saw 
Barclays fined £72m by the FCA over a £1.9bn deal that ran the risk of being used by 
launderers and those financing terrorism.393 In the USA, matters are more extreme. HSBC 
was fined US$1.92bn for allowing itself to be used by launderers in Mexico and terrorist 
financiers in the Middle East.394 Which causes major threats to financial stability.   
 
Financing is critical for terror organizations to operate.395  As long as terrorists have 
access to streams of money, their violent acts will continue.396  Since September 11, 2001 
(“9/11”), reports have been issued stating that al-Qaeda requires an estimated $30-50 
million per year to operate, which is generated from a network of charities, 
nongovernmental organizations, mosques, websites, intermediaries, facilitators, and banks 
and other financial institutions.397  
																																																								
393 Andrew Haynes, (2016) “Editorial”, Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 19 Iss; 4, pp. 314 - 315 
394 Ibid  
395 In a 2007 interview, former al-Qaeda Chief Treasurer Sheik Saeed declared that “funding is the 
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397 Jimmy Gurulé, Unfunding Terror: The Legal Response to the Financing of Global Terrorism 3 (2008); 
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[hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://www.9-
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Accordingly, the global “war” on money laundering has intensified since the 
attacks of 9/11, and this has included combating terrorist financing as well.398 The war on 
terror is not a cheap battle for countries either.  Various analysts have estimated that 
fighting the War on Terror has cost the United States more than $3 trillion.399  Similarly, it 
has been estimated that the United Kingdom spends an estimated £3.5 billion per year to 
fight terrorism.400  However, although the United States has spent large amounts of money 
to fight terrorism with its military, there are many analysts who are concerned that it has 
not invested sufficient resources in fighting the real lifeline of terrorism: its clandestine 
network of global financing.401 
 
In addition to military action on the ground, countries must also work to prevent 
terrorist attacks from occurring by cutting off their financial resources.402  A successful war 
on terror must reach “deep into the financial heart of terrorism” because terrorists are able 
to accomplish their violent attacks with very little money, which means they can plan a 
number of them.403 For instance, while the 9/11 attacks cost al-Qaeda approximately 
$400,000-$500,000,404 the London transit bombings on July 7, 2005, cost terrorist only 																																																								
398 Richard K. Gordon, Losing the War Against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global Standards on Preventing 
Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 503, 506 (2011) [hereinafter 
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401 Task Force, Council on Foreign Relations, Terrorist Financing, 2-3 (2002) [hereinafter CFR, TERRORIST 
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detection mechanisms in place at the time.”); U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-04-163, Terrorist 
Financing: U.S. Agencies Should Systematically Assess Terrorists' Use of Alternative Financing 
Mechanisms 9 (2003) (“To move assets, terrorists use mechanisms that enable them to conceal or launder 
their assets through nontransparent trade or financial transactions such as charities, informal banking 
systems, bulk cash, and commodities such as precious stones and metals.”); Michael Jacobson & Matthew 
Levitt, Staying Solvent: Assessing Al-Qaeda's Financial Portfolio, JANE'S STRATEGIC ADVISORY SERVS., 13 
(Nov. 2009), available at 
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/4b28f9a9e2216.pdf (“Due to the increased 
international scrutiny, Al-Qaeda has also become far more security conscious in its fundraising activities.”) 
402 Vietlong Nguyen, Stop the Money, Stop the Attacks: A Categorical Approach to Achieving an 
International Terrorist Financing Sanction Regime, 1 PENN ST. J.L. & INT'L AFF. 157, 160 (2012). 
403 Shima Baradaran et. al., Funding Terror, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 480-81 (2014) 
404 See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 13 (noting further that of that sum, “approximately 
$300,000 was deposited into U.S. bank accounts of the 19 hijackers”) 
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about $15,000.405  Furthermore, besides direct funds for attacks, terrorist organizations 
need vast amounts of money for the use of indirect activities to maintain their organization 
and infrastructure.406  As terrorist organizations, such as al Qaeda, and now Boko Haram,407 
emerge and wreak havoc, it is just another reminder that countries must follow the money 
as a means stop terrorist from intensifying their efforts.408 
 
This chapter will discuss the importance taking into account the unique features of 
terrorist financing in order to combat it through anti-money laundering measures.  This 
chapter will first discuss the definition of money laundering and its process.409  Next, the 
chapter will move to discuss terrorism and the link between financing terrorism and money 
laundering.410  Then, this chapter will examine legislative efforts by both the United States 
and the United Kingdom and how they have helped lead the world in the fight against 
terrorism financing, while also discussing weaknesses of each regime.411 
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Background	
Money laundering what is it? 	
Estimates have been given that between $590 billion and $1.5 trillion is laundered 
globally every year, making up 2-5% of the world’s GDP.412  Money laundering is “the 
process by which one conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of 
income, and then disguises that income to make it appear legitimate.”413  By having the 
funds appear to be legitimate, those handling the proceeds are able to have it flow through 
society without the funds being confiscated or being prosecuted for the act.414  Money 
laundering can turn out to be a very profitable and complex enterprise,415 which makes it a 
vital tool for organized crime and terrorist alike.416  Although initial anti-money laundering 
efforts were aimed at preventing illegal drug trafficking from benefiting from their 
proceeds, 417  anti-money laundering now targets various criminal activities, including 
financing terrorist.418   
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418 Paul Allan Schott, Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism (2004) (commenting the scope of money laundering). 
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Regardless of the activity, money laundering tends to involve three steps in order 
to be successful.  These steps are: placement, layering, and integration.419  Placement is the 
first step and involves the money launderer to usually place large amounts of “dirty” money 
into a legitimate enterprise.420  This is usually accomplished by depositing the funds into a 
bank account. Exchanging of currency can also be conducted at this initial stage as well.  
The placement must be done without attracting attention from the financial institution or 
law enforcement.421 
 
After the money has been placed, the funds are then “layered” into various 
transactions in order to avoid being traced to their origins.422  The purpose of this step is to 
“create confusion and complicate the paper trail.”423  At this point, the funds may be used 
to purchase other securities, insurance contracts, or other transferable investments.  Funds 
often shift though various financial institutions, being sold or transferred as check, money 
order, bonds, etc.  Shell corporations424 may also be utilized and the funds can be disguised 
as a transfer for payment of goods or services.425 
 
 
As the money begins to be used and “cleaned”, they are then integrated into 
legitimate financial uses, such as bank notes, loans, or other various legal financial 
instruments.426  This stage is done to achieve the main goal of laundering money, which is 
“to create the appearance of legality through additional transactions.”427   The various 
transactions help to shield the criminal from any connection to the funds.428  Furthermore, 
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as each stage in the money-laundering scheme is completed, it becomes more difficult to 
detect where the illegal funds are going and who is behind the scheme.429 
 
As a means to combat money laundering, the Financial Action Task Force 
(“FATF”), an intergovernmental organization, was founded in 1989 at the G-7 summit in 
Paris.430  Since 9/11, it has become the lead organization to develop and promote measures 
aimed at combating money laundering and terrorist financing.431  The FATF provides 
recommendations to its members and also monitors members’ progress in implementing 
money laundering laws and regulations. 432 The FATF has issued 40 recommendation on 
money laundering and 9 Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.433 However, 
these recommendations are highly regarded as “soft law” because although successful at 
getting member states to implement them, the recommendations are not required.434 
Financing Terrorism and the Link to Money Laundering 
 
Terrorist financing is where terrorists use the financial system to fund their illegal 
activities.435 The process of money laundering is essential to terrorist in order to avoid 
detection. 436  Even before the events of 9/11, the United Nations had established the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), which 
provides: 
 
1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person by 
any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with 
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the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full 
or in part, in order to carry out: 
(a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one 
of the treaties listed in the annex; or 
(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or 
to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed 
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to 
abstain from doing any act. 
2….. 
3. For an act to constitute an offence set forth in paragraph 1, it shall not be necessary that 
the funds were actually used to carry out an offence referred to in paragraph 1, 
subparagraphs (a) or (b).437 
   
Although the U.N. Financing Convention was in existence prior to the events of 
9/11, it was not until after the attacks when countries began to bolster their national efforts 
against money laundering.438  Global efforts also intensified to combat the financing of 
terrorism.  The United Nations Security Council quickly passed Resolution 1373,439 which 
urged states to become parties to the U.N. Financing Convention and condemned terrorism, 
particularly the financing of terrorist activities.440  Prior to Resolution 1373, there were 
only forty-eight states who had signed the Financing Convention, only four of which had 
actually ratified.441  Following the Resolution, 84 states signed the Convention, twenty-one 
of which ratified it.442 
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Still, despite the concern for terrorism, there is a lack of a universal definition to 
implement into domestic legislation or to utilize in international law.443  Many countries 
differ on how they define terrorism and what acts constitute terrorism.444  However, the 
FATF has recommended many countries to adopt the definition provided in the U.N. 
Financing Convention.445 
 
Given the various political, religious and national implications, countries still differ 
on how to define the term.446Since 9/11, anti-money laundering measures have been the 
focus for combating terrorist financing.447The initial phase of procuring funds for terrorist 
can often differ from other organized criminals because terrorist’s sources of money may 
be legitimate rather than illicit.448 Terrorists frequently use charities and fundraising as a 
primary method to increase their funding.449  The reason for this is primarily the zakat, one 
of the five pillars of Islam, is a religious duty for all Muslims to provide some of their 
income to humanitarian causes.450  Unfortunately, terrorist organizations have found ways 
to abuse the zakat to help finance their operations.451 The problem in trying to regulate this 
duty is that although some knowingly donate to causes that have terrorist aims, many do 
not.452 
 
																																																								
443 See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
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Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 17 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing U.S. Dep't. of State, Patterns of 
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446 See Morris, supra note 453, at 3 (discussing the benefit of a single definition of terrorism but the 
problems in achieving such a goal). 
447 See Baradaran, supra note 405 at 490. 
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J. Int'l L. 673, 675 (2004) (asserting that the difference between money launder of criminal profits and 
terrorist financing is that criminals clean dirty money while terrorist dirty clean money). 
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Once funds are obtained, placement or layering of them for terrorist financing can 
be accomplished through the use of Informal Value Transfer Systems (“IVTS”). 453  
Although IVTS is referred to as “underground banking” or as an “alternative” for 
remittances, neither of these terms describe the system accurately.454  IVTS networks are 
able to operate both openly and legally because a majority of their services are actually 
legitimate and deal with clean money.455  Additionally, many countries utilize the IVTS 
network as their main financial system, not as an alternative.456 
 
A major example of an IVTS is the Hawala system, 457  which provides fast, 
inexpensive, reliable and convenient service, which attracts many legitimate customers.458 
Another feature of the Hawala system though is that it leaves little to no trace, which is a 
benefit to money launders and terrorists alike.459  In using the Hawala system, no money is 
actually physically transferred and can be done anonymously.460  Theoretically, as an 
IVTS, the Hawala system does fall under the regulatory system within the United States. 
Thus, they should maintain financial records, file suspicious activity reports and register as 
a money service business461 with FinCEN.462  These regulations never come into practice 
for many Hawalas who tend to serve immigrant communities which presents language and 
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Laundering, 91 TEX. L. REV. 711, 716 (2013) (defining money service businesses to be “nonbank firms that 
specialize in money transfer services rather than the provision of traditional financial products”). 
462 See infra discussion III.A. 
	 85	
cultural barriers for enforcement and compliance with regulations.463  Law enforcement 
has trouble monitoring the Hawalas and their existence still puzzles many who do not know 
the system.464 
 
 As such, terrorist funds can come from both legitimate sources as well as criminal 
activities.  They may also use informal or formal banking systems to place, layer or 
integrate the funds. Money laundering schemes are utilized by terrorist organizations in 
order to conceal their funds and to have the money available to them for future terrorist 
financing activities.465  Law enforcement can face several obstacles considering the manner 
in which terrorist launder money.  Primarily, it becomes increasingly difficult because law 
enforcement may be on the watch for illegal activity when in fact terrorist can often utilize 
legitimate means in order to fundraise money.466 Additionally, the various avenues and 
methods that terrorist can launder the money complicate the problem even more. 467  
Accordingly, terrorist financing differs from traditional money laundering in that it often 
dirties clean money, but it can also clean dirty money when it launders from criminal or 
illicit activity.468 
 
Nevertheless, terrorist financing uses money laundering in similar ways and for 
similar objectives.469 The need for significant amounts of money to go undetected is one 
of the ways in which terrorist use the money laundering process.470 Even when using 
legitimate sources, such as money from charities, terrorist must launder the money in order 
to prevent these sources from being discovered.471 This purpose is critical to terrorist 																																																								
463 §2.06 Alternative Banking System, CCH Fed. Banking Law Reporter. 2014 WL 989496. 
464 Ibid. 
465 Schott, supra note 21, at 1-5. 
466 See Baradaran, supra note 405 at 489 (noting the difficulties for detecting terrorist money laundering). 
467 Stefan D. Haigner et. al., Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism: A Survey, 
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terrorism to “mask financial resources and activities from the scrutiny of state authorities”). 
470 See Martuscello, supra note 430, at 369. 
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financing because it not only helps ensure their benefactors are safe from punishment, but 
also allows the terrorist to continue to have access to those sources in the future.472 
Terrorists also need to conceal the use of the funds in order to carry out their activities.473  
Consequently, although the aims may be similar, terrorist financing may not always be 
handled in the same manner as traditional money laundering.474  
Combating the Financing of Terrorism  
 
The United States and the United Kingdom have both enacted major legislation in 
an attempt to curtail terrorist financing.  These new laws focusing on terrorist financing are 
due to the terrorist attacks that have occurred since 2000.475  Both of these countries have 
help lead the global effort to combat terrorist financing, albeit in distinct ways.476  The next 
section reviews the history of each country’s legislation, noting their strengths and 
deficiencies in the war on terror financing. 
United States 
 
As stated above, the United States has spent an immense amount of money on 
military, security and intelligence efforts as a means to combat terrorism.477  The efforts to 
tackle terrorist financing in the U.S. grew out of legislation that addressed traditional 
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organized crime and money laundering.  This was because prior to 9/11, the U.S. did not 
consider financing monitors as a means to combat terrorism.478 
 
Money laundering was not a new issue for the U.S. legislature.  The Bank Secrecy 
Act of 1970 (“BSA”) was the first legislative initiative.479  The BSA required financial 
institutions480 to maintain certain records and authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to 
require the institutions and persons conducting transactions to file Suspicious Activity 
Reports (SARs) on the transactions to the Secretary.481  The financial institutions covered 
by the BSA were thus required to report each deposit, withdrawal, currency exchange or 
other payment or transfer that were more than $10,000.482  It is not surprising that the BSA 
was unpopular among financial institutions for the burdensome requirements, which are a 
strict liability offence if the institution fails to comply.483  Additionally, the requirements 
can be seen as ineffective because criminals and terrorist alike would know to simply 
deposit smaller amounts.  However, such behaviour, known as “smurfing,” was than 
required to be reported by financial institutions as well.484 
 
During the 1980s, due to the prevalence of money laundering, led to the enactment 
of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (“Money Laundering Act”).485  The Money 
Laundering Act established liability for any individual who conducts a financial transaction 
with knowledge that the funds originated from illegal or illicit activity.486  The Act also set 
out to prohibit all “monetary transaction[s] in criminally derived property” in excess of 
$10,000.487  The money laundering act drew from various definitions of income from other 
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legislative acts that were implemented to address organized crime such as drug trafficking, 
prostitution, gambling.488   
 
After 9/11, the United States shifted its focus to actually tracking terrorist financing 
and implementing measures to accomplish this aim.489  Following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. 
passed the Patriot Act to address domestic terrorism.490  The Patriot Act was legislated in 
order to improve the government’s anti-money laundering efforts and tackle terrorist 
financing.491 The Patriot Act not only strengthened the existing BSA system by adding to 
the types of financial institutions covered, but also conferred on the Treasury the authority 
to examine the financial institutions and ban suspect accounts.492 The Act also turned 
failure to comply with the BSA into a criminal offence rather than civil.493  The financial 
institutions were also required to know their customers better, using their full and accurate 
name and to maintain records of date of births, social security number, and passport 
number.494 The financial institutions covered by the Act were also required to file various 
new SARs, along with non-financial trades or businesses.495 Additionally, money service 
businesses without licenses were also brought into the regulatory regime.496 To further 
																																																								
by, through, or to a financial institution ... ‘but does not include’ any transaction necessary to preserve a 
person's right to representation as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the Constitution.” 
488 Andres Rueda, International Money Laundering Law Enforcement & the USA Patriot Act of 2001, 10 
MSU-DCL J. INT'L L. 141, 147-49 (2001) (relaying the scope of the Money Laundering Act). 
489 Donohue, supra note 476, at 368. 
490 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.). [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act] (defining 
domestic terrorism as “acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United 
States or of any State” intended to “intimidate or coerce a civilian population”, “influence the policy of a 
government by intimidation or coercion” or “affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping” that are conducted primarily within the jurisdiction of the United States). 
491 See Sorcher, supra note 431, at 396-97 (commenting that the under the PATRIOT Act increased the 
U.S. government's powers to combat money laundering and terrorist financing).  
492Eric J. Gouvin, Bringing Out the Big Guns: The USA Patriot Act, Money Laundering, and the War on 
Terrorism, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 955, 970 (2003). 
493 Guiora & Field, supra note 396, at 78. 
494 Patriot Act §326. 
495 Ibid. §§356(a)-(b), 365. 
496 Ibid. at §373; see also Guiora & Field, supra note 396, at 83 (stating the importance of including   
unlicensed money businesses to fight the abuse of informal value transfer systems). 
	 89	
strengthen the efforts, the unlicensed entities are required to verify the identity of any 
customer or beneficiary receiving money transfer of more than $3,000.497 
 
The Patriot Act reinforces the sanctions for failing to comply with the anti-money 
laundering provisions by: (1) requiring federal banking agencies to take into account a 
financial institution's record of anti-money laundering efforts when reviewing applications 
in for a bank merger or acquisition;498 (2) implementing civil and criminal penalties of up 
to $1 million for financial institutions for violations of the Patriot Act's money laundering 
provisions;499 and (3) authorizing the Secretary to mandate a U.S. correspondent bank to 
dissolve correspondent banking relationships with a foreign bank that fails to comply with 
or contests a U.S. summons or subpoena.500 Thus, the provisions in their totality provide 
for the Patriot Act’s focus on combating terrorist financing.501  The regulatory requirements 
of due diligence, record keeping, and reporting by both formal financial institutions and 
informal funds transfer systems are designed to detect and criminalize money laundering 
as well as providing material support to terrorist organizations as a means to fight terrorist 
financing.502   
 
Beyond legislative initiatives, the United States also established the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), which works with domestic law enforcement 
agencies to ensure compliance with legislation. 503   The international counterpart to 
FinCEN became the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), whose purpose is to 
disrupt and freeze illicit funds internationally.504 																																																								
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United Kingdom  
 
The British government has designated 58 organizations as a terrorist and banned 
them. 44 of these organizations were banned under the Terrorism Act of 2000. Two of 
these were also banned under the Terrorism Act of 2006 for “glorifying terrorism” other 
than the far right new Nazi National Action, the other fourteen organizations operate (for 
the most part) in Northern Ireland, and were banned under previous legislation.505 The 
United Kingdom has greater experience with terrorist financing due to its battles with the 
Irish Republican Army (“IRA”).506 Since 1974, the U.K. has had specialized terrorist 
legislation.507  Initially, legislation in the U.K. focused on robberies and tax fraud, but 
shifted to more sophisticated organized crime, such as drug trafficking, in its effort to 
curtail terrorist financing. 508  In 2000, the United Kingdom implemented their first 
permanent legislation to combat terrorism, the Terrorism Act, which applied to terrorist 
acts509 in the U.K. in general as well as in Northern Ireland and international acts.510  A 
major component of the 2000 Act is its criminalization of terrorist financing. 511 The 
Terrorism Act did allow law enforcement to ask financial institutions for customer 
information, however in order to obtain the information, the law enforcement agents were 
required to go through a warrant process.512 Furthermore, the type of information that could 
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be obtained was limited. 513 The judicial protections limited the older legislation, 
highlighting the importance of due process in the fight against terrorism.514 
 
The principle legislation relating to money laundering is now the POCA 2002 
which has also been amended on many occasions; most recently in the Serious Crime Act 
2015.515 However, there are also important provisions in the Terrorism Act 2000, the Anti–
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001and the Terrorism (United Nations) Order 2001.  
Following the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the United Kingdom sought to further their 
counterterrorist legislation.516  This led to the implementation of the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act (“ATCSA”).517 The ATCSA authorized the State to confiscate any 
money that was believed to be associated with terrorist operations, regardless of whether a 
court brought a proceeding in relation to the money.518  The ATCSA disregarded the 
judiciary’s role in freezing assets of entities that were not within the United Kingdom.519 
The ATCSA also amended the Terrorism Act of 2000 by authorizing law enforcement to 
apply for an open warrant, which gave the agents the power to conduct open ended 
investigations rather than undergoing the warrant procedures whenever a terrorist related 
matter arose.520  It became a criminal offence whenever any person in the “regulated 
system” failed to notify law enforcement when there were reasonable grounds to suspect a 
person of a terrorist offence and laundering terrorist proceeds.521 
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After the 2005 London bus bombings,522 Parliament felt the need to once again 
strengthen its counterterrorism efforts which led to the Terrorism Act of 2006 (“2006 
Act”).523The 2006 Act, while relying on the 2000 Act’s definition of terrorism, also 
expanded the type of offences that can be criminalized by including the encouragement of 
terrorism, 524  glorification of terrorist activities 525  and the distribution of “terrorist 
publications.” 526  Consequently, the 2006 Act intensified the “flexibility of [its] 
proscription regime.”527  The 2006 Act also expanded upon the 2000 Act’s prohibition on 
terrorist organizations.528  The Act has been found to go further than any other legislation 
of its kind in the United Kingdom.529 
Are these Efforts Effective? 
 
The various methods implemented by the United States and the United Kingdom 
do provide obstacles to terrorist financing.  The due diligence requirements to “know your 
customer”, the monitoring of financial records as well as the other regulatory actions raise 
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awareness of the possibility of terrorist financing.530 However, it is debatable to what extent 
these measures are benefiting the combat of terrorist financing.531  In practice, the fact that 
many of the U.K. and U.S. counterterrorist initiatives developed from anti-money 
laundering hinders their effectiveness.532Although the U.K had been dealing with terrorist 
acts for some time now, their pre-9/11 legislation was still focused on traditional money 
laundering. Similarly, the U.S. applied their anti-money laundering tools and simply 
relabelled them to combat terrorist financings. Though there are similarities between 
money laundering and terrorist financing as discussed above, the differences must be 
addressed in order for a system to be effective, for the state to truly be able to combat 
terrorist acts, and for the system to be fair to all those regulated.  
 
As an example, although the United States money laundering regulations were not 
designed to pick up on terrorist activity prior to 9/11, the system was still very similar to 
what has developed from the Patriot Act, but it still failed to discover the 9/11 plot.  The 
9/11 Commission found that the nineteen hijackers who were responsible for the 9/11 
attacks had actually opened bank accounts, established inter-connected drawing rights, 
received various international money transfers and did not seem to worry whether or not 
their financial activity would attract unwanted attention.533 The anti-money laundering 
tools did not catch any of the hijackers’ behaviour. In fact, they did not conduct their 
financial activity in any manner that would be viewed as illegal or out of the ordinary.534  
Even if the hijackers were to have gone about with their financial plans after the heightened 
regulations following 9/11, they would probably not have been discovered.535 
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has been successful in thwarting terrorist operations). 
532 Ibid. 
533 John Roth, Douglas Greenburg & Serena Wille, Monograph on Terrorist Financing: Staff Report to the 
Commission 52-53 (2004) [hereinafter Staff Report] (detailing an extensive overview of the funding tools 
prior to 9/11).   
534 Barrett, supra note 530, at 721. 
535 Ibid., see also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 397, at 169 (“The plotters' tradecraft was not 
especially sophisticated, but it was good enough. They moved, stored, and spent their money in ordinary 
ways, easily defeating the detection mechanisms in place at the time”). 
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The 9/11 hijackers highlight a very specific problem to anti-terrorist funding, 
namely there must be something more for financial institutions to look for in order to make 
the link to terrorist financing.  As such, identifying clients, creating client profiles and 
monitoring their activity is insufficient when the regulated institutions lack guidance on 
what they actually should be watching for.536  While every terrorist act requires funding, 
and more often than not they will act within the regulated financial industry, it is not helpful 
when the legislative and regulatory tools do not provide proactive measures to identify the 
danger.537 
Financial Reporting and Regulations 
 
Financial agencies have long provided anti-money laundering efforts since before 
9/11.  The post 9/11 regulations have expanded their reach and caused a misfit in handling 
the burden and has not been as effective as they should or could be in preventing terrorist 
financing.538  For example, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, or FinCEN, has 
been transformed from an office that monitored the financial transactions of criminals into 
one that looks for similar transactions by terrorists.539 However, as noted, these transactions 
or even behaviour may not be similar and can be more difficult to track or discover.  The 
result is that in theory, FinCEN looks for a financial lead that will help investigators and 
prosecutors discover terrorist.540 Unfortunately, in practice, the agency does little more 
than policing of the reports of the financial institutions covered by the BSA and the Patriot 
Act.541 
As the United Kingdom and United States have turned to heavy regulation and 
criminalization of financial institutions who fail to report, there has been an increase in 
suspicious activity reports in both countries.  In 2004, the Economist stated, “banks in 
America and elsewhere are trying to cover themselves by filing even more ‘suspicious 
activity reports.’ Regulators are swamped with information. Alas, most of it is 																																																								
536 FATF, Guidance for Financial Institutions in Detecting Terrorist Financing 3 (2002) (“[i]t should be 
acknowledged…that financial intuitions will probably be unable to detect terrorist financing as such”). 
537 See Barrett, supra note 530, at 722 (reiterating the importance of financial institutions to have an idea of 
what information would be useful to detect). 
538 David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1359, 1410 (2007). 
539 Ibid. 
540 Ibid. 
541 Ibid. 
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useless.”542The increase of SARs has overwhelmed the regulators in both countries, and 
many are unsure of their value at times.543  While there are a number of SARs being filed, 
the number of successful prosecutions is limited.544As a result, what is actually occurring 
in the combat of terrorist financing is an overflow of false positives.545 Nevertheless, 
effective and dependable anti-terrorist financing measures need the private sector and their 
financial reports.546  The regulated financial institutions are where terrorist are more likely 
to become noticed because although terrorist financing is not identical to money 
laundering, the techniques and stages are still the same.547 Financial institutions are best to 
spot terrorist financing because they know their clients, what their clients are spending 
money on, how often and when. Thus, they provide a wealth of knowledge.548  However, 
banks and other institutions covered by regulations know about the same as the state when 
it comes to terrorism.549  Unfortunately, many do not learn about the way a terrorist is 
funding its operations until something happens and financing of these operations hardly 
are the same.550 
This discussion is not to conclude that the financial regulatory tools that the United 
Kingdom and the United States are completely ineffective. Overall, it is difficult to 
determine and evaluate the situation with little evidence because of the very nature of 
money laundering and terrorist financing.551  Within months of issuing Executive Order 
13,244552 and the Patriot Act, the Bush Administration declared victory for the United 
																																																								
542 Coming Clean; Money-laundering, ECONOMIST (U.S. Edition), Oct. 16, 2004, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/3292933. 
543 John Adams, Anti-Money Laundering: Diligence is Getting Pretty Pricey, Bank Technology News, Aug. 
2007), available at http://www.dominion-advisors.com/press/in-the-news/2007/anti-money-laundering-
diligence-getting-pretty-pricey (“Frustration mounts that ... [the suspicious transaction reports] filed were 
of no use to apathetic or overwhelmed government authorities”) 
544 See Losing the War Against Dirty Money, supra note 398 at 543. 
545 Ibid. 
546 Barrett, supra note 530, at 730. 
547 See Terrorist Financing Indicators, supra note 438, at 795 (concluding that fourteen of the twenty-four 
cases with sufficient financial information existed used traditional money laundering methods). 
548 Ibid. 
549 Ibid. 
550 Barrett, supra note 530, at 730. 
551 See generally Morris, supra note 453 (providing reasons why it is difficult to determine the extent 
financing terrorism should be the focus because of the lack of evidence). 
552 See Staff Report, supra note 533, at 45 (explaining that the two goals of the Executive Order were to halt 
funding to al Qaeda and to let the public know action was being taken). 
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States in combating terrorist financing.553  Recently, President Obama also claimed that al 
Qaeda was diminishing.554  Also, as recent developments in al Qaeda and other terrorist 
groups have demonstrated, there has not been a victory or a diminishing threat.555 
 
Effect on Privacy and Civil Rights 
	
In addition to the practical implications, the tools used to fight terrorist financing 
and money laundering also brings with it other issues.  The regulations implemented by 
the United States and United Kingdom, while not as effective in fighting terrorist financing, 
have many financial privacy issues along with an effect on civil rights. Privacy issues are 
under siege now that the Patriot Act allows the federal government to request and obtain 
sensitive and private data without a warrant, so long as the agency can fit the investigation 
into one of the two hundred offences listed. 556  Obviously such actions put financial 
institutions ability to safeguard information into question. 557  With strict penalties for 
failure to comply, financial institutions may also report information voluntarily in their 
suspicious activity reports. 
 
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects free speech, 
which includes the solicitation of funds, which has been viewed as essential for the 
exchange of information and ability of citizens to support various positions.558 However, 																																																								
553 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of the Treas., Contribution by the Department of the Treasury to the Financial War 
on Terrorism, Factsheet 6 (Sept. 2002) (declaring, “Our war on terror is working--both here in the United 
States and overseas ... al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are suffering financially as a result of our 
actions. Potential donors are being more cautious about giving money to organizations where they fear the 
money might wind up in the hands of terrorists. In addition, greater regulatory scrutiny over financial 
systems around the world in the future may identify those who would support terrorist groups or 
activities.”); Victor Mallet, Terrorist Funds “Being Squeezed, ”FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 11, 2002, at 12 
(quoting Paul O'Neill's claims that the United States has been successful in its fight against terror 
financing); U.S. Says al Qaeda Hurting for Funds, REUTERS, May 18, 2005, (Treasury Undersecretary 
Stuart Levey announcing that al Qaeda was in financial difficulties). 
554 Remarks by the President at the National Defence University, May 23, 2013, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defence-university 
(claiming that al Qaeda is on the “path to defeat”). 
555 Barbara Starr, Unsettling Video Shows Large al Qaeda Meeting in Yemen, CNN (Apr. 16, 2014) 
available at http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/15/world/al-qaeda-meeting-video/ (remarking on a video which 
demonstrates “the largest and most dangerous gathering of al Qaeda in years”)  
556 Donohue, supra note 476, at 407. 
557 Rob Garver, Will USA Patriot Act Prove a Recipe for Trouble? Government Access to Banking 
Information vs. Right to Privacy, American Banker, Apr. 23, 2002, at 10. 
558 Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). 
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today there are serious risks if one chooses to support an Islamic charity or to do business 
with Islamic or Arab entities.559  After new terrorist financing legislation was implemented 
in the United States, mere association with these entities could lead to assets being frozen 
or rejection from financial institutions.560 
 
The United Kingdom goes a step further in its impact on civil rights. By 
criminalizing speech that is considered encouragement of terrorist activities or 
glorification, the U.K.’s 2006 Act has received a great deal of criticism.561  Critics argue 
that the 2006 Act does not adequately address conduct that is covered by the offence.562  
Further, they state the vagueness of the definition along with the terms used to describe the 
offence covers a wide variety of conduct which provides a chilling effect and could lead to 
self-censorship.563Both the U.S. and U.K. virtually drop intent as an element for terrorist 
financing.  This can be problematic for privacy issues, civil rights and also property matters 
(i.e. frozen assets).  With low burdens to prove association or that a person has encouraged 
terrorist, many individuals are put at risk for abuse of the state.564  This also implicates an 
individual’s right to freedom of religion.565 
 
As it can be noted, there are a myriad of interests involved in efforts to combat 
terrorist financing. There is a need for states to not only implement proactive legislation in 
order to achieve national security interests, but there is also a need to balance individual 
civil rights that are connected to these concerns. This is a two-fold effort.   First, the 
government must ensure that it implements effective, but that their measures are not overly 
broad. Second, they must ensure that they are respecting the liberties of people and the 
market. 
 
 																																																								
559 Donohue, supra note 476, at 406. 
560 Ibid. 
561 Ellen Parker, Implementation of the U.K Terrorism Act 2006-the Relationship Between 
Counterterrorism Law, Free Speech, and the Muslim Community in the United Kingdom Versus the United 
States, 21 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 711, 749 (2007). 
562 Ibid. 
563 Ibid. (stating that this would be in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights). 
564 Ibid. 
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Conclusion 
 
Terrorism has not been defeated or diminished.  While there have been significant 
measures implemented to defund terrorist activity, there is still much to be done. 566  
Terrorists have the ability to obtain large amounts of money and perform atrocities that 
require very little funding. Terrorist are able to adapt quick and stay ahead of regulators 
and legislators by going unnoticed amongst the myriad of laws that are aimed at stopping 
them. While terrorist funding utilizes the same techniques as money launderers, and they 
may share the same objectives, more or less, it is insufficient to base an entire anti-terrorist 
funding regime around traditional anti-money laundering mechanisms. It is critical to 
observe the similarities while also taking note of the differences in the two schemes. 
 
Counterterrorism still holds a place in traditional mechanism such as the military, 
law enforcement, and intelligence mechanisms. However, the funding of terrorist 
organizations needs to be made a top priority as well.  This could be done through new, 
specialized anti-terrorism agencies.567  This would enable the focus to be targeted directly 
at how terrorist procure funds and move them through the system.  This is critical 
considering the vast amount of channels terrorist organizations have at their disposal.  
Specialized agencies would also hone in on what makes terrorist financing unique from 
money laundering.   
 
Furthermore, financial institutions covered by the post-9/11 laws and regulations 
need to provided further guidance on how to monitor their businesses.  It is not enough that 
financial institutions report every transaction for fear of being penalized.  The laws need to 
work smarter, rather than harder.  Guidance must be provided on how to link transactions 
with potential terrorist.  At the moment, institutions have become confused and are unable 
to distinguish legitimate transactions from those that must be reported.568  This overloads 
																																																								
566 See generally Baradaren, supra note 403 (discussing the gaps in the system through the experiment of 
opening a shell company). 
567 Zaring & Baylis, supra note 538, at 1426. 
568 Watterson, supra note 461, at 732. 
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the agencies tasked to filter these reports and provides little security in preventing or 
catching terrorist activity. 
 
Additionally, as this chapter has noted, more effective measures towards other 
means of terrorist financing outside of the formal institutions must be addressed.  Charities 
and non-profits should be considered and new oversight measures should be implemented.  
However, any such measures must be done in recognition of the delicate balance between 
government interest and individual rights.  The identification of Informal Value Transfer 
System is also crucial in a regime to combat terrorist financing.  By identifying these 
entities, regulators can ensure compliance with the various laws to gain assistance and 
information for potential threats.  
  
Combating terrorist financing must be at the forefront of governments around the 
world.  It is insufficient that only a few implement the various measures that the United 
States and the United Kingdom have.  Terrorist financing is a global crime.  Funds move 
across the world through a variety of channels.  In “dirtying” the clean money they obtain, 
the money can come from anywhere or go anywhere.  Other countries must also be on the 
watch for suspicious behaviour and address threats accordingly. Countries in general also 
need to identify more effective ways to measure their successes and recognize their failures 
in implementing counterterrorist measures.  Furthermore, countries need to be able to adapt 
just as quickly as terrorist organizations do. However, any measures taken must be 
proportionate to the threat, and not overly broad so as to compromise individual rights.  
Sharing information on what other countries have found will also be vital.  The United 
States and United Kingdom have led the forefront on combating terrorist financing and will 
continue to do as they evaluate their own methods.  
 
Terrorist organizations have been leveraging cyber technologies such as the internet 
to enable terrorist activities, also using cyber to generate revenue and support. Therefore, 
the next chapter will examine the cybercrime and the role of the International Financial 
Institutions in combating cybercrime to promote stability.   
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CHAPTER 4 
CYBERCRIME  
 
Introduction 
 
Financial institutions are increasingly shifting their operations to cyberspace, as 
cyber-attacks against financial institutions generally take advantage of a mix of technical 
and human vulnerabilities.569 Financial crimes are increasingly turning into cybercrimes,570 
as the Internet and digital world becomes more sophisticated, so do cybercrimes.571 Cyber 
criminals have also become more sophisticated as the trend of cybercrimes continues to 
grow. 572  Both organizations and individuals alike are put at risk for fraud as the 
convergence between the two crimes increases.573 The concern regarding cyber financial 
crimes also derives from its global nature.574 The internet was originally developed in order 
to facilitate sharing of data, research and statistics between the United States and 
Europe.575Now, the internet controls a large portion of peoples’ lives all over the world.576  
The growth of internet uses thus has contributed significantly to the burgeoning of 
cybercrime and fraudulent activity.577  In the United States, it has been estimated that the 
																																																								
569 Financial stability in the digital era (Banque de France. Financial Stability Review. No 20. April 2016) 
available at 
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571 Michael Cohn, Financial Crimes Increasingly Become Cybercrimes, Accounting Today, Mar. 4, 2013) 
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575 Phil Butler Cyber Crime, Financial Fraud and Money Laundering: Understanding the New Threat 
Landscape 1 (Thomas Reuter Accelus 2013) available at http://acceluscdn.thomsonreuters.com/accelus-
pdf/GRC00331-Cybercrime-Phil-Butler.pdf. 
576 Ibid. 
577 Ibid. 
	 101	
cost of cybercrime is as much as $100 billion dollars per year,578 while in the United 
Kingdom, estimates have been found at £27 billion per year.579  However, experts have 
difficulty calculating the exact amount of damages caused by cyber financial crimes due 
to: (1) the lack of a concise definition of cybercrime;580 (2) the reluctance of companies to 
report incidents due to fear of losing consumer confidence;581  (3) the dual system of 
prosecution;582 and (4) the trouble of actual detection.  Cyber criminals often seek personal 
and financial data for fraudulent objectives.583 Thus, cybercrimes has become an integral 
part of any discussion on fraud.584  The problem arises that many cyber criminals, who are 
located all over the world, are undeterred by the prospect of arrest or prosecution.585  Cyber 
Criminals are difficult to detect and pose one of the greatest threats to the financial health 
of businesses, to the consumer confidence, and to nations’ security.586  Studies have also 
shown that the financial sector is the most attractive target to cyber criminals.587 Large 
scale data breaches enable cyber criminals to access a great deal of information, and the 
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583 Mike McGuire & Santa Dowling, Cyber Crime: A Review of the Evidence Research Report 5 (2013) 
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Cyberspace, 2002 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 3 (2002). 
586 Ibid. 
587 See Economic Crime Survey, supra note 572, at 30 (finding that forty-five percent of financial services 
organization affected by fraud were also victims of cybercrime, which is three times as much as all other 
industries).  
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proceeds of the act often are used to fund fraudulent activity such as terrorism and drug 
trafficking.588 
 
Accordingly, this Chapter will seek to explore the approaches taken by the United 
States and United Kingdom in their fight against cyber financial crimes.  The chapter will 
first discuss what a cybercrime is and the top forms of cybercrimes along with the tools 
and infrastructure utilized. 589 Next, the chapter will discuss cyber financial crimes 
specifically. 590 The development of the laws in the United States 591  and the United 
Kingdom will then be explored.592The chapter will then discuss the problem of cybercrimes 
and the need for international cooperation and united efforts.593 The chapter will conclude 
with a review of what is left to be done in order to combat the threat of cyber financial 
crimes.594 
 
What is a Cybercrime? 
 
There is no common definition to what a cybercrime is.595  The lack of a common 
international definition has led to many of the global issues surrounding cybercrimes.596  
However, the unique feature of cybercrimes is that they “are committed across cyber space 
and do not stop at the conventional state-borders. They can . . . be perpetrated from 
anywhere and against any computer user in the world.”597  The internet, as it continues to 																																																								
588 Kimberly Kiefer Peretti, Data Breaches: What the Underground World of "Carding" Reveals, 25 Santa 
Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 375 (2009) (discussing the connection between cyber financial crimes 
and other criminal activity). 
589 See infra discussion II. 
590 See infra discussion III. 
591 See infra discussion IV(A). 
592 See infra discussion IV(B). 
593 See infra discussion V. 
594 See infra discussion VI. 
595 Andrew P. Clark, Fighting Economic Crime in the Financial Sector, (PWC 2014) available at 
http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/economic-crime-survey/pdf/fighting-economic-crime-in-the-financial-
services-sector.pdf. 
596 Ibid.  
597 Communication from the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Creating a 
Safer Information Society By Improving the Security of Information Infrastructures and Combating 
Computer-Related Crime 9 (2000), available at http:// 
europa.eu.int/ISPO/eif/InternetPoliciesSite/Crime/CrimeCommEN.html [hereinafter Creating a Safer 
Information Society]. 
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develop and progress along with various technological advances, provides the ability for 
cybercriminals to utilize the internet to perform financial crimes with little chance of fear 
of repercussions.598  The internet and technology, by providing a sense of invincibility, also 
permits experimentation with various criminal endeavours.599 
 
“Cybercrime” is a term that is used broadly to refer to the use of a computer to 
facilitate or carry out a criminal offence. 600   Additionally, the terms “cybercrime,” 
“computer crime,” “information technology crime,” and high-tech crime” are often used 
interchangeably and will be used throughout the chapter.  However, after several years, 
there is still no internationally agreed upon definition of the term. This poses problems 
because law enforcement would have disparities in recognizing what to be sought after and 
prosecuted, particularly because these crimes can happen anywhere in the world.  
Disparities exist in defining cybercrimes for several reasons.601  First, there is not even an 
agreed upon definition of the term “computer,” which is essential in defining these types 
of crimes.602 
 
In the United States, the legislation passed which focused specifically on computer 
abuses, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, 603  defined “computer” as “an 
electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device 
performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility 
or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, 
but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held 
																																																								
598 See Conclusions of the Study on Effective Measures to Prevent and Control High-Technology and 
Computer-Related Crime: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice, 10th Sess., Item 4 at 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.15/2201/4 (2001), available at http:// 
www.odccp.org/adhoc/crime/10_commission/4e.pdf (concluding that the specific qualities of the Internet 
may encourage a perpetrator to use it instead of traditional means given it provides great communication 
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599See id. at 7 (finding the criminal exploitations of new technologies has led to new forms of crimes). 
600 Michael Edmond O’Neil, Old Crimes in New Bottles: Sanctioning Cybercrime, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
237, 241 (2000). 
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602 Ibid. 
603 See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). 
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calculator, or other similar device.”604  This definition is disliked by some computer experts 
on the basis that is a limited definition and “fails to recognize the substantial changes in 
technology that have evolved from main-frame to hand-held computers.”605 In the United 
Kingdom, the legislation dedicated to cybercrimes, the Computer Misuse Act of 1990,606 
does not even define “computer” The Law Commission found that “all the attempted 
definitions that we have seen are so complex, in an endeavour to be all embracing, that 
they are likely to produce extensive arguments, and thus confusion for magistrates, juries 
and judges involved in trying our proposed offences.”607 The decisions made in the U.S. 
and U.K regarding definitions highlights the issues and approaches that many countries 
take.  There are discrepancies in approaches and what qualifies or what type of activity will 
be prosecuted.  However, it is incremental to establish proper definitions of crimes in order 
to work towards proper legal treatment of the offences.  
 
Tools and Infrastructure of Cybercrimes  
 
 Offences dealing with computers may take on various forms and the law must 
address this characteristic. One criterion to categorize the crime puts the offence in one of 
two categories. The first category is when the computer is the target of the offence, such as 
when there is an attack on a network, which is considered as unauthorized access to and 
illicit tampering with systems, programs, or data.608 The second category entails traditional 
offences, such as fraud, theft, or forgery, which are committed with the assistance of or by 
means of computers, computer networks, or related technologies.609 Another classification 
system consists of four categories for cybercrimes: (1) theft of money, financial 
instruments, property, services, or other valuable data; (2) unauthorized access to computer 
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time; (3) illegal use of computer programs; and (4) unauthorized acquisition of stored 
data.610 
The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) utilizes a three-category approach in 
classifying computer crimes, which depend on the computer’s role in the offence.611  First, 
the computer may be the “object” of the crime.612  This category refers to the theft of 
computer hardware or software, which is generally prosecuted under theft or burglary 
statutes under state law.613  Under federal law, the theft of computer hardware may be 
prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2314, a statute that regulates the interstate transportation of 
stolen or fraudulently obtained goods. 614  The second category identified is when the 
computer is the “subject” of the offence.615  The computer is seen similar to a person who 
is mugged or a house that is robbed.616  The computer is the subject for the attack and is 
the location where any damage occurs.617 This category includes crimes that may involve 
malicious software or malware, which includes spam, viruses, worms, Trojan horses, logic 
bombs, etc.  In the past, these crimes were committed typically by juveniles who were not 
after financial gain.618  However, recently these crimes have been committed by diverse 
groups who are seeking a financial gain.619  These types of malicious software or malware 
are defined as follows: 
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619 Cassell Bryan-Low, Virus for Hire: Growing Number of Hackers Attack Web Sites for Cash--
Entrepreneur Asked a Team to Mastermind Strikes Against Rivals, U.S. Says – WeaKnees on Its Knees, 
WALL ST. J., (Nov. 30, 2004) available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB110176932097886077 
(detailing how hackers have now become a mix of fraudsters and organized crime rings using cybercrimes 
for financial gain); see also Skibell, supra note 618; Bob Sullivan, Consumers Still Falling for Phish: FTC, 
DOJ Announce Prosecution of Teen-ager, MSNBC, Mar. 22, 2004, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4580909 (discussing a case of a teenager who utilized a “phishing” scam to 
steal identities and gain $78,000). 
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1. Spam. Spam is unsolicited bulk commercial e-mail from a party with no pre-
existing business relationship.620  Spam can also be used by hackers as a means 
of distributing other malicious software such as viruses and spyware.621 
 
2. Viruses. Viruses are programs that modify other computer programs.622  The 
virus will spread to other computers when a user sends an infected file by e-
mail, over the internet, through a company’s network or through other forms of 
sharing.623 
 
3. Worms.  Similar to viruses, worms self-replicate but unlike viruses, worms do 
not require any action from the computer owner to spread to other computers.624 
Instead, worms are capable of using computer networks to duplicate and 
transmit itself.625  Worms can be much more harmful given this ability.626 
 
4. Trojan Horses. A Trojan horse is a computer program that actually may 
perform a useful function, but has hidden malicious code to harm the 
computer.627The code that is transmitted into the computer may contain a virus 
or other kind of bug or it may permit unauthorized access by an outside user.628 
 
5. Logic bombs. Logic bombs are computer programs that initiate at a certain time 
and under specified conditions.629  The commands given to the computer may 
be benign or damaging.  They can also go undetected in software or hardware 																																																								
620 Matthew B. Prince & Patrick A. Shea, After CAN-SPAM, How States Can Stay Relevant in the Fight 
Against Unwanted Messages: How a Children's Protection Registry Can be Effective, and Is Not 
Preempted, Under the New Federal Anti-Spam Law, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 29, 45 
(2003). 
621 S. Rep. No. 108-102, at 6 (2003).  
622 Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1023 (2001). 
623 Ibid. at 1024. 
624 Ibid. 
625 Ibid. 
626 Ibid. 
627 Ibid.  
628 Ibid. 
629 Ibid. 
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until it is ready to be set off.630  It is a powerful crime tool as software programs 
can be infected with a bomb and millions of copies could be sold.631 
 
6. Sniffers. Sniffers enable a person to read data as it travels through a network.  
Hackers often use this tool after hacking into a network in order to log all the 
activity on the network.632  The information a hacker can obtain from a sniffer 
includes, passwords, credit card numbers, and other personal information. 
 
7. Botnets. Botnets have becomes a major threat when it comes to cybercrimes.633  
This threat consists of groups of individual computers that are infected with 
malware, which turns the infected computers into “robots.”634  This enables 
cyber criminals to control the computer remotely without the owner’s 
knowledge from command and control servers.635  The malware used on the 
computers may also scan for further vulnerabilities in the system, allowing for 
the launch of further attacks.636 
 
8.  
The third category according to the U.S. DOJ is when the computer is the 
“instrument” used to commit a traditional crime.637  Traditional crimes include identity 
																																																								
630 Ibid. 
631 Ibid. 
632 Troy Denkinger, The Basics of Sniffing, The Sysadmin's Eye Inside the Network, CHI. TRIB.,(Apr. 6, 
2000), available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-04-06/news/0005260051_1_configuration-
ethernet-local-area-network. 
633See Criminal Money Flows on the Internet: Methods, Trends and Multi-Stakeholder Counteraction, 
Money Val 17 (2012) available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/typologies/MONEYVAL(2010)9_Reptyp_full_en.pdf 
[hereinafter, Criminal Money Flows].   
634 Ibid. 
635 Ibid. 
636 Ibid. (noting that spam or distributed denial of service, DDOS, attacks are often launched to shutdown 
critical infrastructure of businesses). 
637 DOJ Computer Crime Manual, supra note 611, at 2. 
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theft,638 distribution of child pornography,639 copyright infringement,640 and mail or wire 
fraud.641	
Cyber Financial Crimes 
 
In today’s market, businesses and entities at all levels feel the need to maintain an 
online presence in order to succeed.642  The financial sector in particular took advantage of 
information and communication technology early on so that they could prepare the ground 
for borderless, around the clock global trading and offering of services. 643   As a 
consequence, however, cyber financial crimes have become the world’s third corporate-
risk priority overall.644  Financial services are the main targets for cyber criminals, and 
often fall victim to large data breaches which compromises personal financial information, 
such as credit or debit card account information, rather than other types of personally 
identifiable information, such as Social Security numbers.645 
  
Cyber financial crimes are usually initiated in the underground economies646 that 
have developed on the internet.647 These underground economies have become essential to 
the infrastructure of cybercrimes. 648  They provide malicious codes and tools for 
committing the crimes and aid in the development of the malware.649  Criminals also use 
																																																								
638 See, e.g., United States v. Prochner, 417 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 2005) (affirming a conviction for a 
defendant who obtained credit card numbers by hacking into secure websites and computer networks). 
639 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 237 F.3d 625, 628-29 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming sentence because of 
computer use in violating non-computer-dependent child pornography statute). 
640 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (holding software 
distributors who promote the software's use to infringe copyright liable for the infringement carried out by 
third parties using the software, despite the fact that the software has other lawful uses). 
641 See, e.g., United States v. Pirello, 255 F.3d 728, 729 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming sentence for violation of 
federal wire fraud statute where defendant posted a fraudulent solicitation for money on a classified ad 
website).  
642 Financial Crimes: A Threat to Global Financial Crimes: A Threat to Global Security 121 (Maximilian 
Edelbacher et al. 2012)  
643 Ibid. 
644 See Bhat & Threattil, supra note 574, at 1. 
645 See Peretti, supra note 588, at 378. 
646 See Financial Crimes, supra note 642, at 127 (defining underground economy as involving an exchange 
of goods and services that are concealed from official view). 
647 See Financial Crimes supra note 642, at 127.  
648 Ibid. 
649 Ibid. 
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these underground economies to assist with sharing techniques to avoid detection.650 
Hence, the underground economy forms a market for stolen goods, especially for credit 
card or bank account details and other personal information that is useful for identity theft 
and fraud.651 Thus, the underground market has become an environment in cyberspace 
where cyber criminals can organize, sell goods and services and share proceeds from the 
crimes they commit.652 
 
 Once a financial cybercrime has been committed, the criminals must be able to 
transfer the proceeds online without revealing or leaving traces of their own identity.653  
This can often be the most difficult part of a financial cybercrime.654  The common way 
cyber criminals go about this step is through the use of “money mules” or “financial agents” 
who set-up bank accounts or make their own accounts available for transfers of earnings.  
Once the money mule has received the funds, further instructions are given to them to 
transfer the money to other accounts or send the money overseas via wire transfer.655 In 
utilizing the types of malware and malicious programs discussed above, cyber criminals 
can perform a number of financial fraud crimes on victims.   
 
Some of the most common types of fraud involved in cyber financial crimes include 
payment card fraud, account takeover and even traditional crimes such as money 
laundering have now turned to cyberspace. Payment card fraud is a multi-billion dollar 
problem domestically and globally.656 Although the numbers on the actual cost of payment 
fraud is not known, one study estimated total costs of credit and debit card fraud in the U.S. 
at approximately $109 billion in 2008.657 Merchants in the United States in 2013 are also 
																																																								
650 Ibid. 
651 Ibid. 
652 Ibid. 
653 Ibid.  
654 Ibid. 
655 Ibid. 
656 Adam J. Levitin, Private Disordering? Payment Card Fraud Liability Rules, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & 
COM. L. 1, 2 (2010). 
657 See LexisNexis, 2009 LexisNexis True Costs of Fraud Study 6, 50, 54 (2009), available at 
http://www.riskfinance.com/RFL/Merchant_Card_Fraud_ files/LexisNexisTotalCostFraud_09.pdf 
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paying $2.79 for each dollar of fraud losses, an increase from the previous year.658  The 
most common form of payment card fraud involves card-not-present payments.659  These 
transactions are often done over the internet, phone, or mail.660  In 2013, the United 
Kingdom experienced a twenty-two percent increase in losses based card-not-present 
transactions.661 This type of cyber financial crimes is also on the rise in the United States.662  
Although fraud prevention techniques have helped, many criminals turn to technological 
advances to carry out the payment card fraud.663 Cyber criminals collect debit or credit card 
information that is put in by the consumer making a transaction and later use this 
information for their own benefit.664  Additionally, cyber criminals can use stolen card data 
and create a counterfeit card.665  Another form of payment card fraud consists of when 
criminals simply use fake data to create a fake card.666 
 
Account takeovers are one form of identity theft.667 This occurs when someone 
other than the authorized account owner gains access to an existing account. 668  The 
ultimate goal of an account takeover is to steal, procure, or otherwise affect funds of the 
targeted account.669 Hackers use malware to hack into computer networks to steal online 
banking credentials, allowing the cyber criminals to make payments, transfer money, or 
apply for new accounts.670  The use of malware to collect banking credentials is on the rise 
																																																								
658 See LexisNexis, 2013 LexisNexis True Costs of Fraud Study 9 (2013) available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/risk/downloads/assets/true-cost-fraud-2013.pdf [hereinafter LexisNexis 2013 
Study]. 
659 See Financial Crimes, supra note 642, at 134. 
660 See Levintin, supra note 656, at 19. 
661 News Release, Scams and Computer Attacks Contribute to Increase in Fraud, as Total Card Spending 
Rises, Financial Fraud Action UK (Mar. 14, 2014) available at 
http://www.financialfraudaction.org.uk/cms/assets/1/2013%20annual%20fraud%20figures%20release%20-
%20final.pdf. 
662 See LexisNexis 2013 Study, supra note 658, at 17 (determining that card not present crimes initiated 
online have increased by thirty-six percent). 
663 See id (finding that criminals are increasingly using malware to perform financial crimes). 
664 See generally, Levitin, supra note 656, at 10-15 (explaining the process of payment card fraud). 
665 See Ibid. at 19. 
666 Ibid. 
667 Lilia Rode, Database Security Breach Notification Statutes: Does Placing the Responsibility on the True 
Victim Increase Data Security? 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1597, 1624 (2007).  
668 Michaele Castell. Mitigating. Online Account Takeovers. The Case Education, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta (2013) available at https://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/rprf/rprf_pubs/130408_survey_paper.pdf. 
669 Ibid. 
670 See Financial Crimes. ,supra note 642, at 135. 
	 111	
which leads to more data breaches resulting in greater cyber financial crimes.671Corporate 
account takeovers have become an even bigger threat to financial institutions and other 
business.672  Cyber criminals would hack into businesses accounts and obtain sensitive 
information and transfer funds.673  Financial institutions and business have become major 
targets for cyber financial crimes considering the large amount of customer and personal 
financial data held on networks, as well as the fact that those institutions are where the 
money is.674  Although larger institutions are more apt to detect the breach, many do not 
know when they have suffered a cyber financial crime until after the fact.675 
 
Increasingly, cyberspace has become the domain for money laundering, or the act 
turning dirty money into clean money as well.676  Criminal organizations have begun to 
take advantage of how dependent society has become on the Internet to launder their 
illegally acquired proceeds through covert, anonymous online transactions. 677  Money 
launders are able to benefit from the development of technology because as online 
marketplaces become more robust and complex their activity is more untraceable.678 The 
criminals are able to find new methods to pass the “dirty” money into online accounts and 
retrieve the “clean” money out of other accounts.679 When these criminals have obtained 
credit card or bank account information, they simply search for means to transfer the money 
anonymously, through services such as Liberty Reserve.680   																																																								
671 See LexisNexis 2013 Study, supra note 658, at 16. 
672 Tommie Singleton, The Top Five Cyber Crimes, AICPA 1 (2013). 
673 Ibid. at 7. 
674 See Economic Crime Survey, supra note 572, at 30. 
675 Ibid. 
676 See The Secrets of Online Money Laundering, MIT TECH. R., Oct. 18, 2013, available at 
http://www.technologyreview.com/view/520501/the-secrets-of-online-money-laundering/. 
677 See Jean-Loup Richet, Laundering Money Online: A Review of Cybercriminals’ Methods, UNODC, 
June 1, 2013, available at http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1310/1310.2368.pdf (identifying online gaming 
and micro laundering as two areas in cyberspace to facilitate money laundering); see also Criminal Money 
Flows, supra note 633, at 21 (discussing that terrorist also use these methods to raise funds and transfer the 
money). 
678 Ibid. 
679 Ibid. 
680 Ibid. (describing that Liberty Reserve is an online service to exchange money anonymously that was 
shut down by the U.S. Government); see also Alexis C. Madrigal, How to Launder Billions and Billions of 
Digital Dollars, ATLANTIC, Nov. 4, 2013, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/11/how-to-launder-billions-and-billions-of-digital-
dollars/281091/ (“Liberty Reserve created a digital currency, LR credits. People could open an account 
with Liberty Reserve and then store their money in the form of these credits. When they wanted to get 
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Launderers also take advantage of mass media and email scams.681  They may 
attempt to steal money from the victim’s account or they may transfer large sums of illegal 
money into the victim’s account.682 Money launderers also take advantage of the benefits 
of anonymity of cyberspace by transferring the money globally to areas of the world where 
regulation is the weakest.683 The ability for cyber criminals to achieve their objectives 
undetected highlights the challenge of cyber financial crimes.  Many institutions do not 
know who the threat is, where it comes from or if it even happened.684 
Development of the Laws 
 
The technologies that computers and cyberspace have provided are unique and are 
capable of addressing many of the world’s problems. At the same time, however, these 
technologies also have a dark side.685  Cybercrime is not only am increasing threat, but its 
potential for harm may be far greater than in traditional criminal enterprises. 686  The 
development of personal computers, Smartphone, tablets and the like pose a significant 
concern for law enforcement.687 These devices possess the ability to access the internet 
virtually anywhere with the capacity to send information and potential criminal activity 
quickly and efficiently.688  The result of such action is that police or law enforcement 
agencies have significantly less time to react to potential cybercrime threats. 689 
																																																								
money in or out, they couldn't just send a wire or go to an ATM. Instead, Liberty Reserve contracted with 
other companies they controlled known as "exchangers" which bought and sold regular money in exchange 
for LR credits”). 
681 Ibid. 
682 Ibid. (finding that if the money is transferred to the victim, the criminals will have that money 
transferred again to an alias account). 
683 Madrigal, supra note 680. 
684 See Ibid. (discussing the problem with lack of knowledge is also the lack of reporting); see also 
McGuire & Dowling, supra note 583, at 20 (commenting that there is little evidence regarding cyber 
criminals). 
685 Goodman & Brenner, supra note 585, at 7 
686 O’Neil, supra note 600, at 238. 
687 Katyal, supra note 622, at 1042 (arguing that the rule of law is threatened by computers and cyberspace 
because (1) computers are a powerful alternative for additional people in a criminal enterprise; (2) 
computers allow anonymity and secure communications; and (3) cybercriminals are often invisible, remote, 
and untraceable.) 
688 Goodman & Brenner, supra note 585, at 8. 
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Additionally, issues of jurisdiction, privacy and anonymity arise making the fight against 
cyber financial crimes increasingly difficult.690 
 
Furthermore, the ability of cybercrimes to develop and change into new forms of 
criminal behaviour and therefore avoiding the reach of existing criminal law creates even 
more challenges for law enforcement around the globe. Cybercriminals are able to exploit 
loopholes in their own country's criminal law to victimize their fellow citizens with 
impunity.691 They also have been able exploit the loopholes in the criminal laws of other 
countries to victimize the citizens of those and other nations, demonstrating just how 
universal the situation of cyber financial crimes has become.692 Thus, the relationship 
between technology and the law is one that is continuously evolving and in which 
innovations benefit consumers but also provide a new realm for criminals.693 
 
Every country continues to struggle to define computer crimes and develop 
computer crime legislation applicable to both domestic and international audiences.694 
Solutions that only apply domestically are thought to be inadequate considering cyberspace 
has no physical or political borders,695 but also because many computer networks are 
effortlessly and covertly accessed from anywhere in the world.696  Accordingly, there are 
some commentators who have argued that cyberspace differs so dramatically from real 
crimes and that cybercrimes demand a change in the way countries think about the 
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691 See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, 1999 Report on Cyberstalking: A New Challenge for Law 
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692 See Frances Ann Burns, Hack Attack Shuts Down Online Auction Site, apbnews.com (Sept. 12, 2000), 
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695 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) (defining cyberspace as a “unique medium ... located in 
no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the 
Internet”). 
696 Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Note, Redefining National Security in Today's World of Information 
Technology and Emergent Threats, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 383, 384 (1999); see also Steve 
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application of traditional legal doctrines.697  Both the United States and United Kingdom 
have taken an approach of creating separate codes dealing specifically with compute 
crimes.698 
 
During the initial attempt to handle computer systems and their ability to collect, 
store and transmit data, many of the western countries developed legislation aimed at 
protecting privacy.699  In the 1980s, as computer technology and the laws continued to 
develop, economic crimes began to be embodied in the legislation.700   This wave of 
legislation was triggered due to the inadequacy of existing criminal codes, which dealt with 
traditional crimes and were established to protect physical, tangible and visible objects 
only.701 The new laws which emerged addressed the new capabilities of computer related 
crimes to violate traditional objects through new means,702 to involve intangible objects,703 
and to utilize new approaches of committing crimes made possible by increasing use and 
reliance on computer systems and networks. 
 
Cybercrime Laws in the United States 
 
As noted above, the United States Congress decided to treat cybercrimes as separate 
and distinct federal offences rather than amending existing criminal law to incorporate the 
technological changes.  The scope of the federal law that addresses cybercrimes has thus 
expanded overtime in an attempt to keep up with the digital age.704  The principal statute 																																																								
697 Niva Elkin-Koren & Eli M. Salzberger, Law and Economics in Cyberspace, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 
553 (1993); but see Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207-
16. 
698 See Kadir, supra note 602, at 625 (finding that this approach has been viewed as beneficial because it 
creates awareness of cybercrimes which has been considered a means of deterring). 
699 Ulrick Sieber, Legal Aspects of Computer-Related Crime in the Information Society, COMCRIME 
Study prepared for the European Commission 19 (Jan. 1998), available at  
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/legal/en/comcrime/sieber.doc. 
700 Ibid. 
701 Ibid. 
702 For example, stealing money by taking over or misusing bank accounts.  See id.  
703 This would be done with the use of computer programs.  
704 Deborah F. Buckman, Validity, Construction, and Application of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 174 
A.L.R. Fed. 101 (2001). But see Maxim May, Federal Computer Crime Laws, SANS Inst. 1 (2004) 
available at http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/legal/federal-computer-crime-laws-1446 
(“[L]aws that take into account the new and constantly evolving technologies are always lagging behind the 
criminals who make use of these technologies”). 
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which handles cybercrimes was enacted in 1984 as the Counterfeit Access Device and 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Law,705 now more commonly referred to as the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”).706  The statute enumerates various crimes which involve 
“protected computers.” 707  The CFAA imposes both civil and criminal liability on 
cybercriminals who partake in internet attacks on corporations and the government. 708 
Although the original 1984 statute was intended to combat cybercrimes, it dealt specifically 
with unauthorized access to federal interest computers, thus leaving loopholes in the 
legislation.709 The manner in which the statute was designed made it very difficult to 
prosecute cybercriminals.710  In 1986, the Act was amended to include computer fraud and 
hacking offences.711 However, the jurisdiction of the Federal government was left only 
when there was a compelling federal interest.712 
 
In 1994, another set of amendments changed the Act. Section 1030(a)(5), was 
amended "to further protect computers and computer systems covered by the statute from 
damage both by outsiders, who gain access to a computer without authorization, and by 
insiders, who intentionally damage a computer."713Additionally, subsection 1030(a)(5)(A) 
specifically prohibits "knowingly [causing] the transmission of a program, information, 
code, or command" which "intentionally causes damage without authorization………"  
This change was done in order to address the threat of malware and malicious codes that 
were discussed above.714  The focus of the Act then shifted towards the defendant’s harmful 
intentions and the resulting damage, rather than a technical concept of computer access and 
																																																								
705 Pub. L. No. 98–473, 98 Stat. 2190. 
706 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (2006 & Supp. 2008). 
707 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (defining “protected computer” as any computer that a financial institution or the 
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708 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030. 
709 See Buckman, supra note 704, at § 2(a) (discussing that the loopholes included authorized persons who 
caused harm to protected computer systems; or unauthorized persons who gave codes or software to 
authorized persons who loaded them into their computers). 
710 See D. Glenn Baker, Trespassers Will be Prosecuted: Computer Crime in the1990's, 12:1 Computer L.J. 
68 (1993) (noting only one indictment was made under the original 1984 Act). 
711 Skibell, supra note 618, at 913. 
712 See Buckman, supra note 704, at § 2(a). 
713 See S. Rep. No. 104–357, § IV(1)(E) (1996 W.L. 492169); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103–711, § 290001(d) 
(1994 W.L. 454841), 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839. 
714 See May, supra note 704, at 3. 
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authorization.715  However, this shift also resulted in a change of the mens rea for the new 
offences to be “intentionally” rather than “knowingly,” the less burdensome demonstration 
of culpability.716The 1996 amendments again changed the mens rea requirements of the 
CFAA, creating essentially two felonies and a misdemeanour, which were to cover a 
variety of crimes.717   
The first felony involved intentional acts of damaging a computer by knowingly 
transmitting harmful programs.718 The second felony applied to those who intentionally 
accessed a computer without authorization and negligently causing harm. 719  As a 
consequence of broadening the mens rea requirements for the offences, the amendments 
significantly expanded the reach of the Act.720   
 
Currently, the CFAA criminalizes seven types of computer offences.  The first is 
the transmission of classified government information.721  This prohibits a criminal from 
knowingly accessing a computer without or in excess of authorization and who transmits 
government information which is classified.722  The second offence is when information is 
obtained from a financial institution, the federal government, or any protected computer 
through unauthorized or in excess of authorization computer access.723  The third occurs 
when an offender without or in excess of authorization access any non-public computer of 
a U.S. department or agency without authorization. 724   The fourth offence covers 
unauthorized or in excess of authorization access for the intent to defraud and obtain 
anything of value.725  The fifth offence is when damage is done to a protected computer as 
																																																								
715 See 139 Cong. Rec. S16421–03, Nov. 19, 1993 
716 Skibell, supra note 618, at 913. 
717 Ibid. 
718 Ibid. 
719 Ibid. 
720 Ibid. See also See S. Rep. No. 104-357, at 9-12 (demonstrating that Congress wanted to also punish 
hackers who do not intentionally cause damage to computers). 
721 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1). 
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724 Ibid. at § 1030(a)(3).   
725 Ibid. at § 1030(a)(4).  The mere "use" of the computer may qualify as a thing of value, but if so, the 
value of that use must exceed $5,000 in a one-year period.  The four elements to this offence are: 1) 
“knowingly” with intent to defraud; 2) accessing a protected computer; 3) “without authorization” or 
“exceeding authorization;” and 4) furthering a fraud or obtaining anything of value. 
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a result of access without or in excess of authorization.726 The transmission of a malicious 
program may be prosecuted under this section regardless if damage was caused 
intentionally, recklessly, or otherwise.727  Additionally, under the fifth offence, an offender 
is culpable when they intentionally access a protected computer without authorization that 
recklessly causes damage to a protected computer.728  Password theft and online extortion 
are covered by the last two offences.729 
 
 The CFAA in litigation has encountered several disputes and debates in an attempt 
to define the scope of a user’s authorization when the perpetrator uses a computer to 
damage information or uses it without or in excess of authority.730Morris v. United States 
was the first case to discuss the scope of authorization under the CFAA.731  Morris was a 
graduate student who created a worm designed to exploit vulnerabilities in certain 
programs and the internet.732  Morris managed to access several Ivy League universities 
networks, but once he released the worm it quickly spread across the United States.733  
Morris was convicted and made an unsuccessful appeal claiming he had not intended to 
cause the amount of damage that was required by the CFAA.734  In the appeal, the Second 
Circuit developed the Intended Function Test as a means to determent when access is 
unauthorized. 735  The Second Circuit found that unauthorized access happens when a 
defendant does not use the attacked program or network “in any way related to their 
intended function.”736  In 2007, the Fifth Circuit adopted the Intended Function test in 
United States v. Phillips.737The Fifth Circuit held that analysis of these cases begins with 
“the scope of a user's authorization to access a protected computer on the basis of the 
																																																								
726 Ibid. at § 1030(a)(5). 
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expected norms of intended use or the nature of the relationship established between the 
computer owner and the user.”738 
 
 The circuit courts are split on how to determine the scope of exceeded authorized 
access, particularly when there is no limit on authorization.739  The majority follows the 
Intended Function test and has held that access exceeds authorization “when the user knows 
or reasonably should know that he or she is not authorized to access a computer and 
information obtainable from that access in furtherance of or to perpetrate a crime.”740 The 
minority view holds that an employee who has authority to access the employer’s computer 
does not violate the CFAA when the employee uses his privilege for the misappropriation 
of accessed information.741  The minority has articulated that “an interpretation of the 
CFAA based upon agency principles would greatly expand the reach of the CFAA to any 
employee who accesses a company's computer system in a manner that is adverse to her 
employer's interests.”742 
 
 Despite the inconsistencies between circuit courts on the reach of the CFAA, 
neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has taken a stance to quiet the debate. 
 
Cybercrime Laws in the United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom currently has one of the world’s largest internet-based 
economies.743 Accordingly, the U.K. government has found cyber security to be one of its 
top four risks.744 Similar to the United States, the U.K. has enacted a separate legislation to 
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742 United States v. Aleynikov, 737 F. Supp. 2d 173, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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deal with computer crimes. The cornerstone of the United Kingdom’s cybercrime 
legislation is the Computer Misuse Act of 1990 (“CMA”).745 
 
The purpose of the CMA was to protect the integrity and security of computer 
systems, rather than the information stored on the computer.746  This is because the United 
Kingdom does not use criminal law as a basis for protecting privacy.747  The CMA was 
thus initially questioned since some of the offences deal with unauthorized access of 
information.748  Furthermore, although hacking has been also compared to trespassing, 
many in the U.K. could still not understand the purpose of the CMA criminalizing the 
offences since trespassing was nothing more than a tort and therefore a civil offence.749 
Thus, the idea of “information theft” as a criminal offence has continuously been debated 
since the introduction of the CMA.750  Nevertheless, the genuine legal concerns which 
brought the CMA into action existed and the Law Commission continued to press for better 
strategies.751 
 
The Computer Misuse Act had its beginnings in 1987 when the Scottish Law 
Commission recommended that hacking should only be criminalized when the offender 
intended to commit further acts.752  In 1989, the English Law Commission recommended 
that hacking be criminalized regardless of further intent.753  However, in 1988, the case of 
R v. Gold was decided by the House of Lords and highlighted the need for legislative 
action.754  The case involved two defendants who obtained a password, which provided 
them, unauthorized access to British Telecom’s Prestel network.755 The hackers made 
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extensive use of the system but were soon arrested when suspicion grew over their 
conduct.756 The question then arose as to what offence the two should be charged with.757 
There was no deception upon a human mind so the defendants could not be charged under 
s. 15 of the Theft Act of 1968.758  Instead, the defendants were prosecuted under s. 1 of the 
Forgery and Counterfeiting Act of 1981.759  The Court of Appeals and House of Lords 
overturned the convictions however.760 Thus began the demand for legislative efforts and 
the CMA was constructed.761 
 
The CMA created three new offences. Under § 1 of the Act, an offender can be 
criminalized if they access programs or data on a computer without authorization.762 This 
is regardless of whether the intent was to access specific data or program.763 Section 2 
provides that once there has been unauthorized access, an offender who intentionally 
attempts to commit a certain acts or facilitates the commission of certain acts is guilty and 
punishable by imprisonment for up to five years.764  Under § 2, it does not matter whether 
the attempted act was impossible or the offender attempted an act a different or later time 
than the unauthorized access. 765  Section 3 addresses unauthorized impairment of 
information or content on any computer, so long as the offender possessed the required 
mens rea.766  To fall under this section, the offender would need to act with intent or 
recklessness to impair the operation of computer, prevent or hinder access to any data or 
program on the computer, impair the operation of any data or programs on the computer, 
or enable any of the acts just mentioned.767  For purposes of this section, it is irrelevant 
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whether the offender directed the impairment at any particular computer, program, or data, 
or that any particular kind of modification was intended.768 
 
In 2006, the Police and Justice Act (“PJA”) amended the CMA.769 Section 35 of 
the PJA increased the penalty for §1offence.770  The offence of unauthorized access became 
indictable and the maximum imprisonment period increased from six months to twelve 
months on summary convictions or two years on conviction from indictment.771  The 
amendment acknowledges the global nature and seriousness of the offence and also 
attempts to deter the behaviour with increased penalty times.772  Section 36 of the PJA also 
amended § 3 of the CMA.773  Originally, § 3 of the CMA made the offence regarding 
modification; however, it was changed to impairment with the PJA. 774  The new 
amendment was also implemented in order to satisfy the European Union Council 
Framework Decision on attacks against information systems requiring legislation against 
illegal system interference.775 The offence’s penalty was also increased from five years to 
ten years.776 
 
Section 37 of the PJA also enacted a new section to the CMA.777 Section 3(A) 
criminalizes “the production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise 
making available of ... a computer password, access code, or similar data by which the 
whole or any part of a computer system is capable of being accessed' when ‘committed 
intentionally and without right” for the purposes of committing illegal access, interception, 
or data or system interference offences.778  The new section also criminalizes the creation, 
supply, or application of “hacker tools” for use in computer misuse offences, such that a 																																																								
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person is guilty of an offence if he “supplies ... any article intending it to be used to commit, 
or assist in the commission of [a computer misuse offence]” or “believing that is likely to 
be used to commit, or assist in the commission of [any such offence].”779 Obtaining such 
an article with the intent to supplying it to commit an offence can also be 
criminalized.780Despite the changes of a lesser mens rea for section 3 crimes an additional 
offence, the CMA still also contains its own flaws.  Impairment can be very subjective for 
section 2 offences.781  Although the new section 3A offences under the CMA would seem 
to allow opportunity for greater prosecution of cyber offences, the amount of prosecutions 
seemed to have dropped, despite the increasing cost of cybercrimes.782 
 
Computer Crimes: A Problem for the International Community to Solve? 	
Cyber financial crimes are easy and inexpensive to commit in comparison with 
traditional crimes, and attackers can easily evade prosecution by being in countries that 
will not arrest them.783As noted above, financial institutions, and particularly international 
ones, are prime targets for cyber criminals to commit fraud and embezzlement.784  Black 
markets have developed online which enables organized crime to sell stolen identity and 
financial information as well as software programs to perpetrate cybercrimes.785Although 
developing an international standard for addressing cybercrimes is difficult, considering 
the global nature of the threat to financial wellbeing of countries along with the national 
security issues leads to the idea that an attempt is needed.   																																																								
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Nevertheless, measures aimed at targeting criminal proceeds and the prevention 
and control of fraud have not been sufficiently addressed in measures combating 
cybercrimes.786 Connections between identity theft and terrorism have been established 
already.787 Additionally, drug traffickers have also been known to engage in identity theft 
to finance their activities.788  Criminals have found countless ways to exploit vulnerabilities 
and take advantage of financial institutions, businesses, and individuals in order to commit 
further crimes.789 Stronger measures addressing these connections are needed to ensure 
prevention, detection and deterrence. 
 
While there is no set definition of “cybercrime” or “computer crime,” many 
industrialized countries have amended their legislation to address four issues created by 
cybercrimes: (1) protection of privacy; (2) prosecution of economic crimes; (3) protection 
of intellectual property; and (4) procedural provisions to help in the prosecution of 
computer crimes.790 Although the debate has been ongoing whether separate and distinct 
legislation is needed for cybercrimes, it seems that existing substantive criminal law is 
inadequate to handle the threats and development of cybercrimes.  Governments should 
adopt computer-specific criminal legislation to address unauthorized access and 
manipulation of data and programs, similar to the United States and United Kingdom.791 
 
In addition to the domestic change in laws, greater international cooperation efforts 
should be developed.  A great step in this direction was the Council of Europe’s Convention 
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on Cybercrime.792  Fifty-five countries, including the United States and United Kingdom 
have signed the treaty, indicating a positive step towards international harmonization of 
cybercrime laws.793 Another attempt is the participation of countries in the Subgroup on 
High-Tech Crime at G-8’s Lyon Group, which the United States is also a part of.794  The 
Subgroup has achieved a network which assists law enforcement authorities of member 
countries to contact one another for assistance in investigating cybercrimes and preserving 
electronic evidence.795   
 
The most critical information for combating cyber financial crimes is held by the 
private sector, the victims of many of the attacks such as banks, payment card providers, 
online banking services, and money transmitters).  The financial sector must consider who 
is responsible for handling cybercrimes, assess where the threats are coming from and learn 
to respond appropriately.  This requires a holistic and untied response and cannot be viewed 
as simply an information technology problem.796  Awareness and transparency are critical 
for combating cybercrimes. Moreover, a lack of transparency can hide the true nature of 
the risks involved and prevent law enforcement from aiding in investigations and 
prosecutions.797 
Reporting cybercrimes is an essential point that all nations must ensure.  Several 
states in the U.S. have adopted state laws that require consumer notification when a 
business’ has been breached.798  Many of the state laws allow for a delay in the notification 
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if law enforcement deems it to hinder the criminal investigation.799  Nevertheless, the 
reporting requirement is vital and necessary for law enforcement to determine where the 
breach came from and who is behind the act.  Additionally, although notification may cause 
consumers to lose confidence, it is critical for them also to be aware of the threats and the 
realities of the situation.800  Although it can be difficult to detect when a breach has 
occurred, each country should provide a reporting protocol in order to accomplish these 
objectives.  While it is not possible to eradicate all vulnerabilities in a system, there are 
several ways to reduce them and to work towards a better practice.801  Vulnerabilities 
continue to exist due to poor security practices and procedures, inadequate training on the 
threat of cybercrimes, and bad choices in software products designed to help protect 
computer systems and networks.802 The U.S. Government has found that approximately 
eighty percent of successful hacks into federal computers have been the result of software 
errors and poor software quality.803  Businesses, and in particular financial institutions, 
must be aware of these issues and take action to ensure they are installing and utilizing the 
best software for their protection. However, in addition to the private sector practicing their 
due diligence, regulators and legislators need to implement legal mechanism or liability for 
software manufacturers.804 
 
As stated, the approach to combating cybercrimes is to take a holistic approach.  It 
is not enough to rely on the private sector to act with due diligence, particularly if there is 
a loophole in the chain of events.  A regulatory commission to oversee the software industry 
in order to minimize vulnerabilities could help deter and limit cybercrimes.805 Regulators 
could also enlist regulatory guidelines on designing computer codes that developers can 
follow to also minimize the risks.  Many software companies outsource their production to 
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foreign countries, which can lead to errors designed to harm.806  Security processes could 
be enabled in order to better protect computer systems and networks.  Software companies 
also should not be able to contract away their liability if they do not follow guidelines or 
regulatory standards. 
 
Greater cooperation and a realization of the need for international efforts are 
critical.  Both the United States and United Kingdom have paved the way to demonstrate 
that separate and distinct criminal codes are needed to tackle the threat of cyber criminals.  
However, more must be done on all fronts to ensure the gaps between nations are filled.  
Countries have not taken full advantage of the opportunities provided by international 
agreements and recommendations.807 Since sometimes conflict with local regulations on 
date privacy, date usage, handling of information reported to the authority, and other 
matters, which Financial Institutions to retain information and self-standing IT systems 
within a subsidiary or jurisdiction.808 Each country must fully invest in the means needed 
to protect not only its national interest, but also the international community’s in order to 
be successful. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Cybercrime is a network of criminals that can be found anywhere in the world.  
Criminals utilizing the cyber domain are not left unconstrained, financial institutions and 
enforcement authorities are helping to enforce new anti-terrorism and cyber-related law 
and has made it much more difficult for criminal to influence the enormous profit potential 
found in the execution of cybercrimes.   
 
The interconnected nature the Internet has provided makes it critical to achieve 
international consistency in criminalization of cybercrimes. As the world becomes more 
and more dependent on the internet, it has become clear that cyber criminals are quick to 																																																								
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develop the tools and infrastructure needed to access and exploit for financial gain. It is no 
secret that the threat of cyber financial crimes is great and continues to grow. The threat of 
cybercrimes cannot be overstated.809  
 
 
The problem of cybercrime presents a conundrum that exposes the manner in which 
the law is able to tackle progressive technology. Nevertheless, any strategy to combat cyber 
financial crimes must entail search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds. Success can 
only be achieved through cooperation of nations though. Cyber financial crimes are global 
in nature and must be treated as such. International organizations and private corporations 
are also working to combat the international threat of cybercrimes by contributing to the 
efforts of harmonizing national legislative efforts.810  
 
Next chapter examines regulatory compliance in the financial sector as key tool for 
financial stability and the role of international financial institutions in setting mandates for 
banks and financial institutions.  
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CHAPTER 5 
COMPLIANCE  
 
Introduction 		
 Over the past decade, safeguarding financial stability has become an increasingly 
dominant objective in economic policymaking, this will illustrated by the periodic 
Financial Stability Report that has been launched by more than a dozen central banks and 
several international financial institutions(including the IMF, the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), and the World Bank), as well as by more prominent place given to 
financial stability in many of these institutions’ organizational structures and mandates.811  
Therefore, protecting financial stability has become an increasingly dominant objective 
incompliance and is on the minds of just about every congress person, regulator, lawyer, 
and financial service professional. Financial institutions are coming under the crossfire as 
regulatory agencies continue to release new rules in order to maintain safe and effective 
markets.812  The concept of compliance has developed over recent year. Gone are the days 
when satisfactory compliance is a bank consisted of making sure that a set of rules provided 
by a regulator had been met and each could be “ticked off and that appropriate returns had 
been sent in. Now the accepted approach is one of ascertaining the risks facing the 
institution and adopting appropriate measures to manage them. Regulatory guidelines are 
a tool to this end.813 
 
The entire financial industry is revamping compliance programs to meet the 
evolving demands of a variety of federal, state, and even international regulators.814  As a 																																																								
811 Aerdt Houben, Jan Kakes, and Garry Schinasi, Toward a Framework for Safeguarding Financial 
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result, compliance departments are becoming more important and more involved in the 
businesses as a means to eliminate regulatory violations and to avoid fines, or reduce them 
in the event of an offence. 815  Regulators understand that financial crime rates are 
increasing 816  and that the role of compliance and control must evolve from simply 
observing the laws to a much more integrated approach to address the situation.  Financial 
institutions understand the need to certify adherence with the relevant rules and regulations 
in order to grow, merge, and prosper.817 Although increased regulation is not a novel 
concept for the financial industry, anti-money laundering regulations have begun to be 
issued at a much more rapid pace.818 Legislators have not only been sceptical of financial 
institutions and their compliance efforts, but also of federal regulators and their 
oversight.819 In addressing the stricter scrutiny from keen regulators, banks will be required 
to increase costs to ensure they abide to tighter AML guidelines.820 Investigations into 
recent banking scandals have demonstrated that compliance risk was worsened by 
globalized institutional structures that have become too complex to manage internally and 
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regulate externally.821 Accordingly, the role of compliance in financial institutions has 
moved to the top concerns of executives.  However, the banking scandals that have 
occurred in recent years have shed light on important questions that must be resolved when 
concerning compliance. Fundamentally, the question that must be ascertained is how the 
oversight model as it currently stands is affecting the situation.   
 
This chapter will discuss what compliance is by going over the compliance function 
and will also explore the importance of how compliance department is organized, as well 
as the role of the Compliance Officer and the use of monitoring software.  Further, it will 
discuss the approaches taken by the United States and the United Kingdom regarding 
compliance, along with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and its principles.  
Lastly, the chapter will address compliance and anti-money laundering in Islamic banking 
and examine various case studies from the recent banking scandals. The chapter will 
conclude that there is a greater need for global integration on compliance and regulatory 
oversight. 
The Meaning of Compliance 	
Compliance, in its most basic terms, means to follow the law. It requires that an 
organization abides by all applicable legal requirements. 822  Thus, it can be said that 
compliance is a state of being in accordance with established guidelines, specifications and 
legislation.823  The notion of compliance risk is also involved in compliance. Compliance 
risk is defined as “the risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material financial loss, or loss 
to reputation a bank may suffer as a result of its failure to comply with laws, regulations, 
rules, related self-regulatory organization standards, and codes of conduct applicable to its 
banking activities.”824 The financial industry is governed by many regulatory agencies in 
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the United States including the Federal Reserve System (“Fed”), the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), 
and other agencies.825 Financial institutions are required to strictly comply with financial 
regulations, which were first introduced in the Securities Act of 1933826 (“1933 Act”). The 
1933 Act was primarily concerned with public offerings of securities to prevent fraud and 
federally regulate the financial industry in response to the 1929 stock market crash that 
occurred during the Great Depression.827 Since then, numerous other regulations have 
entered into force in order to monitor the dealings of financial institutions as well as to 
maintain the confidence of the market.828  This chapter will primarily focus on the issue of 
compliance with anti-money laundering rules and regulations. 
 
The Function of Compliance  	
Modern day compliance departments began in 1977 with the requirements 
established in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).829  The FCPA entered into 
force following an investigation by the SEC which uncovered significant bribery activity 
within United States companies. 830  As a result, the FCPA ensured that companies 
established their own internal resources to “actively monitor” business activities to 
maintain compliance with the applicable rules and regulations.831  Over the years, the 
function of the Compliance Department has evolved in order to keep up with regulations.   
																																																								
825 Stephen D. Simpson, The Banking System: Commercial Banking--How Banks Are Regulated, 
Investopedia, http:// www.investopedia.com/university/banking-system/banking-system6.asp. The Federal 
Reserve primarily regulates state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System, the 
OCC regulates national and federal savings bank associations, and the FDIC insures state-chartered banks 
that are not members of the Federal Reserve System. 
826 Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 111-229, 48 Stat. 74, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sa33.pdf. 
827 Securities Act of 1933, Cornell Univ. L. Sch., http:// www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_act_of_1933; 
see also Securities Laws, Rules, Regulations and Information, SECLAW.com, available at 
http://www.seclaw.com/secrules.htm. 
828 Andrew Yu, Regulatory Financial Reform: Impact of Dodd-Frank Act on It Compliance? 38 Rutgers 
Computer & Tech. L.J. 254, 255-56 (2012) (outlining the history of the U.S. financial regulation). 
829 Miriam Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 962 (2009). 
830 John MacKessy, Knowledge of Good and Evil: A Brief History of Compliance, Fin. Prof'ls' Post (May 
26, 2010), http://post.nyssa.org/nyssa-news/2010/05/a-brief-history-of-compliance.html. 
831 Ibid. 
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Among other things, the Compliance Department is in charge of fulfilling an advisory role, 
monitoring the financial institution’s adherence to the law and also educating those who 
work there. Although there are various regulations that provide the foundation for 
compliance programs, there are only a few specific guidelines for the particular roles and 
organization of the Compliance Department.832 The functions of individual Compliance 
Departments can be many and cover a wide range depending on a financial institution’s 
particular business activities and organizational structure.833 However, there is a set of 
general responsibilities or functions normally associated with Compliance Departments. 
While these functions often reside in the Compliance Department, in some banks they may 
reside in, or be shared with, other control areas or business units.  
 
1. Advisory 
The Compliance Department is to provide regulatory and compliance advice to 
business and control units on a continuous basis. 834   This function may consist of 
responding to questions and issues that arise and proactively keeping the bank abreast of 
regulatory developments and any policy changes it has established itself internally.  As 
such, in-house Compliance Departments are more favored so that personnel are able to 
address and advise the bank on issues in a timely manner.835 
 
2. Guidance and education 
Another core function is conducting training and educational programs in order to 
maintain all personnel apprised of policies and procedures and regulatory developments.  
Trainings are supposed to involve regularly scheduled updates in addition to trainings that 
are done on an as-needed basis when implementing new policies or procedures or to 
address regulatory changes that affect the compliance risk.836  The Compliance Department 
is responsible for providing the staff with written guidance on implementation of 
																																																								
832 Compliance and the Compliance Function in Banks, supra note 824, at principle 7, at 13. 
833 Securities Industry Assoc., The Role of Compliance 3 (White Paper, 2005). 
834 Ibid. 
835 Ibid. 
836 Ibid. 
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compliance laws, rules and standards as well as other documents such as compliance 
manuals, internal codes of conduct and practice guidelines.837 
 
3. Identification, measurement and assessment of compliance risk 
Compliance Departments are essential also in developing policies, procedures and 
guidelines developed to facilitate compliance with all applicable laws and regulations.  
They are also principally responsible for designing the Department’s own policies and 
procedures, which are essential in defining the roles and responsibilities of the Compliance 
Department.838  Assessing and measuring the bank’s compliance risk is also a primary 
function. Additionally, it is critical for the Compliance Department to update or amend 
existing policies and procedures to address regulatory developments and the bank’s 
compliance risk.   
 
4. Monitoring, testing and reporting 
The compliance function also demands constant monitoring and surveillance.  This 
entails an in-depth review of business activities, as well as investigations into business 
transactions and communications to identify potential issues.  Monitoring business activity 
enables ongoing compliance with firm policies and regulatory requirements by aiding to 
identify any patterns of improper behavior or activities in their early stages, material or 
systemic weaknesses and potential product-related problems. Compliance Departments 
will also test the effectiveness of supervisory procedures, often working with other control 
functions such as Internal Audit. There should be continuous reports to senior management 
on compliance matters.839 
 
5. Statutory responsibilities and liaison 
Often, Compliance Departments must also fulfill statutory responsibilities, such as 
the role of anti-money laundering officer.840  This requires the Department to be involved 																																																								
837 Ibid. 
838 Ibid.  
839 Ibid. 
840 Ibid.  
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in reviewing new accounts that are opened (“know your customer”) and monitor for any 
possible suspicious behaviour in customer transactions, including patterns of asset and fund 
movements.841 
 
Compliance Program and the Role of the Compliance Department 	
 Financial institutions have an obligation to create effective compliance programs, 
reasonably designed to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations.  Moreover, 
a compliance program should be incorporated as part of the bank’s general culture, with 
sufficient resources to operate effectively.  Financial policymakers are well aware of the 
important role culture can play within financial services firms. The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, for example, has observed that “[a] demonstrated corporate culture 
that supports and provides appropriate norms and incentives for professional and 
responsible behaviour is an essential foundation of good governance.”842   
 
Despite the evolving and increased importance being placed on Compliance 
Department function, there is a distinction that must be drawn between the role of the 
Compliance Department and the overall responsibility the bank has to comply with 
applicable legal requirements. The general purpose of the Compliance Department is to 
advise a business on how to comply with all the legal requirements that are imposed on the 
business, and les, regulation, to monitor the business’ activities and employee conduct to 
identify any potential violations of rules, regulations, policies or industry standards.  
However, it is the senior management function that is responsible for supervising that the 
business is in fact achieving compliance. Compliance Department personnel are not 
																																																								
841 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, Princ. 12, 
(Sept. 2012) (establishing that all banks should be required to “have adequate policies and processes, 
including strict customer due diligence (CDD) rules to promote high ethical and professional standards in 
the banking sector and prevent the bank from being used, intentionally or unintentionally, for criminal 
activities”). 
842 Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance, BCBS, 8, 22 (Oct. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs176.pdf (“Sound corporate governance is evidenced, among other things, by a 
culture where senior management and staff are expected and encouraged to identify risk issues as opposed 
to relying on the internal audit or risk management functions to identify them. This expectation is conveyed 
not only through bank policies and procedures, but also through the ‘tone at the top’ established by the 
board and senior management.”). 
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generally entitled to correct wrongful conduct, nor authorize or approve transactions. The 
supervisors are those with the power to make such judgments.  The focus on Compliance 
Departments has developed as a consequence of the financial industry’s desire to build a 
culture of compliance.843 This has been a natural growth from regulators encouraging the 
Compliance Department personnel to take a more proactive role in the compliance 
program. Thus, banks have begun to place more resources into their Compliance 
Departments. Nevertheless, such a proactive role does not substitute the nature of the 
Compliance Department and where senior management is supposed to be the ones who 
handle the liability of the business who fails to comply.844 
 
Organizing Compliance Department at Financial Institutions  	
 Compliance departments can be organized in various ways depending on how an 
organization wishes to address its compliance risk.845  In the early 1960s, stand-alone 
compliance departments began to develop.  Before that time, the duty of monitoring 
compliance fell to legal firms.  The need for stand-alone departments emerged as financial 
institutions sought the need for advice and support regarding the diverse responsibilities 
and regulations to apply on a day-to-day basis.  The stand-alone compliance department 
offered the ease and ability to continue to determine the firm’s compliance status while 
also expanding its functions in order to continue to be increasingly efficient.  A financial 
institution’s compliance department can vary by size depending on its functions, resources, 
etc. There is no mandated regulation for how an institution is to develop and maintain its 
compliance department because regulators understand that this is not a “one size fits all” 
issue.846 A compliance department may interact or even share functions with an assortment 
of different control areas within an institution, including the legal department, internal audit 
																																																								
843 The Role of Compliance, supra note 833, at 11.  
844 See Wong Teck Kow, Compliance Function in Financial Institutions (2006) (“The prime responsibility 
to ensure that the business complies with regulations rests with the board of directors, or with the owners or 
the most senior executive management group where there is no board”). 
845 Ibid  
846 See Fed. Fin. Inst. Examination Coun., Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual 
23 (2014), available at, https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/OLM_007.htm [hereinafter 
BSA/AML Examination Manual] (observing that banks must take into account various factors when 
creating AML compliance program). 
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and risk management.847 The Compliance Department may also be required to report to the 
General Counsel, Risk Management or directly into the Executive office. Furthermore, a 
Compliance Department may operate in a centralized manner, across functional lines or 
across business sections. 848   However, as a general rule, given that the Compliance 
Department is established as a control function, its personnel should not report to any 
revenue generating business units. The Compliance Department should maintain a close 
connection to senior management, who are accountable for a firm’s overall compliance 
efforts. 849 Regardless of how a Compliance Department is organized, its reporting 
requirements as well as overall functions should be clearly defined in writing.850  This 
includes separating Compliance Department functions from the supervisory functions of 
line managers, as well as distinguishing the roles of the Compliance Department from other 
control functions.851 
 
Role of the Compliance Officer and Monitoring Software 	
Considering the importance being placed on compliance departments, chief 
compliance officers (“CCO”), who head these departments, are also gaining 
prominence.852  In a slumped job market, commentators have noted that the compliance 
field is “booming.”853 The position of the CCO was first established in a marked way in 																																																								
847 The Role of Compliance, supra note 833, at 2. 
848 Ibid. 
849 Compliance and the Compliance Function in Banks, supra note 824, at 9, principle 1-2(establishing that 
the bank’s board of directors is responsible for overseeing the management of the bank’s compliance risk 
while the senior management is responsible for the effective management of the compliance risk). 
850Ibid. at principle 3 (requiring the senior management to have a written compliance policy “that contains 
the basic principles to be followed by management and staff, and explains the main processes by which 
compliance risks are to be identified and managed through all levels of the organization. Clarity and 
transparency may be promoted by making a distinction between general standards for all staff members and 
rules that only apply to specific groups of staff”). 
851 Ibid. 
852 Former SEC Compliance Chief Asks Chairwoman White to Stop Suing Compliance Officers, Market 
Counsel, marketcounsel.com/2013/06/26/former-sec-compliance-chief-asks-chairwoman-white-to-stop-
suing-compliance-officers; Christian J. Mixter, ALI-ABA Mutual Fund Regulation and Compliance 
Conference, July 19-20, 2012; Mark Schoeff Jr., Crucial SEC Vote Leaves Compliance Officers in the 
Dark, Investment News (Jan. 27, 2012, 3:39 PM), 
www.investmentnews.com/article/20120127/FREE/120129924 (noting compliance professionals “are 
nervous about the SEC's initiative targeting compliance” and worrying about liability issues). 
853 Gregory J. Millman & Samuel Rubenfeld, Compliance Officer: Dream Career? Wall St. J. (Jan. 15, 
2014, 8:13 PM), http:// online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303330204579250722114538; 
see also Aruna Viswanatha, Wall Street's Hot Trade: Compliance Officers, Reuters (Oct. 9, 2013, 4:35 
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1991 as a response to the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the 
“Guidelines”).854   The principles underlying the Guidelines for corporations were “to 
recognize an organization's relative degree of culpability; and to encourage desirable 
organizational behaviour” a carrot and stick approach to govern corporate crime. 855  
Compliance officers work to detect risks and develop targeted trainings and policies, along 
with tailored monitoring programs to address potential risks and deter misconduct.856  A 
bank’s board of directors must designate a qualified individual to serve as the Bank Secrecy 
Act (“BSA”) compliance officer.857   
In the U.K., all firms are to allocate responsibility for anti-money laundering 
systems and controls to a director or senior manager and all appoint a Money Laundering 
Reporting Officer (“MLRO”), who is to act as a focal point for the firm’s anti-money 
laundering activity.858 As such, various laws require the compliance officer’s consideration 
to safeguard a company from illegal behaviour.  The compliance officer is charged with 
monitoring all day-to- AML compliance.859 The compliance officer is also responsible with 
managing all aspects of the AML compliance program as well as managing the bank’s 
adherence to the AML laws and their implementing regulations.860 The compliance officer 
is to be fully knowledgeable of all AML laws and regulations. 861  They should also 
understand the bank’s products, services, customers, entities, and geographic locations, and 																																																								
PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/10/09/us-usa-banks-compliance-idINBRE9980EE20131009 (noting 
a “red-hot market” for CCOs). 
854 Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations: Their 
Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts about Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 205, 
209 (1993) 
855 Id. at 228. 
856 Emmanuel Olaoye, After SAC. Corporate Monitor Says What Makes Effective Compliance Programs, 
REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2013), http:// blog.thomsonreuters.com/index.php/interview-after-sac-corporate-
monitor-says-what-makes-effective-compliance-programs/. 
857 The bank must designate one or more persons to coordinate and monitor day-to-day compliance. This 
requirement is detailed in the federal banking agencies' BSA compliance program regulations: 12 CFR 
208.63, 12 CFR 211.5(m), and 12 CFR 211.24(j) (Federal Reserve); 12 CFR 326.8 (FDIC); 12 CFR 748.2 
(NCUA); 12 CFR 21.21 (OCC). 
858 Financial Conduct Authority, Anti-Money Laundering (2014), 
https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/OLM_007.htm [hereinafter FCA AML] 
859 Fed. Fin. Inst. Examination Coun., Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual 32 
(2014), available at, https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/OLM_007.htm [hereinafter 
BSA/AML Examination Manual]. 
860 Antoinette Verhage, The Anti Money Laundering Complex and Compliance Industry 57 (2011).  
861 Olaoye, supra note 856, (commenting that although many compliance officers have a legal background 
to aid in interpreting and applying the rules and regulations, those lacking the legal background have the 
support of experience from working in the business area). 
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the potential money laundering and terrorist financing risks associated with those 
activities.862  They must be experts in the field, simply hiring a compliance officer does not 
mean the bank is in compliance with the law if the person is not fully qualified.863The 
officer must also report any suspicious behaviour to relevant authorities.864  They are also 
responsible for developing policies, procedures and controls to combat money 
laundering. 865  Providing advice is also a primary responsibility of the compliance 
officer.866 
As a means to detect potential money laundering schemes more effectively, many 
financial institutions have established anti-money laundering detection solutions and 
enterprise-wide procedural programs.867  However, in order to be more effective, AML 
technologies have emerged with the capacity to monitor transactions, identify a variety of 
suspicious behaviours, and also alert officials of the activity.868 Defined broadly, AML 
software is a type of computer program used by financial institutions to analyse customer 
data and detect suspicious transactions.869 These software systems filter customer data, 
classify it according to the level of suspicion and inspect it for anomalies.870  Similarly, the 
software can be used to detect behaviour that attempts to circumvent the law.871  AML 
software can also be designed to flag transactions that involve blacklisted countries or even 
individuals. 872  A report is generated after the flagged data has been identified. The 
compliance officer then evaluates and investigates the flagged transactions listed in the 
																																																								
862 BSA/AML Examination Manual, supra note 859, at 32; FCA AML, supra note 858. 
863 Ibid. 
864 Ibid. The MLRO is to report to the National Crime Agency (“NCA”) while the BSA compliance officer 
is to file Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) with FinCen. 
865 Ibid. 
866 Verhage, supra note 860, at 58.  
867 Rajesh Menon & Sanjaya Kumar, Understanding the Role of Technology in Anti –Money Laundering 
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868 Ibid. 
869 Margaret Rose, Anti-Money Laundering Software, (May 2008) 
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report.873 The software is essential in this day and age given that those involved in money 
laundering are highly organized and tech savvy as well.874   
 
Next generation, behaviour-based technology utilizes advanced analytics when 
mining transactional and customer profile data to unravel intricate patterns of activity.875  
These new software are based on four risk assessment components that ensure disclosure 
and reporting that are required under AML laws.876  These four include: Client Risk 
Assessment which uses detailed customer profiles to investigate purposes; Transaction 
Risk Measurement that identifies transactions with the greatest risks; Behaviour Detection 
Technology which recognizes suspicious patters of behaviours; and Workflow and 
Reporting Tools that assist in alert investigations and compliance reporting.877   
 
Effective AML software technology has become essential in compliance 
departments and to aid compliance officers. They must be customized to address each 
bank’s needs and resources and continuously maintained. There should be global standards 
for what AML technology should do as a minimum benchmark in order to resolve issues 
of inadequacy. A proactive approach is nevertheless essential by compliance officers 
maintain and update the technology to ensure it is doing the absolute best in order for the 
program to be effective and efficient in detecting money laundering, and thus saving the 
financial institution from fines, regulatory action and reputational damage.  
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874 Verafin, Complex Money Laundering Schemes: Using Advanced Technology to improve your 
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Personal liability of senior managers and compliance officers: 
 
The enormous financial penalties that have been imposed particularly in the USA 
and UK on financial institutions in recent years, primarily for compliance related failures, 
have been welcome by many.878 On December 16, 2015, New York State Department of 
Financial Services (“DFS”) had proposed a new anti-money laundering (“AML”) and anti-
terrorist financing rule applicable to DFS-regulated institutions would be required to 
maintain monitoring program to detect potential violations of the Bank Secrecy Act. In 
addition, the regulated institutions would be required to maintain a watch list filtering 
program to identify and interdict transactions prohibited by applicable sanctions and 
terrorist financing rules, including those promulgated by the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), politically exposed person 
(“PEP”) lists, and other internal watch lists.  
 
A recent court decision and proposed regulation, chief compliance officers would 
be personally subject to both civil and criminal liability if their institution’s anti-money 
laundering compliance programs are incapable of detecting and stopping illicit transaction. 
A recent decision from a federal district court held that the compliance officers of a 
financial institutions can be held civilly liable for failing to ensure their institution’s 
compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act’s anti-money laundering provisions, (U.S. 
Department of Treasury v. Haider, No. 0:15-cv-01518), on this case the Treasury 
Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) alleged that 
MoneyGram’s former chief Compliance officer –Thomas Haider- failed to take sufficient 
action to terminate, and failed to file Suspicious Activities Reports (SARs) related to 
transactions he had reason to believe were related to money laundering, fraud, or other 
illegal activities. FinCEN fined him $1 million.  
 
The imposition of personal liability on chief compliance officers is part of the 
regulator’s broader interest in compliance failures at the highest levels of financial 
																																																								
878  Barry Rider, Karen Alexander, Stuart Bazley and Jeffrey Bryant: Market Abuse and Insider Dealing,  
      3rd Edition, (Bloomsbury Professional Ltd 2016). p. 339 
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institutions. The problem with swinging financial penalties against institutions, regardless 
of how they are imposed, is that they do not directly focus responsibility on those primarily 
responsible for the misconduct. Indeed, it is arguable that the penalties weaken the 
institution thereby harming investors, creditors, employees and many other shareholders. 
This will no doubt have implications for those in senior management, certainly in terms of 
reputation and possible financially through the loss of incentives and even employment.879  
 
The 2013 Act was passed as part of an ongoing process to improve the stability of 
the United Kingdome’s banking system880 The aims of the act are to separate retail banking 
deposits from wholesale banking activities by 2019 and to increase loss absorbency.881 For 
this reason powers are granted to the PRA to facilitate this.882 Higher standards are imposed 
on bankers’ conduct by introducing a more stringent approval regime for senior managers 
and new certification regime is being brought in for those in ‘significant responsibility 
functions’. A criminal offence of reckless misconduct is created and depositors are given 
priority on a bank’s insolvency. Also the act itself covers the conduct of the people working 
in the industry.883 According to section 36 of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 
2013, which imposes criminal liability on senior officers or banks and building societies 
for participation in decisions that cause their institution to collapse, in order to be liable it 
must be shown that their conduct, or failure to act, fell far below that standard that could 
reasonably be expected of  persons in such a position.884 Furthermore, the 2013 Act will 
ensure that senior managers can be held accountable for any misconduct that falls within 
their areas of responsibilities, the new Certification Regime and Conduct Rule aim to hole 
individuals working at all levels in banking appropriate standards of conduct. There is a 
tightening up of the approval of senior categories of approved persons and a strengthening 
of the capacity to vary any approval.885 Misconduct is specifically stated to cover a relevant 
person failing to comply with a PRA or FCA requirements.886  There is a noticeable 																																																								
879 Ibid. 
880 Andrew Haynes, Banking Reforms Struggles on: Published by Oxford University Press 2014.   
881 Part 1 and Sch 1 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013.   
882 Ibid  
883 Ibid  
884 Ibid. 
885 Section 63 ZA to 63 ZE Financial Service and Markets Act 2000, as amended.  
886 Section 66 A and B ibid.  
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tightening of the responsibilities placed on senior people in banking and financial services 
institutions. Furthermore, both regulators and compliance officers need to achieve right 
balance in this current environment, Regulators may want to handle the issue of personal 
liability with balancing approach while propagating a stronger culture of compliance; 
whereas compliance professional may want to apply better methods in managing their 
individual accountability risk in order to avoid any regulatory disturbance, therefore, 
finding the right balance would be essential to promote financial stability, since the 
potential criminal lability will be difficult to determine.887     
US & UK and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision  	
Anti-money laundering regulation is done on a national level, but is often based on 
principles established by international organizations such as the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (“BCBS”), which is “hosted” by the BIS. 888  Basel itself is a 
coordinating mechanism. It thus creates loose agreements that do not rise to the level of 
legal requirements. 889  There are no treaties established to create binding agreements 
between countries who participate either.890  The various Basel undertakings are formally 
non-binding.891 Thus, members have no recourse to dispute settlement in the event a Basel 
signatory fails to carry out its Basel commitments.  Basel law therefore does not produce a 
“direct effect” (to borrow a concept from EU law).892 This is also the “Basel perspective,” 
in that the Basel rules do not pretend to have any automatic application. Rather Basel law 
																																																								
887 Ibid  
888 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int'l Settlements, http://www.bis.org/bcbs 
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exists primarily to guide national implementation. The form of national implementation--
whether by statue, regulation, guidelines or whatever--is left to national discretion.893   
However, Basel does directly address the banks and other financial institutions  
which are the ultimate object of its strictures.894  Banks expect the eventual application of 
Basel norms in the various jurisdictions in which they operate; as such, there is 
considerable practical effectiveness directly exerted by Basel norms.895  In 2005, the Basel 
Committee recognized compliance risk as a distinct class of risk.896 The Basel Committee 
went on to further outline ten principles that compliance functions within banking 
organizations should follow, covering aspects such as reporting lines to resourcing for 
compliance functions.897  These principles have been incorporated into AML compliance 
program requirements in the U.S. and the U.K.898  In January of 2014, the Basel Committee 
issued guidelines for the sound management of risks related to money laundering and 
financing of terrorism.899  The AML sound management guidelines details how banks are 
to include the management of risks related to money laundering and financing of terrorism 
within their overall risk management framework.900  The Basel Committee noted that 
“prudent management of these risks together with effective supervisory oversight is critical 
in protecting the safety and soundness of banks as well as the integrity of the financial 
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and Financing of Terrorism (Jan. 2014)., available at, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs275.pdf. 
900 Jenna Danko, Tackling the New Basel Committee Guidelines on AML/FT Risk Management, ORACLE 
(Jan. 2014), https://blogs.oracle.com/financialservices/entry/tackling_the_new_basel_committee. 
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system. Failure to manage these vulnerabilities exposes banks to serious reputational, 
operational, compliance and other risks.”901 
With the AML/FT guidelines, the Basel Committee outlines the “essential 
elements” to effective management of anti-money laundering and financing terrorism risk 
management, including those related to: 
- Assessing, understanding managing and mitigating risks 
- Customer acceptance policies 
- Customer and beneficial owner identification, verification and risk profiling 
- Management of information and record keeping 
- Reporting suspicious transactions and asset freezing902 
These guidelines are meant to address cross-border and group-wide context and 
details the expectations for banking supervisors that must be addresses.  This also comes 
at a time when regional areas are looking into retooling their AML laws.903  However, 
without causing a binding effect, the Basel Committee and their principles and guidelines 
issues serve merely as suggestions.  Although many countries do take them into account, 
as can be seen through the Basel III Framework904 implementation, when costs or political 
controversies enter, the international standards are not implemented as they should.905 
In the U.S., the first federal law designed to limit money laundering was passed in 
1970 as the Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transaction 
																																																								
901 Ibid. 
902 Ibid. 
903 Jenna Danko, New Regulatory Measures Against Money Laundering: Are you Ready? ORACLE (Jan. 
2014), https://blogs.oracle.com/financialservices/entry/aml_the_next_frontier (discussing the U.S. plans to 
enhance AML requirements because there is a push for stricter regulation and supervision and also the 
increased use of internet and mobile banking). 
904 Hurberto M. Ennis & David A. Price, The Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Basel III and the 
Continuing Evolution of Bank Capital Regulation Economic Brief 1 (2011), available at http:// 
www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_brief/2011/eb_11-06.cfm (explaining Basel III is a 
series of global financial regulations that respond to the Great Recession, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 
and regarded as international regulation and rulemaking). 
905 Narissa Lyngen, Basel III: Dynamics of State Implementation, 53 HARV. INT'L L.J. 519, 520 (2012) 
(discussing that national level implementation of Basel III has been contentious and created political 
pressures that has affected its proper implementation). 
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Report Act, or better known as the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”).906  The BSA required banks 
to maintain records and reports as a means to aid in “criminal, tax, or regulatory 
investigations or proceedings, or in the conduct of intelligence or counterintelligence 
activities, including analysis, to protect against international terrorism.”907  The records 
and reports were to aid in facilitating audits or for a paper trail for law enforcement and 
regulatory agencies in order for the transactions to be reconstructed or retraced when 
needed.908Title I of the BSA authorized the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury 
(Treasury) to issue regulations requiring recordkeeping from financial institutions.909  Title 
II empowered the Treasury to prescribe the exact requirements concerning reports of 
transactions over $10,000.910 
Following amendments to the BSA, the next major AML law was the Money 
Laundering Control Act of 1986.911This piece of legislation imposed criminal liability of 
money laundering regulations, but also extended the reach of AML laws by defining 
“transaction”912 and “financial transaction”913 in a very broad manner in order to cover 
various activities.  After the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992,914 the 
Treasury had the power to impose criminal liability on a variety of institutions and 
individuals for wide ranging transactions.   
																																																								
906 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2006).  
907 Ibid. 
908See, e.g., FDIC, See Bank Secrecy Act, Anti-Money Laundering, and Office of Foreign Assets Control, 
DSC Risk Management Manual of Examination Policies, 1 (2004) [hereinafter FDIC Manual], 
http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_ infobase/documents/FDIC_DOCs/BSA_Manual.pdf. 
909 Ibid. 
910 Ibid. 
911 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2006). 
912 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3) (2006) (defining “transaction” to include “a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, 
transfer, delivery, or other disposition, and with respect to a financial institution includes a deposit, 
withdrawal transfer between accounts...or any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a 
financial institution, by whatever means effected.”). Transactions subject to AML laws include those that 
do not involve financial institutions. 
913 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(4) (2006) (“The term ‘financial transaction’ means (A) a transaction which in any 
way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce (i) involving the movement of funds by wire or other 
means, (ii) involving one or more monetary instruments, or (iii) involving the transfer of title to any real 
property, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, or (B) a transaction involving the use of a financial institution which is 
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree.”). In 
United States v. Skinner (946 F.2d 176) (1991), the court upheld convictions for money laundering even 
though the activity was a series of uncomplicated cocaine sales, rather than traditional bank activity. 
914 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (a)(4) (2006) (increasing the Secretary of the Treasury’s authority to include 
summoning powers). 
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Then in 2001, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Interpret and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (Patriot Act) was 
passed.915  The 9/11 attacks exposed the vulnerability of American financial institutions to 
money laundering as investigations later made clear that the terrorists responsible utilized 
the U.S. financial system.916  In turn, strong AML laws were issued in the Patriot Act of 
2002 and agencies also began promulgated stringent regulations for financial 
institutions.917Of the sections relating to financial institutions, Section 312 enforced the 
most significant regulatory burden on banks and the greatest oversight burden on federal 
agencies.918  Section 312 was an amendment to the BSA that “impos[ed] due diligence and 
enhanced due diligence requirements on U.S. financial institutions that maintain 
correspondent accounts for foreign financial institutions or private banking accounts for 
non-U.S. persons.”919  
As discussed below in the context of the HSBC example, the correspondent 
accounts920 of utmost concern and subject to heightened due diligence are those maintained 
by banks operating: (1) under an offshore banking license; (2) under a license issued by a 
country that has been designated as being non-cooperative with international anti-money 
laundering principles or procedures; or (3) under a license issued by a country designated 
by the Secretary of the Treasury as warranting special measures due to money laundering 
																																																								
915 See FDIC, Bank Secrecy Act, Anti-Money Laundering, and Office of Foreign Asset Control, DSC Risk 
Management Manual of Examination Policies 8 (2004), 
http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/documents/FDIC_DOCs/BSA_ Manual.pdf. 
916See Staff of the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 112th Cong., Rep. On U.S. Vulnerabilities to 
Money Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History (2012) [hereinafter HSBC 
Report], available at http:// www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/us-
vulnerabilities-to-money-laundering-drugs-and-terrorist-financing-hsbc-case-history (released in 
conjunction with the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations' July 17, 2012 hearing, this report details 
oversight from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency as ineffective) 
917 See, e.g., Due Diligence Programs for Correspondent Accounts for Foreign Financial Institutions, 31 
C.F.R. §§ 1010.605; 1010.610; 1010.630; 1010.670 (2012). 
918 See, e.g., Due Diligence Programs for Correspondent Accounts for Foreign Financial Institutions, 31 
C.F.R. §§ 1010.605; 1010.610; 1010.630; 1010.670 (2012). 
919 USA Patriot Act, FinCEN, http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_ regs/patriot/index.html?r=1&id=312#312 
920 The final rule implementing Section 312 and the Patriot Act itself define correspondent banking broadly 
as any account established for a foreign financial institution “to receive deposits from, or to make payments 
or other disbursements on behalf of, the financial institution, or to handle other financial transactions 
related to such foreign financial institution.” FACT SHEET, Section 312 of the USA Patriot Act, Final 
Regulation and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Department of 
the Treasury 1-2 (Dec. 2005). 
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concerns.  Essentially, banks are required to demonstrate that they are reasonably capable 
of detecting suspicious activities given the high risk of money laundering inherent to 
designated correspondent accounts.921 
The European Union adopted the First and Second Anti-Money Laundering 
Directives in 1991 922  and 2001. 923  The EU directives were based on the Forty 
Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”).924  The directives relied 
heavily on the suspicious transaction reporting (STR) and no-tipping-off (NTO) 
requirements, which are believed to aid in the ability of investigative authorities to monitor 
financial activity in order to prevent the use of the economic system for money laundering 
and/or the financing of terrorism.  In 2005, the EU adopted the Third Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive,925 based on the 2003 revision of the FATF Recommendations.926  
The European Economic Area countries, which included the U.K., were required to 
implement the Third Directive by the end of 2007.927  The U.K. Parliament adopted the 
Money Laundering Regulations 2007 (“Regulations”) to implement the new customer due 
																																																								
921 31 C.F.R. § 1010.610(b) (2012). 
922 Council Directive 91/308, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77-83 (EEC). According to article 288 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, “A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each 
Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and 
methods.” Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 288, Oct. 26, 
2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 171-72. Thus, each of the anti-money laundering directives was independently 
binding on the EU member states and it was mandatory on each state to implement policies consistent with 
each of the directives. 
923 Council Directive 2001/97, 2001 O.J. (L 344) 76-81 (EC). 
924 Established in 1989, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an international organization composed 
of thirty-four member states and two regional organizations. Member states are typically represented by 
their ministries of finance or, in the case of the United States, the Department of the Treasury. The FATF 
aims to set standards to encourage the implementation of legal and regulatory policy in its member states to 
combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF issues Recommendations, which are 
periodically revised, that reflect the standard policy principles to effectively combat money laundering and 
terrorist financing. The FATF imposes an ongoing review process upon its member states to determine the 
efficacy of anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) policies 
implemented in each member state. The FATF Recommendations are non-binding on the member states; 
however, it has been recognized as one of the most effective international organizations in encouraging 
policy reform to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, and to preserve the integrity of the 
international financial system. About the FATF, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/aboutus. 
925 Council Directive 2005/60, 2005 O.J. (L 309) 15 (EC) [hereinafter 2005 EU Directive]. 
926 John A. Terrill, II, Michael A. Breslow, The Role of Lawyers in Combating Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing: Lessons from the English Approach, 59 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 433, 438 (2015) 
927 2005 EU Directive, supra  note 925, at art. 45. 
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diligence (“CDD”) requirements of the European Union's Third Money Laundering 
Directive, which focused more on a risk based approach.928 
 
However, the cornerstone of the U.K. AML regime is the Proceeds of Crime Act 
of 2002 (“POCA”),929 which generally applies to all individuals in the United Kingdom.  
POCA has been found to have a significant impact on the U.K.’s ability to restrain, 
confiscate and recover proceeds of crime.930  The primary AML provisions are contained 
in Part 7 of POCA, which impose criminal sanctions against individuals who participate in 
money laundering conduct in the United Kingdom. The statute also imposes criminal 
sanctions against individuals in certain industries and businesses who become aware of, or 
have reason to suspect, money-laundering offences and fail to report the same to the 
appropriate authorities.931 Part 7 addresses the substantive offences of money laundering 
(sections 327-329), failure-to-disclose offences (sections 330-332), offences for tipping off 
(sections 333A-D) or obstructing an investigation (section 342), and miscellaneous 
definitional and interpretative provisions. 
Monitoring suspicious activity is a critical part of AML efforts.  POCA requires the 
disclosure of suspicious activity by (1) providing a defence to money laundering conduct 
for making a disclosure to criminal authorities and receiving consent to proceed with the 
conduct, and (2) making it a criminal offence when individuals and businesses in certain 
regulated sectors (including legal professionals in many practice areas) fail to disclose 
suspicious activity to the proper authorities.   
 
Additionally, POCA shields the integrity of investigations by incorporating an 
NTO regime.932Although states such as the U.S. and U.K continue to work on their 
AML/FT laws and requirements, there are still issues with the global AML regime. 
Problems arise in the United States for example, where threats of criminal prosecution are 																																																								
928 The Money Laundering Regulations, 2007, S.I. 2007/2157. 
929 Proceeds of Crime Act, (2002) c. 29 (U.K.) (Business in the Regulated Sector and Supervisory 
Authorities) Order 2003 (effective Mar. 1, 2004; amended at pt. 2, sch. 9, para. 4(1)(f)(g) by S.I. 
2003/3074, art. 3). 
930 Int’l Monetary Fund, United Kingdom: Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
Technical Note 7 (IMF Country Report No. 11/231, July 2011). 
931 Proceeds of Crime Act, (2002) c. 29 (U.K.). 
932 Proceeds of Crime Act § 333A; 
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not backed and breaches are routinely sanctioned by financial regulators through negotiated 
settlements.933  As can be noted below in the case studies, there has been a lack of incentive 
for such “systemically important financial institutions”934 to implement a comprehensive 
compliance program that extends beyond symbolism.935  In the United Kingdom, the 
situation is even more challenging considering there is a failure to hold any individual 
accountable. 936  Trust, which is the foundation of banking and its regulation, has in 
consequence and for good reason diminished. 
Case studies of AML violations 	
 Despite the ever-increasing regulatory measures to ensure compliance, there has 
been evidence of a culture of non-compliance by bands and deficient oversight from 
regulating agencies.937  In the absence of sufficient compliance and meaningful oversight, 
money laundering will continue to be moved through the financial system, as can be seen 
by the following case studies. 
 
Riggs Bank 	
The first high-profile Congressional investigation into anti-money laundering 
compliance began with Riggs Bank, following the passage of the Patriot Act in 2003.938  
																																																								
933 O’Brien & Dixon, supra note 821, at 942 fn2 (“A negotiated settlement agreement is a voluntary 
alternative to adjudication in which the prosecuting agency agrees to grant amnesty in exchange for the 
defendant agreeing to fulfill certain requirements such as paying fines, implementing corporate reforms, 
and fully cooperating with the investigation”). 
934 Defined as “financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity 
and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to the wider financial system and 
economic activity.” Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions, Fin. 
Stability Bd. 1 (Nov. 4, 2011), http:// www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf. 
935 O’Brien & Dixon, supra note 821, at 943. 
936 See Fin. Servs. Auth, The Failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland (Dec. 2011), 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/rbs.pdf. (“Quite reasonably ... people want to know why RBS 
failed. And they want to understand whether failure resulted from a level of incompetence, a lack of 
integrity, or dishonesty which can be subject to legal sanction.”). 
937 See HSBC Report, supra note 916 (released in conjunction with the Permanent Subcomm. on 
Investigations' July 17, 2012 hearing, this report details oversight from the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency as ineffective). 
938 See Staff of the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 108th Cong., Rep. On. Money Laundering and 
Foreign Corruption: Enforcement and Effectiveness of the Patriot Act: Case Study Involving Riggs Bank 1 
(2004) [hereinafter Riggs Bank Report], available at http:// 
www.levin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/supporting/2004/0924psireport.pdf (released in conjunction with the 
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Senator Carl Levin, Ranking Minority Member, submitted a request to the Subcommittee 
on Investigations to investigate the “the enforcement and effectiveness of key anti-money 
laundering provisions in the Patriot Act, using Riggs Bank as a case study.”939  The 
investigation revealed a poorly implemented AML program and a clear disregard to the 
bank’s compliance responsibilities.940  Most notably, two of Riggs Bank’s accounts were 
found to be linked to Augusto Pinochet and Equatorial Guinea.941It was discovered that 
Pinochet, the former dictator of Chile, maintained personal accounts at Riggs Banks for at 
least eight years while under investigation and while under a worldwide court order for 
freezing his assets.942  Riggs Banks served not just as Pinochet’s personal bank, but the 
accounts were initiated due to senior officers at the bank actively pursuing his business.943 
The Report alleged that Riggs participated in transactions in violation of AML laws for 
several years including deposits of money from unknown origins, the creation of offshore 
shell corporations, efforts to hide Pinochet's involvement in cash transactions, and personal 
deliveries of cashier checks to Chile. 944 Riggs maintained a similar relationship with 
Equatorial Guinea, its officials, and their family members.945  Pinochet was found to have 
deposits totaling between $4 and $8 million, while Equatorial Guinean officials along with 
																																																								
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations' Hearing on July 15, 2004, this report describes the AML 
deficiencies at Riggs Bank). 
939 Ibid. 
940 Press Release, FinCEN, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Assessment of Civil Money Penalty 8 (May 13, 
2004), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_ room/ea/files/riggsassessment3.pdf. 
941 James Rowley, Riggs Bank Fined $16 Mln for Helping Chile's Pinochet (Update 5), BLOOMBERG, 
(March 29, 2005), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? pid=newsarchive&sid=aDX6Lhj3.j3I. Augusto 
Pinochet Ugarte took power on September 11, 1973. Although his time as leader helped with economic 
growth in Chile, thousands of citizens were executed or disappeared, and many others were detained, 
tortured or exiled. Equatorial Guinea is a small, oil-rich country in central Africa. The ruling elite has 
amassed a litany of human rights violations spanning fifty years under Francisco Macias Ngeuma and his 
nephew Teodoro Obiang Nguema. The totalitarian reality of life for the 700,000 citizens was “stolen 
elections, strict censorship, routine torture, and murdered dissidents.” Thor Halvorssen and Tutu Alicante, 
How Dictators Triumph: With a Little Help From Their Friends, The Huffington Post (August 6, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thor-halvorssen/how-dictators-triumph-wit_b_ 1789668.html. 
942 Terencce O'Hara & Kathleen Day, Riggs Bank Hid Assets of Pinochet, Report Says, Washington Post 
(July 15, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A50222-2004Jul14.html 
943 Rowley, supra note 941. 
944 See Riggs Bank Report, supra note 938, at 19 (noting that Riggs changed the name on the accounts from 
“Augusto Pinochet Ugarte & Lucia Hiriart de Pinochet” to “L. Hiriat &/or A. Ugarte” to ensure the name 
Pinochet would not be noticed if searched). Timothy L. O'Brien, At Riggs Bank, A Tangled Path Led To 
Scandal, N.Y. Times, (July 19, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/19/us/at-riggs-bank-a-tangled-
path-led-to-scandal.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
945 See O’Brien, supra note 944 (finding that Riggs managed over sixty accounts and certificates of deposits 
for Equatorial Guinea). 
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their families maintained amounts of almost $700 million, which in turn represented Riggs’ 
largest relationship with a client.946  Riggs Bank disregarded the unknown origins of the 
deposits and established shell corporations in order to conceal the beneficial ownership, 
among other misconduct. 947  The Congressional Report concluded that “the evidence 
demonstrates that the Pinochet and Equatorial Guinea accounts were not treated in an 
unusual manner but were the product of a dysfunctional AML program with long-standing, 
major deficiencies.”948 
HSBC Bank U.S.A., N.A. (HSBC-US) 	
 HSBC utilized clandestine financial vehicles such as the in bulk transferring of 
traveller’s checks and cash to bearer share accounts and high-risk affiliate accounts, 
demonstrating an extended period of AML deficiencies.949  HSBC’s overall group policy 
in relation to its global affiliates was at its core contrary with AML laws and it failed to 
abide by enhanced due diligence requirements pursuant to BSA and Section 312.950  The 
procedures required: (1) verification of the identity of the nominal and beneficial owners 
of an account; (2) documentation showing the sources of funds; and (3) enhanced scrutiny 
of accounts and transactions of senior foreign political figures.951As the U.S. affiliate to 
HSBC, HSBC-US provided access to the U.S. financial system to respondent banks that 
were located in high-risk jurisdictions or to those who provided services to high-risk 
																																																								
946 Ibid. 
947 Terence O'Hara, Riggs Bank Agrees to Guilty Plea and Fine, Washington Post (January 28, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41584-2005Jan27.html 
948 Riggs Bank Report, supra note 938, at 4. 
949 See HSBC Report, supra note 937. HSBC-US provided millions of dollars per year to a Japanese bank 
by cashing travelers' checks. Bulk cash transfers were a part of the HSBC Mexico S.A. Banco (HBMX) 
money-laundering scheme and ultimately allowed HBMX to smuggle the more physical U.S. dollars to 
HSBC-US than any of its 80 affiliates. Over the course of a decade, HSBC-US allowed more than 2,000 
customers to open bearer share accounts; these are high risk accounts in that ownership is assigned to 
whomever has physical possession of the shares, allowing secrecy as to the true beneficial owner. The 
HSBC-US office in Miami had over 1,600 bearer share accounts at its peak, while there were over 850 at 
HSBC-US New York. Id. at 277. This note uses HSBC-US instead of HBUS in hopes of avoiding 
confusion. 
950 See News Release, OCC, OCC Assesses $500 Million Civil Money Penalty Against HSBC Bank USA, 
N.A. (Dec. 11, 2012), http://occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2012/nr-occ-2012-173.html 
951 See FDIC, Bank Secrecy Act, Anti-Money Laundering, and Office of Foreign Asset Control, DSC Risk 
Management Manual of Examination Policies 30 (2004), 
http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/documents/FDIC_DOCs/BSA_ Manual.pdf. 
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clients.952  HSBC group policy assumed that any affiliate within the group that owned fifty 
percent or more was meeting the AML law requirements.  Thus, HSBC-US naively 
believed that it was not under the obligation to conduct due diligence as to the affiliate’s 
AML compliance.953 HSBC-US failed to hold affiliates in high-risk jurisdiction to higher 
scrutiny in order to determine the business it was entering into.954  As a result, the policy 
HSBC held negligently ignored even basic due diligence standards that are to be met when 
opening a correspondent account with another financial institution by allowing exceptions 
for foreign affiliates not in accordance with the law.955 
  
Correspondent accounts have been found to operate as a banking tool vulnerable to 
manipulation by foreign banks as a means to launder money over the last few decades.956  
A prime example of this is the relationship between HSBC-US and HSBC Mexico S.A. 
Banco (HBMX).957  In 2002, HSBC group purchased Bital, a Mexican bank, which created 
HBMX. Although HBMX had no AML compliance program despite the widespread drug 
trafficking and money laundering occurring in Mexico, HSBC-US treated HBMX as a low 
risk affiliate.958  An investigation later revealed that HBMX had accounts opened for high-
risk clients, among them criminal currency exchange businesses and suspect 
corporations.959  Such behaviour and lack of compliance adherence demonstrates the risks 
that occur and the dangers that are able to seep into the American financial system.  
HSBC’s behaviour was found to have established an operation that was “a systemically 																																																								
952 See Press Release, Opening Statement of Sen. Carl Levin: U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money Laundering, 
Drugs and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History 5 (July 17, 2012) [hereinafter Levin Statement]. 
953 HSBC Report, supra note 15, at 5. 
954 See HSBC's Grilling, What Comes Out in the Wash, Economist (Jul. 18, 2012) [hereinafter, HSBC's 
Grilling], http:// www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2012/07/hsbc's-grilling (“The senator noted that 
the bank continued to operate in jurisdictions with secrecy laws; he asked whether it could ignore those 
limitations to meet America's transparency demands”). 
955 HSBC Report, supra note 15, at 35. 
956 See USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-156, 15 Stat. 272, 296 (2001). 
957 HSBC Report, supra note 15, at 35 (illustrating “how providing a correspondent account and U.S. dollar 
services to a high-risk affiliate increase[s] AML risks.” 
958 HSBC Money Laundering Report: Key Findings, BBC News (December 11, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18880269. 
959 HSBC Report, supra note 937, at 35. The currency exchange businesses in Mexico are referred to as 
casa de cambios, used by criminals to launder funds by exchanging U.S. dollars or Mexican pesos prior to 
their being transmitted to an international account. Illegal Casa De Cambio Launders More Than $5 
Million, The SAR Activity Review 3 (2001), http://www.fincen.gov/law_ enforcement/ss/pdf/032.pdf. The 
corporations of concern were later proven to be shell corporations used to launder funds from illegal drug 
sales in the United States. HSBC Report, supra note 937, at 35. 
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flawed sham paper-product designed solely to make it appear that the Bank has 
complied”960 with the Bank Secrecy Act961 and other anti-money laundering (AML) laws, 
such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.962  It was found that between 2007 and 2008, 
HBMX moved $7 billion into the U.S. affiliate’s operations.963It was claimed that HSBC 
knowingly and willingly evaded government safeguards intended to block terrorist 
funding, allowing affiliates to shield the fact that thousands of transactions involved links 
to Iran.964   An independent audit paid for by HSBC discovered the bank facilitated 25,000 
questionable transactions with Iran between 2001 and 2007.965 The report also detailed that 
HSBC “worked extensively with Saudi Arabia's Al Rajhi Bank, some owners of which 
have been linked to terrorism financing.”966  HSBC's U.S. affiliate “supplied Al Rajhi with 
nearly $1 billion worth of U.S. banknotes up to 2010,” and “worked with two banks in 
Bangladesh ... linked to terrorism financing.”967 
 
In Senate hearings, HSBC executives admitted to failing to comply with legal 
requirements to prevent money laundering.968  Mexico's National Banking and Securities 
Commission (CNBV) imposed a $27.5 million fine against HSBC a week after the Senate 
report, the largest-ever handed out to a bank by the CNBV.969  HSBC set aside $700 million 
to cover the potential fines, settlements, and other expenses related to the AML 
investigations in the United States, a gross underestimation of the final payout.970  The 
																																																								
960 Carrick Mollenkamp, Brett Wolf & Brian Grow, Special Report: Documents Allege HSBC Money-
Laundering Lapses, REUTERS (May 3, 2012), http:// www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/03/ushsbcusaprobes-
idUSBRE8420FX20120503. 
961 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2001). 
962 5 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1998). 
963 HSBC Report, supra note 15 (commenting that both U.S. and Mexican authorities warned that the 
amount of money could only be achieved through a link to narcotics trades). 
964 Mollenkamp, Wolf & Grow, supra note 960. 
965 HSBC Report, supra note 15. 
966 James O'Toole, HSBC Lax in Preventing Money Laundering by Cartels, Terrorists, CNNMoney (July 
17, 2012), http:// money.cnn.com/2012/07/16/news/companies/hsbc-moneylaundering/index.htm. 
967 Ibid. 
968 Jon Li, HSBC Money Laundering: David Bagley Resigns, Senator Grills Christopher Lok, The Fin. 
Pages (July 18, 2012), http:// www.thefinancepages.co.uk/companies/hsbc-david-bagleyresigns/01713. 
969 Dave Graham, HSBC Mexico Chief Says Fine Concludes Money-Laundering Probe, REUTERS (July 26, 
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/26/us-hsbc-mexico-idUSBRE86P0XM20120726. 
970 Neil Gough, HSBC Sets Aside $2 Billion for Legal Woes as Profit Falls, N.Y. Times Deal book (July 
30, 2012), http:// dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/hsbc-sets-aside-2-billion-forlegalwoes-as-profit-falls/. 
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worldwide failure of compliance and oversight indicates deep structural issues with 
HSBC’s core business model.  
Standard Chartered  		
Standard Chartered was one of the few banks who emerged from the global 
financial crisis with its reputation undamaged.971 However, in August 2012, the New York 
Department of Financial Services (DFS) alleged that Standard Chartered had caused the 
U.S. financial system to be “vulnerable to terrorists, weapons dealers, drug kingpins and 
corrupt regimes,” due to its relationships with Iranian Banks.972   According to DFS, 
Standard Chartered helped enable U.S. dollar transactions worth about $250 billion on 
behalf of its Iranian clients, “which generated hundreds of millions of dollars in fees” for 
the bank.973  DFS was able to issue its claim based on over 30,000 pages of documentation, 
including emails that detailed wilful and egregious violations of the law. 974  The 
investigation led to several unanswered questions, however, and raised concerns regarding 
how the investigation was carried out and handled.  The order provoked a harsh public 
response from Standard Chartered as well. 975  In a released statement, the London-
headquartered bank stated it “strongly rejects the position or the portrayal of the facts as 
set out in the order issued by the DFS.”976  The case was interesting not only in the issue 
of AML violations, but also the manner the investigation was handled given DFS acted on 
its sole accord, initiating strong criticism that DFS had acted outside of its authority.977  
																																																								
971 Justin O'Brien & Olivia Dixon, The Common Link in Failures and Scandals at the World's Leading 
Banks, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 941, 960 (2013). 
972 Order Pursuant to Banking Law § 39, Standard Chartered Bank 1 (N.Y. Dep't of Fin. Servs. Aug. 6, 
2012), available at http:// www.dfs.ny.gov/banking/ea120806.pdf. 
973 Ibid. (alleging the behavior was conducted from 2001 to 2010). 
974 Ibid. 
975 Press Release, Standard Chartered Bank PLC, Standard Chartered PLC Strongly Rejects the Position 
and Portrayal of Facts Made by the New York State Department of Financial Services (Aug. 6, 2012), 
available at http:// www.standardchartered.com/en/news-and-media/news/global/2012-08-06-response-to-
NY-State-Department-comments.html. 
976 Ibid. (arguing that the history of the claims should indicate that at the time none of the account holders 
were designated a terrorist entity or organization). 
977 Mark Gongloff, ‘Rogue’ New York Regulator Benjamin Lawsky Sets Feds Scrambling in Standard 
Chartered Laundering Case, HUFFINGTON POSt (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-
gongloff/benjamin-lawsky-standard-chartered-laundering_b_1765479.html; Nils Pratley, Standard 
Chartered: Rogue Bank or Victim of Renegade Regulator? Guardian (Aug. 7, 2012) 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/aug/07/standard-charteredroguebank-or-victim. 
	 155	
Standard Chartered also argued that “[r]esolution of such matters normally proceeds 
through a coordinated approach by such agencies. The Group was therefore surprised to 
receive the order from the DFS, given that discussions with the agencies were ongoing. 
“We intend to discuss these matters with the DFS and to contest their position.” 978  
Nevertheless, the bank agreed to settle the matter for $340 million, the highest ever for an 
AML violation by an individual regulator.979 Standard Chartered also agreed to hire staff 
to oversee and audit offshore money laundering due diligence and monitoring while also 
agreeing to appoint an external monitor to be assessed by the DFS.980 
 
Conclusion 	
 
The practical and conceptual foundations of financial regulations are being tested 
continuously. Compliance, although it is said to be at the forefront of financial institutions 
is failing to be adhered to. Recent scandals demonstrate that there is a deficiency in ethical 
behaviour and lack of compliance in the culture of banks. Policy makers around the world 
need to rethink, what is the purpose of regulation? Matters remain unclear, especially as 
there is further examination taking place and also examine not how to regulate, but why.  
Resolution of the issues that continue to appear requires the establishment of a common 
standard of what constitutes responsibility and simultaneous clarification of requisite 
accountability structures. Improved global integration allows for financial institutions to 
better manage risks on a global basis. The world is not functioning on national levels and 
compliance and oversight must address this.  
 
Banks have made empty promises at congressional hearings before going on to 
commit further violations, with monetary fines written off as the cost of doing business.981  
																																																								
978 Press Release, Standard Chartered Bank PLC, supra note 975. 
979 Liz Rappaport, Bank Settles Iran Money Case, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444318104577589380427559 
980 Consent Order Under N.Y. Banking Law § 44, Standard Chartered Bank 1 (N.Y. State Dep't of Fin. 
Servs. Aug. 6, 2012). 
981 Mark Squillace, Innovative Enforcement Mechanisms in the United States, Australian Inst. of 
Criminology, http://www.aic.gov.au/media_ library/publications/proceedings/26/squill.pdf 
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Compliance or cultural problems within a bank, regardless of the seriousness, can be 
contained either by adoption of structural reform, by external oversight, or if needed, by 
closing its doors. Regulatory effectiveness cannot be vouchsafed simply by reforming the 
institutional structure. Regulatory rules can be transacted around as can be seen through 
the case studies and also how reverse money laundering can escape around legal 
requirements. Such banking scandals and the new policy issues demonstrates that it is 
unsustainable for regulation to be decided, implemented, and monitored at a national level. 
Global oversight has become an imperative to reduce the conflicts of interest that may 
create profitable industries but not socially beneficial ones.  
 
A bank should also ensure that any outsourcing arrangements for their compliance 
department do not impend effective supervision by its supervisors. Regardless of the extent 
to which specific tasks of the compliance function are outsourced, the board of directors 
and senior management remain responsible for compliance by the bank with all applicable 
laws, rule and standards.982 Therefore, banks and senior management is responsible for 
establishing a written compliance policy that contains the basic principles to be followed 
by management and staff, and explains the main processes by which compliance risks as 
to be identified and managed through all levels of the organization.983  
 
Leaders of the world and organizations such as Basel Committee and FATF must 
work together to make mutually reinforcing structure in order to move into a compliance 
order that is taken seriously and yields the results needed. The Compliance function should, 
on a pro-active basis, identify, documents and assess the compliance risks associated with 
the bank’s business activities, including the development of new products and business 
practices. The compliance programme should be risk based and subject to oversight by the 
head of compliance to ensure appropriate coverage across businesses and co-ordination 
among risk management functions.984   
 																																																								
982 Compliance and the compliance function in banks.  Bank of international Settlements’  
     Report April 2005    
983 Ibid  
984 Ibid  
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A suitable example in banking compliance function is to examine in the next 
chapter the role of Islamic banking in and its possible contribution to stability, as the 
availability of Islamic finance continues to grow, it is essential to understand the 
vulnerabilities that are produced for Islamic banks with regard to financial crimes and 
review the means to combat the risks involved. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ISLAMIC FINANCE AND ITS POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY 
 
Introduction:  	
Over the years, Islamic finance has become one of the fastest growing markets in 
the financial system.985 With more than 350 Islamic financial institutions all over the world, 
there has been an increasing demand for the products and services they provide.986  With 
the demand increasing, many western conventional banks have even begun to offer Islamic 
banking options to offer Shari’a compliant products and services to Muslims and non-
Muslims alike.987 This chapter will provide an overview of the Islamic finance industry, as 
well as the legal framework behind Islamic banking.988 The chapter will also discuss the 
legal and regulatory challenges to promote the development of Islamic banking and its 
current global engagement with International Financial Institutions mainly the World Bank 
and the IMF and its possible in promoting stability.989 
What is Islamic Finance? 
 
Islamic finance has its origins in Egypt, where the first modern experimental 
Islamic bank was undertaken in the 1960s.990 “Islamic finance was born out of the ideals 
to Islamize Muslim societies and even to establish Islamic states based on the sharia.”991  																																																								
985 Euro money Encyclopedia of Islamic Finance 171 (Aly Khorshid ed., 2009) [hereinafter Euro money  
    Encyclopedia].  
986 Ibid.; see also Tasnim Nazeer, Euro money Encyclopedia of Islamic Finance The Ultimate Islamic 
Finance Review 2011, GLOBAL ISLAMIC FINANCE, Jan. 2012, at 14, available at 
http://www.globalislamicfinancemagazine.com/?com=news_list&nid=2187 (finding the Islamic finance 
industry to be valued at $1.14 trillion and growing at a rate of ten percent). 
987 Andreas Ernst, Promoting Islamic Finance and Islamic Banking, 56 RECHTSPOLITISCHES L. POL. F. 6 
(2011) available at, http://www.uni-  
trier.de/fileadmin/fb5/inst/IRP/Rechtspolitisches_Forum/56_Ernst_EBook_geschuetzt.pdf(noting that the 
fast growing market for Islamic finance has captured the attention of many Western banks). See e.g. A.U.F 
Ahmad, Theory and Practice of Modern Islamic Finance: The Case Analysis from Australia 256-259 
(Brown Walker ed., 2010) (discussing how the United Kingdom has amended its tax laws to accommodate 
Islamic finance). 
988 See infra discussion II. 
989 See infra discussion IV. 
990 Brian Kettell, Introduction to Islamic Banking and Finance xiii (2011) (discussing that the movement 
towards Islamic finance was initiated by Ahmad Elnaggar).  
991 Hans Visser, Islamic Finance: Principle and Practice 7, (Edward Elgar ed., 2nd ed. 2013) 
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It is distinguishable from conventional finance and banking in that it is based on Islamic 
law, or Shari’a, which is also known as Islamic jurisprudence.992  The primary materials 
from which Shari’a is derived include, in order of significance, (1) the Holy Qur'an, (2) the 
Sunnah and hadith, (3) Ijm'a, and (4) Ijtihad and Qiyas.  
 
The Qur'an is the main source of Shari’a as it contains the words of Allah as 
revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, which created Islam.993 At the beginning, the Prophet 
Muhammad preached “for humility, generosity and belief in God,” and the Quranic 
commandments were revealed subsequently, a period that is viewed as a beginning of 
“substantive legislation.”994 The text of the Qur’an was recorded and confirmed during the 
life of the Prophet Muhammad. Legal injunctions are scattered throughout the verses of the 
Qur’an and are not confined to any specific chapter. 995  By addressing itself to the 
conscience of an individual, the Qur’an attempts to use its narrative style convincingly. In 
doing so, the Qur’an expresses its “purpose, reason, objective, benefit, reward and 
advantage of its injunctions.”996 However, while some of the Quranic expressions are 
definitive in their application and leave no room for further interpretation, some are open 
to multiple interpretations.997 If the verses of the Qur’an do not help establish a firm 
interpretation, then guidance from other sources of Shari’a are utilized. 
 
The Sunnah are the sayings and behaviours of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) 
based on the recordings, the Hadith, documented by his contemporaries and later followers 
via oral tradition.998  The Qur’an declared the Prophetic traditions were to be followed.999 
Initially, the Prophet discouraged his companions from documenting his life and practice 
																																																								
992 Mohammad Amin El- Gamal, Overview of Islamic Finance  2 (2006) available at, 
http://www.nzibo.com/IB2/Overview.pdf.  
993 Kettell, supra note 990, at 14, 16.   
994 Wael B. Hallaq, the Origin and Evolution of Islamic Law 19-21 (2005). 
995 See ibid. at 30 (commenting that the injunctions include matters related to family law, inheritance, and 
criminal punishments). 
996 Mohammad Hashim, Principle if Islamic Jurisprudence 27 (3rd ed. 2003). 
997 Ibid.  
998 Kettell, supra note 990, at 19 (explaining that Hadith is the narration of the behavior of the Prophet and 
the Sunnah is the example or law that is derived from it). 
999 Ibid. at 63 
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as he wanted to ensure the word of God was separated from his own.1000 Thus, the traditions 
of the Prophet were compiled more comprehensively after his death. As differences in the 
text and transmission arose from the Prophet’s traditions, a scientific study began. The 
prophetic traditions consist of three categories in relation to the Qur’an. The Prophetic 
traditions confirm and reiterate, explain and clarify, or comprise independent rulings that 
are unable to be traced back to the Qur’an.1001 
 
Ijm’a refers to when Islamic jurists reach a consensus on various Islamic matters; 
it is an organic process in which the personal views of jurists concludes in a universal 
acceptance on a particular opinion over time.1002 The consensus is not directly revealed and 
the need for rational proof helps to unveil this source of Islamic law.1003  Consensus 
advances from toleration of a variety of juristic opinions until the diversity of opinion 
merges into a consensus.1004 Once the consensus is established, it becomes a binding 
authority itself and its reliance on the primary sources is no longer significant.1005 A 
consensus once established cannot be repealed by another consensus.1006 Although there is 
support for majority rule to establish a consensus, the popular view favors unanimous 
consensus of all jurists.1007 
Ijtihad in Arabic literally means an effort or to exercise to arrive at one’s own 
judgment.1008A feature of Islamic law is that it attempts to achieve harmony between the 
revealed sources and reasons. Analogical reasoning is the main method for achieving and 
maintaining this harmony.1009 For this reason, Juristic reasoning has become one of the 																																																								
1000 Kamali, supra note 996, at 77-78 (explaining the Prophet did not want to cause confusing about the text 
of the Qur’an).  
1001 Ibid. at 81. 
1002 Kettell, supra note 990. at 20, 39 (finding the reasons for the prohibition of riba to be that it is unjust, it 
corrupts society, it implies improper appropriation of other people’s property, it results in negative 
economic growth, and it demeans and diminishes human personality). 
1003 Kamali supra note 996, at 228. 
1004 Ibid. 
1005 See ibid. at 236-44 (observing that the status of the consensus as a source is established using the 
primary sources). 
1006 See id. at 232, 235-36 (clarifying that although this is the majority rule, some scholars believe that 
creating constituents may repeal the consensus and establish a new one). 
1007 See id. at 234 (providing an overview of the qualifications jurists must possess to participate in the 
Consensus, such as, jurists must qualify as upright individuals, be clear of pernicious innovation and 
heresy, and be qualified to carry out ijtihad). 
1008 Kettell, supra note990, at 21. 
1009 Kamali, supra note 996, at 468. 
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leading sources of Islamic law.1010 Juristic reasoning is utilized to infer and extract meaning 
from the unclear text of revealed sources. 1011  The reasoning can be expressed as an 
analogical reasoning (Qiyas)1012 or in general. 
 
Islamic banks and financial institutions establish their objectives and operations on 
Islamic-ethical principles derived from the Qur’an1013 and also the Sunnah (the word and 
tradition of the Prophet Muhammad). 1014  This means that the products and services 
provided must comply with the principles of Islam.1015 Most Westerns simply consider 
Islamic banking as interest free banking.1016 However, there is much more to the Islamic 
system of finance than just interest free products and services.1017 
 
There are six key principles involved in Islamic banking.  The first of which does 
entail the prohibition of interest (for which the Arabic term is riba) in all 
transactions.1018The Qur’an and the Sunnah both contain various verses which mention the 
prohibition of riba.1019In Islam, only a good loan (qard al hassan) is allowed.1020  To be a 
“good loan” essentially requires the lender not to charge any interest or additional 
amount.1021  Interest, according to Islamic economist is a theoretical concept that does not 
produce real growth of capital.1022  It has been interpreted as a form of exploitation and 																																																								
1010 See ibid. (discussing that the importance of ijtihad lies in the fact that it is a continuous process, and can 
evolve with the “changing conditions of the Muslim community in its aspirations to attain justice, salvation 
and truth”). 
1011Ibid. 
1012 See Kettell, supra note 990, at 21 (Noting that Qiyas represent analogies or the analogical reasoning 
which extends the position of the Shari’a on one matter to a new one). 
1013 Kettell L, supra note990, at 31. 
1014 Imtiaz A. Pervez, Islamic Finance, 5 ARAB L.Q. 259, 261 (1990). 
1015 Ibid.; see also Han Visser, Islamic Finance; Principles and Practices 30 (Edward Elgar ed., 2nd ed. 
2013) (discussing that Islamic economics is based on rules that Muslims should follow). 
1016 Ali Adnan Ibrahim, The Rise of Customary Businesses in International Financial Markets: An 
Introduction to Islamic Finance and the Challenges of International Integration, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 
661, 664 (2008).  
1017 Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy, 1-2 (2000) (detailing the expansion of Islamic 
finance from fourteen centuries of practice). 
1018 See Kettell, supra note 990, at 32 (explaining that riba refers to an addition, no matter how slight, over 
the amount of the principal and covers both interest and usury).  
1019 Islamic Finance: A Practical Guide 10 (Rahail Ali ed., 2nd ed., 2014) [Islamic Finance: A Practical 
Guide]. 
1020 Kettell, supra note 990, at 33. 
1021 Ibid.  
1022 Pervez, supra note 1014, at 263. 
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injustice and thus is contrary to Islamic principles of fairness and property rights.1023  There 
are three types of riba that Shari’a scholars have identified: riba al-jahiliya, riba al-fadl, 
and riba al-nasiya.1024  Riba al-jahiliya was derived from the Qur’an while the other two 
types were based on the Sunnah.1025  Riba al-jahiliya would require the borrower to return 
more money than had been borrowed.1026  Riba al-fadl has been described by Shari’a 
scholars as a hidden interest which involves the exchange of the same type of commodities, 
but in different quantities.1027  Finally, riba al-nasiya involves the exchange of the same 
commodities in the same quantity; however there is a delayed delivery.1028  Thus, riba in 
any form is strongly prohibited in Islamic Finance.1029 
 
The second key principle in Islamic finance entails profit and loss sharing.1030  
Islamic banks must reconcile the entrepreneurial needs of operating as a business and the 
prohibition of riba.1031 To remedy these interests, Islamic banking emphasizes a communal 
relationship between the banks and their clients.1032  Thus, lenders share the losses and 
profits that occur from the enterprise for which money is lent out.1033  At the beginning of 
the lending process, the bank and the client agree upon a ratio of the profit and loss to 
share.1034  The banks, as a silent partner, supply the needed finances and the client would 
provide the necessary labor, which justifies the agreed upon risk sharing.1035  This occurs 																																																								
1023 See Kettell, supra note 990, at 32.  
1024 Islamic Finance: A Practical Guide supra note 1019, at 10. 
1025 Ibid. 
1026 Ibid. 
1027 Ibid. 
1028 See id. (noting that riba al-nasiya has been approved by Shari’a scholars in times of necessity). 
1029 Ibid.; see also, Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, banking Without Interest 7 (1983) (finding the position 
permitting forms of interest as “defeatist”). 
1030 See Euro money Encyclopedia, supra note 985, at 28 (discussing that basic principle of Islamic banking 
is the sharing of profits and loss).  
1031 Islamic Banking and Finance in the European Union 114 (M. Fahim Khan & Mario Porzio eds., 2010). 
1032 See Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Impossible, Highly Desired Islamic Bank, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 
105, 115 (2014) (detailing that since the inception of Islamic finance the ideal is to create a two-tiered silent 
partnership); see also Hajah Salma Latiff, The Risk Profile of Mudaraba and Its Accounting Treatment, in 
Current Issues in Islamic Banking and finance: Resilient and Stability in the Present System 61, 67 (Angelo 
M. Venardos ed., 2010) (“The bank establishes itself as an intermediary between the suppliers of the capital 
and the users of the fund who need the money as a source of capital. In its intermediary capacity, the bank 
invests the funds in perceived lucrative and profitable businesses”). 
1033 Ibid. 
1034 Ibid. 
1035 See Hamoudi, supra note 1032, at 115 (explaining that as the ventures earned or lost money, the banks’ 
portion of the benefits or losses is then distributed to its depositors). 
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because Islam encourages Muslims to invest their money and become partners with the 
bank rather than to become creditors.1036  The key to this principle is that the financer is 
only entitled to gains if there is risk involved in which they also participate in.1037 The result 
of this arrangement is that Islam encourages particular investments to benefit the 
community, ensuring productive enterprises.1038  
 
Considering the above, risk sharing is critical to Islamic banking.1039  Investments 
cannot be made unless there is some risk involved. 1040  This principle distinguishes 
conventional banks from Islamic banks.  Conventional banks are assured to have a return 
on their investments based on the interest charged and the entrepreneurs bear all the risk.1041  
Under Islam, this distribution of risk is not allowed.1042 Islamic banking also emphasizes 
productivity as opposed to credit-worthiness in order to comply with the profit and loss 
sharing principle.1043  When an Islamic bank is preparing to extend a loan to a client, the 
major consideration is whether the enterprise will succeed and create a profit.1044  Thus, 
the bank will examine the soundness of the venture, the business acumen, and the 
competence of the entrepreneur.1045 
The third principle is the notion that it is not acceptable to make money from 
money.1046Shari’a allows money to be used as a medium of exchange, but believes that 
money itself does not have a value.1047 Money is not viewed as actual capital, but rather as 
potential capital.1048 This entails that money becomes actual capital only when it is invested 
																																																								
1036 Kettell, supra note 990, at 33  
1037 Ibid. 
1038 See ibid. (finding that the Islamic financial system emphasizes investments in order to stimulate the 
economy and to provide an incentive for entrepreneurs to maximize their efforts to succeed). 
1039 Kettell, supra note 990, at 34. 
1040 Ibid. 
1041 Ibid. 
1042 Ibid. 
1043See id. (commenting that conventional banks are primarily concerned with the loan and interest being 
paid on time). 
1044 Ibid. 
1045 Ibid. 
1046 Ibid. 
1047 See Ernst, supra note 987, at 17; see also Visser, supra note 1015, at 30 (“Money cannot have an 
exchange value of its own, which otherwise would result in a price for money as the rate of interest.  
Money does not have a market and hence no conceptions of demand and supply linked to such endogenous 
money in Islam”). 
1048 Kettell, supra note 990, at 34. 
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in business.1049  Money represents purchasing power and Muslims are encouraged to spend 
or invest money into productive activities.1050  However, purchasing power cannot be used 
to generate more purchasing power unless it is used in the creation of goods and 
services.1051  Money must also be asset-backed since it has no value itself.1052 
 
Shari’a prohibits gharar (uncertainty, risk or speculation) in transactions and 
represents the fourth principle in Islamic finance.1053  The prohibition of gharar is to 
prevent exploitation of the weak.1054  However, it is impossible to be absolutely certain 
about everything for every transaction which is why Shari’a does permit minor 
uncertainty.1055  Nevertheless, transactions will be invalidated when there is excessive 
uncertainty.1056  Thus, commercial partners are supposed to know the counter value that is 
being offered in a transaction.1057 Similar to the prohibition of riba, scholars argue that the 
prohibition of uncertainty protects investors from excessive financial exposure “or 
payment of mispriced premia to eliminate existing risks.”1058 
 
The fifth key principle of Islamic banking is that only Shari’a compliant contracts 
may be utilized.1059  Given that Islamic banking is based on the ethical system of Islam, all 																																																								
1049 Ibid. 
1050 Ibid. 
1051 Ibid. 
1052 See Ernst, supra note 987, at 17 (discussing that parties to an agreement must link the finance to a 
tangible asset that is specified at the onset of the agreement). 
1053 Kettell, supra note 990, at 35; see Ibrahim, supra note 1016, at 701 (conveying that gharar includes lack 
of complete information, deceit, risk, and inherent uncertainty as to the subject matter of the contract). 
1054 Visser, supra note 991, at 54 (explaining that uncertainty generally includes lack of complete 
information, deceit, risk, and inherent uncertainty as to the subject matter of the contract). 
1055 Ibrahim, supra note 1016, at 701. 
1056See Mohamoud A. El-Gamal, Islamic Finance: law, Economics, and Practice 58-59 (2006) (relaying 
four conditions that invalidate a contract).  First, gharar must be excessive to invalidate a contract. Thus, 
minor uncertainty about an object of sale (e.g., if its weight is known only up to the nearest ounce) does not 
affect the contract. Second, the potentially affected contract must be a commutative financial contract (e.g., 
sales). Thus, giving a gift that is randomly determined (e.g., the catch of a diver) is valid, whereas selling 
the same item would be deemed invalid based on gharar. 
Third, for gharar to invalidate a contract, it must affect the principal components thereof (e.g., the price or 
object of sale).   
1057 Visser, supra note 991, at 53. 
1058See El- Gamal, supra note 1056, at 60-62 (describing empirical findings of contemporary behavioral 
finance literature to emphasize that “human idiosyncrasies” such as people's preference of risk-loving 
behavior over risk-and-loss averse behavior depend on how a “reference point” is presented to them, and 
also noting that a religious pre-commitment helps individuals to avoid financial detriments). 
1059 Kettell, supra note 990, at 35. 
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agents involved in a financial transaction must comply.1060  Accordingly, no contract or 
financial involvement may be haram (forbidden).1061The final key principle in Islamic 
banking is the sanctity of contracts.1062  The Qur’ran encourages trade and commerce so 
long as the transactions are legitimate trade and business.1063  Islam requires more than the 
parties to a contract to keep true to the contractual provisions.1064  Islam holds that personal 
property is inviolable and thus prohibits another from taking property through theft, 
embezzlement, bribery, other means of taking property and wealth.1065Additionally, every 
contract must ensure fairness and the welfare of all parties involved.1066Accordingly, the 
crucial elements of a contract are the form (offer and acceptance), the parties and the 
subject matter of the contract.1067  Furthermore, a contract is only enforceable when there 
is mutual consent of all parties.1068Each party involved must also possess the appropriate 
knowledge of the subject matter and must have the legal capacity to enter into a contract.1069 
 
The World Bank and The IMF’s role on Islamic finance  	
Many multilateral institutions share the consensus that Islamic finance may be 
useful to problems faced by developing countries. The World Bank has publicly expressed 
that Islamic Finance “has the potential to help address the challenges of ending extreme 
property and boosting shared prosperity” (World Bank 2015). It has demonstrated 
considerable commitment to the development of the Islamic financial services industry 
through its 2015 signing of memorandum of Understanding with the General Counsel for 
																																																								
1060 Ibid. 
1061 See ibid. (explaining that the principal business of a company must be in compliance with Shari’a 
which excludes companies involved in selling or offering alcohol products, pork, or forbidden meat, 
gambling, night club activities, pornography, and other haram goods or services that are determined to be 
harmful to society under Islam). 
1062 Ibid.  
1063 See ibid. (observing that Islam regulates both personal life and the conduct of business and commerce). 
1064 See ibid. (finding Islam supports contractual obligations and the release of information as a sacred 
duty); see also ISLAMIC FINANCE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 1019, at 11. 
1065 Ibid. 
1066 Ibid. 
1067 See ibid. (noting that these elements are considered by Shari’a scholars to provide guidance and that the 
absence of any of these elements would render the contract null and void). 
1068 Ibid. (remarking that a contract is invalid when consent obtained through oppression, fraud, or 
misrepresentation). 
1069 Ibid. 
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Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (CIBFI), the global alliance of the Islamic 
financial services industry, to strengthen institutional backing for the industry. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has established as interdepartmental Working Group 
for analytical work on Islamic finance related to its key areas of supervision as well as an 
External Advisory Group of experts to assist in coordination with stakeholders. Not only 
IFSB, at the end of 2015 it also announced that it will integrate Islamic finance into its 
monitoring of financial sectors around the world. The IMF’s initiatives reflect the 
institution’s support for the credibility of Islamic finance as well as the general promotion 
among international organizations to harmonies standards for Islamic finance as it becomes 
increasingly absorbed into the mainstream global financial market.  
 
Several examples already point to the success of Islamic Finance in non-Muslim 
countries. In June 2014, Britain became the first non-Muslim country to issue sukuk, the 
Islamic equivalent of a bond, with the 200 million (British Pound) sukuk offering attracting 
more than 2.3 billion (British Pound) in orders. Working with the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 
PJSC, the Dubai- Based Emirates NBD PJSC, and Qatar’s QInvist LLC, Hong Kong 
Monitory Authority followed with its own issuance in September 2014. The $1 billion sale 
attracted more than $4.7 billion in order, with an estimated two-thirds of total orders from 
outside the Muslim world. The product offered was appealing for clear reasons: the five-
year-dollar-dominated asset at 2.005% was 23 basis appoints above five-year US treasuries 
(The Economist 2014). The sale was financially remarkable as it was politically symbolic 
of China’s entrance into Islamic financial market.  
 
The Legal Framework of Islamic Banking 
 
The framework of Islamic financial institutions in various jurisdictions represents 
the diverse practices and models of the Shari’a governance systems.  While some 
jurisdictions prefer greater involvement of regulatory authorities, other jurisdictions prefer 
less involvement.1070  It is also inevitable that legal obstacles will arise when it comes to 																																																								
1070 Abdul Karim Aldohni, The Legal and Regulatory Aspects of Islamic Banking: A Comparative Look at 
United Kingdom and Malaysia, 124 (2011) (contending that the subject of banking regulation is 
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the accommodation of Shari'a law with a country's secular legal system, which is often 
based upon European Common Law.1071  Even despite whether a country is based on a 
secular legal system or not, another issue with regards to the legal framework of Islamic 
banks is that some countries, and/or particular Islamic banks, authorize the use of all of 
the above mentioned products and services while others are more restrictive.1072 Such 
practices create irregularities and different thoughts as to what is acceptable among 
countries and banks.1073 
 
Islamic financing has found a niche within the modern financial complex, but its 
growth has not been accompanied by a coherent body of governing rules “native to the 
Islamic intellectual perspective.”1074 Furthermore, Shari’a law has not been allowed to be 
practiced fully in any western country.1075  In the United Kingdom, Shari'a has been 
integrated into two areas of British law: food regulations (e.g. allowing meat to be 
slaughtered according to Islamic practices) and finances, where the Treasury has 
integrated Shari'a-compliant financial products such as mortgages and investments.1076  
In Southeast Asia, it has become a matter of individual state legal policy as to how to 
incorporate Shari'a law and secular state legal systems.1077 Although it is up to each state 
to determine Islam's influence on their legal system, it appears that the states are often 
influenced by the current, and projected, size of the state's Muslim population.1078 
 
																																																								
controversial although the need for such regulation is not); Zulkifli Hasan, Regulatory Framework of 
Shari’ah Governance System in Malaysia, GCC Countries and the UK, 3 KYOTO BULL. OF ISLAMIC AREA 
STUD. 82, 83 (2010) available at http://www.asafas.kyoto-
u.ac.jp/kias/1st_period/contents/pdf/kb3_2/07zulkifli.pdf (observing that there is no consensus as to which 
approach to governance is more appropriate). 
1071 Kylee R. Sargenti, The Growth of Islamic Banking: A Singaporean Study on the Legal Conflicts of 
Embracing Shari'ah Law, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 431, 441 (2010). 
1072 Kelly Holden, Islamic Finance: "Legal Hypocrisy" Moot Point, Problematic Future Bigger Concern, 25 
B.U. INT'L L.J. 341, 352 (2007). 
1073 Ibid. 
1074 Holden, supra note 1072, at 362. 
1075 See Sargenti, supra note 250, at 438 (noting that Canada has come close to permitting full practice of 
Shari’a law). 
1076 Ibid. 
1077 Ibid. 
1078 Ibid. 
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As mentioned above, to ensure conformity with Shari’a law and that Islamic 
beliefs are implemented, Shari’a Supervisory Boards (“SSB” or “board”) are mandatory 
in Islamic financial institutions.1079  The SSBs have three central functions that must be 
carried out. First, to ensure that the banking facilities and services offered are in 
accordance with Islam.1080   Second, is to guarantee that the bank’s investments and 
involvement in projects are Shari’a –compliant.1081 Lastly, the SSB is to ensure that the 
bank is managed in concordance with Islamic values.1082 
The board is an independent body of experts knowledgeable in fiqh al-muamalat 
(Islamic rules on transactions) and entrusted with the duty of directing, reviewing and 
supervising the activities of Islamic financial institutions to insure Shari'a compliance.1083 
The board reports to and is accountable for the management of Islamic financial 
institutions.1084 Consequently, Shari'a governance adopts a two-tier system consisting of 
the management board which handles the affairs of Islamic financial institutions, similar 
to a conventional board of directors in any corporation, and the Shari'a board which 
reviews transactions and actions of Islamic financial institutions to ensure their adherence 
to Islamic law.1085 
 
It is the board’s responsibility to work with management to ensure that all matters 
relating to the financial products or service are in compliance with the principles and 
guidelines of the Shari'a and, just as important, to ensure that there is sufficient 
transparency in the Shari'a process so that the product or service is understood by 
consumers or investors to be Shari'a-compliant. In carrying out its responsibilities, the 
Shari'a board needs a clear framework and structure to ensure its independence and 
effectiveness. Thus, Shari'a governance can be defined as a set of organizational 
arrangements concerning how the Shari'a board is directed, managed, governed, and 
																																																								
1079 Kettell, supra note 990, at 25.  
1080 Ibid. 
1081 Ibid.  
1082 Ibid. 
1083 Yousuf Al Qaraddawi, The Governing Rules of Transaction’s Jurisprudence 15-22 (2010). 
1084 Ibid.  
1085 Bashar H. Malkawi, Shari'ah Board in the Governance Structure of Islamic Financial Institutions, 61 
AM. J. COMP. L. 539, 543 (2013). 
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controlled.1086 In comparison to the conventional concept of corporate governance, Shari'a 
governance is considered unique in its financial architecture, as it is concerned with the 
religious aspects of the overall activities of its financial institutions.1087  The role of the 
Shari'a board may vary from one institution to another, depending upon the nature, extent, 
and degree of Shari'a compliance. Nevertheless, the Shari’a board owes a fiduciary duty 
to all stakeholders involved in the financial institution. 1088   Additionally, an Islamic 
financial institution’s integrity depends largely on the status of Shari’a compliance, its 
impact of products, professional competence, and behavior towards, and observance of 
Shari’a norms.1089 Accordingly, the Shari’a board can play an essential role in ensuring 
and enhancing the credibility of the Islamic financial institutes.1090 
 
																																																								
1086 Mohammed Al-Sanosi, The Concept of Corporate Governance in Shari’a,  20 European B. L. REV. 343, 
448 (2009). 
1087 In the conventional system of corporate governance, the primary objective of the company is to make a 
profit and increase shareholder wealth. Accordingly, a non-shareholder manager often has no incentive to 
take risk, since they know that if the company fails they will lose their position.  See Allison Dabbs Garrett, 
Themes and Variations: The Convergence of Corporate Governance Practices in Major World Markets, 32 
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 147, 148 (2004). For banks, the Basel Committee issued a revision to its 1999 
guidance in 2006 which set forth eight principles by which sound banks are governed. These principles are: 
1: Board members should be qualified for their positions, have a clear understanding of their role in 
corporate governance, and be able to exercise sound judgment about the affairs of the bank.  2: The board 
of directors should approve and oversee the bank's strategic objectives and corporate values that are 
communicated throughout the banking organization.  3: The board of directors should set and enforce clear 
lines of responsibility and accountability throughout the organization. 4: The board should ensure that there 
is appropriate oversight by senior management consistent with board policy.  5: The board and senior 
management should effectively utilize the work conducted by the internal audit function, external auditors, 
and internal control functions.  6: The board should ensure that compensation policies and practices are 
consistent with the bank's corporate culture, long-term objectives and strategy, and control environment.  7: 
The bank should be governed in a transparent manner.  8: The board and senior management should 
understand the bank's operational structure, including where the bank operates in jurisdictions, or through 
structures that impede transparency.  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Enhancing Corporate 
Governance for Banking Organizations 6-17 (2006), available at http:// www.bis.org/publ/bcbs122.pdf. 
1088 Muhammad Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance, 465 (2007). See Masudul A. Choudhury & 
Mohammad Z. Hoque, an advanced Exposition of Islamic Economics and Finance 57-58, 85-88(2004) 
(noting that Shari’a corporate governance is based on the principle of Tawhid which is considered the 
foundation of Islam, i.e., the oneness of Allah (God). The principle of Tawhid includes the concept of 
vicegerency (khilafah), and justice (al-adl). The stakeholders as vicegerent of Allah have fiduciary duty to 
uphold the principles of Islamic law through direct participation in the affairs of the corporation or through 
representatives. There are two institutions involved in the process of Shari'a corporate governance, namely, 
the Shari'a board and stakeholders. The Shari'a board ensures that all IFIs activities are in harmony with 
Islamic law while stakeholders play an active role in decision making by taking into account the interests of 
all rather than profit-maximization for shareholders only).  
1089 Ibid. at 467. 
1090 Ibid. 
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 While the Shari’a Supervisory Boards ensure that the Islamic financial institutions 
are correctly handling their services and products, in the majority of cases, Islamic banks 
still remain under the authority of conventional banking systems.1091  This requires that 
before any financial transaction is completed, it must undergo double scrutiny: first, to 
ensure Shari’a compliance and second, to ensure that it complies with the national legal 
and regulatory requirements where the bank is located.1092  To comply with both, Shari’a 
scholars trained in fiqh muamalat, the branch of Islamic law that is concerned with worldly 
transactions and everyday living, work with commercial law lawyers.  All Islamic financial 
institutions are established under national laws and the financial products rendered are 
governed by these laws.  There are no international laws pertaining to Islamic finance or 
any other type of finance, however there are regulatory standards which most national 
regulatory bodies adhere to in order to ensure that the institutions they regulate are viewed 
by foreign financial institutions as creditworthy counterparts.1093 
 
 
In the United Kingdom, which has had success in Islamic finance, any financial 
institution seeking to provide Islamic banking services and products must apply for a 
license under the Financial Services and Market Act of 2000 (“FSMA”).1094  The FSMA 
covers the regulatory framework and the licensing requirements for all financial service 
activity as there is no separate legislation for the registration of Islamic financial 
services.1095 In order to obtain authorization to conduct business, an Islamic financial 
institution has to be incorporated as a company in the United Kingdom and have its head 
of office and senior management in the country.1096  Further, it must also have adequate 
resources for the business it seeks to undertake and the management must fulfill the proper 
criteria, particularly it must be able to undertake the business in a sound and proper manner 
																																																								
1091 See Rodney Wilson, Legal, Regulatory and Governance Issues in Islamic Finance 103 103 (2012). 
1092 Ibid. at 17.  
1093 "Basel III" is a comprehensive set of reform measures, developed by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, to strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of the banking sector.  See 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements, International Regulatory 
Framework for Banks, available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm  
1094 Wilson, supra note 270, at 115.  
1095 Michal Ainley Et Al., Islamic Finance in the UK: Regulation and Challenges 10-15 (2007).  
1096 Ibid. 
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without dependence on outsiders whose interests are not declared.1097 The reasons for the 
success of Islamic banking in the United Kingdom include: (1) the sophisticated market 
and skill base in London in terms of legal, accounting, and financial expertise; (2) a 
preference for Anglo-Saxon common law in Islamic financial transactions;1098 (3) public 
policy and taxation changes; and (4) the United Kingdom's switch to a single financial 
regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”).1099 
  
The applicant should also consult with the FCA about the products they intend to 
offer so that the proper regulatory requirements are determined.  Islamic banks are not 
exempted from regulations that cover aspects such as deposit-protection insurance and they 
must contribute to the Financial Services Protection Scheme, in which bank deposits up to 
a certain amount are fully protected.1100 For mudaraba investment account holders, the 
guarantee must be offered, but they can sign waivers indicating that they do not require 
protection so that their deposit contracts remain in compliance Shari’a law.1101 
  
The FCA as a secular authority and is not concerned with Shari’a compliance.  The 
FCA is interested only in the interests of customer protection and they require assurance 
that if the products and services being offered are Shari’a compliant, that there should be 
some creditable system in place to ensure that this is the case, hence the requirement of 
Shari’a Supervisory Boards. The FCA also concerns itself with the promotional and 
marketing material that Islamic financial institutions employ.1102  The FCA requires that 
this material be clear, fair, and not misleading. Given the complexity of many Islamic 
																																																								
1097 Ibid. 
1098 See, e.g., Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v. Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 19 
(presenting an Islamic finance contract that cited both Shari'a and English law in its choice of law clause). 
1099 See Mushfique Shams Billah, Arab Money: Why Isn't the United States Getting Any?, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L 
L. 1055, 1079 (2011) (noting that the United Kingdom’s advantageous legal and regulatory environment 
has attracted several powerhouse Islamic financial institutions and mainstream Islamic windows, including, 
but not limited to, HSBC Amanah, Lloyds TSB, the United Bank of Kuwait, the Islamic Bank of 
Britain,Gatehouse Bank, Investment Dar, Barclays, Citibank, Kuwait Finance House, Samba Financial 
Group, and European Islamic Investment Bank. 
1100 Ainley et al., supra note 274, at 11.  
1101 Ibid. 
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financial products and the misunderstandings of some clients and potential clients, it is 
particularly important for FCA. 
  
Unlike the United Kingdom who has adopted the “no obstacles, but no favours” 
approach to Islamic finance, enabling its growth in London, the United States has only 
stated this position without implementing it.1103 The First Vice President of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York proclaimed, “Islamic bankers have been quite ingenious in 
developing financial transactions that suit their needs: we bank supervisors, too, can be 
ingenious and will want to work with any of you should you decide that you want to engage 
in Islamic banking in the United States.”1104 Although such proclamations are encouraging, 
the United States government has done little in attempting to remove the main regulatory 
obstacles that are preventing Islamic financial institutions from prospering in the United 
States. That is why there are as few as only nineteen providers of Islamic financial products 
in the United States, none of which is a full-fledged Islamic commercial bank like the 
Islamic Bank of Britain.1105 
Risk and Regulatory Issues 	
 The specific criteria for Sharia compliance necessitates a set of risks for Islamic 
finance, in addition to the standard risks associated with banking activities such as credit, 
market, liquidity, operational, regulatory, and legal risks. In particular, there are risks 
related to the business model and emerging state of the industry. Some of these risks 
																																																								
1103 Ibid.  
1104 Ernest T. Patrikis, First Vice President Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Islamic Finance in the United 
States--The Regulatory Framework, Remarks before the Islamic Finance and Investment Conference (May 
23, 1996) (transcript available at http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches_ 
archive/1996/ep960523.html). Furthermore, in May 2004, the Under Secretary of the U.S. Treasury 
focused on regulating domestic Islamic banks in a public address, “[W]e need to deepen our understanding 
and awareness of Islamic finance, to protect its unique role, to honor its tradition, and to ensure sound 
regulatory frameworks and suitable jurisprudence that allow for efficient financial intermediation.” John B. 
Taylor, Under Sec'y of the Treasury Understanding and Supporting Islamic Finance: Product 
Differentiation and International Standards, Keynote Address at the Forum on Islamic Finance, Harvard 
University (May 8, 2004) (transcript available at http:// www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/js1543.aspx). Also, in 2008, U.S. Treasury Department Deputy Secretary Robert Kimmit 
made a trip to the Middle East where he “publicly expressed the U.S.'s positive and accommodating 
attitude towards the development and growth of the industry in the country.” 
1105 Abdi Shayesteh, Islamic Banks in the United States: Breaking Through the Barriers, 171 NEW 
HORIZON 1, 1 (2009), available at http:// www.kslaw.com/people/pdfbio?id=330374. 
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include equity investment risk sharing from profit-and loss-sharing financial instruments 
and liquidity risk heightened by limited number of Sharia complaint financial instruments 
and lack of lender of last resort facility. Demand for Islamic financial products continues 
to exceed supply, leading to oversubscribed sukuk. In addition, the requirement for 
investments to be backed by tangible assets has precipitated complex transactions as well 
as corporate structures that incorporate non-financial corporations. In sum, as identified by 
European Central Bank, the obstacles of Islamic finance are not few, including insufficient 
standardization, a shortage of liquidity and small size of issuances, the inadequate number 
of high quality issuers, and the tendency to focus only on domestic market.  
 
In most jurisdictions, Islamic banks coexist with conventional banks, both of whom 
compete for clients. Despite the growth in Islamic banking, these banks usually only 
account for a limited share of total bank deposits or total bank assets, often less than ten 
percent of the total.1106 A consequence of Islamic banks holding a minority share of the 
market is that they will often follow existing banking models and process, becoming 
market followers rather than market leaders. 1107  Furthermore, many scholars and 
commentators have pointed to numerous issues with the current manner Islamic finance is 
structured within conventional banking systems.1108  Lack of standardization also effects 
the development of Islamic financial institutions.1109 Islamic banking practices do not have 
a clear policy on what is allowed and what is not allowed.  Shari’a board in one country 
may permit a particular practice while in another country it is not. Even regulations 
regarding Shari’a boards may differ between countries.1110 Along those lines, some Islamic 
banks follow International Accounting Standards, others may adhere to standards issued 
																																																								
1106 See Wilson, supra note 1091, at 89 (finding that there is no market in which conventional banks operate 
where an Islamic bank is the market leader). 
1107 Ibid. 
1108 Oliver Agha, Islamic Finance in the Gulf: A Practitioner's Perspective, 1 Berkeley J. Middle E. & 
Islamic L. 179, 182 (2008). (“[U]ncertainty is considered a problem under Islamic Finance.”); Kilian Bälz, 
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Islamic finance). 
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by the Accounting Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions, and while 
small Islamic banks may just rely on local market standards. However, regulators who take 
time to understand the markets and the willingness of institutions to enter into new markets 
can lead to regulatory harmony on many of the standardization issues. 
  
Most adaptations for Islamic financial institutions to function are done at the 
regulatory level rather than through legislation.  Legislation to accommodate Islamic 
banking is more politically controversial, and thus faces difficult obstacles in passing.  
Regulatory changes are more technical in nature and often prove easier to pass through.1111 
When deregulation began to take place before the financial crisis, Islamic banks were able 
to benefit a little more as it was easier to introduce various deposits and financing 
instruments without too many questions being asked.1112 However, as tighter scrutiny 
began again, there was less willingness to change the status quo.  Since 2008, the move to 
tighter regulation poses several challenges for Islamic banks which could lead to 
discouragement and lack of innovation.1113 The FCA in the United Kingdom takes a keen 
interest in what financial products are offered, but there has been less interest at the 
regulatory level in the Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”).  Financial regulators have two 
objectives.1114  First, they are concerned with that the financial institutions they regulate 
remain solvent. Second, they are concerned that the clients of the financial institutions have 
access to relevant information so that they are able to effectively manage their financial 
affairs. Although the latter refers to financial product information, regulators take more 
interest in the former objective.  Remaining solvent means maintaining adequate liquidity, 
which poses a problem for Islamic banks which cannot hold interest bearing treasury bills 
or maintain deposits with central banks that pay interest. 1115  The social and political 
climates in some countries obviously pose another hindrance on the development of 
Islamic banks when they are unable to break through the political and social 
perceptions.1116 																																																								
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The United States’ regulatory system provides several hurdles for Islamic banks to 
overcome in order to develop a financial system there. For instance, under the Bank 
Holding Company Act (“BHCA”), given certain exceptions,1117 a “bank” is defined either 
as an institution, whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”),1118 or: 
An institution organized under the laws of the United States, any State of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, and any territory of the United States, Puerto Rico, 
Guam, American Samoa, or the Virgin Islands which both-- 
(i) accepts demand deposits or deposits that the depositor may withdraw by 
check or similar means for payment to third parties or others; and 
(ii) is engaged in the business of making commercial loans.1119 As can be 
seen from the above definition, the term “bank” does not apply to a bank 
organized outside the United States. In such foreign contexts, as often is the 
case with Islamic banks, the International Banking Act (“IBA”) applies.1120 
  
Thus, regardless of which part of the regulations are examined, to be a bank within 
the United States relies on deposits. The U.S. does not allow initial deposits to be at risk 
and so they must be insured by the FDIC up to a specified limit.1121 This can prove 
problematic for Islamic banks given that, in order to be compliant with Shari’a, deposit 
accounts are based on a profit-loss sharing system, an arrangement that puts the initial 
deposit at risk. As such, the U.S. statutory definition of deposit poses a potential obstacle 
to Islamic banking.1122 																																																								
1117 See Bank Holding Company Act 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2) (2006) (providing exceptions, such as foreign 
banks and insured bonds). 
1118 See id. (referencing the Federal Deposit Insurance Act under 12 U.S.C. § 1813(h) which provides 
further definitions of a bank, all of which rely on deposits). 
1119 Ibid. at § 1841(c)(1)(B) (2006). 
1120 See Banks and Banking, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-07 (2006) (“For the purposes of this chapter the term 
‘foreign bank’ includes, without limitation, foreign commercial banks, foreign merchant banks and other 
foreign institutions that engage in banking activities usual in connection with the business of banking in the 
countries where such foreign institutions are organized or operating.”). 
1121 See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l) (2006) (defining “deposit” under the BHCA).  
1122 Isam Salah, Legal Issue Arising in Islamic Finance Transactions in The United States, In Islamic 
Finance North America 61 (2009) (detailing the obstacles to Islamic retail investment products in the 
United States). 
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The National Bank Act of 18641123 (“NBA”) also proves to be a regulatory hurdle 
for Islamic banks. The NBA prohibits commercial banks from purchasing, holding legal 
title, or possessing real estate to secure any debts to it for a period exceeding five years. 
Such a prohibition hinders Islamic financial products used by clients for purchasing goods, 
such as murabaha contracts. However, in two interpretive letters, 806 and 867, the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) concluded that particular versions of 
murabaha and ijara contracts would be considered exceptions to the NBA rule if they meet 
the standards for functional equivalence to conventional asset financing.1124 Accordingly, 
although regulatory obstacles exist, there are signs that bankers and U.S. government 
regulators are willing to work on becoming more accommodating. 
  
In the United Kingdom, there is increasing flexibility in dealing with regulatory 
hurdles which allows Islamic banks to flourish more easily.1125 The Financial Services 
Authority adheres to principles which encourage “facilitating innovation and avoiding 
unnecessary barriers to entry or expansion within the financial markets.”1126 This enables 
U.K. regulatory officials and policymakers to be more equipped with regulating new 
financial products with greater flexibility than their American counterparts. For instance, 
although United Kingdom is similar to the U.S. in that a “customer is assured full 
repayment [of his deposit] as long as the bank remains solvent,” a customer has the option 
to turn down deposit protection on religious grounds.1127 As an alternative, customers could 
choose to be repaid under the Shari'a-compliant profit sharing and loss bearing formula.  
The Islamic financial system has several regulatory bodies that oversee it, interpret Shari'a 
law, and issue recommendations, fatwas, and other forms of guidance on how to invest in 
accordance with the will of Allah. Some commentators have also argued that this system 																																																								
1123 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-216d (2006). 
1124 See Shirley Chiu et al., Islamic Finance in the United States: A Small but Growing Industry, 214 
Chicago Fed Letter (2005) (noting that 1) the underwriting standard used in these models must incur the 
same risks as that of a conventional loan; 2) the risk incurred by the bank if a customer defaults on 
payments must be the same as that of a conventional loan; and 3) the risk from the bank's holding of legal 
title to the property must be the same as that of a bank providing a conventional loan).  
1125 See Michael Ainley et, al., Islamic Finance in the UK: Regulation and Challenges, financial Services 
Authority 14 (2007). 
1126 Ibid. 
1127 Ibid. 
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has stalled the growth and advancement of Islamic finance and its adaptation to modern 
conventions and has led to fragmentation. 
 
There are several regulating bodies which have developed to specifically regulate 
Islamic banking.  The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (“AAOIFI”) passes guidelines and regulates Islamic financial systems 
internationally. AAOIFI is arguably one of the most important regulating bodies. Founded 
in 1991, the AAOIFI describes its role as “an Islamic international autonomous non-for-
profit corporate body that prepares accounting, auditing, governance, ethics and Shari'a 
standards for Islamic financial institutions and the industry.”1128 Seven countries have 
adopted and implemented the AAOIFI’s standards, and six others have issued guidelines 
and laws based on the AAOIFI’s standards.1129 AAOIFI does not develop products to be 
issued; it merely establishes the framework within which products can be developed. 
Additionally, even institutions that heavily rely on the AAOIFI will typically also retain an 
internal or external Shari'a board that supervises compliance with these principles. As a 
result, standardization in the manner carried out by the AAOIFI may help provide some 
guidance, but it will not solve the problems encountered when structuring a concrete 
product.1130 
The Islamic Financial Services Board (“IFSB”), found in Malaysia, is “an 
international standard-setting organization that promotes and enhances the soundness and 
stability of the Islamic financial services industry by issuing global prudential standards 
and guiding principles for the industry, broadly defined to include banking, capital markets 
and insurance sectors.”1131 The IFSB publishes standards and other regulatory documents 
to aid in guiding institutions and countries in developing Shari’a compliant banking.1132 
 
																																																								
1128 Accounting & Auditing Org. for Islamic Fin. Insts., AAOIFI Overview, available at 
http://www.aaoifi.com/overview.html. 
1129See id. (listing implementation of AAOIFI standards in Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Sudan, Syria, 
and Dubai International Financial Centre, and of AAOIFI-based guidelines in Australia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa). 
1130 Ibid. 
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The International Islamic Financial Market (“IIFM”) also located in Bahrain, was 
established out of collaboration of several central banks and government agencies.1133 A 
key objective of the IIFM is to “encourage self-regulation for the development and 
promotion of the Islamic Capital and Money Market segment.”1134 The IIFM issues trade 
guidelines, best practice procedures, and standardized financial contracts in its effort to 
promote Islamic financial systems.1135 
Finally, the International Islamic Fiqh Academy, founded in Saudi Arabia, is an 
organ of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.1136 Included in its objectives is to 
“study contemporary problems from the Sharia point of view and to try to find the solutions 
in conformity with the Sharia through an authentic interpretation of its content.” 1137 
Rulings of the Fiqh Academy have been considered generally decisive on a number of 
recent Islamic finance issues.1138 
 
Despite the emergence of the above regulatory bodies, no single one is regarded as 
a central point of reference for guidance on the issues of compliance with Islamic law, 
since these organizations sit on different theological ground to each other and having 
different impact.  Receiving standards and guidance from various regulatory bodies creates 
a strain on presenting a cohesive message. Each has a different meaning as to what Shari’a 
compliance entails. This proves especially difficult in entering into a legal market such as 
the United States which requires strict requirements. There is already difficulty in entering 
into secular markets with conventional banks. For various Islamic banks to follow different 
regulatory bodies can add to this difficulty as the conventional market may not be able to 
understand or know how to accommodate Islamic financing. Additionally, because the 
guidelines are not binding law and each body has their own, it also adds in the difficulty of 
																																																								
1133 Int'l Islamic Fin. Mkt., http://www.iifm.net (noting that Bahrain, Brunei, Dubai, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
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1134 Int'l Islamic Fin. Mkt., Objectives, http:// 
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1135 Ibid. 
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1137 Organization of the Islamic Conference, Subsidiary Organs, http:// www.oic-
oci.org/page_detail.asp?p_id=64#FIQH.  
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advancing Islamic finance because the national laws in each country must determine how 
to reconcile the differences. 
  
Furthermore, the risk of unexpected rule changes is one of the primary and most 
widely discussed obstacles to the development of Islamic finance in the mainstream and 
non-Muslim population. Many Islamic countries do not approve of the notion of binding 
precedent,1139 meaning that clerics and scholars can change their opinions and disagree 
with past decisions. This practice leads to some degree of uncertainty as to whether a 
financial method or instrument currently considered Shari'a-compliant will remain so for 
the length of any given project or investment plan.1140The religious-based, non-binding 
legal nature of Shari’a compliant financing produces a risk of disagreement among 
religious leaders which is hard for many secular based legal systems to understand how to 
handle the Islamic financial system. The purpose of engaging in Islamic banking is to make 
profits while at the same time adhering to the principles and directives of the Shari’a law. 
For non-Muslims, who lack this second prong of religious conviction, conventional 
financing would be equally appealing in many ways. Those who engage in Islamic finance 
for religious purposes view their religious beliefs as intertwined with their conduct, both 
in their personal and professional undertakings.1141 
  
However, the conservative side of Islamic banking can indicate further difficulties 
in Islamic finance developing and entering into new markets.1142 An example of this 
hindrance is that conservative scholars argue for the end of murabaha contracts. The 
“phase-out” of murabaha investments of all types has been formally adopted by Al-Rajhi 
Bank (one of Saudi Arabia's major banks), al-Baraka (bank based in Bahrain), and the 																																																								
1139 See Tamara Box & Mohammed Asaria, Islamic Finance Market Turns to Securitization,21 INT'L FIN. L. 
REV., 20, 22 (2005) (discussing Saudi Arabia's “lack of a system of binding precedent”); John H. Vogel, 
Securitization and Shariah Law, in Islamic Finance News 2009, at 63, 64 (S. Slvaselvam et al. eds., 2009) 
(“[D]ecisions of courts are not often reported and, even if reported, are generally not considered to establish 
binding precedent for subsequent decisions.”). 
1140See Agha, supra note 1108, at 189 (“[T]here is no requirement that just because a structure has been 
done in the past, that that structure will be considered viable a year from now”). 
1141 Robert R. Bianchi, The Revolution in Islamic Finance, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 569, 573 (2007) (examining 
the notion that Islamic bankers feel an obligation to be honest and moral because “their religion holds them 
to a higher standard”). 
1142 Vogel & Hayes, supra note at 9.  
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Government of Sudan.1143 Such a phase-out is problematic for the Islamic finance industry 
because murabaha is a critical product that is offered.1144 The concern regarding murabaha 
for conservative scholars is that it resembles conventional banking techniques. As noted, 
to be Shari'a-compliant, murabaha contracts require that the bank assumes ownership of 
the product before selling it to the client in order to receive the profit. However, there are 
many who doubt that the banks actually assume possession of the product. These 
“synthetic” murabaha transactions are “nothing more than short-term conventional loans 
with a predetermined interest rate incorporated in the price at which the borrower 
repurchases the inventory.”1145 
  
The regulatory issues found in entering new markets, particularly secular ones can 
cause issues for the murabaha contracts. Nevertheless, although they are criticized, they 
are an essential service to Islamic banks.1146 This debate demonstrates the vulnerability of 
Islamic banks and the fragmentation of regulatory bodies. Regardless of whether the 
conservative scholars succeed in their ways, it is crucial that the supervisory bank board 
knows what the consensus is from scholars. Many bankers and institutions are 
understandably confused by the different rulings of the Shari'a councils. Individual 
transactions or instruments are approved or disapproved and then later the ruling is 
reversed.1147 This is problematic and risky in the eyes of regulators and legislators in areas 
such as the United States and the United Kingdom.  
 
Combating Financial Crimes 	
Islamic finance utilizes fairly sophisticated financial methods in order to create 
modern financial practices from simple contracts such as leases and sales.1148 Although the 
																																																								
1143 Ibid. 
1144 Usmani, supra note 316, at 7 (explaining that clientele would be inconvenienced and encouraged to 
engage in conventional banking if murabaha is no longer available) 
1145 Vogel & Hayes, supra note 89, at 9.  
1146 Ibid.  
1147 Faud Al Omari and Mohammed Abdel Haq, Islamic Banking: Theory, Practice, and Challenges 110 
(1996). 
1148 Mahoud A. El-Gama, supra note 330, at 1, (conveying that the methods used in Islamic banking were 
originally developed for regulatory arbitrage purposes). 
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industry seems to be largely self-regulating, since the events of 9/11, Islamic financial 
institutions undergo close scrutiny.1149 As such, it would seem odd if terrorists or criminals 
who commit financial crimes would favour Islamic banks.1150 Nevertheless, the regulatory 
arbitrage methods utilized in Islamic banking to hide interests and other factors considered 
forbidden under Shari’a law often resemble the methods used in criminal financial activity 
in recent years.1151 The asset or commodity-based nature of Islamic finance, “which the 
industry advertises as its main virtue, may in fact be viewed as a source of weakness, since 
multiple-hop commodity and asset trading at losses or profits is a standard method used to 
hide the source (in money laundering) or destination and transmission route of funds (in 
terrorist financing).”1152 Accordingly, it is important to examine the strengths and areas of 
improvement for Islamic financial institutions in handling financial crimes.  Traditionally, 
the idea of moral hazard in relation to financial regulation has been in connection with 
policies that may encourage reckless or dishonest behaviour. 1153  An “Islamic moral 
hazard” can be identified in that particular aspects of Islamic banking may be susceptible 
to corrupt conduct. Within Islamic banking, because Islam prohibits acts that are connected 
with financial crimes, there is an assumption of righteous behaviour by employees and 
customers.1154 Such assumptions can make an Islamic bank attractive to financial criminals 
so long as they may come across as good Muslims.1155 However, a cohesive international 
regulatory scheme which includes specific regulations for Islamic banking would help 
minimize these assumptions. 
 
The use of religion by Islamic institutions to avoid scrutiny or criticism can also be 
seen within the Islamic moral hazard. This is because until recently, the Islamic financial 
system was considered to be above the need for regulation due to the inherent morality of 
the system being required to comply with Shari’a law.1156 Another factor is the potential 
																																																								
1149 Ibid. 
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1151 Ibid. 
1152 Ibid.  
1153 Ron Terrell, Islamic Banking: Financing Terrorism or Meeting Economic Demand? 57 (2007). 
1154 Ibid. 
1155 Ibid. at 58 (discussing that the Dubai Islamic Bank suffered scandals involving its employees and 
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for ambiguity when blending economics and Shari’a. Patience and even loan forgiveness 
for delinquent borrowers are encouraged in Islam’s legal system. Late fees or penalties also 
often go unenforced. This is often seen as the opposite of economics in a secular system. 
The relationship between the banks and their depositors is also a part of the moral hazard. 
Although investment account holders are not guaranteed a fixed rate of return, they still 
expect a competitive one. Banks are then compelled to accommodate this expectation for 
fear of losing business.1157 Banks manage this changing the profit distribution ratios in 
favor of investment account holders over shareholders. If there are no strict regulatory 
controls, activities such as that may continue. 
 
Shari’a arbitrage can be viewed as an inherent weakness to the Islamic financial 
system.1158 The adherence to pre-modern contract forms often results in loss of efficiency 
which is often justified as necessary for the “Islamization process.”1159 The development 
of an Islamic financial product begins with a conventional product for which an Islamic 
alternative does not exist. Bankers, ulama, and lawyers collaborate in order to reengineer 
the conventional product to make it Shari’a complaint, as well as attempting to make it 
compatible with the legal a regulatory systems by ensuring it is “as similar as possible to 
the convention product with which regulators are familiar.”1160 Islamic financial products 
are never completely detached from their conventional counterpart. The “degrees of 
separation” used to separate the Muslim customer from interest-bearing products often 
resembles the layering techniques of money launderers and criminal financiers. 1161 
Furthermore, offshore financial centres are also utilized to minimize incorporation costs of 
special purpose vehicles, used in converting conventional products into Shari’a compliant 
ones, and also tax burdens.1162 Thus, a lack of a single regulatory framework, along with 
the lack of sophistication of regulatory and law enforcement in the Middle East, where the 
majority of Islamic banks are found, may leave the Islamic financial system open for abuse 																																																								
1157 Ibid 
1158 Mohammad A. El Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law & Economics, and Practice 194 (2006) (defining 
Shari’a arbitrage as a regulatory arbitrage whereby a financial product available in one market would be 
restructured under what is perceived as Islamic law in order to make it available in another market). 
1159 Ibid.  
1160 Ibid. 
1161 Ibid.  
1162 Ibid. 
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by criminals. This is particularly due to the lack of transparency in differentiating from the 
conventional products. Financial criminals are knowledge in layering techniques which are 
similar to Shari’a arbitrage that may allow the criminals to exploit Islamic banks since they 
are poorly regulated.1163   
Islamic banks also can find problems with internal risk management. Shari’a 
boards do not always address this religiously sensitive matter, particularly as it relates to 
reducing the risk of financial instruments or deposit insurance.1164 Some commentators 
argue, however, that Islamic banking is effective in combating financial crimes such as 
terrorist financing due to its overall regulatory scheme because it is more stringent since it 
must comply with Shari’a law.1165 It is also argued that given the asset-backed nature that 
Islamic finance is more stable. Nevertheless, the Islamic financial system will not be able 
to achieve an international market due to the risks it produces and its lack of management. 
Even if those risks are merely perceived and not necessarily reality, regulators in the West 
will continue to remain cautious.1166  
Yet, there is little proof that Islamic banking is connected with financial crimes any 
more than conventional banking.1167Islamic financial institutions also have many positive 
aspects that they utilize that may aid in the fight against financial crimes. Islamic banks are 
often required to adopt transparency, disclosure, and documentation to a greater extent than 
conventional banks.1168 Islamic banks are not passive financiers concerned for interest 
payments and loan recovery and as such their disclosure standards should be more 
stringent. Additionally, considering the profit-loss share nature of Islamic transactions, 
Islamic banks must put effort into assuring that the client is involved in socially beneficial 
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businesses that add value to the economy.1169 Islamic banks must concern themselves with 
the character of the client and the nature of the business in order to avoid loss or risk their 
reputations.1170 
  
There are those who counter these benefits by arguing that although the Islamic 
banks are not engaging directly in financial crimes such as terrorist financing, requirements 
like zakat are utilized to fuel the money to terrorist organizations.1171 Again, there are cases 
of some Islamic banks involved in layering money which has its final recipient as terrorists, 
but that does not indicate a widespread issue.1172 However, Zakat cannot be misused to 
finance terrorism because the act of terrorism is prohibited and goes against the basic 
principles of Islam.1173 Furthermore, Islamic banks in Western countries must still comply 
with national laws regarding anti-money laundering and terrorist financing.1174  When 
Islamic financial institutions appear not to abide by the laws on money laundering and 
terrorist financing because of lax enforcement of the laws by the authorities, financial 
institutions in other countries are prohibited from dealing with the non-abiding institutions 
and international pressure is exerted on the non-cooperative countries.1175  As such, it is 
argued that existing and future laws and regulations can prevent Islamic financial 
institutions from engaging in illegal activities. In order to ensure that Islamic banks are 
doing all that is possible to combat financial crimes such as money laundering and terrorist 
financing, regulatory action again must be taken in a united front. No financial institutions 
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should open or maintain anonymous accounts or any account with a fictitious name.1176 
Islamic banks must be aware of businesses that may seem legitimate but are in fact not. 
Each bank should provide a written policy approved by its board of directors, incorporating 
the minimum information and data to be obtained before approving the opening of an 
account for client. Such data should be in depth and include the client’s identity, profession 
or business and sources of their income, the purpose for opening the account and other 
information that can provide additional certainty. An identification process should also be 
utilized even for a casual customer who may be there for foreign exchange, foreign transfer, 
lease of safe deposit locker or any other service.  
  
The banks should also ensure the relation involved of the customer in both new and 
existing accounts.  If a client would want to open an individual account, the bank should 
obtain a statement from the client that they are in fact the beneficiary of the account being 
opened in their name. In the case that someone is opening an account on behalf of another; 
the bank should obtain documents evidencing the nature and scope of the legal 
representation.1177 If an institution or legal person opens an account, a verification process 
that the institution or company does in fact exist should occur and the bank should also 
obtain the names of those authorized as directors and verify their identities. The banks 
should also regularly update the basic information they obtain from clients and their 
activities. This will enable the banks to identify any changes that may cause suspicion or 
any discrepancies in the data, verifying the soundness of the data the bank is in possession 
of will also enable them to monitor for criminal behaviour.  
 
Money laundering and terrorist financing, along with other financial crimes, may 
use advanced techniques in order to conceal the identity of a concerned person or entity. 
Great attention must be paid to identifying the risks involved and the appropriate actions 
carried out in order to prevent such methods. Organized criminals and terrorists often 																																																								
1176 Jae-Myong Koh, Suppressing Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering - 22 (2006) (“Government 
sources and other experts on terrorism indicated that a large portfolio of ostensibly legitimate businesses 
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utilize others in an attempt spread influence and to establish a parasitic operational base in 
targeted areas. 1178  This allows them to create friendships with those outside of the 
organization which often can do some of their bidding. Any complex or unusually large 
transactions deserve the utmost attention as well. This is critical considering that money 
launderers often utilize layering techniques in order to disguise their source of illicit funds. 
However, it is also critical for terrorist who use the technique to hide where the destination 
of the money is.1179 Accordingly, unusual patterns of transactions which may not have an 
apparent economic or lawful purpose or objective should be closely examined. The same 
if the transactions appear to be inconsistent with the client’s nature of business, or raises 
doubts on the true nature of the transactions. 
Islamic finance and ethical or social responsible investment  	
There is a significant reason for the rise of Islamic Banking is its overlaps with 
ethical or social responsible investment. The strong ethical principles and religious 
underpinnings of Islamic finance have renewed discussion that Islamic finance has an 
integral role in the stabilization of a healthy financial system. The Sharia persistently 
underlines the importance of stewardship for people looking after other people’s wealth. 
As its foundation rests on partnership and cooperation, Islamic finance relies on equity 
participation and risk sharing, the system of Islamic finance in principle advocates for an 
equal distribution of risk and cooperation between fund-providers (investors) and fund-
users (entrepreneurs). In promoting the understanding of Islamic finance, the European 
Central Bank has noticeably illuminated the overlaps between ethical and social 
investment, which incorporates social and environmental considerations into the process 
of selecting investment options and gives preferences to companies above a certain 
threshold of corporate social responsibility.  This decisively concludes that “Islamic 
finance, therefore, falls under ethical finance”1180a multitude of criteria for qualifying for 
ethical or socially responsible investment align with principles of Islamic finance, 																																																								
1178 Ibid.  
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including corporate citizenship, environmental management, product safety, and the 
exclusion of the haram industries of alcohol, tobacco, gambling, defence contracting and 
nuclear power.1181   
Until recently, many of the issues of governance manifest in the more developed, 
markets of the West have not been of significant concern in Islamic Banking.1182  However, 
as Islamic finance gains greater prominence and market share, corporate governance in 
IIFS has begun process of internationalization and standardization. Sharia corporate 
governance has expanded from the requirement of Sharia supervisory boards to include a 
myriad other component such as Sharia auditing, Sharia review, Sharia research, and Sharia 
risk management.1183 However, fitting international best principles to Islamic Banking 
raises questions about the necessity of harmonization. Professor Rider has argued that 
because of the high moral content of the tenets of Sharia, and its adherence to integrity and 
fair dealing, the restricted context in which Sharia, and its adherence to integrity and fair 
dealing, the restricted context in which Sharia-compliant institutions must operate arguably 
does not require the procedural principles of Western governance and might even produce 
better governance standards. However, in Islamic finance exists tension between financial 
innovation, as allowed by more liberal interpretations of the Sharia, and a strict reading of 
the law.1184  Conventional banks can charge penalties to a borrower defaulting on his/her 
loan. However, in Islamic finance, banks may do so only if they transfer the same amount 
to charity. For religious purposes, Islamic lenders may hesitate from imposing penalty 
charges that could help maintain the borrower in relative solvency.  
 
For the above reasons, though Islamic banks and conventional banks displayed no 
differences in financial stability, fully fledged IIFS in general displayed a lower degree of 
stability compared to conventional banks during the period 2008-9.1185In terms of the 																																																								
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performance of capital markets, the weekly returns on Islamic Equities portfolio (Sharia) 
outpace the portfolios of the overall European market and market without financial forms. 
However, when the economy experiences an upward growth trend, Sharia-compliant 
equities slightly underperform the market portfolio. The empirical evidence gathered thus 
far demonstrates that the financial crisis tested the resilience of Islamic finance, which 
lacks the risk frameworks of conventional banking for faster recovery. Furthermore, among 
the main causes of 2008 financial crisis were excessive debt, risky investment, and 
extensive use of over-the counter (OTC) derivatives for speculation, primarily on the part 
of the major financial institutions but also by households.1186 
 
Each of these elements is part of a self-reinforcing cycle, with speculation driving 
up assets.1187 Because of Islamic banking is based on the principle of risk- sharing, as 
opposed to risk- transfer, and because it is linked to the real economy, it has inherent limits 
to the amount of debt-creation which can take place. Unlike traditional bond markets, 
which are primarily debt-based, ‘Sukuk’ (bond backed by real assets) are frequently equity-
based and contain risk of sharing features which can enhance the stability of financial 
markets. Further, Islamic finance’s prohibition on derivatives, options, and futures trading, 
which nearly eclipsed an obviously unsustainable $600 value (11 times global GDP) in 
2007,1188  helps reduce systemic risks in economy. One study cited in the World Bank’s 
Report that “during the years immediately after the crisis, Islamic banks were more resilient 
and achieved higher credit and asset growth than conventional banks.” This was in part 
because Islamic Banks had higher capitalization and liquidity reserves to cover losses,1189as 
opposed to leverage ratios as high as 40 to 1 at the major investment banks.1190 
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Is Islamic Finance promoting more stability than traditional banking services? 
In the context of global financial crises- 2007-9, relatively nascent Islamic banks 
may still trial behind the recovery rate and stability of conventional banking institutions. 
Several empirical studies have assessed the effect of the financial crisis of 2007-9 on the 
performance of Islamic Banks and 49, conventional banks in fifteen countries, in 2007, 
before the onslaught of the crisis the group of Islamic banks outperformed the group of 
traditional banks; in 2008, the performance had no significant differences; in 2009, 
conventional banks outperformed Islamic banks. The 2008 results reflect that the crisis 
impacted both Islamic banks and conventional banks, while the faster recovery of 
conventional banks in the following year could be explained by the effect of the crisis on 
the real economy in which Islamic Banks typically operate.1191  The slower post crisis 
recovery of Islamic Banks can also indicate the weaker risk management of these 
institutions as well as their infancy as obstacles for fast recovery.  
Another study across 120 Islamic banks and conventional banks across eight 
countries during the period 2007-9, shows that the profits of Islamic banks decreased by 
more than those of conventional banks in 2009. 1192   Additionally,  Islamic financial 
institutions has demonstrable success with high-value, durable public projects, they have 
yet to prove they can organize major composite investments outside of infrastructure, let 
alone address the liquidity shortage and raise enough capital to be independently viable. 
As it stands, Islamic financial institutions are not so different from conventional banks.        
The infrastructure and tools for liquidity risk management, still weak and emerging 
at most Islamic banks financial institutions, can account for this decline in profitability 
shortly after the crisis. During a financial panic, when depositors might try to liquidate their 
savings enmasse, the profit-and loss-sharing model can make Islamic banks more 
vulnerable to large quantities of deposit withdrawals.1193  Conventional Banks can charge 
penalties to a borrower defaulting on his/her loan. However, in Islamic finance, banks may 
do so only if they transfer that same amount to charity. For the above reasons, though 
Islamic banks and conventional banks displayed no differences in financial stability, fully-
fledged IFIS in general displayed a lower degree of stability compared to conventional 
banks during the period 2008-2009.1194 
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Conclusion 
In my opinion, Islamic finance is less a substitute for conventional finance and more 
a supplement to it, offering ethical and religious products and services for those who want 
them, and perhaps to a small extend increasing access to finance by micro-enterprises, 
However, the heart of Islamic finance –equity- is missing from IFIs; they are functionally 
closer to traditional banks then they are apart. Most IFIs are choosing to avoid risky and 
low margin businesses, instead opting to transfer risk and guarantee returns from large 
borrowers through non-PLS instruments.  
In addition, on top of the boards ‘transparency and accountability issues, there is 
still significant disagreement across the Muslim world as to which scholars are qualified to 
sit on such boards and whose conceptions of ‘Sharia- compliant’ are acceptable or not. 
Furthermore, while the IFIs do appear to be slightly more resilient than conventional 
institutions, the delayed collapse of Dubai’s real estate market further exemplifies the fact 
that IFIs and the societies in which they operate are inextricably linked to the majority non-
Islamic financial sector. The ties between the two will only strengthen as more non-Muslim 
countries issue suckuk and more conventional institutions open subsidiary IFIs.1195 	
 
This chapter has demonstrated what is Islamic banking? The chapter also discussed 
the legal and regulatory issues that have prevented Islamic banking from flourishing as an 
international contender in the financial industry. Furthermore, discussion was given to the 
issue of financial crimes, with particular attention to money laundering and financing 
terrorism. Although there have been some cases of certain Islamic banks being involved in 
one manner or another in these financial crimes, there is little proof that the Islamic 
financial system is connected to money laundering and terrorist financing any more than 
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conventional banks. Similar to all other banks, Islamic banks are also required to be wary 
and report suspicious transactions.  
 
They must follow national laws where they operate and follow international 
regulations that cover such crimes. A hindrance of Islamic banking, however, is the lack 
of cohesive regulatory system directed at Islamic financial institutions. This chapter listed 
several regulatory suggestions that should be unified in order to help promote safe banking 
habits.  
 
Islamic finance today appears to be competing aggressively with conventional 
finance. If Islamic banking is to develop as a serious banking alternative though, the 
industry must be prepared for innovation. The strategy thus far seems to suggest an 
intention to streamline Islamic finance products with the conventional financial markets, 
and to offer a viable alternative. Nevertheless, this strategy has exposed the Islamic finance 
industry to the risk of being labelled as an industry that is encouraging tactics that 
circumvent Islamic law injunctions and can make it appear to be more favourable with 
financial crimes.  
 
 
Islamic finance offers a great incentive for Muslim countries to develop financial 
markets and develop them to a level where they are attractive to international participants. 
Islamic banking also provides a great alternative for non-Muslims, but the industry must 
proceed in a manner that demonstrates a cohesive regulatory approach and one that can 
enter foreign markets and encourage sounds business practice.  
 
Another issue of financial misconduct concerning financial stability and the role of 
International Financial Institutions is the corruption and the stolen asset recovery which 
will be examined in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CORRUPTION AND STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY 
 
Introduction 	
Over the last few decades, increasing attention has been paid not only to 
prosecuting those who commit crimes but also to depriving them of the proceeds of these 
crimes.1196  Corruption and the recovery of stolen assets have become prominent issues in 
international law.1197  Corruption can be found in countries throughout the world, although 
the most affected by its impact are developing countries and transition countries.1198  The 
seizure and recovery of the proceeds of recovery is known as asset recovery.1199 Stolen 
asset recovery is quickly emerging as a key aspect in the fight against corruption and the 
promotion of the rule of law.1200 Asset recovery is an effective tool as it helps to deter 
corruption by demonstrating to corrupt officials that they will be deprived of their illicit 
gains along with improving international cooperation to achieve the end goals. 1201 
However, stolen asset recovery also presents its difficulties in that there are a variety of 
legal and practical issues, including insufficient legal precedent, lack of cooperation from 
offshore financial institutions and domestic political intervention.1202 
 
This chapter will examine corruption and the use of asset recovery as a means to 
combat it. First, a discussion will be had on what corruption is and how it has been defined. 
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Financial Crime Edited by Barry Rider (Edward Elger Publishing 2015).  
1197 Jean- Pierre Brun et al, Public Wrongs, Private actions: Civil Lawsuits to Recover Stolen Assets 1 
(Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, The World Bank, 2014). 
1198 Larissa Gray et, al., Few and Far: The Hard Facts on Stolen Asset Recovery 1, (Stolen Asset Recovery 
Initiative, The World Bank, 2014) (discussing that corruption slows economic growth and development, 
affects the quality and accessibility of public services and infrastructure, erodes public confidence in 
government, reduces private sector development and weakens the rule of law). 
1199 Ibid. 
1200 Mark V. Vlasic & Gregory Cooper, Beyond the Duvalier Legacy: What New "Arab Spring" 
Governments Can Learn from Haiti and the Benefits of Stolen Asset Recovery, 10 NW. U. J. INT'L HUM. 
RTS. 19, 1 (2011) (noting that the importance of stolen asset recovery has increased since the post-Arab 
Spring).  
1201 Gray et Al., supra note 1198, at 1.  
1202 Vlasic & Cooper, supra note 1200, at 1.  
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Next, the chapter will analyse asset recovery and international developments that have 
occurred in this discipline, focusing on the United Nations and particularly the World Bank. 
The chapter will also provide an overview of what the United States and the United 
Kingdom have done in their pursuit to aid in asset recovery. Lastly, this chapter advocates 
for the use of civil suits as a means to facilitate combating stolen assets and will conclude 
on this note. 
What is Corruption? 
 
Corruption can be viewed as the abuse of power for personal gain. When 
perpetrated by public officials, these abuses are considered public wrongs.1203 Many would 
argue that corruption is a universal phenomenon.1204 To this end, corruption has been found 
to cause a variety of negative impacts in the world. 1205  Although it seems virtually 
impossible to rid the world of corruption, the international community has formally 
condemned it and continues to make efforts in order to suppress and deter it.1206 
 
Corruption is not an easy word to define due to the fact its meaning will derive 
principally from cultural norms. 1207  The meaning of “corruption” can therefore shift 
depending on the speaker.1208 More than ten years ago, corruption was seen as being tied 
to doing business internationally and, for better or worse, an inescapable reality.1209 Today, 																																																								
1203 William Blackstone, Commentaries of the Laws of England, bk. 4, ch. 1, Of the Nature of Crimes; and 
Their Punishment 1765–69. (“breaches and violations of duties due to the whole community, considered as 
a community, in its social aggregate capacity”)  
1204 Corruption in International Business: The Challenge of Culture and Legal Diversity, 179-80 (Sharon 
Eicher ed., 2008). 
1205 Claes Sandgren, Combating Corruption: The Misunderstood Role of Law, 39 INT'L LAW. 717, 730,  
(2005) (finding that corruption causes poverty.); Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters (The World 
Bank Development Research Group Macroeconomics and Growth & World Bank Institute Governance, 
Regulation and Finance, Working Paper No. 2196, 1999), http:// 
siteresources.worldbank.org/intwbigovantcor/resources/govmatrs.pdf (establishing that corruption reduces 
private investment), Elizabeth Spahn, International Bribery: The Moral Imperialism Critiques, 18 MINN. J. 
INT'L. L. 155, 224-25 (2009) (discussing how corruption frustrates efforts to achieve human rights). 
1206 Winfield Bean, Hyperbole, Hypocrisy, and Hubris in the Aid-Corruption Dialogue, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 
781, 786 (2010) 
1207 Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart once declared 
that although he could not define pornography, he knew it when he saw it) 
1208Se Susan Rose – Ackerman, Governance and Corruption, in the global crisis, Solution 301(Bjorn 
Lomborg, ed., 2004). 
1209 Demetrios Argyriades, The International Anticorruption Campaigns: Whose Ethics? In Where 
Corruption Lives 217 (Gerald E. Caiden, O.P. Dwivedi & Joseph Jabbra eds., 2001). 
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as noted, corruption is considered as one of the fundamental obstacles to development, 
which must be prevented and defeated.1210 The word “corruption” has been derived from 
the Latin word corrupts, meaning to break.1211 The word’s Latin roots emphasize the 
destructive effects of corruption on society.1212 In its everyday meaning, corruption is said 
to encompass the situations where agents and public officials break society’s trust in 
them. 1213  The Oxford English Dictionary defines “corruption” as the “perversion or 
destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favours; the use or 
existence of corrupt practices, esp. in a state, public corporation etc.”1214 
 
Over the years, governments have focused their anti-corruption efforts on fighting 
administrative corruption.1215 Administrative corruption often involves the payment of 
small-scale bribes to mid and low level government officials.1216 Today, the focus has 
shifted to grand corruption. Grand corruption, also known as political corruption, embodies 
large bribes given in connection with major interactions, such as large infrastructure 
projects or arms sales, and the abuse of political power to extract and accumulate for private 
gain.1217  The key difference between these types of corruption is that “administrative 
corruption reflects specific weaknesses within different systems, while grand corruption 
involves the distortion and exploitation of entire systems for the benefit of private 
interests.”1218  Grand corruption is often associated with the massive redirection of public 
funds for the private use of the political elite.1219 The most notorious culprits have stolen 
billions of dollars from their countries for their own personal wealth accumulation. 
																																																								
1210 See USAID Anticorruption Strategy, available at http:// 
www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/ac_strategy_ final.pdf. 
1211 Colin Nicholls et al., Corruption and misuse of Public Office 1 (2d Ed., 2011) 
1212 Ibid. 
1213 Ibid. 
1214 See ibid. (Citing Oxford English Dictionary 1989 Edition). 
1215 Mary Evans Webster, Fifteen Minutes of Shame: The Growing Notoriety of Grand Corruption, 31 
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 807, 808 (2008). 
1216 Claes Sandgren, Combating Corruption: The Misunderstood Role of Law, 39 INT'L LAW. 717, 723 
(2005) (noting mid and low level government officials included police officers, customs personnel, medical 
doctors, and teachers). 
1217 U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center, what is Political Corruption? available 
athttp://www.u4.no/themes/political-corruption/introduction.cfm #definitions. 
1218 Steven E. Hendrix, New Approaches to Addressing Corruption in the Context of U.S. Foreign 
Assistance with Examples from Latin America and the Caribbean, 12 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 1, 4 (2005). 
1219 Ibid 
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Transparency International (“TI”) is an international NGO that has been at the 
frontline of anticorruption efforts since the end of the Cold War when the incentives to 
overlook corruption in receiving nations subsided. 1220  TI developed a Corruption 
Perceptions Index which measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption around 
the world.1221 In its report, TI has found no country received a perfect score and that more 
than two-thirds of countries score below 50, on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very 
clean).1222Currently, the only universal legally binding instrument is the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (“UNCAC”).1223 In December 2000, the General Assembly 
recognized the need for an effective international legal instrument to combat corruption 
that would be independent from the Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime.1224 UNCAC represents the results of serious efforts put forth by the international 
community in order to address the specific aspects of corruption.1225 
 
UNCAC distinguishes itself from other international conventions in that it 
recognizes that the problem of corruption extends beyond bribery and that other aspects of 
corruption must be addressed in order to make global efforts successful.1226 The signatories 
declare themselves to be “[c]onvinced that the illicit acquisition of personal wealth can be 
particularly damaging to democratic institutions, national economies and the rule of law, 
[and] [d]etermined to prevent, detect and deter in a more effective manner international 
transfers of illicitly acquired assets and to strengthen international cooperation in asset 
recovery.”1227 One of the most contentious and important aspects of the UNCAC is its 																																																								
1220 Winfield Bean, supra note 1206, at 789.  
1221 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2014: Results, available at 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results(2014). 
1222 See Ibid. (finding that a poor score is likely due to widespread bribery, lack of punishment for 
corruption and public institutions that do not respond to citizens’ needs). 
1223 United Nations Convention against Corruption, opened for signature 31 October 2003, 2349 UNTS 41 
(entered into force 14 December 2005) available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption [hereinafter 
UNCAC] 
1224 United Nations Convention against Corruption, Background, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html. 
1225 See Ibid. (commenting that to date there are 140 signatories to the Convention). 
1226 Philippa Webb, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: Global Achievement or Missed 
Opportunity? 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 191, 191 (2005). 
1227 Preamble, UNCAC, available at <http:// 
www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/convention_corruption/signing/Convention-e.pdf 
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provisions regarding asset recovery. Asset recovery is a major issue for countries where 
grand corruption has resulted in the loss of millions of dollars that could be used for poverty 
mitigation and development of civil services.1228 Leaders involved in the negotiations for 
the UNCAC recognized that asset recovery was fundamental to the Convention and a 
significant indicator of the political will of states to truly work together to fight grand 
corruption.1229 The Convention ultimately dedicated an entire chapter to asset recovery.1230 
 
Asset Recovery and its Role in Combating Corruption 
 
Asset recovery has developed into a critical tool in combating transnational 
corruption.1231 However, the utilization of asset recovery is filled with both legal and 
practical difficulties. 1232  Although there are exuberant amounts of money involved, 
recovering stolen assets does not always simply focus on money. This tool has been used 
to aid in deterrence efforts as well as help in fighting the impunity that is often associated 
with financial crimes.1233 In many cases, asset recovery will fill three distinct purposes: 
recovering monies to fund governments programs and initiatives that help their people; 
providing a semblance of justice for victims while often challenging a political culture of 
impunity; and deterring officials from engaging in future corruption.1234 Although these 
objectives are difficult, they are seen as worthwhile in accomplishing.  
 
 
In addition to being addressed in anticorruption instruments, asset recovery has also 
been recognized in international financial regulations. Although these regulations do not 
focus exclusively on anticorruption, they often must interact with the anticorruption 
																																																								
1228 Webster, supra note 1215, at 811. 
1229 Webb, supra note 1226, at 208. 
1230 See UNCAC, supra note 1223, at ch. V. 
1231 Thomas R. Snider & Won Kidane, Combating Corruption Through International Law in Africa: A 
Comparative Analysis, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 691, 741 (2007). 
1232 Vlasic & Cooper, supra note 1200, at 3 (listing such difficulties as insufficient legal precedent, lack of 
cooperation from offshore financial centers, and domestic interference encountered in asset recovery). 
1233 Ibid. 
1234 Ibid. 
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instruments. 1235  Illustrations of this include the Financial Action Task Force 
recommendations,1236 the guidance of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision1237 
and the Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private Banking, revised in June 
2012. 1238  As such, States’ obligations laid out under these international financial 
instruments must be read in conjunction with their obligations under international anti-
corruption instruments. 
 
The success of asset recovery can also depend on the regulation of the financial 
sector. 1239  Financial regulations often complement and strengthen the anti-corruption 
instruments, although they have also been seen to contradict each other on certain 
issues.1240  Corporate law also influences the success of asset recovery provisions. An 
example of this is the Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative (to be discussed below) 
																																																								
1235 One example is international accounting standards. Following the example of the FCPA, certain 
multilateral conventions contain separate provisions on accounting standards (for example, OECD 
Convention art 8). Imposing stringent accounting requirements to a certain extent brings the anti-corruption 
effort under the rigorous oversight of market and stock exchange watchdogs such as the SEC in the US. 
1236 Financial Action Task Force, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the 
Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations (February 2012) [hereinafter FATF 
Recommendations]. The FATF is an independent intergovernmental body that develops and promotes 
policies to protect the global financial system against money laundering and terrorist financing: see 
generally Financial Action Task Force, About Us: Who We Arehttp://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/. 
See also Financial Action Task Force, Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption, (Report, July 2011). 
1237 For documents issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“BCBS”): see generally Bank 
for International Settlements, Basel Committee-- Last 3 Years  available at 
http://www.bis.org/list/bcbs/index.htm> The BCBS has released guidance on a number of topics: see, e.g., 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the 
Purpose of Money-Laundering (Statement, December 1988) available at http:// 
www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc137.pdf; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consolidated KYC Risk 
Management (Guidance Document, Bank for International Settlements, October 2004) available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs110.pdf; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Due Diligence and 
Transparency regarding Cover Payment Messages Related to Cross-Border Wire Transfers (Guidance 
Document, Bank for International Settlements, May 2009) available at http:// 
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs154.pdf. 
1238 Wolfsberg Group, Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private Banking (May 2012) 
available at, http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/pdf/Wolfsberg-Private-Banking-Prinicples-May-
2012.pdf. The Wolfsberg Group is an industry-led initiative comprised of 11 global banks. The Group aims 
to elaborate standards on known-your-customer, money laundering and counterterrorism financing issues: 
see generally Wolfsberg Group, Global Banks: Global Standards (2012) available at http://www.wolfsberg-
principles.com. 
1239 Jan Wouters et. al., The International Legal Framework Against Corruption: Achievements and 
Challenges, 14 MELB. J. INT'L L. 205, 261 (2013). 
1240 Cf. Indira Carr & Miriam Goldby, Recovering the Proceeds of Corruption: UNCAC and Anti-Money 
Laundering Standards, 2 J. of Bus. L. 170, 180. (2011) (indicating that the FATF recommendations may 
conflict with the UNCAC provision as to the requirement of double criminality);  
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report highlighting the use of complex corporate vehicles to launder the proceeds of 
corruption. 1241   The report details how the corporate veil shields the corrupt from 
investigations.1242  On the same note, private actors can play a critical role in the successful 
enforcement of asset recovery provisions. Know-your-customer (“KYC”) rules, for 
instance, require banks to increase due diligence efforts1243 for bank accounts of high-level 
politicians or in the case of large financial transactions.1244 However, a limitation of these 
rules is that they are more apt to identify grand corruption and as such, are limited in their 
ability to detect petty corruption that can accumulate over time.1245 Although other forms 
of corruption can also escape detection from private actors, it highlights the necessity of a 
comprehensive anti-corruption approach. Accordingly, the international developments in 
asset recovery attempt to create a wide breath of mechanisms.1246 
International Developments in Asset Recovery  
 
Legal provisions that utilize asset recovery try to ensure that property that was taken 
from its rightful owner through corrupt practices is returned.1247 The goals of asset recovery 
are to tackle the economic motivations for corrupt acts. This is accomplished because in 
addition to the persons involved in corruption being held criminally or civilly liable (with 
a focus on the individual), but also the proceeds from their corrupt acts can also be seized 
(with a focus on the assets).1248  To this aim, international laws and enforcement efforts 
focused on this matter have begun to accelerate as are discussed below. 
 																																																								
1241 Emile van der Does de Willebois et al, The Puppet Masters: How the Corrupt Use Legal Structures to 
Hide Stolen Assets and What to Do About It (Report, Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative/World Bank, 24 
October 2011). 
1242 Ibid. 
1243 FATF Recommendations, supra note 1236, at 14 (requiring banks and other private actors to identify 
potentially corrupt actors); see also United Nations Guiding Principles, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31, annex. 
1244 See, e.g., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Customer Due Diligence for Banks (Guidance 
Document, Bank for International Settlements, October 2001), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs85.pdf. 
1245 Carr & Goldby, supra note 1240 
1246 See Tim Daniel & James Maton, Recovering the Proceeds of Corruption by Public Officials: A Case 
Study in Recovering Stolen Assets 463 (Mark Pieth ed., 2009) (reiterating that asset recovery efforts need 
flexibility and that a range of mechanisms are needed in order to achieve the desired results). 
1247 Wouters et al., supra note 1247, at 265 (commenting how regulations requiring rules on know your 
customer (‘KYC’), mandatory registration of suspect transactions, record-keeping and bank secrecy help to 
aid in asset recovery). 
1248 Ibid. 
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United Nations Convention against Corruption  
 
As noted above, UNCAC is the first truly global anti-corruption treaty, focusing on 
a “common language” for the anti-corruption movement.1249 UNCAC was adopted by the 
General Assembly on October 31, 2003 and opened for signatures on December 9, 2003. 
The treaty entered into force two years ago. The number of signatures and ratifications is 
testimony to the broad international consensus on the UNCAC.  
 
UNCAC is predominantly phrased in non-mandatory terms where is concerns 
preventive measures, leaving it to state parties to decide concrete implementation 
measures.1250 Nonetheless, UNCAC requires states parties to adopt measures (without 
imposing a detailed one-size-fits-all implementation) in a wide range of areas: they must 
set up anti-corruption bodies; establish appropriate procurement systems; strengthen the 
integrity of the judiciary; take measures to prevent private sector corruption; promote the 
active participation of civil society; and institute a comprehensive regulatory regime for 
banks and other financial institutions to prevent money laundering.1251 These specific 
provisions are preceded by the chapeau paragraph of article 5, which requires that states 
parties adopt comprehensive and coordinated anti-corruption policies that promote the 
participation of society and reflect the principles of the rule of law, proper management of 
public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability.1252 Thus, the 
requirement of good governance is the basic thrust of this general provision. During the 
negotiations of UNCAC, developing countries prioritized the inclusion of asset recovery 
provisions1253 and their efforts were reinforced with the support of the United States on this 																																																								
1249 Antonio Argandoña, The United Nations Convention against Corruption and Its Impact on International 
Companies, 74 J. of Bus. Ethics 481, 485 (2007). 
1250 UNCAC, supra note 1223, at Ch. II. 
1251 See id. arts. 6-14. Although the basic focus of these provisions is that states parties “shall” adopt such 
measures, this requirement is often weakened by adding qualifiers such as “in accordance with the 
fundamental principles of its domestic law.” see, e.g., id. art. 13.1. 
1252 Ibid.  
1253 Recent studies have estimated an outflow of capital from poorer countries of more than $1.2 trillion in 
2008, of which around $50 billion would be proceeds of corruption. See Financial Action Task Force, 
Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption, supra note 1236, at 9; Theodore S Greenberg et al, Stolen Asset 
Recovery: Politically Exposed Persons--A Policy Paper on Strengthening Preventive Measures (Policy 
Paper, Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative/World Bank, 2009) xiii, 3-4, available at http:// 
siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSARI/Resources/5570284-1257172052492/PEPs-ful.pdf; Dev Kar and 
Karly Curcio, Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2000-2009--Update with a Focus on Asia 
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matter.1254 As such, a separate chapter in UNCAC has established the provisions for asset 
recovery. 1255  A balance was sought between effective asset recoveries, along with 
procedural safeguards. UNCAC thus aims to strike a fragile balance, on the one hand, it 
contains detailed and strong anti-corruption provisions, which developed countries 
requested; while on the other hand, developing countries were willing to accept these 
provisions in return for strong cooperation and asset recovery provisions. The latter were 
acceptable to developed countries on the condition that they were subject to sufficient 
procedural safeguards.  
 
The Convention facilitates asset recovery by requiring that state parties amend their 
laws to permit the confiscation of the proceeds of crime and to revise their laws so that 
bank secrecy is no longer absolute. Article 31(7) of UNCAC provides that, “each State 
Party shall empower its courts or other competent authorities to order that bank, financial 
or commercial records be made available or seized. A State Party shall not decline to act 
... on the grounds of bank secrecy.”1256  It is not surprising considering the balances that 
were made that asset recovery in the Convention has been met with mixed sentiments. 
Many consider the provisions to be ground breaking.1257 The Convention also provides 
mandatory provisions, which empower states to recover property through civil action or 
international cooperation.1258 However, the enforcement of the Convention in international 
law remains largely incidental to international cooperation. While the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties requires states that ratify treaties to oblige by the treaty under the 
																																																								
I (Report, Global Financial Integrity, January 2011) available at http:// 
www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/IFF2010/gfi_iff_update_ report-web.pdf; Raymond W 
Baker, Capitalism's Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free-Market System 172 (2005). 
The Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative's (‘StAR’) estimates indicate that around US$5 billion has been 
recovered in the period 1995 to 2010: Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, Frequently Asked Questions 
(2013), http:// star.worldbank.org/star/about-us/frequently-asked-questions. 
1254 Webb, supra note 1226, at 207. 
1255 UNCAC, supra note 1223, art 51 (“The return of assets pursuant to this chapter is a fundamental 
principle of this Convention, and States Parties shall afford one another the widest measure of cooperation 
and assistance in this regard”). 
1256 Ibid. art. 31(7). 
1257 Webb, supra note 1226, at 209. 
1258 UNCAC, supra note 1223, arts. 53-54. 
	 201	
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, no reliable body of enforcement exists in international 
law.1259 
The World Bank  
 
The World Bank is one of the global frontrunners in the fight against corruption 
and was the first development finance organization to implement a comprehensive anti-
corruption regime.1260  The Bank has changed its role from a self-described apolitical 
institute to a bank that actively supports the progression of public institutes and the 
strengthening of governments.1261 “Between 2000 and 2004, lending to promote economic 
reforms fell by 14 percent a year, but lending to improve governance rose by 11 percent. 
In the 2004 fiscal year the Bank committed 25 percent of its lending to law and public 
administration.”1262 Today, the Bank has determined corruption to be one of the greatest 
hurdles to economic and social development and has identified five elements of an effective 
anticorruption strategy: increase political accountability, strengthen civil society 
participation, create a competitive private sector, implement institutional restraints on 
power, and improve public sector management.1263   
 
In 2006, the World Bank proposed a new strategy on governance and anti-
corruption.1264 The Bank recognized that the issue of grand corruption and noted that it is 
an issue that is harder to address than administrative corruption.1265 Similar to UNCAC, 
the Bank listed its technical assistance for asset recovery as fundamental to its global 
approach to the problem of corruption.1266 From this, in 2007, the World Bank announced 
																																																								
1259 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 36,May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331; see also Webb, 
supra note 1226, at 222. 
1260 Parthapratim Chanda, The Effectiveness of the World Bank's Anti-Corruption Efforts: Current Legal 
and Structural Obstacles and Uncertainties, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 315, 318 (2004). 
1261A Regime Changes: Paul Wolfowitz at the World Bank, THE ECONOMIST, June 2, 2005, 
http://www.economist.com/node/4032601. 
1262 Ibid. 
1263 The World Bank, Anti-corruption, available at http:// go.worldbank.org/EWYJ9SL5X0. 
1264 Strengthening Bank Group Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption, Sept. 8, 2006, available at 
http:// www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/comments/governancefeedback/gacpaper.pdf. 
1265 Ibid. 
1266 Ibid. 
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the Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative, a joint project between the Bank and the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.1267 
 
The StAR Initiative seeks to implement the UNCAC by aiding countries in building 
capacity for mutual legal assistance, creating partnerships to share information and 
expertise, and establishing a joint funding vehicle to provide assistance to states for asset 
recovery cases.1268 The Initiative established four primary tasks for the project which 
include: to build institutional capacity in developing countries, to strengthen the integrity 
of financial markets (especially by assuring that financial centers are in compliance with 
anti-money laundering legislation), to assist the asset recovery process of developing 
countries, and to monitor the use of recovered assets.1269 StAR and the concept of asset 
recovery soon led to a number of G-20 statements and commitments.1270 As a result, some 
of the most influential countries and national leaders in the world have signed on to the 
link between development, poverty, and fighting corruption with stolen asset recovery, 
thereby elevating asset recovery to the forefront of the development agenda.1271 
 
StAR aims to assist client countries throughout each stage of the asset recovery 
process, which can prove to be very complex and challenging, particularly for developing 
countries with no prior experience in stolen asset recovery.1272 StAR aids countries in 
initiating asset recovery cases, by guiding them through the initial steps that are required 
to launch a legal proceeding. It also advises countries in how to overcome legal and 
																																																								
1267 Press Release, World Bank, World Bank and UNODC to Pursue Stolen Asset Recovery, 
2008/061/PREM (Sept. 18, 2007), available at http:// go.worldbank.org/08LGHMJT10; see also StAR, 
About Us, http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/star_site/about-us.html (reiterating that asset recovery is 
undertaken by states using legal procedures and that StAR does not investigate cases, prosecute or request 
mutual legal assistance). 
1268 Ibid. 
1269 See Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative: Challenges, Opportunities, and Action Plan, available at, http:// 
siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/Star-rep-full.pdf. 
1270 Vlasic & Cooper, supra note 1200, at 18. 
1271 The G20 2010 emphasizes asset recovery in its Anti-Corruption Action Plan. See Government of 
Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, The G20 Seoul Summit Leader's Declaration (Nov. 22, 
2010), http:// www.canadainternational.qc.ca/g20/summitsommet/2010/g20_seoul_declaration.aspx? 
Langeng & menuid=41&menu=L&view=d. See also Government of Canada, Annex III - G20 Anti-
Corruption Action Plan (Nov. 22, 2010), available at http:// www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g20/summit-
sommet/2010/G20_seoul_annex-annexes% 203.aspx? view=d. 
1272 StAR, About Us, supra note 1267. 
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operational barriers in order for the countries to better collaborate with countries where the 
assets are located. StAR also plays the role of facilitator for countries in their discussions 
with financial institutions where assets may be hidden. Additionally, StAR connects 
officials in complainant countries with practitioners, law enforcement officials and 
prosecutors in financial canter. StAR also assists in building institutional capacity by 
helping countries develop legislation to strengthen their legal and regulatory systems for 
recovering stolen assets and combating corruption. Through training workshops and 
seminars, StAR equips law enforcement and financial intelligence practitioners, as well as 
investigative judges and prosecutors, with skills and knowledge on topics such as asset 
tracking and international legal cooperation. 
 
As an integral part of the Bank’s overall governance and anti-corruption work, the 
StAR Initiative plays a critical complementary role in the Bank’s efforts in the area of 
governance and anti-corruption. Such efforts include the Bank’s involvement in the 
criminal justice sector, which is not precluded under the Bank’s mandate, provided that 
proposed interventions are grounded in an appropriate and objective economic rationale 
and are structured so as to avoid interference in the political affairs of a member country. 
Successful asset recovery has an immediate and direct economic benefit through the 
recovery of funds that would otherwise have been lost. It is a vital component in deterring 
corruption, which is widely recognized as a major obstacle to development and growth. 
Furthermore, it promotes greater accountability and transparency and has significant 
potential benefits, such as supporting institutional reform and the effective functioning of 
the rule of law. 
Considering the “political prohibition” in the Bank’s Articles of Agreement,1273 it 
has been recommended that it use a risk management approach to political interference 
issues. This includes a case-by-case assessment of the risks and the measures that it may 
utilize in order to mitigate those risks. Cases related to stolen asset recovery are generally 
set against a background of partisan politics, forming part of a larger struggle between rival 
political forces. Direct support for specific cases would be considered as the sort of 
interference in the internal political affairs of a member country that the political 																																																								
1273 The World Bank Articles of Agreement, Art. IV, § 10. 
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prohibition is meant to proscribe. However, this does not mean the Bank can never support 
specific cases.1274 Currently, StAR is involved in Arab countries in transition, assisting 
Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia in their efforts to return assets from various foreign jurisdictions. 
The focus in these countries is on the need for early action and strategic planning.1275 
 
In 2012, the Bank went live with a database of corruption cases, which includes 
over 150 large-scale corruption cases. The database was created as part of the U.N.-led 
Working Group of states who are signatories to the U.N. Convention Against Bribery.1276 
Another related database was launched in 2011, and is known as The Puppet Masters 
Database of Grand Corruption Cases. The World Bank's searchable database is a 
consolidated repository of three U.N., World Bank, and UNODC databases, including The 
Puppet Masters, Asset Recovery Watch, and World Bank debarment actions. The cases 
involve the misuse of at least one legal entity or legal arrangement to obscure its beneficial 
owner(s) and conceal the origin or destination of stolen assets.1277   
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
1274 StAR Initiative, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/0,,contentMDK:22940228
~menuPK:9203924~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:445634,00.html  (“There may be cases 
where it is beyond doubt that there is little or no potential political implications to a particular case. There 
may also be cases where counter-considerations weigh in favor of support: in cases involving the diversion 
of Bank loan proceeds, for example, consideration of the political prohibition must be weighed against the 
Bank’s fiduciary duty under the Articles to ensure the proper use of loan proceeds. And there are activities 
ancillary or preparatory to potential specific cases that the Bank may support without incurring undue 
political interference risk, for example, forensic audits, financial analysis and other forms fact-finding, as 
well as briefings on relevant legal requirements, that would inform a decision whether or not to pursue a 
case.”) 
1275 StAR, About Us, supra note 1267. 
1276 See U.N. Conference of the State Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 
Vienna, Austria, Aug. 30-31, 2012, Overview of Progress Made in the Implementation of Conference 
Resolution 4/4 and the Recommendation of the Working Group, U.N. Doc. CAC/COSP/WG.2/2012 (June 
27, 2012). See also StAR Corruption Cases Search Center, Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, 
http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/assetrecovery/?f[0]=bundle% ̋puppet_masters (last visited Feb. 
17, 2013) [hereinafter StAR Database]. 
1277 Ibid. at 27-28. 
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Stolen Asset Recovery in the United States and the United Kingdom 
 
Asset Recovery in the United States 
 
It has been said that “any discussion of international measures against corruption 
and bribery must begin with the United States.”1278 In the late 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. 
was afflicted by corruption scandals. In 1977, the U.S. Congress took the forefront and 
adopted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), the first law prohibiting transnational 
bribery.1279 The FCPA, which contains far-reaching jurisdictional provisions,1280 served as 
the benchmark for international efforts to combat corruption of foreign officials. 
 
The FCPA has two sets of provisions, those targeting anti-bribery 1281  and 
accounting provisions.1282 The anti-bribery provisions provide the basis for prosecutions 
of individuals and corporations involved in bribing foreign officials, whereas the 
accounting provisions concern transparency and the reporting of payments made to foreign 
officials. According to the FCPA, it is unlawful for U.S. persons and companies to pay 
bribes to foreign government officials (non-U.S.) for the purpose of obtaining or retaining 
business or for any improper advantage.   
  
The FCPA affords for a classic, active and personality-based jurisdiction in which 
it subjects all “United States person[s]” to the FCPA, even if their acts of bribing foreign 
officials have no nexus with the territory of the U.S.1283 Additionally, the FCPA also 
applies to persons or entities that are organized under the laws of a U.S. state or have their 
principal place of business in the U.S., even if they are not U.S. nationals (this harkens to 
the law’s so-called “domestic concerns”). 1284  Nevertheless, jurisdiction will not be 
																																																								
1278 Peter W. Schroth, National and International Constitutional Law Aspects of African Treaties and Laws 
Against Corruption, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 87 (2003). 
1279 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 USC § 78dd-1 (1977) (“FCPA'). 
1280 Ibid. §§ 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(i). 
1281 Ibid. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3. 
1282 Ibid. § 78m 
1283 Ibid. § 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(i). 
1284 Ibid. § 78dd-2(h)(1). 
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established with regards to these persons if process cannot be served on them (absence of 
in personal jurisdiction).1285 
 
Under the FCPA, the U.S. is able to have far-reaching jurisdictional claims. This is 
due to the fact that the provisions permit U.S. enforcement agencies to bring claims against 
foreign issuers for the bribery of foreign officials without any nexus with the US (except 
the listing of stock on a U.S. exchange),1286 and also (in respect of foreign bribery) against 
foreign persons whose stock is not even listed in the US, on the sole basis that some act 
furthering bribery has a link with the U.S.1287 Accordingly, it is no overstatement to find 
that U.S. jurisdiction over corruption is potentially quasi-universal. 
 
Possibly the most important substantive provision of the FCPA is the section that 
defines unlawful conduct. This provision states that it is “shall be unlawful . . . to make use 
of the mail or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance 
of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of payment of any money, or offer, 
gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value.”1288 In order for 
these offers, payments, or promises to be unlawful, they must be provided to at least one 
of three categories of persons: foreign officials,1289 foreign political parties or candidates, 
or third persons who may act as intermediaries “while knowing” that the intermediaries 
would offer all or part of such benefits to the former two categories.1290 The punishable 
acts must also be made for purposes of: 
																																																								
1285 See United States v Bodmer, 342 F Supp 2d 176, 192-3 (SDNY, 2004). 
1286 FCPA, § 78dd-1(g). 
1287 Ibid. § 78dd-2(i). 
1288 Ibid. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a). 
1289 The Act defines foreign officials to include: “[a]ny officer or employee of a foreign government or any 
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any person 
acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or 
instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international organization.” Id. § 78dd-1(f)(1). 
1290 See ibid. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1) - (3), 78dd-2(a)(1)-(3). According to the Act: 
A person's state of mind is “knowing” with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result if (i) such person 
is aware that such person is engaged in such conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such result is 
substantially certain to occur; or (ii) such person had a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that such 
result is substantially certain to occur. (B) When knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is 
required for an offence, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of the 
existence of such circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such circumstance does not exist. 
Id. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(A)-(B). 
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(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity, (ii) 
inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of 
such official, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or 
 
(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government or 
instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or 
instrumentality, [i]n order to assist such issuer [or domestic concern] in obtaining business 
for or with, or directing business to, any person.1291 
 
 The FCPA sets severe civil and criminal penalties for violations of any of the 
provisions by any natural or legal persons subject to its authority.1292  If enforcement 
authorities are able to prove wilful disregard of the statute, penalties for natural persons 
may include imprisonment for up to twenty years.1293 
  
According to the United States, providing remedies for transnational public bribery 
as a consistent and sustained practice furthers U.S. foreign policy goals underlying the 
FCPA.1294 Further, as observed by a U.S. Senate committee report regarding the enactment 
of the FCPA, foreign public bribery undermines “the image of American democracy 
abroad.”1295 In this sense, by providing a forum for foreign victims to vindicate their rights 
and hold corporations accountable would protect the integrity and safeguard the image of 
the United States.  Transnational access to remedies for transnational public bribery is 
therefore justified on principled and pragmatic grounds. However, legal frameworks 
internationally and in the United States have failed to adequately meet this need. Although 
there are still issues that should be reformed, between 2002 and 2008, FCPA enforcement 
																																																								
1291 Ibid. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1)-(3), 78dd-2(a)(1)-(3). 
1292 See generally id. §§ 78dd-2(g), 78ff. 
1293 Ibid. § 78ff(a). 
1294 See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1029 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the FCPA was 
“designed to protect the integrity of American foreign policy”). 
1295 S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101. 
	 208	
resulted in over “$1.2 billion in settlements and penalties involving more than 30 
countries.”1296 
  
A limitation of the FCPA is that it does not expressly permit any private right of 
action. During the drafting of the FCPA, a proposed text included a private right of action 
“for any person who could establish actual damage to his business resulting from illegal 
payments made by a competitor.”1297 This idea was regarded as having merit, but the 
proposed text was found to be too ambiguous.1298 A Senate committee requested that the 
text be revised, but it seems that no follow-up action was taken and the provision never 
became endorsed by the Senate.1299 The Supreme Court and several lower courts have also 
held that the FCPA provides no implied private right of action, on grounds that this was 
not the legislative intent and would be inconsistent with the legislative scheme. Experts, 
academics, and commentators have argued for an FCPA amendment to include a private 
right of action though.1300 Despite the limitations, the Department of Justice has also 
established the protocol  for Asset Recovery Initiative to aid in the recovery of proceeds of 
public bribery that have been laundered into or through the United States “for the benefit 
of the people of the country from which it was taken.”1301 On June 28, 2012, the first 
forfeiture judgment was obtained under the Initiative with the forfeiture of US $401,931 in 
assets traceable to former Nigerian Governor of Bayelsa State, Diepreye Solomon Peter 
																																																								
1296 Matt A. Vega, Balancing Judicial Cognizance and Caution: Whether Transnational Corporations Are 
Liable for Foreign Bribery under the Alien Tort Statute, 31 MIC H. J. INT'L L. 385, 387 (2010). 
1297 S. Rep. No. 94-1031 (1976). 
1298 Ibid. 
1299 S. Rep. No. 95-144 (1977).) 
1300 See, e.g., Richard L. Cassin, The FCPA Is No Private Matter, FCPA Blog (Mar. 2, 2008), 
http://tinyurl.com/mx23f6x; Paul D. Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt Practices Law, 32 MICH. 
J. INT'L L. 129, 154 (2010) (advocating for amending the FCPA to permit private enforcement of its anti- 
bribery provisions by foreign citizens in US courts, on behalf of their governments whose officials were 
bribed). 
1301 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Seeks to Recover More Than $70.8 Million 
in Proceeds of Corruption from Government Minister of Equatorial Guinea (Oct. 25, 2011), available at 
http://tinyurl.com/3buj6ce. 
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Alamieyeseigha.1302 Since 2004, the United States has forfeited and returned over $168 
million to victims abroad.1303 
Asset Recovery in the United Kingdom 
 
In the United Kingdom, corruption offences are treated under both legal statues and 
common law. And while the United States has been the historic frontrunner in the 
criminalization and prosecution of foreign corruption, the U.K. was long considered as 
lagging behind.  In 2005, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) issued a report criticizing the U.K.’s approach to the corruption offences, arguing 
that too little had been done to update the legal framework.1304  Even as late as 2008, OECD 
still had to address the issue.1305 The U.K. did criminalize the corruption of foreign officials 
by U.K. nationals or companies since 2001,1306 yet reliance on a strictly circumscribed 
active personality principle did nothing to combat foreign corruption by UK-based foreign 
nationals.1307 As a means to address the criticism, in 2010, the U.K. Bribery Act was 
enacted and came into force in July 2011. 1308  However, so far no “extraterritorial” 
prosecution has been brought under the Bribery Act.1309 																																																								
1302 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Forfeits More Than $400,000 in Corruption 
Proceeds Linked to Former Nigerian Governor (June 28, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-crm-827.html. 
1303 U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Asset Recovery Tools & Procedures: A practical Guide for International 
Cooperation (2012) available at, http://tinyurl.com/n64mbxe. 
1304 Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in  
International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in  
International Business Transactions. OECD, 17 March 2005; available at  
http://wwwoecd.org/dataoecd/62/32/34599062.pdf. 
1305 Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development, ‘United Kingdom: Phase 2bis-- Report on the Application of the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials on International Business Transactions and 
the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions' (Report, 
Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development, 16 October 2008) http:// www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/20/41515077.pdf 
1306 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK) c 24, s 109 (which came into force on 14 December 
2001). 
1307 F. Joseph Warin, Charles Falconer and Michael S Diamant, The British are Coming: Britain Changes 
Its Law on Foreign Bribery and Joins the International Fight against Corruption, 46 Texas Int’l L. J. 1, 5 
(2010). 
1308 Bribery Act, 2010, c.23 (U.K.). 
1309 For a discussion of the first domestic prosecution brought (namely that of Munir Patel) and fine 
imposed for failings in anti-bribery and corruption systems and controls (on Willis Limited) under the 
Bribery Act (UK), see Steven Pitt and Barney Connell, A Year in the Life of the UK Bribery Act, in Sidley 
Austin LLP, Insurance and Reinsurance Law Report (2012) 35, 38-41 
http://www.sidley.com/files/upload/2012_IRLR_UK%20_BRIBERY_ACT.pdf. 
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The Bribery Act contains three main jurisdictional provisions.1310 Section 12 is the 
most forthright, providing for jurisdiction “if any act or omission which forms part of the 
offence takes place in ... the United Kingdom,” such as territorial jurisdiction.1311 This 
section provides the U.K. jurisdiction over a person or entity bribing a foreign public 
official if the person or entity has a close connection with the UK, even if the act or 
omission at issue does not take place in the U.K.1312 The Act expands on this further in      
7, however, by criminalizing the failure of a “relevant commercial organization” to prevent 
foreign bribery, giving the Act a long arm reach.1313  It not only defines a “relevant 
commercial organization” as “a body which is incorporated under the law of any part of 
the United Kingdom and which carries on a business (whether there or elsewhere)”1314 or 
as “a partnership which is formed under the law of any part of the United Kingdom and 
which carries on a business (whether there or elsewhere),”1315 but also as “any other body 
corporate (wherever incorporated) which carries on a business, or part of a business, in any 
part of the United Kingdom”1316 or as “any other partnership (wherever formed) which 
carries on a business, or part of a business, in any part of the United Kingdom.”1317 
 
Thus, the U.K. can assert jurisdiction over a failure to prevent foreign corruption 
under the Bribery Act (which also extends to corruption of private persons) under an 
extended active personality principle and on the basis of territorial links. It will fall to the 
relevant enforcement agency to determine what territorial link is sufficient for UK 
jurisdiction to be triggered, but a wide interpretation of territoriality, similar to the US, is 
not excluded. The potential jurisdictional scope of the Bribery Act becomes amplified if 
“relevant commercial organization[s]” (to which the Act applies) included foreign 
																																																								
1310 Bribery Act (UK) c 23, ss 6, 7, 12. 
1311 Ibid. 
1312 Ibid.; A person or entity has a close connection for example, when that person or entity, was a British 
citizen, was an individual ordinarily resident in the UK, or a body incorporated under the law of any part of 
the UK. For an overview of all instances of ‘close connection’: see id. s 12(4). 
1313 Ibid. s 7. 
1314  Ibid. s 7(5)(a). 
1315  Ibid. s 7(5)(c). 
1316  Ibid. s 7(5)(b). 
1317  Ibid. s 7(5)(d). 
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subsidiaries of U.K. companies, or foreign companies in which U.K. companies have an 
interest.1318 
The U.K. Bribery Act creates “four categories of offences: (1) bribing another 
person; (2) taking bribes; (3) bribing foreign public officials; and (4) failure of a 
commercial organization to prevent bribery. With its expansive scope and jurisdictional 
reach, the Bribery Act significantly reshapes the UK's anti-corruption regime.” 1319 
Additionally, “[p]enalties for violations of the Bribery Act include unlimited fines for 
companies and individuals and a term of imprisonment of up to 10 years for individual 
defendants.”1320 For financial service firms subject to regulation authority by the U.K.'s 
FSA (recently replaced by the FCA and PRA), “adequate internal controls reasonably 
designed to prevent bribery of non-U.K. officials are not just an affirmative defence to the 
UKBA's so-called corporate offence, but an affirmative requirement for all firms 
authorized by the FSA in accordance with the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 
(“FSMA”).”1321 Likewise, “in a short note, the FSA reminded FSA-authorized firms that 
underlying acts of making corrupt payments or an offer to make corrupt payments need not 
exist for a company to be subject to regulatory action for lacking sufficient anti-bribery 
internal controls.”1322 The FSA note, in its entirety, follows: 
 
“Corruption and bribery are criminal offences under the Bribery Act 2010, which 
came into force on 1 July 2011. The Act consolidated and replaced previous anti-
corruption legislation and introduced a new offence of commercial organizations 
failing to prevent bribery. Firms have a full defence for this offence if they can 
																																																								
1318 Warin, Falconer and Diamant, supra note 1307, at 29-30 (arguing that in this respect “section 7's 
requirements could effectively extend to even the remotest corners of a global organization”). 
1319Covington & Burling LLP, Anti-Corruption Mid-Year Review (July 2011), available at 
http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/01a3d761-b8ca-421f-9932-
b0fef03c4219/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/68ac553e-2122-49fa-b270-b38b69ff5215/Anti-
Corruption%20Mid-Year%20Review%20-%20Beijing.pdf. 
1320 Gibson Dunn, 2010 Year-End FCPA Update (Jan. 3. 2011), available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010Year-EndFCPAUpdate.aspx. 
1321 Karolos Seeger & Matthew H. Getz, The U.K. FSA Reminds Financial Services Firms of Anti-
Corruption Compliance Obligations, FCPA Update (Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, NY), Sept. 
2011, at 7, available at http://www.debevoise.com/files/Publication/ccf8c29f-9f86-47ac-95f5-
05c65c607046/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/a83e70dc-a1b5-4d6d-ac22-
2c7034d175b5/FCPA_Update_Sept_2011.pdf. 
1322 Ibid. 
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show that they had adequate procedures designed to prevent bribery. The 
Government has published guidance on these procedures.” 
 
There are various key differences that exist between the U.K. and U.S. anti-bribery 
laws. The U.K. Bribery Act goes farther than the FCPA, criminalizing the payment, offer, 
or promise of a bribe, as well as the request, acceptance, or agreement to accept a bribe.1323 
The U.S. law only criminalizes the former.1324 The U.K. law also contains a corporate 
offence of failing to prevent bribery and contains no facilitating payment exception, as is 
found in the FCPA.1325  However, the potential penalties under the Bribery Act may 
generally be considered far more draconian than those under the FCPA.1326 
 
However, despite these differences, the U.K. still seems to lack in its ability to aid 
in asset recovery.1327 In the 2010 StAR/OECD study revealed that between 2006 and 2009, 
the U.K. froze US$229.6 million (18.7 per cent of the total frozen in all 30 OECD 
countries), and had recovered and returned $2.2 million (0.8 per cent of the total 
returned). 1328  The report indicates that the U.K. appears to have underperformed in 
comparison to the in terms of returning what small seizure was achieved and returning it 
																																																								
1323 Jones Day, A New Weapon in the Arsenal for the Fight Against Corruption: The U.K. Bribery Act of 
2010 (Apr. 2010), available at http:// www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/79cd836f-6829-4b74-bc38-
f0cff1ec49ec/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f77034b9-035e-45a3-bf41-
f11708369196/New%20Weapon.pdf. 
1324 Criminal Div. of the U.S. Dep't of Justice & the Enforcement Div. of the U.S. Secs. and Exch. Comm'n, 
A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 10 (Nov. 14, 2012) available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf. 
1325 Jones Day, supra note 1323. 
1326 See generally Robert F. Amaee & John P. Rupp, Keeping Current: Anti-Corruption, The Bribery Act 
2010 Guidance: Countdown to Implementation, Bus. L. Today (Am. Bar Assoc., Chicago, Ill.), June 2011, 
at 1, available at http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/b5bdef2d-c3ef-4d5d-94de-
c96458fac452/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ff24dd9a-0520-41fc-a9eb-cb7b40205263/Anti-
Corruption%20-%20The%20Bribery%C20Act%C202010%C20Guidance%20-% 
20Countdown%20to%20Implementation.pdf. 
1327 See Transparency International, Closing Down the Safe Havens: Ending Impunity for Corrupt 
Individuals by Seizing and Recovering their Assets in the U.K. 6, available at 
http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/15-publications/809-closing-down-the-safe-havens/809-
closing-down-the-safe-havens [hereinafter Closing Down the Safe Havens] (“The UK is among the leading 
jurisdictions in the world in terms of recognizing the problem [of laundering stolen money]; but still not 
doing nearly enough to resolve it”)  
1328 Selected OECD Activities on Asset Recovery, Illicit Flows and Financial Crime, 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/workinggroup2/2011-August-25-
26/Presentations/Achim_Pross_and_Kjetil_Hanssen_OECD.pdf 
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to victims and the origin states. Nevertheless, the U.K. has strong legal tools in non-
conviction based asset forfeiture (“NCBAF”).1329 However, considering the low adoption 
of NCBAF around the world, the U.K. may lack the necessary mutual legal assistance from 
other jurisdictions to take forward NCBAF cases with international dimensions.1330 
Advocating for Civil Remedies in Asset Recovery 
 
Clearly there are practical difficulties of recovering the proceeds of corruption, both 
from within the U.S. and U.K. and elsewhere. These difficulties have become starker as a 
result of the Arab Spring and asset recovery initiatives in the wake of regime changes 
across the region in 2011 and 2012.1331 It has been over two years since longstanding 
autocratic regimes in the region fell, but, since that time, there has been little concrete 
progress globally in the repatriation of stolen funds.1332 Although criminal prosecution and 
non-conviction based asset forfeiture have seemed to become the preferred methods for the 
U.S. and U.K. governments, taking cases on in a private civil route can possibly prove to 
be a better option to secure and recover stolen assets.1333 To the World Bank and the StAR 
initiative, civil actions are an underused method in achieving the fight against corruption. 
As can be seen, the proceeds of corruption can be recovered through either criminal or civil 
proceedings. Criminal proceedings require a prior criminal conviction which focuses on 
the corrupt individual. When a criminal conviction is impossible (for instance, where the 
corrupt individual has passed away or enjoys immunity) or conviction is just unattainable, 
civil proceedings may be a practical alternative. Civil proceedings focus on the goods that 
have been stolen through corrupt acts, rather than on the corrupt individual. Hence, 
																																																								
1329 See Closing Down the Safe Havens, supra note 1327, at 8 (noting that the standard of proof for non-
conviction based asset forfeiture is based on the balance of probabilities which is a lower standard then 
beyond a reasonable doubt required for criminal proceedings). 
1330 Ibid. 
1331 Ibid. 
1332 Ibid. 
1333 One practical impediment to the forfeiture of the proceeds of corrupt acts is the requirement of 
quantifying those proceeds. Identifying the value of the bribe is one step, but the actual benefit of the 
bribery for the bribe-giver may be several times the amount of the bribe. A joint OECD/Stolen Asset 
Recovery Initiative report aims to address such difficulties by providing very detailed guidance on the 
calculation of the actual benefit amounting from a bribe. Jan Wouters et. al., The International Legal 
Framework Against Corruption: Achievements and Challenges, 14 Melb. J. Int'l L. 205, 264 (2013) 
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property can be seized through civil proceedings without the user or owner being convicted 
for the initial corrupt act.1334 
 
The basis behind civil asset recovery lies in the seeming ability of leaders of 
organized crime gangs to distance themselves from detectable criminal behaviour by 
delegating responsibility for the implementation of illegal acts, thereby preventing 
prosecution in the conventional way.1335 The same premise can be applied to corrupt 
leaders who steal from their country and are able to escape corrupt criminal charges or 
distance themselves from their deeds. 
 
The international mechanisms for asset recovery allow states to claim civil damages 
in corruption cases and the state parties, and their respective agencies, are empowered to 
bring such claims.1336 Article 35 of the UNCAC requires state parties to take necessary 
measures and establish appropriate mechanisms to ensure that entities or persons who have 
suffered damage as a result of an act of corruption have the right to initiate legal action to 
obtain compensation.1337 Furthermore, Chapter V of the Convention requires states parties 
to take measures to restrain, seize, confiscate, and return the proceeds of corruption, 
including civil proceedings and remedies. Article 53 of the UNCAC requires states to 
permit other states “to initiate civil action in (their) courts to establish title to or ownership 
of property acquired through the commission of an offence established in accordance with 
the Convention.”1338 
 
Similarly, there has been regional recognition of the importance of civil 
proceedings to combat corruption as can be seen through the Council of Europe Civil Law 																																																								
1334 An example is the fourth (formerly third) FATF recommendation, entitled Confiscation and Provisional 
Measures': FATF Recommendations, supra note 1236, 12. See also Financial Action Task Force, Best 
Practices: Confiscation (Recommendations 3 and 38) (Guidance Document, 19 February 2010) 7 ; 
Theodore S Greenberg et al, Stolen Asset Recovery: A Good Practices Guide for Non-Conviction-Based 
Asset Forfeiture (Guidance Document, Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, World Bank, 5 January 2009). 
1335 Liz Campbell, The Recovery of "Criminal" Assets in New Zealand, Ireland and England: Fighting 
Organized and Serious Crime in the Civil Realm, 41 Vict U. Wellington L Rev. 15, 16 (2010) 
1336 See UNCAC, supra note 1223, art. 34 (emphasizing the importance of civil proceedings and remedies 
in the fight against corruption). 
1337 Ibid. art. 35. 
1338 Ibid. art. 53(a) 
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Convention. Article 1 of the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption1339 
requires state parties to enable “persons,” natural or legal, who have suffered damage as a 
result of corruption to defend their rights and obtain damages.1340 Article 8§2 of the same 
convention also requires that “each Party shall provide in its internal law for the possibility 
for all parties to a contract whose consent has been undermined by an act of corruption to 
be able to apply to the court for the contract to be declared void, notwithstanding their 
claim for damages.” The 35 countries that have ratified this convention are therefore bound 
to implement national legislation to enable a greater use of civil remedies by victims of 
corruption.1341 As such, countries recognize the value of civil remedies and many nations 
already recognize the right of foreign states to sue in their civil courts.1342 
 
Asset recovery through civil action avoids many of the problems encountered in 
efforts to criminally prosecute corrupt leaders in their home countries. Importantly, because 
it is a civil suit and there is no need to obtain a criminal conviction, the burden of proof is 
lower.1343 This may greatly facilitate the recovery of assets from corrupt acts, though of 
course this does not result in a criminal conviction of the culprits. Nevertheless, although 
no criminal conviction will result, the civil proceeding facilitates the main theory being the 
importance of asset recovery, which is that by reclaiming the stolen money, the profit is 
taken out of corruption.1344 
 
																																																								
1339 See Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Nov. 4, 1999, Europe. T.S. No.174, 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty 
/en/Treaties/Html/174.htm; Article 1 “Each Party shall provide in its internal law for effective remedies for 
persons who have suffered damage as a result of acts of corruption, to enable them to defend their rights 
and interests, including the possibility of obtaining compensation for damage.” 
1340Ibid. See also Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Explanatory Report paragraph 26, http:// 
conventions 
.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/174.htm. 
1341 The importance of the use of civil remedies in the fight against corruption was recognized at the EU 
level as early as 1997 with the Twenty Guiding Principles for the Fight against Corruption, a directive 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which called upon its member states to 
“ensure that civil law takes into account the need to fight corruption and in particular provides for effective 
remedies for those whose rights and interests are affected by corruption” (Council of Europe, 1997, 
Principle 17). 
1342 For examples of civil action asset recovery cases see generally Jean-Pierre Brun Et. Al,supra note 1197. 
1343 See John Hatchard, Strengthening Presidential Accountability: Attorney General of Zambia v. Meer 
Care & Desai & Others, 5(1) J. OF COMMONWEALTH L. & LEGAL EDU. 69 (2007). 
1344 Ibid. 
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Authorities that pursue civil actions to retrieve stolen assets have the option of 
initiating proceedings in domestic or foreign civil courts.1345 The courts of the foreign 
jurisdiction may be competent if a defendant is a person (individual or business entity) 
living or incorporated in the jurisdiction (personal jurisdiction), if the assets are within or 
have transited the jurisdiction (subject matter jurisdiction), or if an act of corruption or 
money laundering was committed within the jurisdiction. As a private litigant, the 
authorities seeking redress can hire lawyers to explore the potential claims and remedies 
(ownership of misappropriated assets, tort, disgorgement of illicit profits, contractual 
breaches).1346 The civil action will entail collecting evidence of misappropriation or of 
liabilities based on contractual or tort damages. Normally, it is possible to use evidence 
gathered in the course of a criminal proceeding in a civil litigation. It is also possible to 
seek evidence with the assistance of a court prior to filing an action.1347 
 
In a private civil action, the plaintiff usually has the option to petition the court for 
a variety of orders, including the following: 
 
- Freezing, embargo, sequestration, or restraining orders (potentially with worldwide 
effect) secure assets suspected to be the proceeds of crime, pending the resolution 
of a lawsuit-laying claim to those assets. In some jurisdictions, interim restraining 
orders may be issued pending the outcome of a lawsuit even before the lawsuit has 
been filed, without notice and with extraterritorial effect. These orders usually 
require the posting of a bond, guarantee, or other undertaking by the petitioner. 
 
- Orders against defendants oblige them to provide information about the source of 
their assets and transactions involving them. 
 
																																																								
1345 UNCAC, supra note 1223, art. 53(a) (calling on states parties to permit another state party to initiate a 
civil action in domestic courts). 
1346 Jean – Pierre Brun, Asset Recovery Handbook: A guide for Practitioners 12 (2011) [hereinafter Asset 
Recovery Handbook]. 
1347 Ibid. 
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- Orders against third parties for disclosure of relevant documents are useful in 
obtaining evidence from banks, financial advisers, or solicitors, among others. 
 
- “No-say” (gag) orders prevent banks and other parties from informing the 
defendants of a restraint injunction or disclosure order. 
 
- Generic protective or conservation orders preserve the status quo and prevent the 
deterioration of the petitioner’s assets, legal interests, or both. Such orders usually 
require showing the likelihood of success on the merits and an imminent risk in 
delaying a decision.1348 
 
Thus, authorities may secure and recover assets and also seek damages based on 
torts, breach of contract or illicit enrichment or even proprietary claims. Under a torts 
claim,1349 damages are issued in order to compensate a plaintiff for loss, injury, or harm 
directly caused by a breach of duty, including criminal wrongdoing, immoral conduct, or 
pre-contractual fault by the tortfeasor. 1350  In corruption cases, civil fraud, tortious 
interference, conspiracy, breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, or breach of agency duty 
(which gives rise to, claims for an accounting for the use and application of a principal's 
property), as well as abuse of power in office are all relevant causes of action.1351 In breach 
of trust or fiduciary duty cases, equitable damages will often be available to remedy any 
impossibility to trace assets. 
 
In certain cases of corruption there will be a contractual relationship between the 
harmed party and the perpetrator of the corrupt act. Remedies for invalidity or breach of 
contract will generally include monetary damages.1352 The absolute invalidity of a contract 
made for an unlawful purpose is based on the social harm of corruption and the violation 																																																								
1348 Ibid. 
1349 See Black Law Dictionary 1626 (9th ed. 2009). A tort is “[a] civil wrong, other than breach of contract, 
for which a remedy may be obtained, usu. in the form of damages; a breach of a duty that the law imposes 
on persons who stand in a particular relation to one another.” 
1350 Ibid. 
1351 Emile van der Does de Willebois & Jean-Pierre Brun, Using Civil Remedies in Corruption and Asset 
Recovery Cases, 45 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 615, 637 (2013). 
1352 Ibid. at 632.  
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of general moral principles rather than on the harm to the aggrieved party (the harm would 
be an argument for a voidable—as opposed to a void—contract).1353 Article 34 of UNCAC 
provides that, “States Parties may consider corruption a relevant factor in legal proceedings 
to annul or rescind a contract.”1354 
 
Unjust enrichment is a separate cause of action. The focus of this action is on “re-
establishing equality as between two parties as a response to a disruption of equilibrium. 
Its raison d'être is founded in the injustice that lies in one person's retaining something 
which he or she ought not to retain, requiring that the scales be righted.”1355 In these cases, 
there is no need to demonstrate that any loss was suffered.  
 
Proprietary claims are expressly recognized in UNCAC.1356 Owners of assets are 
to be entitled to exercise their full rights to those assets, regardless of who has possession 
of it. Although both civil and common law jurisdictions may handle these cases, common 
law jurisdictions, such as the U.S. and U.K., make a distinction between the person holding 
legal title of an asset and the person holding beneficial title to it. 
 
As any means of legal justice, there are pros and cons to civil remedies, however, 
on balance it appears to be a means that should be utilized. The most obvious disadvantage 
would be the costs of tracing assets without the benefit of investigative tools found in 
criminal proceedings and the cost of the litigation itself. 1357  Cooperation and mutual 
assistance among states are also crucial to guarantee that efforts to locate the money will 
not be blocked or resisted by financial institutions. Furthermore, politics, both internal and 
international, always can hinder the willingness of parties to pursue a civil action.1358 
 
																																																								
1353 Ibid. 
1354 UNCAC, supra note 1223, art 34. 
1355 Martin S. Kenney, The Fundamentals of a Civil Asset Recovery Action, in Asset Tracing & Recovery, 
The Fraudent World Compendium 111, 125 (2009). 
1356 See UNCAC, supra note 27, art. 53(a), (c) (stating that states are obliged to “recognize another State 
Party's claim as a legitimate owner of property [so] acquired”).  
1357 Webb, supra note 1226, at 210-11. 
1358 Ibid. 
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On the other hand, civil proceedings offer benefits that other asset recovery 
methods do not. Among these advantages are less-demanding requirements for linking the 
assets to the wrongdoing, the ability to claim damages generally, rather than claim 
particular assets, and a wider choice of parties to sue.1359 Also, initiating a civil suit may 
prove to be easier by the range of venues. Establishing jurisdiction in a range of venues is 
easier (typically extending to countries where the stolen money has travelled), and as such, 
the case does not need to be brought in the home state of the official.1360 
 
Civil actions tend to helpful in addressing financial consequences of corruption, 
particularly in cases where numerous corrupts acts have been committed over a long period 
of time. In criminal cases, although some or all acts of corruption may be proven, it may 
be near impossible to trace all the proceeds because the trail is incomplete. In a situation 
where the direct link between the specific crime and the assets cannot be established, it is 
difficult to achieve further criminal action and confiscation in most jurisdictions. 
 
In cases where the link between the assets and corruption is weak, civil suits may 
be able to overcome in a claim for general damages. Most of the time, large amounts of the 
proceeds from corruption are spent far from the country from which they were stolen. 
Proceeds may be laundered through various transactions, purchasing real estate, business 
investments, or buying luxury goods, making it difficult to locate the funds. In jurisdictions 
where only the asset directly related to the crime can be confiscated, items that were 
purchased with the stolen funds will not be criminally confiscated. The problem becomes 
more complicated in jurisdictions that recognize only property-based confiscation (an 
action to recover a particular asset) and less so where value-based confiscation is permitted 
(a legal action to recover the value of benefits that have been derived from criminal conduct 
and the imposition of a monetary penalty of an equivalent value). In any case, civil 
proceedings can provide a remedy to this issue by establishing a general claim for damages. 
 
																																																								
1359 Jean - Brunet Al, supra note 1197, at 5. 
1360 Hatchard, supra note 1343, at 73.  
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Another significant attribute of civil suits is that it expands the options of people to 
sue. Some jurisdictions do not extend to corporations or other entities in criminal 
proceedings, leaving only individuals. A plaintiff may seek to bring a civil action claiming 
damages from third parties with substantial financial assets, whose forfeitable criminal 
gains may be negligible, or whose criminal liability cannot be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt but can be proved under a lesser standard.1361 Civil suits also open the doors even if 
presidential immunity extends to civil suits under the laws of the kleptocrat's country, an 
action still may be brought against friends and family, who are often closely involved in 
corruption schemes. If a third party acted in concert with other wrongdoers, he may also 
be held liable for the greater damages caused by the others. Furthermore, civil actions may 
be brought even if a former president is deceased or has fled to another country.1362 
 
Conclusion 	
Corruption continues to be a universal issue and the act of stolen assets has yet to 
be fully addressed. Citizens from around the world have been damaged by these deeds and 
justice is to be sought. According to National Crime Agency (NCA)’s Annual report and 
account 2016-17 during the year the International Corruption Unit (ICU) has conducted 25 
investigations into: the laundering of the proceeds of foreign grand corruption in the UK; 
instances of UK entities paying bribes overseas, and breaches of HM Treasury financial 
sanctions. As part of its ongoing enquires The ICU made eight arrests and has under 
restraint in connection with its investigations assets worth about £170M, Civil recovery of 
£900,000 from a suspected cyber criminal’s estate, £735,538.25 confiscated from two 
defendants in a joint drug trafficking and money operation. Sentences of 12.5 years for two 
people who laundered the proceeds of a million-pound fraud. Bothe were also disqualified 
as a company director for 18 years. Use of European Arrest Warrant to enforce a 
																																																								
1361 Jean - Brunet Al, supra note 1197, at 6 (noting that third parties could include anyone who knowingly 
assisted the main actor, such as family members and associates, lawyers, banks, and bankers). 
1362 Kevin M. Stephenson, Larissa Gray, Ric Power, Jean-Pierre Brun, Gabriele Dunker, and 
Melissa Panjer, Barriers to Asset Recovery: An Analysis of the Key Barriers and Recommendations for 
Action (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011), 71–74 (commenting that in the context of civil lawsuits 
officials or former officials and their assets may not enjoy the same kind of immunity as in the context of 
criminal prosecutions). 
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confiscation order for £4,929,334 with 6 months’ time pay and 7.5 years default.  A civil 
recovery and tax investigation resulted in the recovery of a property, valued at over £1 
million, belonging to a Merseyside man believed to have been involved in drug trafficking, 
money laundering and tax evasion. The partner and fugitive drug-dealer son of a deceased 
Liverpool drug trafficker were deprived of almost £2million of property and assets 
following an NCA investigation.1363   
 
Although many countries, such as the United States and United Kingdom, along 
with institutions such as the World Bank, are advancing their means to correct these wrong 
doings, more is still to be done. Criminal proceedings and non-conviction based forfeiture 
are great tools in this realm of criminal activity, but states should also look to civil suits as 
a means for obtaining justice. Civil remedies, although not without its faults, can provide 
an array of benefits. Furthermore, it is also expressly advocated for in UNCAC. This tool 
has already been used to punish corrupt individuals and return stolen assets.  Further study 
and practice of civil actions should hopefully continue to grow as asset recovery is pursued. 
  
The approaches elaborated at the international and national levels for assets 
recovery aim to tackle this problem by engaging international financial institutions. 
Therefore, the next chapter will examine the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and 
its’ role in combating financial crimes.  
 							
																																																								
1363 National Crime Agency Annual Report and Accounts 2016-17 
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CHAPTER 8 
International Financial Institutions and its Sanctions Regime 
Introduction  
How International Financial Institutions Combat Financial Crimes? 	
As the world progressively becomes more globalized, financial crimes must be 
addressed on a global scale, however, questions remain as to how the international 
community should achieve such an objective.1364 An effective response must be three 
dimensional. First, the root causes of the problem must be addressed. Second, the response 
must provide a regulatory framework to prevent future infractions. Lastly, it must ensure 
compliance through an effective enforcement mechanism. The following section will 
examine the role for the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), first 
through a brief overview of the international financial institutions respective fields of 
operation and the extent to which these institutions' policies and lending facilities have 
evolved over time; and second, through an analysis of their potential to combat financial 
crimes. 
 
In July 1944, delegates from forty-four allied nations1365 assembled at the Mount 
Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, with the goal of creating institutions 
that, through a unified system of purpose, policies, and rules, would regulate the 
international monetary system while concurrently restructuring the international relations 
which had begun to foster before World War II.1366 While each of the forty-four nations 																																																								
1364 Jennifer Trahan, Terrorism Conventions: Existing Gaps and Different Approaches, 8 New Eng. Int’l & 
Comp. L Ann. 215, 220-21 (2002). 
1365 The Department of State, Proceedings and Documents of United Nations Monetary and Financial 
Conference Vol. I at 5 (1948) [hereinafter Bretton Woods Conference Vol. I]. The forty-four nations: 
Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippine Commonwealth, Poland, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. 
1366 See Ibid. at 5-7; Dept. of Public Info, Everyone’s United Nations 365 (9th ed. 1979) (relaying that there 
were four versions of the draft documents that were presented to the delegates: The U.S. version, the U.K. 
version, new material, and material taken from the Monetary Fund proposal). Edward S. Mason & Robert 
E. Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods 21 (1973) (discussing that lesser developed nations, 
including European countries which suffered during World War II, held a greater interest in development 
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was present, the Bretton Woods agreement was negotiated primarily between Britain and 
the United States.1367 The conference resulted in the formation of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (“World Bank”) and the International Monetary Fund 
(“IMF”).1368 
The World Bank and its Mandate 	
Although many perceive the World Bank as a single unit, it is actually composed 
of four financial institutions that are interrelated under the title of World Bank Group.1369  
The World Bank is a multidimensional institution that enables its member states to 																																																								
of the IBRD than the IMF). Well established monetary conditions are the cornerstone to successful lending 
and a precondition to the membership in the Brenton Wood Institutions. Id. 
1367 G. John Ikenberry, The Political Origins of Bretton Woods, A Perspective on the Bretton Woods 
System 155 (1993)(noting that the United States and Britain were the two major Western powers from 
World War II); see also Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton 
Woods To The 1990s 33 (1996) (“The Bretton Woods negotiations are often portrayed as a battle of wills 
between Keynes and White.”); M.J. Stephey, A Brief History of Bretton Woods System, TIME (Oct. 21, 
2008), available at http:// www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1852254,00.html. 
1368 Lee E. Preston & Duane Windsor, The Rules of the Game in the Global Economy: Policy Regimes for 
International Business 132-33 (2d. ed. 1997) (explaining that the names of the institutions can be confusing 
given the IMF was established to carry out exchange, reserve, and short-term loan functions normally 
associated with “bank,” while the IBRD is essentially a “Fund” for providing long-term loans). The IBRD 
was established on December 27, 1945 with the purpose to: “[A]ssist in the reconstruction and 
development of territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes; to 
promote private foreign investment and, when private investment is not readily available on reasonable 
terms, to supplement it by providing loans for productive purposes out of its own capital funds; and to 
promote the balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance of equilibrium in balances of 
payments by encouraging international investment for the development of the productive sources of the 
Bank's members.” Dept. of Public Info., Everyone's United Nations 364-65 (9th ed. 1979). Membership to 
the IBRD is open to all members of the IMF. Id. at 364. The IMF was established with the intent of 
facilitating international monetary cooperation; promoting exchange rate stability; assisting in the 
establishment of multilateral payment systems; eliminating foreign exchange restrictions; providing loans 
to nations experiencing balance of payments issues; all for the purpose of creating conditions for strong 
economic growth. Id. at 55.  
1369 The World Bank: Structure and Polices 12 (Christopher L. Gilbert & David Vines eds., 2000) 
[hereinafter World Bank: Structure and Polices]. The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (“IBRD”) is the original and central institution in the World Bank Group. Id. Its primary 
purpose of IRBD is “to borrow funds and lend these on to qualifying member governments or to public 
sector institutions for agreed projects.” Id. The second institution of the World Bank is the International 
Development Agency (“IDA”), whose role is that of an aid agency, concentrating its activities to sixty 
“IDA countries” that have a low GDP per capita. Id. Even though the IBRD and the IDA are nearly 
completely coextensive, their differences essentially lie on the duration of the loan, its interest rates and the 
source of the loaned funds. Id. at 12-13. In essence, “[t]he Bank, as IDA, provides both development 
assistance and development aid while, as the IBRD, it provides assistance and enhanced access to capital.” 
Id. at 13. The third unit of the World Bank is the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”), which was 
founded in 1956. Id. at 12. This institution's main focus is to strengthen domestic industries by lending to 
private sector institutions and taking equity shares in private sector enterprises. Id. The fourth and last unit 
is the Multinational Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”), which was created in 1988. Id. Its purpose is 
to guarantee “private sector investors against expropriation and repatriation risks in developing countries.”  
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contribute in the collective “promotion, worldwide of economic sustainable development 
and poverty reduction.”1370  The Bank’s aims are pursued through lending, producing 
research, providing economic analysis and the establishment of policy advice and technical 
assistance. 1371 As a creation that emerged from World War II, the World Bank was 
originally intended to handle the financial necessities of the post-war reconstruction.1372 
Thus, reconstruction was the World Bank’s primary focus during the first decade or so of 
its initiation.1373 However, by the 1960s, the world’s politics had changed dramatically.1374 
In order to adapt to these changes, the World Bank needed to alter its priorities “from 
reconstruction to development and from Europe to the developing world.”1375   
 
Despite the fact the World Bank’s membership is dependent on members of the 
IMF, the objectives of the two institutions are very different, and this is clear from the 
World Bank’s functions being primarily a financial intermediary.1376 Funds are raised 
through selling bonds on the international capital market and then are subsequently lent  to 
member states a small mark-up over the World Bank’s AAA1377 borrowing rate.1378 The 
Bank lends either “directly to a member government or [requires that its loans be] 																																																								
1370 Ibid. 
1371 Ibid. 
1372 Ibid. (quoting Harry Dexter, U.S. Treasury official and one of the drafters for the World bank who 
sated that the primary objectives of the Bank were to “provide or otherwise stimulate long-term, low-
interest-rate loans for reconstruction and for the development of capital-poor areas.”). 
1373 Ibid. 
1374 Ibid. 
1375 Ibid. 
1376 Rajesh Swaminathan, Regulating Development: Structural Adjustment and the Case for National 
Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 161, 164 (1998) 
(commenting that the Bank’s Articles of Agreement states that its membership is limited to sovereign states 
who are already members of the IMF). The two institutions are similar in organizational and voting 
structures. The Board of Governors, representing all member states, has all of the World Bank's powers 
vested in it, while the Executive Directors conduct the institution's daily operations. See Articles of 
Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, opened for signature Dec. 27, 
1945, art. V, sec. 2, 60 Stat. 1440, as amended Dec. 16, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 1942, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter 
World Bank Articles of Agreement]. The Bank and the IMF both have a total of 24 Executive Directors 
with the United States, Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, having 
their own seats on the Board, and the remaining directors elected on a rotating two-year basis. See World 
Bank, IBRD/IFC/IDA Executive Directors and Alternates. 
1377 John Burgess, Groups Plan Boycott of World Bank Bonds, Washington Post, Apr. 11, 2000, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wbank/bonds.htm; see also The World Bank's Bonds Are 
Getting Looser, http://www.wbbeurope.org/tool-kit-article3.php (explaining that an AAA rating indicates a 
guarantee that anyone who purchases AAA-rated bonds will be sure to get their money back, with the 
agreed interest, when the bonds mature.  
1378 Swaminathan, supra note 1376, at 168. 
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guaranteed by the member government in whose territory the project [or program] is 
located.”1379 Additionally, the World Bank limits the use of such loans “for the foreign 
exchange component of specific [programs or] projects.”1380  The World Bank places 
conditions on the borrowing state adopting certain policies in order to receive 
disbursements. Article III(4) of the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement provides that the 
World Bank may offer loans “to any member or any political subdivision thereof and any 
business, industrial, and agricultural enterprise in the territories of a member,” subject to 
the condition that the member state fully guarantee the repayment of the principal and 
interest.1381 The Bank is also required to “pay due regard to the prospect that the borrower... 
will be in [the] position to meet its obligations under the loan...”1382 Conditions that are to 
be met by borrowing states are comprehensive and typically include policy and structural 
reforms, including improved governance, the elimination of corruption and gender 
equality, along with other obligations.1383 
The International Monetary Fund and its Mandate 	
The IMF was founded as a special agency on the United Nations to promote the 
stability of the international monetary system.1384 The IMF’s job is to focus on preventing 
economic crises from occurring by advising member states on the soundness of their 
economic policies and to provide short-term financing for those members experiencing 
balance of payment issues.1385 
																																																								
1379 Kim Reisman, The World Bank and the IMF: At the Forefront of World Transformation, 60 Fordham 
L. Rev. S349, 353 (1992).  
1380 Ibid. 
1381 World Bank Article of Agreement, supra note 1376, art. III, sec. 4. 
1382 Ibid. 
1383 Herbert V. Morais, The Globalization of Human Rights Law and The Role of International Financial 
Institutions in Promoting Human Rights, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 71, 94-95 (2000). 
1384See generally International Monetary Fund; What is the International Monetary Fund, http:// 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/what.htm [hereinafter What is the IMF?]. 
1385See ibid. The IMF reports to the ministries of finance and the central banks of governments of its 
member states. A Board of Governors, representing each member state, is the highest power within the 
institution and meets once a year to decide on significant policy issues.  The Executive Board which meets 
several times per week at the IMF's headquarters in Washington, D.C. takes care of day-to-day 
requirements The Executive Board consists of a total of 24 Executive Directors with the United States, 
Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, having their own seats on the 
Board, and the remaining directors elected on a rotating two-year basis. Decisions are made determined on 
a weighted voting system with the state with the larger “quota” having more votes. These quotas are 
basically capital subscriptions that members pay upon joining the institution and are meant to reflect each 
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The IMF’s Articles of Agreement embodies its statutory purpose.1386 Its objectives 
include the advancement of balanced world trade expansion, exchange rate stability, the 
establishment of a multilateral system of payments, and temporary financial assistance to 
member states experiencing balance of payment problems.1387 To promote its objectives, 
the IMF inspects the performance of each member's economy as a whole, concentrating 
mainly on its macroeconomic policies — policies on exchange rates, the management of 
money, and a member state's government budget — and financial sector policies.1388 The 
IMF additionally considers a member state's structural policies, such as labour market 
policies, that may affect macroeconomic performance. 1389  Moreover, the institution 
counsels its members on the best course of action in re-evaluating national policies so they 
more effectively pursue objectives such as high employment, low inflation, and sustainable 
economic growth. 1390  This technical assistance is further supplemented with training 
programs for government and central bank officials of member states.1391 
The IMF’s ability to disburse loans is a critical aspect of its mandate. Sustaining a 
healthy balance is a vital prerequisite to the IMF’s founding purpose of supporting global 
economic stability.1392 Article I of the IMF’s Article of Agreements states that this is 
required to make funds “temporary available under adequate safeguards…to correct 
maladjustments in their balance-of-payments without resorting to measures destructive 
national or international prosperity.”1393 
In order to participate in the IMF’s lending, member states must comply with the 
condition of adopting policies designed to correct balance of payment problems.1394 Article 
V(3)(a) of the IMF's Articles of Agreement provides that the IMF “shall adopt policies on 																																																								
member's relative size in the global economy. The major developed countries benefit from greater voting 
powers because quotas are based on the economic size of a country. 
1386 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, opened for signature Dec. 27, 1945, 160 
Stat. 1401, as amended April 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, available at http:// 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm [hereinafter IMF Articles of Agreement]. 
1387 Ibid. 
1388 What is the IMF?, supra note 1384; IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 1386, art. I, para. V. 
1389 What is the IMF?, supra note 1384. 
1390 Ibid. 
1391 Ibid. 
1392 IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 1386, art. I, para. v. 
1393 Ibid. 
1394 What is the IMF?, supra note 1384. 
	 227	
the use of its general resources... and may adopt special policies for special balance of 
payments problems, that will assist members to solve their balance of payments problems 
in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Agreement and that will establish 
adequate safeguards for the temporary use of the general resources of the Fund.”1395By 
requiring performance-based conditions, the IMF is able to “independently... examine [the] 
country's need for balance of payments assistance and to require the adoption of corrective 
policies before funds are disbursed.” 1396  Conditions may be required include trade 
liberalization measures, depreciation of the exchange rate, decreasing the fiscal deficit, and 
restrictions on the credit provided by domestic banks. 1397  According to the IMF, the 
“conditionality associated with IMF lending helps to ensure that by borrowing from the 
IMF, a country does not just postpone hard choices and accumulate more debt, but is able 
to strengthen its economy and repay the loan.”1398 
The Power of the World Bank and IMF to Fight Financial Crimes 	
The World Bank and the IMF are international institutions with unparalleled 
resources at their disposal, putting them in an exceptional position to combat financial 
crimes.1399 These international financial institutions (IFIs) have several means available to 
them in order to the crimes discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Although there are 
many critics of the IFIs,1400 collectively, they are the most capable to address financial 
crime issues. Additionally, in accordance with the increasing recognition of the importance 
of financial integrity issues, the roles of the World Bank and IMF have evolved their duties 
over the years in order to take up this challenge.1401 
																																																								
1395 IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 60, art. V sec. 3(a). 
1396 Swaminathan, supra note 1376, at 166. 
1397 Mary C. Tsai, Globalization and Conditionality: Two Sides of the Sovereignty Coin, 31 LAW & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 1317, 1321 (2000). 
1398 What is the IMF?, supra note 1384. 
1399 Olivera Medenica, The World Bank, the IMF and the Global Prevention of Terrorism: A Role for 
Conditionality, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 663, 692 (2004) 
1400 Ibid. 
1401 The IMF and the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, Fact Sheet, Mar. 
31, 2013, http://www.imf.md/imf-aml.html (discussing how the involvement of the IMF has evolved in the 
field of anti-money laundering and terrorist financing). 
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The IFIs together have an array of tools available to them to combat financial 
crimes.1402 The IFIs currently utilize many of the mechanisms at their disposal primarily to 
prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, which has become a key aspect of the 
IFIs’ duties.1403 Some of the tools that should be utilized more in preventing financial 
crimes will be discussed below. These include conditions used to provide loans, technical 
assistance and the assessments. 
The Role of Conditions as a Tool for Financial Crimes 	
One of the main and controversial aspects of the IFIs is the use of conditions for the 
disbursement of aid, which are semi-contractual in nature.1404 As is common with many 
lending facilities, the IFIs require states requesting aid to provide reliable commitments to 
ensure the repayment and cooperation in the application of the loans. 1405  Conditions 
imposed by the IFIs are generally applied as policy measures endorsed by the IMF and the 
World Bank.1406 These conditions, which aim to help the state to stabilize and grow, and 
are often criticized for this inclusion of policy-oriented objectives. Nevertheless, they are 
an essential component of the IFIs.1407 
 During the 1980s, policy conditions incorporated wide-ranging macro-economic 
stabilization and structural economic reform.1408 However, during the early 1990s, there 
began a fundamental shift in policies applied by the IFIs with the application of the concept 
of “good governance” as an objective and also a condition for loan disbursement.1409 The 																																																								
1402 Wesley J.L. Anderson, Disrupting Threat Finances Utilization of Financial Information to Disrupting 
Terrorist Organizations in the Twenty First Century. P. 123(2010). 
1403 Finance & Development (Int’l Monetary Fund, External Relations Dep’t, 2000) (explaining that 
financial crimes such as corruption, tax crimes, insider dealing and fraud are all predicate crimes to money 
laundering 
1404 Tony Killick Et Al., Aid and Political Economy of policy change 6 (1998) (defining conditions as a 
mutual arrangement by which a government takes, or promises to take, certain policy actions, in support of 
which an IFI...or other agency will provide specified amounts of financial assistance). 
1405 Michael Chossudovsky. The Globalization of Poverty: Impacts of the IMF and the World Bank 
Reforms. p. 45 (1997)  
1406Ibid. 
1407 Medenica, supra note 1399, at 687.  
1408 See Id. at 688-89 (listing policy programs which included reforms such as currency devaluation, 
liberalization of the labor market, reducing budget deficits, price and trade liberalization, among others). 
1409 The World Bank defines “governance” as “the form of political regime; the process by which authority 
is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development; and the 
capacity of governments to design, formulate and implement policies and discharge functions.” The IMF 
defines it as “all aspects of the way a country, corporation, or other entity is governed” and “includes the 
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transition in policy was due to the IFIs recognition “that the reasons for underdevelopment 
and mismanaged government are ‘sometimes attributable to weak institutions, lack of an 
adequate legal framework, damaging discretionary interventions, uncertain and variable 
policy frameworks and a closed decision-making process which increases risks of 
corruption and waste.”’1410  The shift also reflected the pressure resulting from donor 
countries requesting that the IFIs tackle issues of corruption, economic irresponsibility and 
bureaucratic failures, which prevented the repayment of financial assistance.1411As a means 
of utilizing conditions as a tool to combat financial crimes, the IFIs could incorporate 
international law into their financial assistance programs. This could take the form as 
requiring states in need of assistance to implement international treaties that address 
financial crimes into state legislation.1412 For instance, currently, IFIs play a key role in 
monitoring the implementation of the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”)1413 policies 
for anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (“AML/CFT”).1414 
The IFIs participation in this role mainly involves assessments and technical assistance (to 
be discussed below). However, conditions could also be applied to address the issues of 
AML/CFT along with the other financial crimes that plague the economic conditions of 
the global market. Conditions could focus on the areas of prevention, suppression and the 
exchange of information in order to succeed in the fight against financial crimes. In this 
manner, each disbursement of funds would be contingent on the actual implementation of 
law in order to combat financial crimes in general. Such conditions, although not directly 
within the mandates of the IFIs are connected to them by maintaining economic stability 
and aiding states in development.  
																																																								
economic policy interactions that fall within the mandate and expertise of the IMF,” as well as “their 
effectiveness; their transparency, and thus the accountability of policy makers; and the extent to which they 
meet internationally accepted standards and good practices.” See Carlos Santiso, World Bank and Good 
Governance: Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality, 7 Geo. Pub. 
Policy Rev Geo. 1, 2, 4 (2001). 
1410See Ibid. at 5. 
1411 Ibid. 
1412 See Medenica, supra note 1399, at 704 (discussing the possibilities of the IFIs requiring the 
implementation of United Resolution 1373 as a means to prevent terrorism). 
1413See Kenneth S. Blazejewski, The FATF and Its Institutional Partners: Improving the Effectiveness and 
Accountability of Trans governmental Networks, 22 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 30 (2008) (“The FATF is 
The international trans-governmental network charged with designing and effective regime of anti-money 
laundering and combating the financing of terrorism policies”). 
1414 Ibid. 
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Expanding the IFIs current Technical Assistance and Assessment Measures to 
Address Financial Crimes 	
Currently, the IFIs rely on technical assistance and assessments in order to monitor 
the implementation of FATF Recommendations among their member states.1415 This is 
done to through surveillance of economic conditions through the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (“FSAP”).1416 The FSAP assesses the reliability of member states’ 
financial systems through detecting risks and vulnerabilities, evaluating financial need, and 
assisting members in addressing these weaknesses through technical assistance and policy 
recommendations.1417 In order to aid this aim, the Report on the Observance of Standards 
and Codes (“ROSC”) was created. ROSC exists to report on the implementation of twelve 
standards that the IMF has recognized as “benchmarks of good practices” in regard to 
financial and economic soundness of a state. 1418  However, participation in FSAP is 
voluntary for the members of the IFIs.1419 
 
Assessments conducted by the IFIs through the FSAP program are a critical means 
to combat AML/CFT crimes, which is also necessary to prevent other financial crimes. 
However, the voluntary nature of this program obviously can leave some countries 
unchecked. Hence, the FSAP should be required for members in order for the IFIs to apply 
FATF Recommendations as well as monitor all member prevention mechanisms. As of 
2013, only seventy assessments of country compliance of FATF Recommendations had 
																																																								
1415 FATF, Financial Action Task Force 40 Recommendations (2003), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/document/28/0,3343,en_32250379_32236930_ 33658140_1_1_1_1,00.html#r21. See Blazejewski, 
supra note 1413, at 30. 
1416 Int'l Monetary Fund, Public Information Notice, IMF Executive Board Reviews Experience with the 
Financial Sector Assessment Program, http:// www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2005/pn0547.htm 
[hereinafter IMF FSAP Board Review]. 
1417 Ibid. 
1418 Int'l Monetary Fund, Standards and Codes: The Role of the IMF, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sc.htm. The twelve standards include accounting, auditing, 
banking supervision, corporate governance, data dissemination, fiscal transparency, insolvency and creditor 
rights, insurance supervision, monetary and financial policy transparency, payments systems, securities 
regulation, and money laundering and the financing of terrorism. 
1419 IMF FSAP Board Review, supra note1416. 
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been conducted.1420 This number is less than half of the member states of the IFIs,1421 
indicating a gap in the IFIs ability to fight financial crimes. 
 
The technical assistance program of the IFIs is another tool that can be expanded 
upon in order to increase the success of financial crime prevention. Technical assistance is 
one tool that can be considered the most significant in order to achieve policy reform to 
combat financial crime.1422 The aim of the technical assistance is to improve governance 
by tackling the underlying systematic problems in member countries.1423 Typical activities 
include advice on particular macroeconomic policy issues, technical advice on practices 
and institution-building in the IMF's core areas of responsibility—mainly central banking, 
monetary and exchange rate policies, public finances and budgeting, tax policy and 
administration, and statistics—the promotion of international standards and codes of good 
policymaking, and training provided to government and central bank officials to strengthen 
skills in the institutions responsible for policy-making, such as finance ministries and 
central banks.1424 Technical assistance is also used as a means to help countries meet 
internationally recognized standards in various areas related to economic policymaking.1425 
 
Technical assistance receives a great deal of criticism for being “supply-driven,” 
meaning that its activities are driven by donors rather than being provided to aid the 
recipient country’s needs.1426 Nevertheless, the IFIs’ policies are meant to be implemented 
as a means to protect the country itself and for the greater good of the world economy. 
																																																								
1420 U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Implementation of Legislative Provisions Relating to the International 
Monetary Fund: A Report to Congress 19 (2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/international/int-monetary-fund/Documents/2013-12-13_%28Legislative_Mandate_Report%29.pdf. 
1421 There are a total of 188 member states in the IMF and World Bank, as membership in the World Bank 
is dependent on membership in the IMF. See Member Countries, World Bank, 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/members.  
1422 Lending & Technical Assistance, World Bank, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/0,
,contentMDK:20223795~menuPK:468641~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:286305,00.html 
1423 Ibid. 
1424 IMF Technical Assistance: Transferring Knowledge and Best Practice (May 2003), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/techass/techass.htm#whatis. 
1425 Ibid. 
1426 Williams, G., Jones, S., Imber, V., and Cox, A., A Vision for the Future of Technical 
Assistance in the International Development System’, Oxford Pol’y Manage. (2003), 
http://www.opml.co.uk/policy_areas/aid_policy/ed768_vision_ta.html 
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Poorly structured economic policies and goals can let financial crimes go undetected. IFIs 
have a great deal of expertise in financial crimes and the personnel who assist in technical 
assistance are trained for these matters to be addressed. Nevertheless, it is important for 
countries to take ownership and understand the process and what is actually being done 
and also what is needs to be done in order for there to harmonious cooperation between 
recipients and the IFIs.1427 Extra time should be taken in order to ensure capacity building 
is accomplished, not just that the “job gets done.”1428 
 
Donor objectives should be considered important but not a priority.1429 The IFIs are 
the ones who understand the importance of sound policy in order to fight financial crimes, 
and as seen above, these crimes are complex and difficult to fight. Cooperation and 
capacity building is what is essential to focus on during technical assistance.1430 Only by 
providing the tools and knowledge necessary to recipient countries to combat these crimes 
will any real progress be made.1431 This can be improved by creating capacity building 
plans based on policy objectives and national development strategies.1432 Also, the full use 
of national resources should be addressed in order to have all parts and agencies involved 
in the assistance project.1433 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
																																																								
1427 Ibid. 
1428 ActionAid, Real Aid: Making technical assistance work, (2006), 
http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/real_aid2.pdf. 
1429 Ibid. 
1430 Ibid. 
1431 Ibid. 
1432 Ibid. 
1433 Ibid. 
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Sanctions Regime 
Corruption can undermine development efforts across the world. Although 
international financial institutions implement a range of criteria and mechanisms in order 
to secure money transfer from falling into corrupt hands, it is still being difficult to combat 
corruptions. It has been reported that billions of dollars have been used for corrupt purposes 
when that money was given for development projects. This continuous corruption has lead 
international financial institutions to begin to harmonize their strategies as a means of 
posing a united front against corruption since many recipient governments are not able or 
trusted to maintain the funds for the designated projects.  
 
The principal multilateral development banks (MDBs)1434 have begun to strategize 
and build international cooperation to address corruption, through sanctions and debarment 
regimes. In addition to establishing uniform, principle-based standards for investigations 
among international financial institutions, common definitions of sanctionable practices, 
and a common system of mutual enforcement of debarment or “cross-debarment,” the 
MDBs continue to work to further integrate and coordinate their respective systems.1435 
Greater harmonization among the MDBs provides several benefits for all stakeholders, and 
particularly helps to enforce the rule of law and fight corruption. The World Bank is the 
most active MDB from an enforcement perspective. Since 2007 through 2014, the World 
Bank has debarred or sanctioned a total of around 250 entities and individuals.1436 The 
majority, about 60%, of these sanctions decisions were handed down during 2012 – 2013, 
demonstrating a clear trend towards increased levels of enforcement.1437 However, a key 
issue to the MDBs’ sanction regime is the lack of effort to strengthen law enforcement and 																																																								
1434 The multilateral development banks (MDBs) include the African Development Bank Group (consisting 
of the African Development Bank, the African Development Fund, and the Nigeria Trust Fund), the Asian 
Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Inter-American 
Development Bank Group (consisting of the Inter-American Development Bank, the Inter-American 
Investment Corporation, and the Multilateral Investment Fund), and the World Bank Group (WBG) 
(consisting of the International Bank for Research and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation, and the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency). 
1435 Frank A. Fariello, Jr. & Conrad C. Daly, Coordinating the Fight Against Corruption among MDBs: The 
Past, Present and Future of Sanctions, 45 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 253, 254 (2013). 
1436 See Office of Suspension and Debarment, The World Bank Office of Suspension and Debarment: 
Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007–2013, World Bank (2014). 
1437 Ibid.  
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government at the national level. Sanctions are targeted to private suppliers, while 
governments are not held accountable when fraud and corruption occur.  
 
Thus, this chapter proposes that the MDBs sanction system should continue to 
harmonize their efforts, while also demanding integrity measures that aid in strengthening 
domestic efforts to combat corruptions.  Section II will briefly discuss the overall 
corruption regime and its development. It will then discuss more specifically the World 
Bank and how it began its role in anticorruption. Section III will then discuss the sanctions 
regime of the MDBs and how they have harmonized their efforts, with a focus primarily 
on the World Bank given its central role in combating corruption and because many of the 
other international financial institutions have based their system on that of the World 
Bank’s. Section IV will discuss the issues found within the sanctions regime and conclude 
with recommendations. 
 
History of the Anticorruption Regime  
Anticorruption efforts have been ongoing for many years now. As there has been 
increased awareness over the impact of corruption, more attention and measures are being 
put in place in order to combat it. Recently, anticorruption efforts have been focused on 
terrorist financing;1438 drug trafficking; and the obstacles to economic aid and development 
funds caused by corrupt practices. The United States was a major player on the 
anticorruption movement, most notably  in 1977, when the US Congress took the lead and 
incorporated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).1439 The FCPA was the first law 
of its kind, prohibiting transnational bribery, although it is limited to corrupt transactions 
in business operations, it does not extend outside of the commercial circle. 
 
 
 
																																																								
1438 See, e.g., UNCAC Preamble para 2: “Concerned also about the links between corruption and other 
forms of crime, in particular organized crime and economic crime, including money-laundering.” 
1439 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 USC § 78dd-1 (1977) (“FCPA') 
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As corporations in the US began to feel the seriousness of the anticorruption regime 
emerging, the US began to lobby for international measures and an anticorruption treaty in 
order to have greater reach. 1440  The United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(“ECOSOC”) began its focus on the offering of bribes by transnational corporations from 
developing countries, instead of focusing on public officials demand for bribes. However, 
tensions were great between developed and developing nations and discussions soon broke 
down. The US soon turned to the OECD, which eventually adopted the OECD Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
(“OECD Convention”).1441As anticorruption efforts began to be raised on an international 
level, the World Bank slowly began to enter into the realm of combating it. Scandals began 
to occur with funds which fuelled a new awareness.1442 The World Bank sanctions regime 
was significantly influenced by the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1998, as well as 
the nature of the procurement approach found in the US Federal Acquisition Regulation, 
especially subpart 9.4.1443 Though the two systems have their differences, particularly with 
regard to the World Bank's limited sanctionable practices, they are similar in many 
respects.1444 Nevertheless, the World Bank also began take on a role of its own in the fight 
against corruption. 
 
The World Bank and its entry into anticorruption 
Although today the World Bank can be seen as a forerunner in the fight against 
corruption, there were many years of hesitation to address the matter.1445 The issue of 
																																																								1440	Jan	Wouters	et.	al.,	The	International	Legal	Framework	Against	Corruption:	Achievements	and	Challenges,	14	MELB.	J.	INT'L	L.	205,	209	(2013)	
1441 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 
opened for signature 17 December 1997, [1999] ATS 21 (entered into force 15 February 1999) (‘OECD 
Convention’). 
1442See, e.g., Richard Calkins et al; Dealing with Governance and Corruption Risks in Project Lending: 
Emerging Good Practices (Note, World Bank, February 2009) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGOVANTICORR/Resources/3035863281627136986/EmergingG
oodPracticesNote_8.11.09.pdf>. 
1443 Pascal Hélène Dubois, Domestic and International Administrative Tools to Combat Fraud & 
Corruption: A Comparison of US Suspension and Debarment with the World Bank's Sanctions System, U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 195, 196-97 (2012). 
1444 Ibid. at 234-35.  
1445 Anne- Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, World Bank, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process and its 
Recent Reforms 9 (2012) 
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“leakage” of proceeds was always an issue to prevent which the Bank managed through 
fiduciary systems by establishing procedures such as procurement rules, financial reporting 
and audits, and controls on disbursement.1446 The issue in addressing corruption was that 
it was widely believed that matters of governance were considered political issues and did 
not fall under the Bank’s mandate of economic development.1447  Moreover, for the Bank 
to enter into issues of governance was perceived as contradictory of the “political 
prohibition” set forth in the Bank’s Articles of Agreement.1448 Similar provisions also exist 
for most of the other MDBs as well.1449 Today, the Bank understands that so long as it is 
done correctly, fighting corruption is acceptable and necessary in order to fulfil its 
mandate.1450 Specifically, the Bank relies on its “fiduciary duty” which implies that the 
																																																								
1446 See Ibid. at 9-11. This can be seen in specific anti-corruption provisions in the World Bank's 
Procurement Rules. World Bank, Guidelines: Procurement Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits § 1.14 
(May 1, 2010), available at http://go.worldbank.org/1KKD1KNT40 [hereinafter World Bank Procurement 
Guidelines]. Financial reporting, auditing, and other bookkeeping measures are extensively used as means 
of identifying corruption. See, e.g., The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. Sec. & Exchange 
Commission, http:// www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml. Disbursement rules control payment with the goal of 
preventing World Bank finances being improperly applied. See World Bank Disbursement Guidelines for 
Projects 5 (2006). 
1447 See International Bank for Research and Development Articles of Agreement art. 1, opened for 
signature Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 (as amended Feb. 18, 1989) [hereinafter IBRD 
Articles of Agreement]. The IBRD Articles of Agreement provides as follows: The purposes of the Bank 
are: (i) To assist in the reconstruction and development. (ii) To promote private foreign investment ....(iii) 
To promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance of equilibrium in 
balances of payments ....(iv) To arrange the loans made or guaranteed by it in relation to international loans 
through other channels .... (v) To conduct its operations with due regard to the effect of international 
investment on business conditions ....Id.; see also IDA Articles of Agreement art. I, done Jan. 26, 1960, 11 
U.S.T. 2284, 439 U.N.T.S. 249 [hereinafter IDA Articles of Agreement] (“The purposes of the Association 
are to promote economic development, increase productivity and thus raise standards of living in the less-
developed areas of the world ....”). 
1448 The IBRD Articles of Agreement contain a clause that states that “[t]he Bank and its officers shall not 
interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the 
political character of the member or members concerned.” See IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 
1447, art. IV, § 10. The IDA Articles of Agreement maintains provision that is identical. See IDA Articles 
of Agreement, supra note 1447, art. V, § 6. 
1449 Similar provisions are found in the Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank art. 
VIII, § 5(f), done Apr. 8, 1959, 10 U.S.T. 3029, 389 U.N.T.S. 69 (as amended July 31, 1995); the Articles 
of Agreement of the Asian Development Bank art. 36(2), done Dec. 4, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1418, 571 U.N.T.S. 
123; and the Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank art. 38(2), Aug. 4, 1963, 1276 
U.N.T.S. 3 (as amended July 5, 2002). On the other hand, the constituent documents of the EBRD and 
European Investment Bank (EIB) do not contain such restriction. See also Hassane Cissé, Should the 
Political Prohibition in Charters of International Financial Institutions Be Revisited? The Case of the World 
Bank, 3 WORLD BANK LEGAL REV. 59, 59-92 (2011). 
1450 Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Corruption: A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of the World 
Bank, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 451, 453-58 (1997) (conveying that “the vested interests established through 
corrupt practices tend to weaken public institutions and delay attempts to reform the system, thus inhibiting 
the development of new activities and reducing economic growth”); Claes Sandgren, Combating 
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Bank must ensure that the loans given are used for their intended purposes, and respecting 
the economy and efficiency.1451 The Bank, along with other MDBs, now understands that 
both fraud and corruption weaken development projects and cause harm to the economy in 
general.1452 
As such, since the early 1990s, the World Bank began to integrate anti-corruption 
measures into the Bank’s good governance conditionality.1453  Corruption began to be 
viewed as a greater issue, and was no longer simply an economic issue in order to better 
international business transaction, but rather, a serious obstacle in the way of societal 
development. Nevertheless, in measuring anti-corruption progress, the Bank continues to 
use a more econometric method.1454 
According to the World Bank: 
“Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a 
country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate 
and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them”.1455 
																																																								
Corruption: The Misunderstood Role of Law, 39 INT'L LAW 717, 718 (2005) (arguing that corruption 
diminishes economic growth). 
1451 See IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 1447, art. III, § 5(b) ( “The Bank shall make arrangements 
to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with 
due attention to considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other non-
economic influences or considerations.”); IDA Articles of Agreement, supra note 1447, art. V, § 6 (“The 
Association and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be 
influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only 
economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed 
impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in this Agreement.”); see also Sanctions Procedures, 
supra note 2, § 1.01(a) (outlining the World Bank's “fiduciary duty” under the Articles of Agreement). 
1452See President Paul Wolfowitz, Press Briefing with Paul Wolfowitz: IMF/World Bank Group 2006 
Annual Meetings (Sept. 15, 2006), available at http:// web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ 
NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21053812%EBpagePK:34370%EBpiPK:34424%%~theSitePK:4607,00.html 
(“[T]he purpose [of the Bank's Strategy Paper on Governance and Anti-Corruption] is not to find a reason 
to cut back on lending; to the contrary, it is to make the quality of our lending better and to make sure that 
the lending and grant-making that we do goes where it is supposed to go, which is to help the poorest 
people of the world.”); David Chaikin & Jason C. Sharman, Corruption and Money Laundering: A 
Symbiotic Relationship 2 (2009) (providing a review of how corruption is connected to money laundering). 
1453 Courtney Hostetler; Going from Bad to Good: Combating Corporate Corruption on World Bank-
Funded Infrastructure Project, 14(1) YALE HUM. RIGHTS & DEVP’T L. J. 231 (2011). 
1454 James Thuo Gathii, Defining the Relationship between Human Rights and Corruption, 31 U. OF PENN. 
J. OF INT’L L. 125, 127 (2009). 
1455 World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, http:// 
info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm. 
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There are six governance indicators in which the Bank examines when measuring 
a country’s governance score, this includes the management of corruption.1456 The World 
Bank’s attention to good governance was reinforced by works which explained the 
foundations of corruption based on the behaviour of governments.These studies 
proclaimed that various governmental policies often increase corrupt practices.1457 Such 
policies that were found included trade restrictions, governmental subsidies, price controls, 
low wages in the civil service, and licensing requirements (particularly if it was left to only 
certain officials or departments to grant).1458 Given that these policies could encourage 
rent-seeking, the Bank sought to correct these ailments through conditionality and 
deregulation.1459 Nevertheless, other factors also prompt rent-seeking, which are often not 
related to governmental policies and thus, outside of the World Bank’s reach.1460 
 
In realizing the effects of corruption and the need for good governance, the World 
Bank began its sanctions system, which many of the MDBs have adopted or modelled their 
own after. The sanctions system’s primary goal is to safeguard the Banks’ funds in 
furtherance of its fiduciary duty, which is where both its legal basis and scope is derived 
from. This goal demonstrates that the purpose of the sanctions system is not really to 
punish, but principally to protect the Bank’s financing by excluding those who have corrupt 
																																																								
1456See id. (listing the other five indicators which are: (i) voice and accountability; (ii) political stability and 
absence of violence/terrorism; (iii) government effectiveness; (iv) regulatory quality; and (v) rule of law). 
1457 Paolo Mauro, The Effects of Corruption on Growth and Public Expenditure, in, Political Corruption: 
Concept & Contexts, (Third Edition, 2002) 339, 341-42. 
1458 Susan Rose-Ackerman, When Is Corruption Harmful? in Political Corruption: Concept & Contexts 
(Third Edition, 2002) 353, 355, 358 (arguing that in giving the authority to provide licenses to a central 
body it can promote efficiency on the one hand, however on the other hand, if officials know that there is 
no other way to get a license the officials may be more likely to accept bribes). 
1459 World Bank, Strengthening Governance: Tackling Corruption--The World Bank Group's Updated 
Strategy and Implementation Plan 7 (Report, 6 March 2012) (reiterating its strategy on corruption and good 
governance and finding that “anti-corruption strategies without effective broader governance strategies are 
unlikely to succeed”). This updated strategy relies less on the notion of implementing a one-size-fits-all 
conditions and blanket deregulation, noting that, “a modest global [governance and anti-corruption] 
program based on the World Bank's role as convener, connector and generator of knowledge”, id. at 4; 
“[World] Bank clients demand services and borrow to fund their own priorities and to meet their own 
aspirations”, ibid. at 20. 
1460 Jan Wouters, et al., The International Legal Framework Against Corruption: Achievements and 
Challenges, 14 Melb. J. Int'l L. 205, 231 (2013) (listing other factors which enhance corruptive practices 
and rent-seeking which include sociological ones, such as strong family ties and ethnic diversity). 
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practice and more so, to deter misconduct related to the proceeds.1461 The Bank’s method 
in fighting corruption has thus become to focus on denying funding to those parties that 
are found to have engaged in sanctionable practices. 
 
The sanctions regime as it stands today is the product of continuous developments 
in international financial institutions. An initial beginning for the sanctions regime began 
in 1996, following James Wolfensohn’s famous “cancer of corruption” speech.1462 Also 
around that time, other multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), commenced policy 
work on corruption, including the initial development of the UN and OECD conventions 
on corruption. Wolfensohn encouraged the anticorruption scheme in many ways including 
leading to the development of cross-country data sources, background information for 
corruption indices, procurement systems and integrity mechanisms in general, 
nevertheless, it appears that country responsibility of these measures was not taken into 
account.1463 
The sanction process did not incorporate measures involving the governments that 
were supposed to control the funds, nor was it based on efforts to improve their criminal 
justice systems. The World Bank thus responded to cases of corruption in its projects as 
issues to be sanctioned and solved internally (through using its own system) instead of as 
a problem to be examined in the larger context of corruption in recipient governments.1464 
 
The World Bank assigned Dick Thornburgh, along with a group of experts, to  
assess its sanctions system in terms of efficiency, fairness, and transparency and to also 
make any recommendations needed. The assessment became known as the Thornburgh 
report and it significantly influenced the design of the sanctions regime, especially with in 
terms of fairness of procedures and the position of the sanctions-determining body vis-à-																																																								
1461 See, e.g., The World Bank's Sanctions System: Tackling Corruption Through a Two-Tier 
Administrative Sanctions Process, World Bank, http:// go.worldbank.org/EB6JXKU4Z0. 
1462 James Wolfensohn, People and Development (Speech delivered at the Annual Meeting of the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, 1 October 1996), available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/PUC5BB8060. 
1463 Tina Soreide et al., An Efficient Anticorruption Sanctions Regime? The Case of the World Bank 
(Working Paper, 2015) 
1464 Ibid.  
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vis investigations. The Report also aided to establish the protection of funds as the main 
purpose of the regime.1465 
 
The MDBs harmonization and furtherance of anticorruption 
After the Thornburgh Report and several internal reviews, the Bank began to further 
the sanctions regime by developing definitions, strategies, and procedures for imposing 
sanctions. 1466 This section explores the regime more in depth in order to examine the ways 
it can be improved and to develop criticisms on its functioning. 
 
In 2006, as a means to harmonize efforts of the MDBs against corruption and fraud, 
the five above mentioned MDBs, along with the International Monetary Fund and the 
European Investment Bank (EIB), formed the International Financial Institutions Anti-
Corruption Task Force (“the Task Force”). By publishing their recommendations and with 
each institution endorsing the document, it became an essential first step in unifying the 
MDB’s efforts against corruption. 1467  The document, the Uniform Framework for 
Preventing and Combating Fraud (“Uniform Framework”) harmonized definitions for 
sanctionable practices to be used by the participating financial institutions. It also contained 
a commitment to harmonize the investigative procedures and also explore whether 
debarment decisions from one institution should be recognized by the others. The Uniform 
Framework recognizes four sanctionable practices: corrupt practice, fraudulent practice, 
coercive practice, and collusive practice. Moreover, in addition to these four practices, each 
of ADB, IADB and WB also incorporate obstructive practice in their sanctions regime.1468  
These practices are defines as follows: 																																																								
1465 Dick Thornburgh et al., Report Concerning the Debarment Processes of the World Bank (2002). 
1466 Integrity Vice Presidency, The World Bank Group Integrity Vice Presidency Annual Update: Fiscal 
Year 2014, World Bank, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/01/20274019/world-bank-group-
integrity-vicepresidency- annual-update-fiscal-year-2014. 
1467 Uniform Framework for Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption [hereinafter Uniform 
Framework], available at http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/integrity/task.pdf.  
1468 See World Bank Sanctions Procedures (April 15, 2015) [hereinafter Sanctions Procedures], available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/WB_Sanctions_ Procedures_Jan_2011 
(with_July_2011_Amendments).pdf, the ‘Sanctions Practice’ definition, at 4; Asian Development Bank, 
Anticorruption and Integrity, Second Edition (October 2010) [hereinafter ADB Procedures], available at 
http:// www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Anticorruption-Integrity/anticorruption-integrity-
policystrategy.pdf, at 4; and Sanctions Procedures of the Inter-American 
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1. A corrupt practice “is the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, directly or 
indirectly, of anything of value to influence improperly the actions of another 
party.”1469 This is considered to occur irrespective of whether the illicit act was 
accepted or received or whether “the purpose of the payment was achieved.”1470 
The definition encompasses a prohibition of both active and passive bribery. 
“[T]he definition of corrupt practice is not limited to the prohibited activity 
during the procurement process but extends to bribery during the execution of 
the contract.”1471 Bribery may also be used as a means to incorporate lenient 
contractual clauses for enforcement or in relation to a number of other issues 
such as product quality or the use of subcontractors.1472 Prime examples of 
corrupt practice often include officials being bribed to be placed on the short 
list or providing information, often of a confidential nature, regarding the 
criteria for selection process.1473 This can occur when an individual or entity is 
granted a government contract financed by the World Bank and a bribe of some 
sort is offered to the government official who directed the contract to the 
individual or entity.1474 
 
2. A fraudulent practice “is any act or omission, including a misrepresentation, 
that knowingly or recklessly misleads, or attempts to mislead, a party to obtain 																																																								
Development Bank [hereinafter IADB Procedures], available at 
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsddocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=36233155, x2.2. Of note, the EBRD does not 
recognize ‘obstructive practice’ as a sanctionable practice on its own. Arguably, the four practices defined 
in the Uniform Framework concern wrongdoings in the context of an MDB operation, while ‘obstructive 
practice’ concerns actions in the course of proceedings carried out by an MDB in order to ascertain such 
wrongdoings. 
1469 World Bank, The World Bank's Anti-Corruption Guidelines and Sanctions Reform: A User's Guide, 
at 5 (Oct. 15, 2006), available at http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-
1173795340221/EnglishFinalAnti_CorruptionGuidelines5_05_08nd.pdf [hereinafter Anti-Corruption 
Guidelines]. 
1470Ibid. at 9 
1471 Sope Williams, The Debarment of Corrupt Contractors from World Bank-Financed Contracts, 36 Pub. 
Cont. L. J. 277, 287 (2007). 
1472Ibid.  
1473 Anti-Corruption Guidelines, supra note 1469, attachment P7(a); Press Release, 
World Bank, Statement: World Bank Group Discloses Debarments under Corporate Procurement Program, 
No.2009/198/EXC (Jan. 11, 2009), available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22030864~pagePK:64257043~ 
piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html. 
1474 Anti-Corruption Guidelines, supra note 1469, at 6. 
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a financial or other benefit or to avoid an obligation.” 1475  Generally, any 
material misrepresentation or omission of material information is classified as 
a fraudulent practice. A negligent or innocent misrepresentation or omission 
does not normally count as a violation.1476 The action must be done knowingly 
or in a manner that is “recklessly indifferent as to whether [the information] is 
true or false.”1477 An illustration of a fraudulent practice would occur when a 
firm or consultant has misrepresented their credentials or expertise in order to 
be selected for the procurement process.1478 This could include misrepresenting 
experience or facts in proposals or falsifying or forging documents in support 
of proposals.1479 More illustrations include “financial misrepresentations, the 
falsification of contract implementation information and accounting records, 
the tender of misleading bids, malicious frontloading of contract prices, 
overbilling, and the alteration of invoices or other supporting documents.”1480 
It also applies to “any document-based change designed to manipulate or alter 
procurement or contractual outcomes.” 1481  Suppressing information about 
material conflicts of interest could also qualify. 
 
																																																								
1475 Ibid.; see also see also Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Debars Four for Engaging in Fraud in 
Bank-Financed Projects, No. 2009/375/INT (June 2, 2009), available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,contentMDK:22198025~pagePK:64257043~pi
PK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html? cid=3001 (debarring an entity and its principle attempting to secure a 
contract due to submitting false bank references). 
1476 “To act, ‘knowingly or recklessly,’ the fraudulent actor must either know that the information or 
impression being conveyed is false, or be recklessly indifferent as to whether it is true or false. Mere 
inaccuracy in such information or impression, committed through simple negligence, is not enough to 
constitute a fraudulent practice.” Anti-Corruption Guidelines, supra note 1469, at 5, n.10. 
1477 Ibid. 
1478 Ibid. at 6-7. 
1479 See Press Release, World Bank, Croatia: World Bank Sanctions BIS Healthcare Group in a Health 
Reform Project (Nov. 22, 2004), available at http://go.worldbank.org/HKCFUV3NA1 (debarring a 
company and its principal for misrepresenting their experience and qualifications); Press Release, World 
Bank, World Bank Debars Firm, Individual For Fraudulent Practices Under Russian Federation 
Community Social Infrastructure Project, No: 2006/343/ECA (Mar. 30, 2006), available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,, 
contentMDK:20870134~menuPK:34463~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~ theSitePK:4607,00.html 
(debarring because of forging a manufacturer's letter of authorization and for misrepresenting information 
in corporate documents). 
1480 Williams, supra note 1471, at 287. 
1481 Ibid. ta 287-88. 
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3. A collusive practice “is an arrangement between two or more parties designed 
to achieve an improper purpose, including influencing improperly the actions 
of another party.”1482 Collusive practice is often found where an individual or 
entity works with other individuals or entities to manipulate the system to 
achieve an improper result. 1483  It also comprises of situations where an 
individual or entity works with others to direct a contract award to a particular 
individual or entity.1484 Hindering competition can be classified as collusive 
practice. Manipulating the requirements for a request for proposal so as to 
exclude others would be an example of collusion, as would situations where 
parties work in tandem to actively and maliciously impede others from having 
an opportunity to bid on a potential contract.1485 A collusive practice can be an 
arrangement among possible suppliers wherein they agree, before bids are 
submitted, on a price over and beyond what are competitive and decide who 
among their number will submit the winning bid, still artificially high, while 
the other suppliers submit extremely high bids (that have no chance of 
winning). 1486  In such a situation, the proceeds may be shared among the 
suppliers or possibly through a rotation system to facilitate the bids of other 
suppliers.1487 
 
4. A coercive practice “is impairing or harming, or threatening to impair or harm, 
directly or indirectly, any party or the property of the party to influence 
improperly the actions of a party.”1488 An example of a coercive practice is 																																																								
1482 Anti-Corruption Guidelines, supra note 1469, at 8. 
1483 Ibid, see Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Debars Seven Firms and One Individual for 
Collusive Practices Under Philippines Roads Project, No: 2009/200/INT (Jan. 14, 2009), available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/BKL6BASPQ0 [hereinafter Press Release 2009/200/INT] (sanctioning firms after 
it was determined that they “had participated in a collusive scheme designed to establish bid prices at 
artificial, non-competitive levels and to deprive the [World Bank] Borrower of the benefits of free and open 
competition”). 
1484 Anti-Corruption Guidelines, supra note 1469, at 8. 
1485 Ibid. 
1486 Williams, supra note 1471, at 287. 
1487 Ibid.; see Press Release, World Bank, Timor-Leste: World Bank Sanctions Companies in School 
Project (Nov. 22, 2004), available at http:// go.worldbank.org/QEQ0NUN3O0 (debarring companies for 
finding collusive practice to disburse various lots of furniture by deciding which company would have the 
lowest bid). 
1488 Anti-Corruption Guidelines, supra note 1469, at 7. 
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taking measures to thwart a competitor from submitting a timely bid. Also 
included is applying undue pressure on decision makers.1489 
 
5.  An obstructive practice “is (i) deliberately destroying, falsifying, altering or 
concealing of evidence material to the investigation or making false statements 
to investigators in order to materially impede a [World] Bank investigation into 
allegations of a corrupt, fraudulent, coercive or collusive practice; and/or 
threatening, harassing or intimidating any party to prevent it from disclosing its 
knowledge of matters relevant to the investigation or from pursuing the 
investigation, or any combination of the foregoing, or (ii) acts intended to 
materially impede the exercise of the [World] Bank's contractual rights of audit 
or access to information.”1490 One example is when an entity, that has been 
awarded a contract, fails to present documents when the World Bank has 
requested a review of the entity’s records.1491 
As can be noted, the prohibited practices are broadly defined and offer the MDBs 
with a wide margin to sanction individuals and entities. Furthermore, in addition to 
harmonizing the definitions of prohibited practices, the Uniform Framework also provided 
agreed upon minimum standards that each MDB must take to conduct investigations.  
  When corrupt practices have been uncovered, the MDBs may select from a variety 
of sanctions to impose on the individual or entity: 
1. Public Letter of Reprimand, which is issued to the sanctioned party.1492 
2. Debarment, “which means that the sanctioned party is barred, effective 
immediately, from participating in [World] Bank projects, either indefinitely or for 
a period of time.”1493 
3. Conditional Non-Debarment, which means that the sanctioned party is told that 
they will be debarred unless they comply with certain conditions, i.e., doing certain 
things to make sure that fraud and corruption does not happen again, such as putting 																																																								
1489 Ibid.  
1490 Ibid. 
1491 Ibid.  
1492 Ibid.  
1493 Ibid. 
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in place an ethics program, and/or making up for the damage caused by their 
actions, such as restitution.1494 
4. Debarment with Conditional Release, “which means that the sanctioned party is 
debarred until the specified conditions has been complied with.”1495 
5. Restitution, “which means paying back the ill-gotten gains to the government or to 
the victim of the fraud and corruption.”1496 
When deciding on the outcome of a case, one or more sanctions, including 
cumulative sanctions, may be imposed.1497 The sanctions may also be imposed on any 
affiliate of the one that is under proceedings.1498 Additionally, sanctions will also apply to 
any successors and assigns, as determined by the proceedings.1499 There are several factors 
that may be deliberated in the imposition of sanctions which include, among others: the 
severity of the misconduct; 1500  the magnitude of harm caused; 1501  inferring in the 
investigation of the alleged practices;1502  the past history of sanctionable conduct;1503 
mitigating circumstances such as cooperation in investigation; 1504  any breach of 
confidentiality of the sanctions proceedings.1505  In order to strengthen their efforts to 
combat corruption, the MDBs decided to sign the Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of 
Debarment Decisions (“Mutual Enforcement Agreement”). 1506   This significantly 
enhanced the sanctions regime that the MDBs would impose. Any entity found to have 																																																								
1494 Ibid. 
1495 Ibid. see Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Sanctions Lahmeyer International for Corrupt 
Activities in Bank-Financed Projects, No. 129/2007/INT (Nov. 6, 2006), available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/7DBYL7MON0 (convicting both Lahmeyer International GmbH and the recipient 
of a bribe but debarment sentence was to be reduced by four years if Lahmeyer International “puts in place 
a satisfactory corporate compliance and ethics program and cooperates fully ... in disclosing any past 
misconduct ....”). 
1496 Anti-Corruption Guidelines, supra note 1469, at 14. 
1497 Sanctions Procedures, supra note 1468, at § 9.902. This does not include when there is a violation of a 
Material Term of the VDP Terms and Conditions which leads to a mandatory ten year debarment. 
1498 Ibid. at § 9.904(b). 
1499 Ibid. at § 9.904(c). 
1500 Ibid. at § 9.902(a). 
1501 Ibid. at § 9.902(b). 
1502 Ibid. at § 9.902(c). 
1503 Ibid. at § 9.902(d). 
1504 Ibid. at § 9.902(e). 
1505 Ibid. at § 9.902(f) 
1506 Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions, 9 April 2010, available at http:// 
www.ebrd.com/downloads/integrity/Debar.pdf. The Agreement was signed by AfDB, 
ADB, EBRD, EIB, IADB, and WB. 
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engaged in any of the corrupt practices recognized by the MDBs which results in 
debarment will be enforced by the other participating MDBs.   
The Mutual Enforcement Agreement is founded on six core principles that are 
shared by its signatories as a pledge that their tasks are not to be compromised by corrupt 
behaviour: 
1. adoption of harmonized definitions of sanctionable (also known as prohibited) 
practices, which include (i) fraudulent practice, (ii) corrupt practice, (iii) 
coercive practice, and (iv) collusive practice,1507 as described above; 
2. adherence to uniform investigatory procedures that ensure fair, impartial and 
thorough investigations;1508 
3. instituting internal authorities responsible for the investigative function 
4. and a distinct decision-making authority;1509 
5. publication of written procedures that require (a) notice to entities and/or 
individuals against whom the allegations are made and (b) an opportunity for 
those entities and/or individuals to respond to the allegations;1510 
6. employ the use of the “more probable than not” standard in assessing sanctions 
violations;1511 and  
7. provide for a range of sanctions that are proportional and incorporate mitigating 
and aggravating factors.1512 
There are limitations to the Mutual Enforcement Agreement, however. For 
instance, only those debarment decisions that are made public 1513  by the sanctioning 
institution, that exceed one year,1514 and those decisions that were made within ten years 
of sanctionable behaviour are to be recognized across the signatories.1515  The Mutual 
Enforcement Agreement does not affect decisions made based on a national or international 
																																																								
1507 Ibid. at § 2(a). 
1508 Ibid. at § 2(b). 
1509 Ibid. at § 2(c)(i). 
1510 Ibid. at § 2(c)(ii). 
1511 Ibid. at § 2(c)(iii). 
1512 Ibid. at § 2(c)(iv). 
1513 Ibid. at § 4(b) 
1514 Ibid. at § 4(c). 
1515 Ibid. at § 4(e). 
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forum.1516 Moreover, if a MDBs decision is in conflict with another’s legal or institutional 
considerations, it may decline to enforce the decision.1517 Nevertheless, an opt-out decision 
of one MDB does not affect the obligations of the others. If in case a MDB decides this, it 
must promptly notify the others of its decision. Lastly, the Mutual Enforcement agreement 
does not prevent a MDB from conducting independent sanction proceedings which may 
result in “concurrent, consecutive or subsequent periods of debarment” for entities and 
individuals engaging in sanctionable practices.1518 
 
The MDBs took further steps to harmonize their efforts in 2012 as well. The first 
document, signed by the five MDBs, along with the EIB, was done in order to “harmonize 
their respective sanctioning guidelines, to ensure consistent treatment of individuals and 
firms.”1519 After reviewing certain aspects of the Mutual Enforcement Agreement, the 
document recognizes the sanctions discussed above that may be imposed singularly or in 
combination. In introducing the sanctions of conditional non-debarment and debarment 
with conditional release into the MDB harmonized regime, there was a strong incentive for 
entities and individuals to work on improving compliance measures. A further step to 
harmonization in the future may be for the MDBs to agree upon a set of integrity 
compliance measures or guidelines. In doing so, the MDBs may improve the likelihood of 
the application of rehabilitation measures among vendors/bidders and other entities.1520 
 
An additional feature of the document is that it raises interest is the identification 
of debarment for three years (with or without conditional release) as the base sanction.1521 
This was an important step in harmonizing the manner in which the MDBs apply their 
procedures. The document also provides a table that recognizes the possible increases or 
																																																								
1516 Ibid. at § 4(f). 
1517 Ibid. at § 6. 
1518 Ibid. at § 7. 
1519 General Principles and Guidelines for Sanctions, available at 
http://lnadbg4.adb.org/oai001p.nsf/0/CE3A1AB934F345F048257ACC002D8448/$FILE/Harmonized%20S
anctioning%20Guidelines.pdf 
1520 Lorenzo Nesti, The 2010 Agreement on Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions and its Impact 
for the Fight Against Fraud and Corruption in Public Procurement, 14 J. of Pub. Procurement 62, 70 
(2014). 
1521 General Principles and Guidelines for Sanctions, supra note 1519, ¶ 4. 
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decreases to the base sanction as a result of aggravating circumstances1522 or mitigating 
factors. 1523  Lastly, the document covers settlements, leaving the door open for the 
introduction of this important instrument also by other MDBs besides the WBG. While 
these General Principles and Guidelines for Sanctions are not to be considered prescriptive 
in all areas (such as with settlements), it is explicitly foreseen that the standards set out by 
them should be incorporated by each participating MDB in its sanctioning policies.1524 
 
The MDBs also collaborated on a second document that harmonized the principles 
for the treatment of corporate groups.1525 The Corporate Groups documents were set up to 
be a set principles “intended as guidance to the Institutions as they develop their own 
applicable policies and procedures.” 1526  It provides guidance on the application of 
sanctions to entities controlled by the accused party (also known as the Respondent).1527 
The document’s guidance explains how sanctions typically apply to entities controlling the 
Respondent or entities under the same control as the Respondent. However, in such a case, 
the participating MDB has the burden of proof of establishing the involvement of these 
entities in the prohibited practices. Furthermore, the harmonized principles provide 
guidance on how to apply a sanction to successors and assigns in cases of acquisitions, 
mergers or reorganizations. 1528  In regard to corporate groups in cross-debarment, the 
document establishes that only those entities identified by name by the MDB can be subject 
to cross-debarment. The harmonization for corporate groups is very important given it 
addresses various issues which liability of corporate conduct may pose. 																																																								
1522 Ibid.at ¶ 5. For example: the severity of the prohibited conduct, the harm caused by it, an interference 
with the investigation or obstruction of the investigative process, a past history of sanctions or the violation 
of a previous sanction or temporary suspension. 
1523Ibid. For example: a minor role of the sanctioned entity/individual in the prohibited conduct, a voluntary 
corrective action taken by the sanctioned entity/individual or the cooperation by the latter with the 
investigation. 
1524 Nesti, supra1520, at 71. 
1525 MDB Harmonized Principles on Treatment of Corporate Groups (Sept. 10, 2012), available at 
http://lnadbg4.adb.org/oai001p.nsf/0/A7912C61C52A85AD48257ACC002DB7EE/$FILE/MDB%20Harm
onized%20Principles%20on%20Treatment%20of%20Corporate%20Groups.pdf 
1526 Ibid. 
1527 Ibid. 
1528 Ibid. The Principles of Corporate Groups provide guidance on the means and procedures for the 
prevention of attempts to circumvent sanctions by the creation or acquisition of a new entity. The document 
also clarifies which factors should be considered in determining the type and severity of the sanction to be 
imposed on any Respondent or other entity subject to a sanction (different sanctions may be imposed to 
different entities within a corporate group). 
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Although the MDBs moved forward with major harmonization areas, there are 
more that can be addressed to further their efforts and unify their goals. As will be discussed 
below, the MDBs should consider harmonizing efforts in aiding local governments take on 
corruption challenges themselves. Transparency as well can be harmonized in terms of the 
amount of information that is made publicly available by the MDBs. 
 
Due process in the sanctions regime  
Exercising their legal power in a sanctions regime is a step towards MDBs 
practicing a procedure that is generally left to national systems. The World Bank has 
reiterated that the system is fundamentally administratively based.1529 Nevertheless, in 
examining the type of sanctioned practices that are regulated, the wide scope of the 
sanctions and the independence of the investigating system, and taking into consideration 
the types of national remedies it takes the place of, it appears that the MDB sanction regime 
can seem similar to criminal justice practices.1530 
 
At any rate, due process procedures are given substantial consideration by the 
MDBs in order to ensure fairness, regularity, and transparency. The Integrity Vice 
President (INT) at the World Bank is responsible for investigating alleged corrupt practice. 
The INT is not limited to the procurement process, as its jurisdiction can extend to other 
areas of the Bank’s practices.1531 In carrying out its duties, the INT must adhere to the 
institutional framework that is designed to ensure due process. For instance, the INT 
submits the evidence found to the Evaluation and Suspension Officer (EO) when then 																																																								
1529 Ann Marie Lory & Frank A. Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process and Its Recent 
Reforms 
(2012).  
1530 In a foreign bribery case, the Supreme Court of Norway concluded that no additional criminal sanctions 
should be imposed on the company given “the act had resulted in extensive reactions from the World 
Bank.” Considering the likelihood of further debarment from public procurement, the court decided to 
leave out corporate penalty since “viewed collectively [it] might have disproportionate consequences for 
the company.” see HR-2013-1394-A, case no. 2012/2114), Norconsult: http://www.domstol.no/en/Enkelt-
domstol/-Norges-Hoyesterett/Summary-of-Recent-Supreme-Court-Decisions/Summary-of-Supreme-Court-
Decisions-2013/. 
1531 Sanctions Procedures, supra note 1468, at pt. I, P (c) (noting the INT can investigate into investment 
projects, non-compliance with third party audit rights, and obstruction of corruption investigations). 
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determines “whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding” that the entity or 
individual has engaged in a sanctionable practice and whether to continue the adjudicatory 
process.1532 This can be seen as functioning as a checks and balances, not one unit is given 
authority to make such decisions.  Such due process measures are beneficial not only for 
creating legal certainty, but for safeguarding the sanctions process in general. Often times, 
the accused entity is debarred the moment the process begins when the EO issues a 
notification that there is an adjudicatory process to go underway.1533 There is also an 
opportunity for the accused to reach a settlement in which the accused and INT agree about 
the charge, the sanction, and what is to be publicized, in exchange for information, 
implementing a strong compliance system, and supervising the supplier’s operations.1534 
 
The sanctions regime also enables the accused to appeal a decision by the INT to 
the Sanctions Board – which embodies the second step of the adjudicatory process.1535 The 
Sanctions Board is made up of three members of the World Bank staff and four external 
members.1536 The Board functions as a sort of appeals court – as a means to maintain due 
process through the sanctions procedure. The sanctions regime overall applies a low 
standard of evidence, “more likely than not” when determining guilt.1537 Accordingly, it 
entails a weak presumption of innocence.  In considering this, the regime can be likened to 
procurement law debarment regimes maintained by state administrations, where suspected 
crime (and not conviction) in many cases will prove a satisfactory basis for determining a 
supplier ineligible to participate in a tender. 
 
Additional formal rules of evidence do not apply in these proceedings.1538 “Any 
kind of evidence may form the basis of arguments presented in a sanctions proceeding.”1539 																																																								
1532 Ibid. § 9(1). 
1533 Ibid. § 9(6). 
1534 Ibid. § 11. 
1535 Ibid. § 8. 
1536 Int'l Bank for Reconstruction & Dev. & Int'l Dev. Ass'n Int'l Fin. Corp. and Multilateral Ins. Guarantee 
Agency, Sanctions Board Statute, art. V (Dec. 2006), available at 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/anticorruption.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Sanctions_Statute/ 
$FILE/Sanctions_Statute.pdf. 
1537 Sanctions Procedures, supra note 1468, at § 8. 
1538 Ibid. art. VII. 
1539 Ibid.  
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In addition, “[h]earsay evidence or documentary evidence shall be given the weight 
deemed appropriate.” 1540  Purpose, intent, and knowledge may be inferred from 
circumstantial evidence. “A party's refusal to answer, or failure to answer truthfully or 
credibly, may be construed against that party.”1541 Communications subject to the attorney-
client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine are protected and not subject to 
disclosure. The sanctioned party's identity and sanctions imposed are publicly 
disclosed.1542 Information acquired from the sanctions proceedings may be provided to 
governmental authorities, international organizations, or other development banks. 
Disclosure can also transpire before the determination of culpability of an individual or 
entity. Prior notice of disclosure is also not required, nor is there a means of precluding 
such disclosures. Limitations on disclosures to governments or international organizations 
may be imposed if “there is a reasonable basis that revealing the information might 
endanger the life, health, safety, or well-being of a person” or violate an understanding 
associated with the Voluntary Disclosure Program (VDP).1543 
 
The World Bank’s Legal Vice Presidency (LEG) continues to try and make the 
sanctions regime more efficient and effective, and also to try and increase transparency and 
fairness. At the moment, sanctions are made open to the public to some extent. While those 
entities that are debarred are officially blacklisted, little is known about the negotiated 
settlements that occur or even the conditional non-debarment sanctions. Although the Bank 
exhibits levels of transparency above what other international financial institutions or 
organizations, LEG examines how to enhance transparency even more.1544 This is also tied 
to LEG increasing due process procedures because it has recognized the increasing 
sophistication and quasi-judicial nature of the regime.1545 As such, it would be welcomed 
to have continued efforts to increase transparency of the system. 																																																								
1540 Ibid. 
1541 Ibid. 
1542 Ibid. art. X. 
1543 Ibid. THE VDP is a system that allows an individual or entity to undergo remedial action by coming 
forth regarding conduct that (1) may be an obstacle to obtaining opportunities at the World Bank or (2) that 
may lead to the composition of sanctions for projects currently underway. 
1544 See generally Conrad Daly & Frank Fariello, Transforming Through Transparency: Opening up the 
Bank's Sanctions Regime, 4 World Bank Legal Rev. 101, 101-21 (2012) (examining the development and 
“opening up” of the World Bank's sanctions regime to bolster greater transparency and accountability). 
1545 See, e.g., id. at 19 (commenting on the Bank's care and attention to due process and the rule of law).  
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The World Bank and MDBs should harmonize efforts to build up local governments 
There is no doubt that the MDBs are continuously working to the aim of combating 
corruption and that the forerunner of them all is the World Bank. As noted earlier, the 
Sanctions Procedures lays out the Bank’s fiduciary duty, the legal basis for the sanctions 
regime, stating that its purpose is to protect Bank’s funds and to work as “a deterrent upon 
those who might otherwise engage in the misuse of the proceeds of Bank financing.”1546 
However, in analysing the sanctions regime it is clear that there is still a lot left to do. 
 
In abiding by its fiduciary duty, the bank must ensure stronger safeguards against 
itself. That is, it must implement due diligence for itself if it is to succeed in the fight against 
corruption. The Bank loans billions of dollars to development projects a year which falls 
into corrupt hands.1547 In light of this statistic, the preventative advice that the World Bank 
extends to developing countries is not very effective. Though the World Bank notes that it 
has “helped build precautions ... against corruption” into various high-risk projects, these 
precautions came in the form of advice, not due diligence on its own part.1548This is not to 
say that the Bank has not helped some governments in uncovering and preventing corrupt 
practices,1549 but the advice provided by the Bank is only given on a limited basis. Between 
the years 2009 to 2011, the Bank only offered advice to governments regarding integrity-
compliance about thirty times. 1550  The infrequency the Bank offers advice may be a 
																																																								
1546 Sanctions Procedures, supra note 1468, at § 1. 
1547 See World Bank, Stolen Assets and Development, http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/star_site/stolen-
assets.html (providing a conservative estimate that between $20 to $20 billion is stolen from developing 
countries each year, which comprises about 20 to 40 percent of annual international development 
assistance). 
1548 The World Bank Group Integrity Vice Presidency, Annual Report: Finding the Right Balance 12 
(2012), available at http:// 
siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDOII/Resources/WBG_IntegrityReport2012.pdf. The World Bank uses 
the word “advice” to describe the precautions that it took against corruption in high-risk projects. Id. While 
it instructed borrowing countries about performing due diligence, it does not indicate that it performed due 
diligence itself. Id. at 24. 
1549 See Ibid. at 22 (conveying how the World Bank's advice has thwarted corruption in developmental 
projects). 
1550 Between 2009 and 2011, the World Bank Group Integrity Vice Presidency made 129 recommendations 
in total, only 23 percent of which it directed toward borrowing countries. Id. at 24. 
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realization that simply discussing anticorruption to corrupt governments does little to fight 
it: 
There is something of an ‘Alice in Wonderland’ quality to the idea that a foreign-
aid agency can provide money to a corrupt foreign government for the express 
purpose of reducing corruption and then expect the objective to be attained. Corrupt 
governments have zero incentive to reform their ways when provided with huge 
amounts of foreign cash. More likely, they will just steal the cash.1551 
 
Yet, there is a slight conflict of interest found within the system also. Could it be 
that there is not a strong enough inclination to fight corruption with the governments given 
success and promotions are dependent on the amount of loans that are approved, not the 
number of projects that go under investigation.1552 There is a direct problem with an 
anticorruption mission when interest can still be earned or accelerated payment can occur 
on a loan with stolen funds.1553 When viewing the picture as a whole, internal incentives 
such as these may help explain they the Bank offers more advice to governments rather 
than setting up due diligence for itself. This could lead the Bank to becoming a greater 
contributor rather than a fighter of corruption.1554 The World Bank, as the provider of the 
																																																								
1551  Frank Vogl, Waging War on Corruption: Inside the Movement Fighting The Abuse of Power 213 
(2012). 
1552 See ibid. at 216; see, e.g., Hearing before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 2, at 2 (“The 
‘pressure to lend’ creates a bias in favor of quantitative rather than qualitative results, and corrupt elements 
in client governments know this.”) (statement by Professor Jeffrey A. Winters). 
1553 Int'l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., General Conditions for Loans, at §§ 3.02(a), 7.06(a) (Mar. 12, 
2012) available at http:// 
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/Resources/IBRD_GC_English_12.pdf. 
1554 Vogl, supra note 1551, at 214 (highlighting that the World Bank “has often been more a part of the 
problem than a contributor to the solution”); Combating Corruption in the Multilateral Development Banks: 
Hearing before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing 
before the Comm. on Foreign Relations] (statement by Professor Jeffrey A. Winters, Professor of Political 
Sci., Northwestern Univ.) (“Under international law, the Articles of Agreement explicitly require the World 
Bank to make arrangements to ensure that the funds it lends or guarantees are used for their intended 
purpose. For decades it did not do this, despite extensive knowledge that loan funds were being 
systematically stolen.”); lberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign 
Aid? 5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7108, 1999), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7108.pdf (arguing that developmental loans often aid in increasing 
corruption). 
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funds, should “have the ... responsibility to follow the money and to ensure that the money 
serves the purposes for which it is disbursed.”1555 
Lack of due diligence has converted the World Bank into a passive participant to 
the corrupt and illicit flow of cash.1556 The lending practices of the Bank create a systemic 
risk within the financial sector, along with the anticorruption regime:  
 
[T]he major governments have come to appreciate that illicit financial flows are on 
such a scale that they threaten the stability of the global financial system and that, 
as a result, there are profound systemic reasons ... for a larger assault on all those 
institutions ... that support the global money-laundering business.1557 
 
Even more so, there are those who believe “there is bound to come a time when a 
[U.S.] congressional committee investigates the World Bank's anticorruption record and 
finds that the World Bank's continued trust in governments that are highly corrupt has led 
to the waste of vast amounts of cash.”1558 The way loans are handled goes beyond a breach 
of the Bank’s fiduciary duties, the loans can be seen as criminal in two senses--first because 
it [is] a crime to allow the development funds to be stolen, and second because it is an 
injustice to expect poor populations ... that never received these funds to ... repay 100% of 
the loans plus interest.”1559 
 
In addition to the lack of due diligence when it comes to funds, it can be argued that 
when the Bank does in fact engage in anticorruption sanction procedures, it is going after 
the wrong offender. The Bank targets suppliers on government contracts, but the question 
																																																								
1555 Paul A. Volcker et al., Independent Panel Review of the World Bank Group: Department of 
Institutional Integrity 10 (2007), available at http:// 
siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/Volcker_Report_Sept._12,_for_ website_FINAL.pdf. The 
panel also noted that “[a] lack of common purpose, distrust, and uncertainty has enveloped the anti-
corruption work of the Bank.” Id. at 9. But see Transparency International, Press Release, Hugette Labelle, 
Chair of Transparency International (June 26, 2014) (“the World Bank’s sanction process is critical to 
eradicate fraud, corruption and collusion from the projects it finances.”)  
1556 Vogl, supra note 1551, at 234. 
1557 Ibid. 
1558 Ibid. 
1559 Hearing before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 1552, at 1 (adding that the World Bank has 
a “‘don't ask, don't tell’ policy regarding criminal debt”). 
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is whether these private actors are really the most responsible in the scheme of corrupt 
practices, or should the target actually be the local government and law enforcement. There 
are obvious setbacks that would make it difficult to switch the anticorruption regime to 
focus on the corrupt governments themselves. First, government officials, when involved 
in a crime, are likely to prevent any investigation that would jeopardize their position and 
put their assets at risk.1560 Yet, the likelihood of encountering an influential government 
official is not the not great.1561 The Bank, however, acts as if it cannot rely on the local law 
enforcement in general; instead it conducts its own initiatives in all cases of alleged 
violations.  Nonetheless, when looking at the primary goal of safeguarding development 
funds, it seems inconsistent to hold suppliers responsible and not focus on the governments 
that are put in charge of distributing the funds appropriately and efficiently. It cannot be 
argued that funds are more protected by holding only suppliers accountable when decisions 
about the proceeds come from the government representatives. By only looking to 
suppliers, government representatives can simply turn to another supplier when one is 
debarred from the procurement process. 
 
The issue with a sanctions regime is that it is supplier-focused in its fight against 
corruption and it is the doubt attitude toward corruption among suppliers that does not 
automatically prevent government representatives from conducting bribes. In fact, the 
profit the can be obtained for those involved and bribes for the corrupt decision makers 
may even rise if suppliers are debarred from a certain market.1562 Also, given local law 
enforcement is not as robust, and even with the MDBs sanctions regime, the chance of 
being cause in corruption remains low. Thus, regardless of any deterrent effects the 
sanctions regime may invoke, corrupt governments may continue to have a steady supply 
of entities willing to partake in corrupt deals.1563 In the end, a decline in the number of 
firms willing to offer bribes may simply imply greater paybacks for those firms that are 
still involved in corrupt schemes, and the problem is not really addressed if the regime only 
																																																								
1560 Soreide, supra note 1463, at 11. 
1561 Ibid. (finding that more often the perpetrators are not influential enough to prevent an investigation). 
1562 For an explanation of how bribes depend on shifts in the supply and demand functions, see Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy Academic Press, (1978). 
1563 Soreide, supra note 1463, at 13. 
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looks to the suppliers.1564 The regime cannot be seen as efficient in diminishing corruption 
if government representatives cannot be reached. To that end, it can seem that the MDBs 
sanctions regime targets the wrong offenders, or at least does not target all the offenders 
necessary to truly prevent corruption of funds. 
 
Regardless, MDBs should keep funding projects even in countries with high level 
of corruption, since the poorest people in the world are often the ones that live in those 
countries where corruption is indeed a serious issue for the whole society. In doing so, 
measures such as country assistance programs should try to be implemented. Such 
programs can focus on governance and anticorruption problems as a means to ensure the 
recipient country’s compliance with anticorruption protocols. A monitoring mechanism 
could also aid to ensure that the funds are in fact being used for the purposes they were 
intended for. Remedial measures could also go hand-in-hand in the case misallocation or 
abuse of funds is found to have occurred.  
 
Despite the inherent weakness of domestic regimes, it is critical for them to gain 
trust in their respective societies so as to be able to function properly. The World Bank 
cannot trust organizations that are not reliable. Yet, by refusing to trust any domestic courts 
– and announcing that they are not to be trusted – the Bank’s sanctions regime underlines 
a public belief that domestic institutions lack the capacity to enforce the laws of their 
countries. In doing so, the Bank aids in pushing both private parties and public officials 
toward alternative and informal strategies, such as bribery and corruption, to handle their 
issues.1565 It is this behavior that undermines the very issue that the sanctions regime is to 
combat. The MDBs must understand that there is a need to collaborate with local 
enforcement in order to achieve their goals. Although internal procedures should 
incorporate more due diligence, the organizations should also pursue alternative outlets for 
demanding systems with working integrity in countries where its funds go to support 
development projects. Currently, when an offence has been committed, INT does work 																																																								
1564 For an analysis of the market consequences of competition between firms encountering sanctions as a 
consequence of uncovered corruption see Kjetil Bjorvatn and Tina Søreide. Corruption and Competition for 
Natural Resources, 21(6). Int’l Tax & Pub. Fin.  997-1011 (2014) 
1565 Soreide, supra note 1463. 
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with law enforcement institutions on a national level. In its collaboration, INT encourages 
the national institutions to investigate and prosecute those involved in offences and may be 
out of reach for the World Bank, which may include government officials. INT 
representatives could potentially extend this collaboration by serving as advisers during 
cases. The effort would create a stronger force against corruption in aiding the local 
governments to act independently and honestly, and protect the funds as they are supposed. 
 
Conclusion 
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank play a critical role in 
promoting stability and combating financial crimes. Despite the criticisms these 
international financial institutions receive, the world is dependent on them for their 
resources, expertise, and capacity to address the issues of global financial crimes. It is not 
enough for countries to be isolated in their means to combat these crimes. A transnational 
world where crimes are committed in various areas that transcend borders requires greater 
tools in order to maintain safety and stability of the world market. Accordingly, this 
foregoing review of the literature creates huge responsibility for the IFIs in combating 
financial crimes and promoting stability. In this means, the IFIs can turn to mechanisms 
not currently used as policy tools, such as conditions, in order to ensure countries are 
implementing international standards against financial crimes. Additionally, the IFIs 
should turn to tools already in use to continue their goals but to expand their use or better 
them in order to accomplish the aims they have sought out to achieve.  
 
The MDBs have a challenging mandate – they must provide financial support to 
developing countries, particularly with regard to those with rampant corruption, while at 
the same time attempting to safeguard the efficient use of those funds when they are no 
longer in control by the MDBs. The sanctions regime is a great step towards fighting 
corruption. It must be examined with regard to the MDBs’ need to maintain confidence in 
donor government and also offer financial aid to those countries that are unable to fight 
fraud and corruption on their own. As a strategy to handle their obligations, the MDBs have 
harmonized on the sanctions regime, focusing on suppliers of government contracts while 
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providing a quasi-judicial system with due process measures to respect the rights of those 
involved.  However, the efficiency and overall goals the MDBs wish to achieve require a 
hard look into how this system is actually attacking the problem of corruption. Greater 
internal measures along with transparency are needed to ensure due diligence and that the 
MDBs are doing their part, not just on the sanctions side. More can be done, implemented 
and harmonized in order to further the fight against corruption. It was noted that the World 
Bank Legal Vice Presidency, which oversees the sanctions system, has demonstrated 
attention in comprehending the root causes of corruption in order to better assess the 
Bank’s anticorruption initiatives. An exhaustive review of the system, taking into 
consideration all sides, is likely to disclose that the current design of the sanctions regime 
is not founded upon an understanding of essential causes of corruption, and that the calls 
for debates about the regime’s functionality are warranted. 
 
The MDBs must be aware that they cannot bypass local governments when it comes 
to corruption. It is as if they are condoning turning a blind eye to the matter knowing that 
continuously, year by year, funds are taken for corrupt ends. Rather than focusing sanction 
efforts only on suppliers, which has its drawbacks as was discussed above, the MDBs can 
harmonize their efforts and sanction governments that fail to investigate and prosecute 
government officials who are guilty of corruption, along with the suppliers. Collaboration 
efforts between the MDBs and the local officials may be needed due to the lack of structure 
and trust in the systems, however, the results would send a strong message of the 
seriousness and determination to end corruption. The MDBs could also implement the 
notion of “ex post conditionality” on governance by rewarding good performance with 
greater financial support or greater freedom in spending.1566 Third party monitors could 
also be employed to manage funds to ensure their allocation adheres to their intended 
purposes.1567  While these options may seem difficult or beyond the scope of a mandate, it 
is important to recall that the World Bank, in embarking on its role into corruption, realized 																																																								
1566 Paul Collier, Learning from Failure: The International Financial Institutions as Agencies of Restraint in 
Africa, in The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies 313–32 (Andreas 
Schedler et al. eds., 1999). 
1567 Eirik G. Jansen, “Don’t Rock the Boat”: Norway’s Difficulties in Dealing with Corruption in 
Development Aid, in Corruption, Grabbing and Development: Real World Challenges 186–95 (Tina 
Søreide & Aled Williams eds., 2014). 
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the need to look deeper into its mandate and that corruption is not just a political concern. 
It is indeed a cancer that can continue to harm those that are most vulnerable in the world. 
Local judicial and law enforcement institutions must be monitored, as well as the funds. 
They must build trust and serve their intended purposes if there is truly to be a solution to 
corruption.  																													
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION  
 
Introduction 
            In evaluating the role of the International Financial Institutions in promoting 
stability and examining the various financial crimes that are rampant in the financial 
system, along with the mechanisms in place in trying to combat them, there are some 
general issues that need to be addressed in order to ensure financial stability.1568 Primarily, 
regulatory, reforms and enforcement issues continue to need to be revised and re-examined.  
 
More regulation and supervision is needed for financial stability 	
The objectives of financial regulation determine the environment of the financial 
system.1569 It is understandable that financial regulators have a tough job to complete. The 
process of regulation is multifaceted and involves deliberation of conflicting goals, 
interests of various entities such as governments, financial regulators, regulated institutions 
and their clients, and all these stakeholders that do not have the same priorities. 1570 
However, the primary goals that should be in forefront of regulators are: achieving and 
maintaining financial system stability and confidence in the financial system (goal set at a 
macro level), providing a safe and sound operation of financial intermediaries (goal set at 
micro level) and the protection of users of financial services.  
 
Currently, the global market has created an effect of “regulatory arbitrage” allowing 
financial institutions to choose the financial system and the regulatory regime that suits 
their needs the best.1571 Being able to choose of course creates competition among financial 																																																								
1568 Global Economic Stability Report Potent Policies for Successful Normalization, xiii (Int’l Monetary 
Fund, April 2016) available at https://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2016/01/pdf/text_v2.pdf 
(finding that overall stability risks have increased since 2015). 
1569 Ajan V. Thakor, The design of financial systems: An overview, 20 J. OF BANKING AND FINANCE 917, 
917-918 (1996). 
1570 Carol Sergeant, Risk-based regulation in the Financial Services Authority, 10:4 Journal of Financial 
Regulation and Compliance 329, 330 (2002). 
1571 Gerald Hertig, Regulatory competition for EU financial services, 2 Journal of International Economic 
Law, 349, 365 (2000). 
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regulators and can encourage innovations and strengthen the role of market mechanism. 
However, it also leads to competitive de-regulation, weakening the control and causing 
reluctance to implement appropriate sound measures.1572As a means to combat this laxity 
and competitive deregulation, international financial institutions have stepped up to set 
standards and principals that are supposed to be met throughout the global market. 
Nevertheless, there is still a decentralized system for financial regulation, although there is 
more of an effort for countries to provide a united front with common goals of financial 
stability.  
 
The lacking of a central regulator may be the issue that is preventing the global 
market from fully achieving financial stability and soundness and gaining the confidence 
that goes along with these goals. As it has been discussed, financial crimes have an even 
more global aspect to them. Money laundering techniques have turned into terrorist 
financing activities, cyber-crimes are present as our world becomes more connected, and 
insider dealing is alive and well throughout the international markets. Moreover, the lack 
of uniform definitions means that countries are simply able to define and regulate as they 
see fit. This prevents international unity and means that one person may be able to escape 
scrutiny under one definition while another may not. 
 
The role of International financial institutions mainly the World Bank and the 
International Monitory Fund (IMF) in promoting stability by combating fraud and insider 
dealing, has been examined in the second chapter which concluded that, neither the United 
States nor the United Kingdom provides perfect examples of insider dealing regulation, 
The U.S. has become a model for many other countries in developing their laws and 
enforcement regimes against insider dealing, considering the U.S. has the most 
prosecutions for the crime.1573 However, the U.S. regime has also been argued to be 
“inconsistent and erratic . . . regulation that ill serves the investing public.”1574  This in turn 
																																																								
1572 Caroline Bradley, Competitive deregulation of financial services activity in Europe after 1992, 11 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 545, 554-556 (1997). 
1573 Ibid. 
1574 Marc I. Steinberg, Insider Trading – A Comparative Perspective, IMF 1, 16 (2002), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/steinb.pdf (observing that while the United States 
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can seem as though the United States’ laws are not sufficient to protect investors and 
market integrity like other markets.1575  Nevertheless, the crucial factor is enforcement of 
its laws. While other countries may have wider nets that encompass greater factors for 
insider dealing, the United States is the country that manages to enforce the most, providing 
remedies for the breaches. Statutes and insider dealing regimes will only ever be as 
effective as they can be enforced regularly and bring results. 
 
However, much like any other regulatory body that needs to cover and monitor 
numerous institutions, a network could be implemented in order to carry out the regulator’s 
mandate. The important aspect would be common definitions, sanctions, and other aspects 
of the regulatory system. Further reform of the financial system would require a global, 
integrated approach, not only in terms of harmonization of the rules on banks, but also 
harmonization of supervision. In turn, this would aid tremendously in financial system 
stability and combat financial crimes that diminish confidence and economic efficiency.  
 
Formulation of sound practices 	
Given that there is no super-international regulatory body, and no plan of one 
occurring in the near future, the international community must come together to fully 
support a consensus on sound macroeconomic and structural policies. These policies of 
course will fall on national governments to ensure proper implementation and to absorb 
the risks involved when they fail to do so. The International Monetary Fund already has 
crafted indicators for measuring financial stability, but more needs to be done regarding 
practices and principles in a regulatory scheme.1576 Without more of a focus on sound 
policies, market chaos may occur, financial conditions will tighten thereby erode 
confidence. International and national policymakers must work together to develop a more 
resilient path for growth and stability, while finding a means to protect the market from the 
devastating effects of financial crimes.  																																																								
has strong enforcement of their insider trading laws, the laws are still not the most effective and concise 
application). 
1575Ibid. at 26. 
1576 Int’l Monetary Fund, Financial Soundness Indicators, http://data.imf.org/?sk=9F855EAE-C765-405E-
9C9A-A9DC2C1FEE47. 
	 263	
 
In coming to an agreement on strict policies and practices, not simply 
recommendation, governments can be depended on provide stable environments to 
encourage economic growth and combat financial crimes. However, international financial 
institutions would still have an integral role in creating and enhancing financial stability as 
examined in chapter 8. The IFIs should support and encourage the implementation of best 
practices throughout the global market. They can assist in national efforts to minimize the 
macroeconomic inequities and eradicate the structural distortions that are at the root of 
financial instability. Moreover, by encouraging the improvement of the quality and 
comparability of the information that is currently made available, and encouraging and 
supporting additional dissemination of data, they can improve the capacity of stakeholders 
to monitor progress and provide the incentives and discipline that will bolster the 
robustness of financial systems. 	
Better data on financial crimes is needed in order to promote financial stability 
 
Regulatory measures even if not done by international regulatory body, can and 
should aid in increasing information and implement requirements to provide more 
information on financial crimes regularly. Asymmetrical information creates a moral 
hazard when it comes to financial crimes and governments should be incentivized to try 
and reduce this problem. Accordingly, laws should be enforced to compel firms to maintain 
internal controls that help to supervise and monitor their conduct. Monitoring provides a 
means to engage in information production through audits to strengthen and certify what 
is going on. Solving the lack of information would help improve results for stability and 
soundness, providing better measurement of criminal activity and suspicious activity, and 
also providing insight into the costs and benefits. When more information is gathered, 
regulations and monitoring can be adjusted to catch the criminals and also increase the 
costs of the crime, ensuring a greater likelihood of penalties being incurred. 
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Financial crimes involve a spectrum of activities and financial instruments which 
are difficult to detect making meaningful estimates and difficult to collect. The gravity of 
these crimes requires more and better data. Although macroeconomic data can provide 
suggestions of both direct and indirect influences on financial crimes, the addition of 
indirect influences creates doubt as to what exactly is being measured. Conversely, a micro-
based approach necessitates the creation of copious amounts of data primarily for 
measurement purposes. As such, measures of this data need to be taken as much as possible 
on both macro and micro levels in order to gain critical information to bulk up regulatory 
measures.  
 
Risk-based approach could be taken to tackle financial crimes as a means to 
promote financial stability 	
Supervisors should adopt a risk-based approach to supervising the financial 
industry’s risk management. This kind of approach requires that supervisors: i) gain a 
comprehensive understanding of the risks that exist in the jurisdiction and their potential 
impact on the supervised entities; ii) assess the sufficiency of the system‘s risk assessment 
based on the jurisdiction‘s national risk assessment; iii) evaluate the risks present in the 
target supervised entity to understand the nature and extent of the risks in the entity‘s 
customer base, products and services and the geographical locations in which the bank and 
its customers do business; iv) evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness in implementation 
of the controls designed in achieving obligations and risk mitigation; and v) utilize this 
information to allocate the resources, scope the review, identify the necessary supervisory 
expertise and experience needed to conduct an effective review and allocate these resources 
relative to the identified risks. Supervisors have a duty to ensure their banks maintain sound 
financial crime risk management to protect their own safety and soundness and also to 
protect the integrity of the financial system as a whole.1577 
 
																																																								
1577 BIS. Sound management of risks related to money laundering and financing of terrorism. Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision - Consultative Document. June 2013. Available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs252.pdf. 
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The risk-based approach system is a method that can help rank supervision 
activities, adopted by regulatory agencies in various countries, and intended to encourage 
an efficient relationship between the use of available resources and materials with the 
accomplishment of goals enacted. As a result, the system is composed of the following 
stages: (i) identifying the risks to which the market at hand is exposed; (ii) sizing such risks 
and sorting them according to potential damage levels; (iii) deciding how to mitigate the 
risks found and sized; and (iv) controlling and monitoring risk events. The risk-based 
approach’s main characterization is to sort out the risks found. The risks are separated 
depending on their likelihood of occurring, and according to the potential impact caused in 
the event they do occur. 1578  This approach is suggested as a means to increase the 
effectiveness of information provided by financial institutions. This method can also help 
promote efficiency in supervisors by guaranteeing institutional procedures and controls are 
reliable and appropriate to their risk levels.1579  Financial system stability is critical to both 
national and international economic efficiency. Financial crimes can implicate the 
soundness of the financial system and increase the volatility of capital flows, creating wide 
inefficiencies. Financial crimes can take many forms, but their reach is growing every year, 
spanning the globe and causing effects throughout the markets. This wide reach of financial 
crimes also causes alterations in how resources can be used and how wealth gets 
distributed. These effects are clearly hard and costly to detect and prevent, but more efforts 
must be taken to get a better handle on these issues.  
 
Financial crimes are far from being victimless crimes. These crimes jeopardize the 
integrity of financial institutions while criminals seek to increase their illegal profits to 
enjoy that “champagne lifestyle”1580 or to carry out atrocities for terrorist aims.1581 The 
crimes discussed herein significantly weaken the financial systems, which are primary 																																																								
1578 Mauro Salvo, Money Laundering as a Threat to Financial Stability: a risk-based approach 16 (2014). 
1579 Ibid. 
1580 N. Ryder, Financial Crime in the 21st Century, (Ed. Edward Elgar 2011).  
1581 Jimmy Gurulé, Unfunding Terror: The Legal Response to the Financing of Global Terrorism 3 (2008); 
Nat'l Comm'n on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 169-72 (2004) 
[hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://www.9-
11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf; see also Nick Ridley, Terrorist Financing: The Failure of Counter 
Measures 1-2 (2012) (“[E]fforts against terrorist financing tend to be focused on assessing and calculating 
individual operational costs, and the significance of auxiliary support or infrastructure is not yet fully 
apparent to organizations and agencies engaged in counter terrorism”). 
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players in the global markets when it comes to transactions as well as dictating the welfare 
of the global economy.1582 Financial instability resulting from financial crimes can also 
lead to national security issues given that these criminals are breaching laws and continuing 
to get away with their illicit aims.1583 To this end, the International Monetary Fund has 
even recognized that financial abuse:  
 
“…could compromise bank soundness with potentially large fiscal 
liabilities, lessen the ability to attract foreign investment, and increase 
volatility of international capital flows and exchange rates…financial 
system abuse, financial crime, and money laundering may also distort the 
allocation of resources and the distribution of wealth.1584 
 
 Financial crimes also have individual affects. Although these effect on individuals 
are much less then public and private sector losses, they nevertheless have a great effect on 
the individuals affected. Individuals can result in lessening the flow of funds in the financial 
system due to distrust and a lack of confidence. Naturally, a decrease in funds from 
individuals can add up when several feel the effects of financial crimes. The impact of 
financial crimes cannot be overstated. The measurement of these financial crimes is far 
from concrete. The figures cited by various institutions may or may not be just the tip of 
the iceberg. Accordingly, it is of the utmost importance that national and international 
regulatory systems, legislation, and standards that are in place effectively work to combat 
the commission of these crimes. This thesis has argued that greater regulation is needed 
rather than deregulation. Although many may feel regulations hinder financial competition, 
there are certain aims which must take priority. Financial stability is interconnected with 
some many aspects of national and international economic aspects. When financial crimes 
are continuously committed and a grasp cannot be had on them, this creates significant 
																																																								
1582 S. Vaithilingham & M. Nair, Factors affecting Money Laundering: Lesson for developing countries, 
10(3) J. of Money Laundering Control 352 (2008). 
1583 Ryder, supra  note 1580.  
1584 See International Monetary Fund, Financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and Money Laundering – 
Background Paper, (Int’l Monetary Fund, 12 Feb. 2001).  
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instability which can hinder growth and diminish confidence, and as it has been noted, this 
has poor effects, both on the macro and micro level. 
  
More international cooperation would also aid in hindering financial crimes. 
Currently there are many institutions that function to supervise, monitor and conduct 
assessments of financial stability. However, many of these organizations lack the rule of 
law to enforce their standards. Additionally, national governments can simply take the 
principles and standards to shape them to fit their financial system. The lack of cohesion 
and legal requirement creates little ability to formally enforce the rule of law across the 
board. Various definitions for the same financial crime have been created in different 
jurisdictions, leaving countries on uneven grounds for fighting them. This presents a 
problem for financial stability given that financial crimes are not being fought as a united 
force by the international community and also because of the risk of spill over from 
jurisdictions with weaker legal systems.  More data could also be required in order to more 
efficiently ward off financial crimes. Measures on how and what these crimes actually 
entail and hammering down more on what needs to be addressed would obviously ramp 
their efforts. The international financial institutions, which already carry out these types of 
measures and indicators, could begin applying more options to gather relevant data to aid 
in this process. Producing more sound practices and policies will ensure stability. Tips from 
Islamic banking could also aid in this in how they handle their financial system and the 
moral obligations behind the function they have. Although it has been seen that Islamic 
banking may not be the ideal alternative, it is more resilient to financial crimes and financial 
crises. More data on how certain aspects can be implemented into conventional financial 
system may strengthen. 
  
Resilient financial systems that are well regulated and well-supervised are essential 
for both domestic and international economic and financial stability. This is not an easy 
task and it takes efforts from all fronts of the problem. The goal to improve the financial 
system is an essential tool for global economic development. This can only be achieved 
with the help of all financial institutions, the government and citizens to ensure the system 
is not used or susceptible to financial crimes or harmful to competition, so as not to 
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deteriorate healthy financial relationships. Policy makers need to understand that financial 
stability and competition are not mutually exclusive. Both can be achieved when working 
as primary aims. However, financial crimes, in using illegal resources to infiltrate the 
financial system can destabilize domestic and international economy and their impacts may 
cross borders, given the global economy's interdependent character. Accordingly, more 
research needs to be done and greater efforts to try to make stronger, cohesive and far 
reaching regulations and policies must be undertaken. 
 
An important related initiative concerns the work of the IMF and the World Bank 
to encourage compliance with international standards and codes in the financial sector. As 
part of a broader initiative, the fund and the Bank have adopted several standers and codes 
that specify good practices that countries should observe in designing and implementing 
the institutional framework governing different aspects of the financial sector. While some 
of these standards were developed by the IMF and the World Bank, many others were 
developed by other international bodies with expertise in particular areas, including the 
Basel Committee’s Core Principles on Banking Supervision, the International Organization 
of Securities commission’s objectives for Securities Regulations, the International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors’ Insurance Supervisory Principles, the Committee on 
Payments and Settlement Systems, and financial Action Task Force’s Recommendations 
on in the area of Anti-money Laundering and Combating the Financing Terrorism. Other 
standards address such issues as the conduct of monetary and financial policy, corporate 
governance, accounting and auditing.  
 
 
The IMF and The World Bank assess members’ compliance with these standards 
and issue reports on their observance known as Reports on Observance of Standards and 
Codes or “ROSCs,” The purpose of the ROSC exercise is to identify in a member’s 
institutional framework areas that need to be strengthened.  As has been argued on Chapter 
6 that the risk to financial institutions of non- compliance with AML laws and regulations 
and reporting requirements currently appear to overweight any risks of civil liability. 
Global oversight has become an imperative to reduce the conflicts of interest that may 
	 269	
create profitable industries but not socially beneficial ones. Leaders of the world and 
organizations such as Basel Committee and FATF must work together to make mutually 
reinforcing structure in order to move into a compliance order that is taken seriously and 
yields the results needed.  FATCA, just one example of this new world of regulatory 
compliance obligation, is already imposing extraordinary administrative burdens on US 
institutions and foreign government and has been resulted on closing of accounts and the 
withdrawal of assets. Theses business challenges are foreseeable consequences of a new 
environment of openness made possible by technological capabilities and fueled by the 
fight against money laundering, terrorist financing and sanctions regimes and 
determination of the US to recoup the enormous revenues lost to tax evasion. 1585  
Therefore, as established on Chapter 6 the culture of compliance is significantly promoting 
financial stability and shield financial institutions from potential misconduct.        
 
Chapter 3 concluded that although difficult to measure, the magnitude of the sums 
involved and the extent of criminal activities that generate criminal income have 
implications for both the domestic and the international allocation of resources and 
microeconomic stability. Although, the IMF reports, there is currently no theoretical 
literature on the microeconomic effects of money laundering, indirect macro-based 
empirical research and related studies of crime and the underground economy, coupled 
with the pervasive role of money laundering in illegal activity, suggest that money 
laundering maybe sufficiently widespread to exert an independent impact on the macro 
economy.1586  Another contested issue in the ‘balancing act’ between the money laundering 
and financing terrorism counter measures  and the legal principles mainly the human rights 
has concluded that all relevant international initiatives have justified action against money 
laundering order to deprive perpetrators of serious offences (organized crime, terrorism) 
from their proceeds.         
 
																																																								
1585 International Financial Crimes Research Handbook, Edited by: Barry Rider p.515. (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited 2015)  
1586 Commission of European Communities, Second Commission Report to the European Parliament and 
the Council on the implementation of the Money Laundering Directive, COM (1998) final Brussels 
1.7.1998 p. 18.      
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Chapter 6 of this thesis established that the performance and growth of Islamic 
finance are backed by number of support from multilateral organizations and governments 
of developing countries, developing countries’ engagement with Islamic finance.  While 
useful for its ethical underpinnings, the provision of alternative sources of funding, 
contribution to the global financial system, political inclusion, and an adequacy for public 
infrastructure projects found in Islamic banking presents significant challenges. As 
institutions inexperience with Islamic finance look to the industry funding, they will face 
practical obstacles in acquiring expertise in the field as well as political challenges in 
quelling tainted perceptions of Islam in the current political economy. These present 
obstacles that have to be resolve with political will, institutional strength, and regulatory 
oversight for which non-Muslim developing countries without sufficient resources might 
be in adequately prepared. Furthermore, the research established that the performance of 
capital markets, the weekly returns on Islamic Equities portfolio (Sharia) outpace the 
portfolios of the overall European market and market without financial forms. However, 
when an economy experiences an upward growth trend, Sharia-compliant equities slightly 
underperform the market portfolio. Events show from 2007-2008 financial crisis suggests 
that the factors related to Islamic banks’ business model helped contain the adverse impact 
on profitability in 2008, while weaknesses in risk management practices in some Islamic 
banks led to larger decline in profitability compared to commercial banks in 2009. In 
particular, adherence to Shariah principles precluded Islamic banks from financing or 
investing on the kind of instruments that have adversely affected their conventional 
competitors and triggered the global financial crisis.1587 Thus far demonstrates that the 
financial crisis tested the resilience of Islamic finance, which lacks the risk frameworks of 
conventional banking for faster recovery. While Islamic Financial Institutions do appear to 
be slightly more resilient than conventional institutions, the delayed collapse of Dubai’s 
real estate market further exemplifies the fact that IFIs and the societies in which they 
operate are inextricably linked to the majority non-Islamic financial sector. 
 
																																																								
1587 Maher Hassan & Jemma Dridi, The effects of Global Crisis on Islamic and conventional Banks. A  
      Comparative Study. IMF working paper 2011. 
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The IMF and the World Bank’s role in promoting stability throughout their sanction 
regimes were discussed in chapter 8. This chapter explained that IFIs can turn to 
mechanisms not currently used as policy tools, such as conditions, in order to ensure 
countries are implementing international standards against financial crimes. Additionally, 
the IFIs should turn to tools already in use to continue their goals but to expand their use 
or better them in order to accomplish the aims they have sought out to achieve. The MDBs 
have a challenging mandate – they must provide financial support to developing countries, 
particularly with regard to those with rampant corruption, while at the same time 
attempting to safeguard the efficient use of those funds when they are no longer in control 
by the MDBs. The sanctions regime is a great step towards fighting corruption. It must be 
examined with regard to the MDBs’ need to maintain confidence in donor government and 
also offer financial aid to those countries that are unable to fight fraud and corruption on 
their own. As a strategy to handle their obligations, the MDBs have harmonized on the 
sanctions regime, focusing on suppliers of government contracts while providing a quasi-
judicial system with due process measures to respect the rights of those involved.  
However, the efficiency and overall goals the MDBs wish to achieve require a hard look 
into how this system is actually attacking the problem of corruption. Greater internal 
measures along with transparency are needed to ensure due diligence and that the MDBs 
are doing their part, not just on the sanctions side. More can be done, implemented and 
harmonized in order to further the fight against corruption. It was noted that the World 
Bank Legal Vice Presidency, which oversees the sanctions system, has demonstrated 
attention in comprehending the root causes of corruption in order to better assess the 
Bank’s anticorruption initiatives. An exhaustive review of the system, taking into 
consideration all sides, is likely to disclose that the current design of the sanctions regime 
is not founded upon an understanding of essential causes of corruption, and that the calls 
for debates about the regime’s functionality are warranted. 
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Finally, it is clear that at the cornerstone of our risk-based approach is the idea that 
we should focus our and industry’s resources where they will have most effect.  No 
regulator will end money laundering, fraud, cybercrime or insider dealing overnight. But 
effective anti-financial crime systems and controls in financial institutions can make it 
significantly harder for criminals to access the financial system, so there’s value working 
with IFIs to focus their efforts, by sharing assessment of the threats. I also believe the 
results will make us better at allocating our own resources, so regulation has a greater effect 
on tackling financial crime and promote stability.   
This research has also engaged in critical analysis for financial crimes, identifying 
what market and other mechanisms International financial institutions can play, 
realistically use to bring about a reduction in financial crime. If successful at this first stage, 
we expect to continue the project, developing concepts of measurement and their 
application so we can assess the scale and impact of financial crime using robust 
techniques.    
Financial criminal policy making should be evidence-based. A key to delivering 
this is the unique skills and viewpoint of the academic community, which is why we have 
sought to engage with them on this project. The key to delivering market stability in the 
face of increasing financial crime is an understanding of the risks, and transparent 
communication of these risks. The risk-based approach requires continual review, 
communication and information sharing between and within the public and private 
sectors.  Academic work to improve the means of measurement means better and more 
targeted action.  That, in turn, will lead to more stable markets. 
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